I. Communication

Communication Policies in Japan

Preface

Communication policies are sets of principles and norms established to guide the behaviour of communication systems. They are shaped over time in the context of society's general approach to communication and to the media. Emanating from political ideologies, the social and economic conditions of the country and the values on which they are based, they strive to relate these to the real needs for and the prospective opportunities of communication.

Communication policies exist in every society, though they may sometimes be latent and disjoined, rather than clearly articulated and harmonized. They may be very general, in the nature of desirable goals and principles, or they may be more specific and practically binding. They may exist or be formulated at many levels. They may be incorporated in the constitution or legislation of a country; in overall national policies, in the guidelines for individual administrations, in professional codes of ethics as well as in the constitutions and operational rules of particular communication institutions.

The publication of this series has been undertaken as part of the programme adopted by the General Conference of Unesco at its sixteenth session, related to the analysis of communication policies as they exist at the different levels-- public, institutional, professional--in selected countries. The aim of the series is to present this information in a manner which can be comparable. Thus an attempt has been made to follow, as far as possible, a fairly similar structural pattern and method of approach which was agreed between the national institution undertaking the work.

Within this series of monographs the first five studies are devoted to European communication policies. Similar studies for Latin America have been published. These are now followed by policies carried out in Asian countries.

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This study is not an official document of the country it refers to. The views stated therein are the author's and do not necessarily represent the official Japanese views or those of Unesco.

1. The Concept and some Problems of Communication Policy

Today's Japan is probably one of the most media-saturated societies in the world. As will be discussed in detail later, there are approximately 120 daily newspapers,[1] 6,500 television stations, 480 radio stations,[2] 50 weekly magazines, and 1,500 monthly magazines. In 1975, some 33,000 books were published with a total circulation of 800 million. An average household subscribes to at least 1.5 copies of newspapers every day, and nearly all households have at least one television set and more than two radio receivers.

Although broadcasting is licensed, there are very few legal restrictions on the free flow of communication. Article 21 of the Constitution of Japan clearly states that "Freedom of assembly and association as well as of speech, press and all other forms of expression is guaranteed. No censorship shall be maintained, nor shall the secrecy of any means of communication be violated."

This supreme guarantee of freedom of speech is the fundamental "co-mmunication policy" of contemporary Japan, and every effort is made to protect this basic democratic idea and ideal. Every Japanese citizen is free to express his or her opinion on any occasion, and government interference in the free flow of communication is, by definition, unconstitutional.

However, in both theory and practice, Article 21 of the Japanese Constitution is not always necessarily and unconditionally appreciated; other laws and regulations are often in conflict with it. There even seem to be conflicts within the framework of the Constitution itself. For example, Article 12 of the Constitution states that

> The freedom and rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be maintained by the constant endeavor of the people, who shall refrain from any abuse of these freedoms and rights and shall always be responsible for utilizing them for the public welfare.

In other words, freedom of speech and expression should not be "abused" and should be utilized for "public welfare". The concepts of "abuse" and "public welfare" are ambiguous and often subjective, and one may argue that certain news reports in mass media "abuse" the freedom of speech, or are against "public welfare". In this connection, many cases have been brought to court to examine the limits of the freedom of speech and expression. It may be worth while, therefore, to look into several of the court cases in which conflicting principles have been legally interpreted and clarified.

In 1953, the publisher and the translator of D. H. Lawrence's *Lady Chatterley's Lover* were sued by the police for publishing and distributing "obscene documents". The prosecutor insisted that the novel was "obscene" to the general public, if not to a sophisticated literary circle, and that therefore the "public display" of such a document constituted a crime defined in Article 175 of the Japanese Penal Code.[3] The defendants, on the other hand, held that the prosecutor's interpretation of the Penal Code was both inappropriate and unconstitutional. After a series of disputes in the local court, in 1957 the case was brought to the Supreme Court, where the majority of judges agreed that the defendants were guilty. The final sentence of their findings said that

> the freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution is not absolutely unconditional and should not be used against the public welfare and there is no question that the efforts to protect sexual order and to maintain basic standards of sexual morality are contained in the concept of public welfare.

