Public Participation: Patterns and Political Environment

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Public Participation:
Patterns and Political Environment

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Introduction

This paper is a part of an attempt to see whether a structure of political decision-making influences the pattern of public participation; studies have been made about who participates and why, but how people participate is usually of secondary interest, and explained by attributes of participants like their repertoires and available resources. Public participation, however, is not free from institutional constraints, even when it takes the form of unconventional participation. It is especially true for public participation in highly institutionalized political system in

要 旨

本論では、ある国の政治参加のパターンは、参加者側の要因だけではなく、制度的要因にも大きく影響されるという仮説に基づき、日本政治参加について考えてみる。特に考察の中心となるのは、市民運動のような新しい型の政治参加である。

まず、最近の政治学の傾向である、日本政治の多様主義的評価を紹介し、その批判を試みる。ここでは、「非・政策決定」、権力の二面性という考え方を、批判の論拠とする。多様主義理論に対しては、既に政策決定の場に上った問題しか対象にせず、そこに到達する以前につぶされてしまった問題に関心を向けない、という反論がこれまでに示されてきた。また「非・政策決定」理論の方にも、実証のむずかしさという弱点がある。

この弱点を補正し、理論の実証性を高めるために、「制度による政治問題の選択」あるいは「よりわけ」の考え方が登場した。本論ではこの中でも特に、行政上の手続きにおける選択に注目して、実証分析を試みた。取り上げたのは原子力エネルギー問題である。原子力については、事故の危険性などから、不安を感じている国民の多いこととか批判調査にも表れている。にもかかわらず、原子力を基軸エネルギーにしようとすると政府の支持を変更される気配はない、このギャップは、原子力政策が政治問題化していないうちの事情であり、政治問題としては、制度による選択が行われているからではないか、と考えて、原子力行政の問題点を指摘してみた。

最後に、そうした行政のあり方が反原子力を訴える運動の活動パターンに影響し、日本の場合、運動の政治的影響力を弱めていることに言及する。政治参加が制度的要因に左右されることの一つの例としたい。

市町村参加：
そのパターンと政治的環境

高橋和夫・田総恵子

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which mediation between state and society is regulated and deviation is considered to be an unusual event to be avoided.

Policymaking is, therefore, designed to preclude such events in consideration of uninterrupted policy formulation and implementation; it is accomplished by anticipation and exclusion\(^1\). Anticipation is to coopt as many actors as possible who are anticipated to be affected by a policy under discussion, so that possible problems are dealt with in advance. Exclusion, on the other hand, is to reject access to policymaking to those who make uncompromising demands. We think that it greatly matters to the pattern of public participation which tactics is preferably adopted.

With this basic hypothesis in mind, we will examine a case of Japan in this paper, with critical examination of recent pluralist literature about Japanese political system.

I. Query

The first query of this paper is whether Japanese political system is so pluralistic as recent scholars insist in their arguments on power-shift between the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and bureaucracy. The Japanese system may have become more pluralistic than before; yet we argue that its extent of pluralism is still limited, especially in the field of dealing with unconventional public participation, i.e., citizens' movements which have appeared in Japanese political scenes since the late 1960's.

Pluralist scholars have some reservations to call Japanese system unconditionally 'pluralist'; they add special qualifications to the term such as 'patterned', or 'bureaucratic inclusionary'. We stress these conditions, and presume that Japanese political system maintains a relatively closed policymaking structure, although with modification over time, and there remain actors who have yet to be 'patterned' in or 'included' in political discussions.

In this paper, we will first review the recent pluralist literature, and then present some critical comment with suggestions for studying the limitation of a pluralist political system. In the next section, we will specifically ask, as the second query, in what aspect Japanese political system is less pluralistic, and study a case of formulation and implementation of nuclear energy policy. Finally, we will try to see whether any pattern can be found in the relation between a political system and public participation.

II. Pluralist Arguments

Japanese pluralist system is called by many names: 'bureaucratic-inclusionary
pluralism', 'administrative or patterned pluralism', 'compartmentalized pluralism', and 'referent pluralism'. Whatever the adjective is, they refer to certain features of Japanese political system, which are summarized as follows;

(1) the LDP parliamentarians have developed stronger influence in policymaking process for the last decade;
(2) bureaucrats retain unusual degree of influence in policymaking process, compared with other pluralist systems;
(3) parliamentarians and bureaucrats are in close cooperation, and the parliamentarians' intervention to administrative process is institutionalized;
(4) increasing influence of parliamentarians is a result of growing importance of the LDP's policy affairs research councils (PARCs) and 'zoku' parliamentarians;
(5) bureaucrats play a crucial role in mediating between state and society, by representing social interest in political arena.