It went on to say that freedom of expression was "under restraint of Article 12 of the Constitution, which prohibits the abuse of freedoms and views such freedoms in the light of public welfare". The questions whether Lawrence's novel was "obscene" or not and whether the decision of the Supreme Court was right or not caused a very controversial discussion not only among intellectuals but also in the mass media, but the important point was that the Supreme Court put priority on Article 12 rather than on Article 21 of the Constitution. In a word, the Supreme Court clearly recognized and declared that freedom of speech was not unlimited.

Following this famous precedent, crimes of "public indecency" became more frequent, in spite of the constitutional guarantee and of the opposing opinion of those who believed in the priority of Article 21 over the Criminal Code and other laws. Today, the most crucial issue in this field is the problem of pornographic materials in both print and the audio-visual media of communication. The Japanese police take the position that Article 175 of the Penal Code can, and should, be applied to pornographic materials, although certain intellectual and literary circles are demanding a complete "liberalization" of pornography on the basis of constitutional rights and freedoms.

Another area where the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech leads to legal conflict is that of defamation. Among hundreds of cases of defamation, a case between a young film actor and a weekly magazine will be introduced here as an illustration. The magazine published an article where the actor was reported as having an affair with an actress. The actor accused the magazine, saying that the news was totally false and that the editors had slandered him. The court, after careful investigation, ordered the defendant to put an "advertisement of apology" in major newspapers and to pay a solatium. This court judgement, made in 1969, became a judicial precedent for similar crimes of defamation. As in many other societies, Japanese magazines specializing in entertainment tend to publish sensational gossip about celebrities without factual evidence, and the court decision was viewed as an important warning against such irresponsible media practices. In making the decision, the judge applied Article 230[4] of the Penal Code, which defines the crime of defamation.

A similar and much more famous case was that between a former government minister and a distinguished writer, in 1964. The former minister was a candidate for the governorship of Tokyo, but lost the election. His wife helped him, but divorced him after the election. The writer who was interested in the theme of love and politics, wrote a novel inspired by the incident (using fictitious name) but the reading public was well aware that the novel was based on actual facts. The former minister, displeased with the way the story had been constructed--a mixture of fact and fiction--appealed to the court on the grounds that his privacy had been invaded and that the public might have formed a misleading image about himself. The court recognized the writer's artistic achievement, but decided that he was guilty of giving the public a false impression of the former minister, who unfortunately passed away before the end of the case. The writer settled the case with the family of the deceased by paying consolation money.

The idea of "privacy" *vis-à-vis* freedom of expression became a public concern after this case which also raised another complicated and conflicting issue, because the right of access to information (the right to know) must also be recognized as one of the fundamental human rights in a democratic society. For example, the mass media and the general public want to know the facts about people who appear in the news (in political scandals, for instance). It is quite likely, however, that an individual will strongly resist invasion of his or her "privacy". As the editors of the *Yomiuri Shimbun* (one of the leading newspapers in Japan) stated in their article "Standards of Privacy", the protection of the secrecy of private life, as guaranteed in Article 13 of the Constitution[5] and the "right to know",another constitution right, are like two parallel lines which never cross each other. The media in Japan today, therefore, are trying to find a crossing point by means of compromise, both individual and social.

Freedom of expression is also restricted in regulations for the protection of minors. On the national level, Article 61 prohibits the publication of the name, age, occupation, residence and any identifying characteristics of a juvenile who commits a crime or is prosecuted, in order to avoid possible future handicaps for that particular person. On the local level, most of the prefectural governments in Japan have established their own local ordinances to protect minors (those under the age of 18). The local regulations include prohibiting minors from attending certain films, purchasing certain printed materials, and being exposed to certain advertisements, so that the younger people can be given minimum protection against public indecency. Persons responsible for the distribution of such information, i.e. owners of cinemas, bookstores, etc., are penalized if they violate the regulations.