Different features of Japanese pluralist system are emphasized in different definitions. For example, 'bureaucratic-inclusionary pluralism' is applied to describe relations between state and society; it is a political system in which representation of the public interest is a bureaucratic task, and relationships among political actors are characterized by horizontal mobility rather than a fixed hierarchical order²⁰.

'Administrative or patterned pluralism' is a political system of which policymaking process is governed mostly by the better organized and routine procedure of bureaucratic rule; changing and inconsistent demands presented by representatives are not to prevail²⁰. Bureaucrats, then, try to align themselves with relevant pressure groups in order to strengthen their bargaining power; bureaucracy is now a political actor with independent source of power. Muramatsu calls it 'the political bureaucracy'. Pressure groups are therefore organized according to bureaucratic jurisdiction. In his analysis, patterned are not only policymaking processes but also relationships between state and social interest.

'Compartmentalized pluralism' is defined as "the system in which the roles of the dominant party politicians and bureaucrats are indistinguishable; the level of integrity at the center of power is relatively low; and the relationship between interest groups and the bureaucrat–LDP complex is stable⁰". Here emphasis is on conflicts within the ruling coalition and the growing importance of the LDP in the coalition. Relationship between the ruling coalition and social interest is again considered to be strong and stable, and 'compartmentalized' by ministerial division.

Finally 'referent pluralism' introduces another actor in Japanese political system: mass media⁰. While the three previous definitions stress the inner workings of the ruling bureaucrat–LDP coalition and the corresponding organization of social interest, referent pluralism emphasizes the social influence structure which promotes pluralistic tendency. Mass media, with their power to "refer to people to selected
images and symbols, and to cause them to identify with certain groups and ideas which carry political implications", is the major promoter of referent pluralism. This pluralism then helps "generate popular opinion and social movements with which the (ruling) Triumvirate must contend".

III. Counterargument

III.1. Conventional vs. Unconventional Policymaking

The four pluralist analyses are mostly based on observation of conventional policymaking processes. It is largely the case in most pluralist studies; what they describe is the ordinary state of political dynamics. 'Conventional' politics in advanced industrial democracies usually involves policies distributing governmental wealth and services, therefore Japanese pluralist studies tend to choose issues such as agricultural subsidies and public enterprises. The choice may be plausible, but it is also limiting the scope of analysis.

Japanese politics has a different kind of agenda: national defence, the Constitutional revision, the Yasukuni Shrine, and such. These issues may not be constantly debated, but when they are, the debate gathers attention from outside the 'conventional' policymaking community. Intellectuals, opposition parties, and ideological organizations, who are not usually active in the polity, participate in the discussion.

Only Muramatsu mentions the 'ideology' process distinguished from the ordinary policy process; yet he dismisses it as a process to be avoided to maintain a stable political system and to be absolved by bureaucratic efforts not to let issues escape from their jurisdiction.

Neglecting unconventional issues as not constituting the large part of Japanese policymaking system makes the pluralist studies only partially plausible as a description of Japanese politics. Response of the pluralist system to unconventional political situation should be studied in order to examine the extent of pluralistic features of Japanese politics.

III.2. Pluralist vs. Participatory Democracy

Pluralist approach in general has been criticized for its limited choice of case studies and its tendency not to question the existing power relationship. The classic conflict between pluralist and elitist studies has been waged over whether the theory is empirically tenable; pluralists argue that elitists (theorists) suspect conspiracy behind every policymaking, which cannot be empirically examined except for identification of elite membership by reputational analyses; elitists insist that pluralists take community power relationship for granted and only see the surface, in which plural numbers of yet elite interact.
Since pluralists put emphasis on empiricism and select issues already on political agenda for case studies, they tend to limit the sphere of politics to institutional process and separate it from social influences. Elitists, on the other hand, consider power relationship important for understanding political dynamics and try to link politics and social (and economic) relationship. In elitist argument, political process takes place not only in political institutions but also in social relations.

Pluralist criticism to elitist analysis is verified; it is indeed difficult to present case studies in which such elite exerts power covertly as well as overtly to enforce their will. Especially covert influence, which elitists regard the most effective weapon, poses difficulty in empirical research. However, what cannot be seen sometimes does exist; they should not be neglected because of invisibility.

Kabashima and Broadbent have enhanced the scope of analysis. In an influence structure model they constructed from survey data, they identify the importance of mass media, which seems to have been unduly neglected. Although mass media is located outside of the 'polity', they are considered by both themselves and others to exert strong influence upon the LDP and bureaucracy. Their task is to give counter-elite new potent resources by redistributing "emotionally meaningful symbols and event". Media, therefore, comprise a new form of political resources, which may be more beneficial to power challengers than power contenders.

However, the model indicates another interesting feature of Japanese political system. Citizens' movement groups in this model have only one identifiable channel to influence the polity, i.e., that through the use of mass media. Media is indeed more sympathetic to socially disadvantaged groups, but if those who are underprivileged are represented in the polity only through media's referent power as a reference to policymaking, the disadvantaged might have to totally rely on mass media in order to have their demand fulfilled.

By expanding the scope of analysis to the outside of the polity, the referent pluralism indeed allows possibilities for political process to be carried out in the social relationship. However, they do not adequately define the extent of referent pluralism, by neglecting a political impact of inequality in influence relationship. If mass media is the only channel for citizens' movement groups to be referred to the polity, media becomes the double-edged sword for them; they can promote the groups' interest by reporting it, but they can also suppress it by ignoring it.

The concept of 'non-decision making' is introduced from the aspect of participatory democracy, to provide a theoretical framework for studying the covert exercise of influence to prevent issues from becoming a political problem. Potential issues here are defined as those which may challenge or change the existing social order and upset the ruling elite coalition. Such issues tend to be oriented toward the unorganized, the socially disadvantaged, or those who have not been regular participants in
the political process. These people's interest is neglected due to the ruling coalition's 'non-decision making' power which prevents it from demanding political solution. Poverty problem of black people in the 1950's is cited as an example, as well as pollution in the 1970's.

From sociological redefinition of power as having two effects, one of which is exercised when forcing others to do what one wishes them to do, and the other of which is exercised when forcing others not to do what one wishes them not to do, the concept of non-decision making is thus introduced to political analyses. Claus Offe, recognizing the two faces of power, argues that a political system has a certain built-in mechanism to regulate political agenda. Selection, or filtering, of issues, as he calls it, is performed in four levels of a political system; structural, ideological, procedural and repressive levels. In his argument, he particularly refers to structural problems of the capitalist state.

Structural selectiveness is established *de jure* and *de facto*, giving a political system a definite course of action; the guarantee of private property is the obvious example of policies to be dealt with by state policies. Other *de facto* limits are marked by "the restricted availability of material resources and information", and also by "the existence and the effectiveness of bureaucratic organizations".

Even the most flexible system cannot escape the influence of ideological-cultural norms; the repressiveness of the system of norms in a society makes difference by defining the objectives of state policies. Procedural selectiveness is more concretely defined, and will be the central concern of our empirical analysis. Selection takes place in "formal rule structures determining the process of parliamentary consultation, collective bargaining, bureaucratic planning and administration, policy-discussion by academic experts, election campaigns and political mass-communication." Offe argues that;

"(these procedures) are never mere procedural formalisms but they predetermine as such the possible content and possible outcome of the process. They do so by investing certain policy contents with increased chances of being implemented, by providing certain interests with a head start, and by granting them chronological priority, relatively more favourable coalition chances or the opportunity to employ specific power resources. Every procedural rule creates conditions of being favoured, or conversely being excluded, for certain issues, groups or interests. This is what is meant by the concept of 'non-decision'."

And he quotes Bachrach and Baratz's definition;

"non-decision making is a means by which demands for change in the existing allocation of benefits and privileges in the community can be suffocated before they are even voiced; or kept covert; or killed before they gain access to the relevant decision-making arena; or failing all these things, maimed or destroyed in the deci-
The final stage of filtering issues is repression, the overt use of police, the armed forces and the judiciary to restrict the scope of possible political events.