To summarize, communication policy in contemporary Japan is essentially a constitutional policy where freedom of speech and expression is guaranteed in so far as it does not conflict with other laws and regulations which specifically define the "abuse" of freedom and/or "public welfare". For obvious reasons, however, the interpretation of "freedom", "abuse", "defamation", and "public welfare" cannot be isolated from each particular socio-cultural and legal context, so that the definition of the relationships between them and priorities among rights have to await the decisions of the courts. It is difficult, therefore, to determine a single communication policy in contemporary Japan.

What has been consistent throughout the history of the dispute, however, is an appreciation of Article 21 of the Constitution, and, as Professor Masami Itoh of Tokyo University aptly said, "in the discussion of communication legislation, Article 21 of the Constitution is both the starting point and final goal".[6]

Indeed, Japan today, is one of the few countries where extraordinary efforts are being made to secure a free flow of communication. As we have seen already, except for the several specific areas where legal conflicts take place, Japanese citizens are free to express their ideas, and the Japanese public is very conscious of constitutional freedom. Furthermore, there are good reasons why the Japanese public today is so much concerned with the idea of freedom of speech.

As any standard textbook of modern history tells us, Japan from the middle of the nineteenth century until 1945 was more or less a totalitarian State where military power dominated. In those 100 years, there was no such thing as freedom of speech. Censorship was an everyday practice, and media and communication people who held liberal ideas were oppressed by the government. Indeed, many writers and editors who opposed the military régime were put in prison. On the popular level, too, people were more or less resentful of government interference and control over social communication. With such bitter experiences of the past, the Japanese people have been very appreciative of the freedoms guaranteed by the new Constitution which came into being in May of 1947. One of the fundamental reasons why the concept of "communication policies" is relatively unknown and sometimes unpopular with the Japanese, including even communication researchers, lies in the historical control over the free flow of communication. Therefore, the basic thrust of Japanese communication policy is towards the right to freedom of speech, and to keep government interference in communication processes to a minimum.

In the field of broadcasting, for technical reasons, a special law for licensing is in effect, but as we shall see in Chapter 3, broadcasters also are given constitutional rights and freedoms.

2. The Historical Development of Communication Polocoes and Some Implications

Japan is exceptional among Asian countries in the sense that it has achieved amazingly rapid economic growth in the past 100 years. There were many factors which contributed to such growth and development, but the communication policies upheld by the Japanese Government since the middle of the nineteenth century should not be neglected as one of the most effective and encouraging forces behind the modernization and industrialization of the country.

The political and socio-economic change which took place in Japan in 1868 is usually known as the "Meiji Restoration", but in great contrast to the conservative connotation of the term "restoration", what actually happened was a "revolution" comparable to many major revolutions in the West. First, its major goal was to abolish feudalism and the old class system. Secondly, those who took the initiative in this social change--people whose backgrounds were mostly lower-middle class--made drastic efforts to establish a highly centralized government in order to unify the whole country as a modern nation-State, which could not only defend itself from outside pressure but also catch up with the West. The leaders of the new government found in the Emperor an effective means of achieving the unification of the nation and finally succeeded in making him the sole and absolute symbol of the country. Using this symbol, they made the "revolution" a great success.

In order to centralize its power, the new Meiji Government enforced a radical land reform in 1872 with heavy taxation, which produced a tremendous amount of money for national finance. With this ample accumulation of money in hand, the government made investments in the military, heavy industry, education and many other basic sectors of the society. It is no exaggeration to say that the major enterprises of the early Meiji period were either totally or partially subsidized by the government.

In the process of this drastic social change, the government was well aware of the fact that the dissemination of information all over the country had a vital role, because an informed public was the basis for national consciousness and nationalism. With that philosophy and policy orientation in mind, the administrators of the Meiji Government began to promote the newspaper business. As early as 1872, the government enacted "newspaper regulation" (*Shimbun Jōrei*). The preface to the regulations states that "the purpose of newspapers must be the enlightenment and the expansion of knowledge of the general public" and that "the newspaper report must be written in plain language. No unusual style nor uncommon vocabularies should be used". In a word, the new government was trying to encourage newspapers for the general public. While newspapers were private enterprises, very often they were sponsored, directly or indirectly, by high officials of the government. The central government as well as local government all over Japan subsidized newspapers by purchasing a substantial number of copies our of the government budget. In May 1873, the Ministry of Finance, mentioning the names of four specific newspapers, sent a memorandum to each local prefectural government saying that "since these papers carry the news, both foreign and domestic, and can help the progress of knowledge, the Ministry has decided to send copies of these papers each Prefectural government". The average circulation of the newspapers designated in the memorandum, according to Fumio Yamamoto,[7] was a very modest number of around 1,000, and the ministry purchased 225 copies of each. In other words, the percentage of government subsidy, in terms of newspaper sales, was 22.5 per cent, but these guaranteed sales gave a sound basis for the newspapers. Moreover, those papers were able to sell more copies because the prestige of the government was behind them. Each prefectural government, following the pattern of the central government, also encouraged and subsidized local papers. High officials of the central government often visited local prefectures to emphasize the importance of newspaper publication as a vital force in making a new modern nation-State.

In 1871, new postal regulations were introduced which gave newspapers a special discount rate. At that time, there was no railway service; all mail was delivered by messengers, and therefore the rate was extremely high. But the Minister of Transportation of the day boldly ordered that only a nominal rate should be charged for authorized newspapers. According to his memoir, delivering a boxful of newspapers from Tokyo to other parts of Japan incurred a considerable loss to the government budget because of the special rate, but the government was confident about the value of newspaper delivery.

With these realistic policies, newspapers soon penetrated every corner of the Japanese islands. In order to increase public exposure to newspapers on the prefectural level, special social measures were taken. In some prefectures, the local government instituted an "assembly of newspaper reading". Though the literacy rate in Japan in the nineteenth century was very high, the price of a regular subscription to a newspaper was beyond the means of the average household. The local governments, therefore, distributed a copy of a newspaper to each village and appointed a priest or a schoolteacher as a "reader". An "assembly" was called regularly by the head of the village, and the "reader" read a copy of the latest newspaper aloud to the villagers, including women and children, who gathered at a temple or a school, to be informed of current happenings both domestic and international. Other prefectures established a number of "newspaper reading stations" where any individual could read the latest newspapers, free of charge.

In other words, an institutionalized "two-step flow of communication" was designed by local governments as well as the central government, and as a result the contents of a single copy of a newspaper were transmitted to hundreds of people. Indeed, the diffusion of information by newspapers was "amplified" through these social measures. Before long a substantial "informed public" was created by such channels, and once the public learned the importance of news media, private subscriptions to papers also increased. The newspaper business in Japan thus developed under the very ingenious protection policy of the Meiji Government. In fact, the major newspapers had become independent and commercially successful media before 1890.[8]

Encouragement, including subsidy, of newspaper publication, however, was given only to those papers which supported the policies of the government. And the governments, both national and local, suppressed relentlessly those papers which took views opposing their own. The opposition came from two sources. On the one hand, there were groups of people who still clung to the old feudal establishment purged by the new government. For obvious reasons, they resented the modernizing policies of the new government and began to express their conservative political stand through their newspapers. On the other hand, there was a small number of new liberal intellectuals who saw the Meiji Government as a totalitarian dictatorship. They were the advocates of democracy and criticized the centralized power as well as the tyranny of the new government officials. They also tried to appeal to the public and started their own newspapers.

The government naturally did not like to see these anti-government papers circulated among the public, and in 1876, established new regulations on newspapers along with a new law concerning libel and contempt. By this new legislation, a newspaper, if found to be critical of the government's policies or individual officials of the government, might be ordered to terminate its publication, and the editor or reporter of such a newspaper could be punished by imprisonment. Indeed, between 1876 and 1881, more than 200 editors and reporters were imprisoned because their news reports were found to be contrary to the regulations. Dissatisfied and angry, a group of editors and reporters who had published anti-government papers held an ironical "funeral ceremony for newspapers" at a Buddhist temple in 1877.

In order to conciliate frustrated but capable newspapermen, the government offered them high offices in the government, and many of them accepted such appointments. In a word, the government endeavoured to make all newspapers supportive of its policies, and the strategy was, on the whole, successful.

Censorship, of course, was in effect, and information unfavourable or harmful to the interests of the government was under strict control.