The concept of 'non-decision making' has been criticized again for its poorly defined subject matter. When the study of decision making includes non-decision making process, the scope of political analysis could be enhanced to the degree that makes it difficult to distinguish political process from the entire system of social processes. It is also difficult to tell potentially significant non-events from other politically dismissed events. The authors of *Power and Poverty* conducted an empirical research of power relationship between black and white people in Baltimore, and the non-decision making process by examining the process of black people overcoming the barrier created by socially advantageous white people's non-decision making power. Crenson did a comparative research on two towns, which faced the same air pollution problem but demonstrated different reactions to it; by comparing them, he disclosed that the stronger non-decision making power was at work in one town than the other.

Definition of potentially significant non-event remains unsettled in spite of the efforts of these scholars to explain it in retrospective or comparative terms.

In this paper, we will try yet another approach to study non-decision making, by focusing the already controversial issue of nuclear power plant construction in Japan. It is an issue over which plant-site residents and administration have created sometimes violent conflicts; of which the Japanese Socialist Party and its affiliated unions and the Japanese Communist Party disapprove; and for which the majority of the public expresses opposition, or at least, uncertainty. Nevertheless, the government constantly supports the nuclear energy development, and plant constructions have been encouraged. For the past several years, administration's advisory body has gradually set down the prospect for the future energy needs, yet dependence on nuclear is expected to be higher.

The gap between the public fear for nuclear energy and the government's constant endorsement is worth looking into; why the conflicting opinion is not represented and the seemingly great controversy in party politics remains a non-event in the governmental agenda. The mechanism creating this gap may be called structural selectiveness. Our hypothesis is, therefore, that nuclear energy policy is kept intact, despite all controversies, from the public counter pressure by structural selectiveness of Japanese political system.

Due to the limited space, and to the importance attached to Japanese bureaucracy in the pluralist arguments as a mediator between state and social interest, we will concentrate our analysis on examination of the mechanism of filtering issues performed in bureaucratic planning and administration; how the plan for nuclear energy is
formulated and implemented; whose interest is given priority by formal procedural structures; and whose interest is given less respect. Although it is expected that patterns of individual planning of plant construction fluctuate, which should be analyzed in detail, we intend here to see the general features applicable to many cases.

IV. Case Study - Nuclear Administration

IV.1. Licensing Process - Procedural Selectiveness

There are now 35 nuclear power plants commercially operating in Japan. In the history of nuclear power development, there has been no plant which is suspended of construction or operation for reasons other than malfunction. An official of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry attributes the untroubled progress to the centralized system of nuclear administration, compared with the decentralized system of the U.S.\(^\text{17}\). All the administrative and licensing authorities over nuclear matters fall in the MITI's jurisdiction. Electric power is developed and provided nationwide by 9 (10 when including Okinawa) companies, which cover different areas separately in an uncompetitive manner. A centralized system is certainly the advantage for nuclear energy promoters; it means fewer numbers of participants and less conflict between them\(^\text{18}\).

Electric power companies assume responsibility of the whole process of nuclear power plant project from site selection, land purchase, construction to operation. There are, however, several steps that companies must take with the government in order to be licensed. The government actually controls the overall nuclear power project by holding the licensing authority.

When an electric power company draws a plan for plant construction, the plan has to be examined against the Law Concerning Power-Resources Development whether it accords with the policy to promote balanced development and uses of energy sources. The Council of Power-Resources Development and Coordination (Degen Kaihatsu Chôsei Shinghikai, Denchôshin) discusses the plan and determines whether it should be integrated into the general power-resources development plan; the Council consists of relevant ministers such as the Prime Minister, the Minister of ITI, and the Director of Economic Planning Agency, and people from the academia, and upon the advice of this council, the Prime Minister makes the final decision. Included here are mostly representatives of industrial or economic interest, and little of relevant local or ecological interest.

Prior to the Denchôshin deliberation, land purchase, negotiation with local residents, and environmental survey must be all completed on the electric power company's responsibility; it is, therefore, usually the case that the plan is almost
automatically admitted into the general plan once it is presented to the Denchōshin. The preliminary negotiation with local administrations and relevant organizations are carried out directly by the electric power company, or sometimes mediated by prefectural or city administrators. Local authorities' responsibilities and power are not explicitly defined in the national nuclear administration; they are not institutionalized participants in this matter.