From the viewpoint of contemporary principles of democracy, the series of communication policies developed by the Japanese Government in the late nineteenth century was absolutely undemocratic and despotic. Indeed, it is quite true that the Japan of that period was a terrifying police State. But at the same time, it may be argued that in a period of transition to an industrial age, especially in an attempt to make such a transition within only several decades, strict control over social communication was inevitable. If there had been no government interference, it is doubtful whether the country could have been unified and consolidated as an industrial nation-State. The past communication policies of Japan, in this historical context, may be seen as an example of a social dilemma which many societies had to face during development.

Government control over communication continued in the field of Broadcasting as well. Immediately after the successful start of radio broadcasting in Pittsburgh in 1920, Japanese businessmen and technicians became keenly interested, and as early as 1922, several experimental radio broadcasting stations started operating. In 1923, some fifty-five applications for broadcasting licences were submitted to the Japanese Government. The Minister of Communication proposed that the applicants should merge and forme new bodies in three major cities in Japan, i.e. Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya. The three stations thus founded started operating in 1925 as legally independent public corporations financed by private capital.

However, in the spring of 1926, the government ordered the three stations to consolidate into a single system called the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (*Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai* [NHK]) and nominated former officials of the Ministry of Communication as directors of the new corporation. In spite of strong resistance on the part of the broadcasters, government power finally forced them to consolidate, and they completed the network system in 1928. This was the beginning of NHK, the current public broadcasting system of Japan. NHK is a somewhat unique institution, in that it has been under direct government control but is still financed by private capital.

3. Communication Policies Under Occupation

The year 1945 marked a new starting–point for Japan. As Japan surrendered unconditionally to the Allied Powers on 15 August 1945, the county was occupied by military force, including those of the United States of America, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, China, and others, but the hegemony of occupation policies was in the hands of the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (GHQ), dominated by the United States. In general, GHQ followed a policy of indirect control by giving instructions and orders to the Japanese Government as a way of materializing the principles of democratization of the country, as defined in the Potsdam Declaration. However, as far as communication policies were concerned, GHQ adopted direct control by means of "advice" and "suggestions" to those in communications, especially the mass media. On 10 September 1945, two days after the inauguration of GHQ, "A Memorandum on the Freedom of Speech and Press" was given to the Japanese mass media, stating that the restrictive laws and regulations on communication which had been in effect under the old régime were completely abolished and that freedom of speech and of the press was established. It emphasized the importance of such freedom as a vital force for democracy. The memorandum put an end to government control over communication which had lasted for a century.

However, the Japanese media were not given complete freedom of expression; quite contradictory to memorandum, GHQ also gave the mass media a "press code" as the standard of news reporting. Several items of the code prohibited any news report which was unfavourable to the occupation forces and their policies; for example, such incidents as automobile accidents, rape, or any act of violence involving occupation personnel were prohibited from publication.

Moreover, GHQ exercised censorship. Major newspapers were ordered to submit a proof copy before publication every day. Every news item was read by the officers of GHQ, and without their approval, could not be published. No reason was given when a news item was rejected. In other words, for the Japanese press, GHQ was a saviour in the sense that it abolished all the restrictions from which the media used to suffer, but at the same time, it imposed another series of restrictions. The "freedom of speech and press" during the occupation period was conditional. Censorship continued until the autumn of 1948, when GHQ recognized that the democratization of the Japanese press had been achieved. The same restrictions and censorship were applied to broadcasting as well. The contents of each programme had to be submitted to GHQ beforehand, and censorship in broadcasting continued until the summer of 1949. During this same period, private mail also was censored.