The primary public hearing is held at this stage by the MITI with representatives from plant-site areas, the electric power company, and the relevant administrative agencies.

When the plan is approved with regard to the general power-resources development plan, the company presents the blueprint of reactor building to the Minister of ITI, which has almost monopoly of powers over the nation's nuclear power program. The minister then examines the uses of the power plant, safety measures and structures of plant facilities and such; he delivers license when he deems the plan qualified. The Atomic Energy Commission (Genshiryoku linkai : AEC) and the Nuclear Safety Commission (Genshiryoku Anzen linkai : NSC) present their own opinions at this stage and the minister is expected to respect them. The Atomic Energy Commission is headed by the Director of Science and Technology Agency, of which 4 members are appointed by the Prime Minister with consent of the commission chairman and the Diet. The Commission oversees the R & D of nuclear energy; it had almost almighty power over nuclear research when the project was still at R & D stage in the 1960's. It was made an independent body directly responsible to the Prime Minister so that it could perform its delegated functions without being interrupted by political conflict. When nuclear power reactors became commercially viable energy source, the MITI took over and assumed all responsibilities and powers over nuclear matters, dwarfing the Commission's power.

The Nuclear Safety Commission is another independent body to check matters concerning safety measures of power reactors, plant facilities and fuel transportation. It also examines safety reports presented by relevant administrators when requested (daburu chekku : the double-checking system). Specific problems are dealt with by attached councils. However, the Commission is understaffed, unprovided with independent facilities, and given only an advisory role. Its examination tends to be done only in papers, and since reports are made by the MITI, the Commission is vulnerable to the MITI control. These two commissions are advisory bodies directly responsible to the Prime Minister, and little interested in representing conflicting opinions to the national policy.

The second public hearing is held by the NSC at this stage. Public hearing (kōkai hiaringu) started in 1979, replacing the previous hearing (kōchōkai) system.

Once the Prime Minister approves, the rest of the administrative responsibility
is left with the MITI. During the construction process, the electric power company must acquire at least 7 approvals from the MITI, concerning reactor design, fuel loading, and safety regulation. Inspections are carried out thus continuously until a reactor starts to operate. The MITI inspects a reactor and plant facilities regularly during the operation, and retains power to suspend the operation if necessary.

Although inspections are thus frequent and continuous, they are done by the MITI, the major promoter of Japanese nuclear energy. The lack of an independent inspector raises questions about neutrality of investigation. Antinuclear groups' suspicious attitude toward inspection specifically, and toward information provided by nuclear energy promoters in general, may be attributed to the partial nuclear administration, in which few neutral parties are involved.

Public Hearing : An Opportunity for Antinuclear Groups' Direct Involvement

Two public hearings are required by law to discuss desirability and safety of a nuclear power plant with plant-site residents. They must be held at different occasions during the licensing process: the first by the MITI before the Denchôshin deliberation, and the second by the NSC before the MITI's approval for construction. In addition to these hearings, the electric power company reports an environmental assessment to plant-site residents before nominating the site to the MITI. Although residents are free to examine the report, it is up to the company whether residents' opinions are included in the report that is evaluated by the Thermal Power Division of the MITI's Energy Resource Agency. The assessment report, therefore, does not seem to provide an opportunity for public participation.

The primary hearing is designed to give an opportunity for constructors to explain a plan to those who are affected and for the affected to present their questions and opinions, with emphasis on the former function. The first primary hearing was held in Niigata in December 1980 for the second and the fifth reactors of Kashiwazaki/Kariwa plant: nine such hearings have been held ever since. It was the subject of political conflict from the beginning; antinuclear groups, which had advocated for a mandatory hearing when it had not been required, were against it. In Kashiwazaki, antinuclear groups demanded what they called an 'open debate', denouncing the MITI-sponsored hearing as "a mere ceremony for advancing steps for construction".

Antinuclear groups' dissent is not unjustified. Apart from the fact that the MITI-sponsored hearing was far from their idea of public hearing, which included the referendum, the hearing procedure seems too limited to claim itself a 'public' hearing. Hearing is scheduled to be held for one day regardless of numbers of reactors in question and numbers of affected municipalities. It is to be announced 6 weeks in advance; relevant documents are available through a branch office of the electric power company during these weeks. When antinuclear groups regard documents insufficient, they may demand additional information to be supplied.
In the case of the primary hearing for the third and the fourth reactors of the Genkai plant in Saga prefecture, antinuclear groups found that supplied documents inadequate; the environmental assessment report made earlier did not consider effects of the second reactor which started operation after the assessment was made. Sixty member of several antinuclear groups protested directly to the Atomic Power Division of the Energy Resources Agency, demanding that the assessment be updated; that the hearing be suspended until the municipal scandal over the issue of grants given to Genkai town is investigated; that the installment of two reactors be cancelled in consideration of sluggish electricity demand.

The MITI responded to these requests uncooperatively. As to the first request, the MITI insisted that “the environmental assessment report is not a required document for the hearing. Leaflets provided by the electric power company are sufficient for discussion at the hearing”[17]. It ignored the other two requests, saying that they wanted to hold the hearing as soon as possible although the date was still undetermined. The hearing took place in July 16, 1982.

The secondary hearing is held by the NSC; its purpose is defined as “absolving opinions of plant-site residents on safety matters so that they are considered (san-shakusuru) in the NSC’s evaluation of the MITI safety report[22]”. It states that it is desirable that both pro-and anti-nuclear residents should be present in the hearing to discuss safety of nuclear power.

The hearing, however, has not been without problems. Just like the primary hearings, the secondary one started with opposition by antinuclear activists. The first secondary hearing took place in Takahama in Fukui prefecture in January 1980 with the MITI as an explaining party. Antinuclear groups started the campaign at the NSC’s announcement of holding a hearing. Their concern was over the fairness of the procedure. Antinuclear groups maintained that the proposed hearing was too exclusionary, limiting the numbers of petitioners to 12 people and each petitioner’s statement to within 10 minutes. The procedure also prohibited questioning. Condemning the hearing with such regulations ‘deception’, antinuclear groups refused to participate, and held demonstrations outside the building where the hearing was held.

In may 1983, the NSC held the secondary hearing for construction of the second reactor of the Shimane plant. The Shimane Conference of Groups opposing Nuclear Power Plant (Shimane Genpatsu Kōgai Taisaku Kaigi) decided, for the first time as any antinuclear group, to participate in the hearing, although their decision invited criticisms even from within the antinuclear forces as compromising the campaign[23]. The hearing turned into a turmoil as antinuclear petitioners pressed on the MITI and the NSC officials. When the two-day hearing was over, the Shimane groups declared their victory for revealing the deceptive attitude of nuclear promoters and forcing
them to "admit their inability to answer the questions\textsuperscript{24}". The second reactor is being under construction as of August 1986, in spite of the strong opposition expressed in the hearing.

Putting aside the specific effects on nuclear power plant construction, which may vary from none to delay in process or suspension, the hearing has served little for communication between pro-and anti-nuclear groups. Antinuclear groups, as mentioned above, do not regard it as an opportunity to register their dissent over the policy, but make it a target of antinuclear campaign. Government officials consider it a necessary but troublesome step that has to be taken in order to proceed with the construction plan. They need as little trouble as possible in procedure; in 1981, the law was revised for the primary hearing to allow questioning in letters to substitute the public hearing so that troubles with local residents should be avoided. The role of the hearing thus has been weakened, making the almost only opportunity for direct public participation in the policy formulation process into a closed channel, by which antinuclear groups are kept from becoming a legitimate political force.

\textbf{IV. 2. Grant - Switching of the Issue from Nuclear Energy to Regional Development}

\textbf{(a) Financing of Nuclear Energy Development}

When Japanese nuclear development reached the stage of construction of power reactors and their commercial operation, the existing legal system became insufficient. Necessary legal framework was prepared in the 1960’s through the early 1970’s; relevant legislations now count approximately to 40. They are divided into six categories according to jurisdiction. The first is the Basic Atom Law of 1956, which defines the purpose of Japanese nuclear energy research and development. The second group includes laws to create the Atomic Energy Commission of Japan, the Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan, the Agency of Science and Technology and such, instituting the national nuclear energy administration. The third group consists of laws creating the R & D organizations such as the Research Institute of Atomic Energy (Nihon Genshiryoku Kenkyūjo, Genken), and the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corp. (Dōryokuro, Kakunenryō Kaihatsu Jigyōdan, Dōnen).

The fourth category concerns the safety regulation of nuclear power; laws to regulate reactors and nuclear materials and fuel are collectively known as the Regulatory Laws of Reactors and Such (Genshirōtō kiseihō). The fifth group of another regulatory legislation designed to prevent radiation leak and exposure. And the last group is purported to encourage both builders and local residents to cooperate in plant construction. The Law Concerning Tax for Promotion of Power-Resources Development (Dengen kaihatsu sokushinzei-hō), the Law Concerning Special Account for Promotion of Power-Resources Development (Dengen kaihatsu sokushin-taisaku tokubetsu kaikei-hō), and the Law Concerning Development of Area around Power
Plant (Hatsuden’yō shisetsu shūhenchiiki seibi-hō), collectively known as three laws concerning promotion of power-resources development (Degen 3-pō) are the main components of this group.

The last group of laws established in 1974, as their titles suggest, are to contribute to increasing numbers and variety of power-resources, covering all possible sources: hydroelectric power, thermal power, solar power, nuclear power, etc. The laws, however, seem to have served development of nuclear power particularly well, in spite of the general nature in their provisions.

The laws work in combination as follows; (1) the government collects tax for promotion of power-resources development from electric power companies, based on the sales amount of electric power (Degen kaihatsu sokushinzei-hō); (2) the government establishes the special account for promotion of power-resources development with the above revenue (Degen kaihatsu sokushin-taisaku tokubetsu kaikei-hō); (3) then, from this account, the government appropriates money for construction and repair of public facilities in a plant-site area, and for grants to a local governmental authority in return for accepting a power plant (Hatsuden’yō shisetsu chiiki seibi-hō).

Nuclear power is the beneficiary of this system; the construction of nuclear power plant is entitled not only to the grants under the seibi-hō, but also to money from the budget for nuclear safety measure also appropriated from the above special budget. The budget is allocated to experiment on plant’s safety measure, radiation monitoring, investigation of influence of heated water, and public information and safety services.

In 1986, the spending specifically designated to nuclear power plants holds 22% of the Power Plant Location Account under the Special Account. (It does not include spending under the general grants for promotion of power-resources development.) Another sub-account in the Special Account is called the Power-Resources Diversification Accounts, of which nuclear development spending amounts to 63%. In total, nuclear alone spent 48% of the Special Account for Promotion of Power-Resources Development. Considering that the MITI and the Agency of Science and Technology have their own accounts for nuclear development and nuclear fuel expenses, nuclear energy development is given priority in Japanese energy development.

(b) Nuclear Power Plants and Regional Economy

Plant-site municipalities receive two kinds of governmental subsidy at the start of construction: grants for promotion of power plant location and grants for area around nuclear power plants. The first grants are awarded for about ten years from the beginning of construction until five years after the operation. Uses of grants are limited to construction of public facilities such as roads, ports, parks, public gymnasium or educational facilities; if grants are spent on enterprises financed by other governmental subsidy, the same amount as the grants spent on it is to be deducted
from the subsidy. It is allowed from 1979 to appropriate 10% of the grants to maintenance of these facilities.

The grants help little of the general development of regional economy. Grants for area around nuclear power plant (Genshiryoku hatsuden shisetsu-tō shūhen chiiki kōfukin) were created in 1981 at the request of plant-site municipalities, which demanded stable employment opportunity for residents. Electric power in plant-site area is partly paid with the grants, lowering the rate of charge; cheap electricity may be attractive to outside industries. The grants may be used directly on enterprises to modernize provincial industries and on expenses for inviting outside industries.

Benefits from these grants, however, seem to have been limited so far; few other industries have come to plant-site towns, and local authorities are left with a need for a greater amount of money to maintain new facilities when the grants are gone. Considering such limited benefits for plant-site areas, the grants may only increase the burden on local finance in the long run. This increasing burden would, and already have in some areas, lead plant-site municipalities to invite the second and the third reactors, in order to maintain the level of local revenue swollen by the past grants.

Nuclear administration in Japan is so structured as to promote nuclear energy, and to exclude antinuclear pressure as much as possible. Selective licensing procedure minimizes the impact of antinuclear pressure; the preferable treatment of nuclear in budget matters tend to benefit pro-nuclear groups, motivating them to stronger commitment.

Antinuclear groups are selected out of nuclear policymaking community by the pro-nuclear administrative and legal structures. Vague fear expressed in public opinion surveys remains among people without being translated into political support for anti-nuclear campaign, because antinuclear opinion is not represented in political discussions as an alternative.

V. Structural Selectiveness and Patterns of Public Participation

Being selected out of the legitimate nuclear policy discussions, Japanese antinuclear groups have resorted to a means of resistance which is most effective in producing immediate results; refusing to compromise fishing rights and land ownership. In the history of Japanese antinuclear movement, various means of resistance have been tried: demonstration to oppose hearings, petition, litigation, and election of antinuclear candidates to local councils. However, the effectiveness of these means were limited. Hearings are, as explained earlier, do not serve as an opportunity to register their dissent; petition does not have legally binding power; litigation takes so long
a time to get a result, and does not suspend construction while the case is discussed in court; and elected representatives are too small in number to be a political force. Cooperation with opposition parties has been continued, but without much success. All these factors are to be examined in detail in another occasion.

While trying all these available means and exchanging information with people in other plant-site regions, antinuclear activists learned that once the construction starts, there is few things left for them to do to stop it, and that the most effective means of opposition is prevention, not allowing it to start. Since electric power companies must complete land purchase and negotiation with fishermen’s organizations before applying for license, land ownership and fishing rights are important resources of resistance for antinuclear groups. Antinuclear activists then encouraged local groups to adopt the tactics and it certainly succeeded in some nominated towns, such as Namie in Fukushima prefecture, Maki in Niigata, and Shiga in Ishikawa.

Relying on this tactics, antinuclear groups’ success began to depend more and more upon individual landowners’ or fishermen’s persistence; the tactics has also led the issue to look like a conflict between industrial developers and local residents. The grants given for regional development has made the impression strong; the resistance was sometimes overcome by increased amount of grants. As the issue has been perceived increasingly as a local concern to be settled between the direct participants, nationwide coordination of local activities, although still imperative for continuing campaign, has assumed less importance than individual local efforts. It is admittedly better to win wherever they can, and a success in some area certainly encourages efforts of landowners and fishermen in other areas.

However, less demand for nationwide campaign tends to localize the issue and to fragment the movement. Local groups do not depend much on outside support except for moral one because the chosen tactics does not require it; outsiders, even concerned with the issue, do not associate the local problem with their vague fear for nuclear energy in general. The gap between the public fear and plant-site residents’ efforts can be, at least partially, attributed to the tactical choice.

Structural selectiveness thus affects the pattern of public participation by limiting the tactical choice for groups selected out from the legitimate political discussions. In the case of Japanese antinuclear movement, the successful dismissal of antinuclear opinion from the political process forced antinuclear groups to adopt the most effective tactics that is allowed to them: land ownership and fishing rights. The tactics, however, localizes the issue by stressing local efforts, and makes it difficult to place the antinuclear opinion on national political agenda. Structural selectiveness performed in Japanese nuclear administration has exerted sufficient ’non-decision making power’ to keep the issue from becoming a political controversy.
NOTES


6) ibid., p. 354.

7) Muramatsu, ibid., p. 299.

8) Kabashima and Broadbent, ibid., p. 351.

9) ibid., p. 350.


13) ibid., p. 39.

14) ibid., p. 40.

15) ibid., p. 40. (originally in Bachrach and Baratz, ibid., p. 44).

16) Bachrach and Baratz, ibid., and Crenson, ibid.


18) The impact of the number of participating policymaker on the pattern of public participation is analyzed on the West German antinuclear movement in Keiko Tabusa, “Public Participation and Its Political Environment: A Case of Antinuclear Movement in West Germany”, in Chihi Kenkyû [Area Studies], No. 5, (1988).

19) The term 'genshiryoku (atomic) ' is preferably used in Japanese official language to avoid association with nuclear weapon (kaku heiki). However, we adopt the term 'nuclear' except for official translation of Japanese institutions and such, considering that the term is widely used now in English.

20) Hangenpatsu Shinbun [Antinuclear Newsletter], No. 31, Nov. 20, 1980.


23) Hangenpatsu Shinbun, Nos. 60 & 61, Apr. & May, 1983.

24) ibid., No. 62, June 1983.