In the early period of occupation, GHQ was very sympathetic to those liberals and socialists who had been oppressed during the war; therefore, it was not only permissive but even encouraging towards socialistic ideas as a counter to the old military ideology. The publication of the *Akahata* (Red Flag), the party organ of the Japanese Communist Party, for instance, became legal under the occupation. But, as soon as the Korean War began in 1950, GHQ criticized the *Akahata* as an agent of aggressive world communism and ordered a purge of its editors. Furthermore its publication was suspended for an unlimited period because it reported that the Korean War was caused by provocation from United States military forces. At the same time, major news services, newspapers and broadcasting stations were ordered to discharge the Communist Party members among their employees, resulting in the purging of more than 700 media people.[9]

GHQ's control over broadcasting was also very restrictive. In September 1945, only a few days after the formal surrender of Japan to the Allies, the son of the man who had tried to establish the first radio station in Osaka in the early 1920s inaugurated a "preparatory office for the new broadcasting company". By the end of the same year, he and the editorial staff of the *Mainichi* newspaper had merged to establish a new station call the New Japan Broadcasting Company Limited. Their application for a licence was submitted to the Ministry of Communication.

In addition to this new company, several other groups were interested in broadcasting. In Nagoya, the president of the city's Chamber of Commerce, initiated *Chūbu Nihon* Broadcasting Company Limited, and in Tokyo, the chairman of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce, took the initiative in inaugurating the People's Broadcasting Company Limited.

Government officials were also looking into the possibilities of new broadcasting systems, since part of NHK's facilities had been confiscated by the occupation forces and GHQ was said to have a radical plan for reorganizing Japanese mass media. The Minister of Transportation and Communication foresaw the reform of NHK and the communication industry, and began to encourage the establishment of a new broadcasting system based on private capital. His idea was to make this new broadcasting system complement NHK, and the proposal was approved in a cabinet meeting in September 1945.

The proposal was then sent to GHQ for examination and seemed to be received with favour at that time. However, for months, GHQ did not respond to the prospectus; and when questioned the officers of GHQ repeatedly stated that the matter was "pending" or "under consideration". Indeed, GHQ officers had little time for or interest in the new broadcasting system, since they were more concerned with the reform of NHK.

On 11 December 1945, GHQ released a memorandum on the "reorganization of NHK" which suggested (a) the abolition of government control over the NHK organization; (b) the establishment of a new, autonomous public broadcasting system; and (c) the appointment of a new committee, representing the people of Japan, which would select the chairman of NHK and advise him. In addition to the memorandum, the GHQ officers stated orally that they were not considering permitting any private broadcasting, since democratization of NHK would be sufficient to respond to the new needs of the public. The committee suggested by the memorandum was organized. At that time, the idealism of the "new deal" prevailed at GHQ, which preferred to have more or less progressive (left wing) people in the committee. Conservative candidates recommended by the Ministry of Transportation and Communication were rejected. In a word, GHQ's policy was to make a revolutionary change in the organization and management of NHK, bringing in the most radical elements.

The committee nominated the chairman of NHK and made a series of recommendations for its reorganization. GHQ's orders and advice for NHK programmes were two-pronged: they instructed NHK to produce such anti-militaristic programmes as *This Was the Truth, The People Who Defended Freedom,* and *School for the People*; at the same time, they tried to introduce the American programming pattern--15-minute time-modules, entertainment such as quiz and participation programmes--which had not previously been known to Japanese broadcasting.

The minister who had initiated and encouraged the move towards the new free broadcasting systems, found himself in an awkward position under the GHQ reform policy in which the reorganization of NHK took priority over development of a new radio system, and he had to recommend that applicants for broadcasting licences petition directly to GHQ, since he had no authority as a co-ordinator between applicants and GHQ.

GHQ's reluctance to give broadcasting licences was some what understandable from the viewpoint of occupation policy. On 11 December 1946, GHQ asked the Joint Occupation Committee (consisting of delegates from China, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., and United States for their decision on the broadcasting system of Japan under occupation. The committee's resolution was to maintain the status quo in Japanese broadcasting and not to permit any new broadcasting system. They agreed to maintain NHK, under the control of GHQ, as the only system. The Ministry of Transportation and Communication was advised by GHQ to confirm the cancellation of all applications for broadcasting licences and to report that the applications would be "kept on file".

The decision of the joint committee and GHQ was needless to say catastrophic for the people who had been working towards independent stations. In most of the preparatory offices in the broadcasting field, the initial capital was almost exhausted and investors lost interest. Moreover, on 4 February 1947, GHQ purged the central figures among the applicants because of their business activities during the war. Most of the offices, therefore, were disbanded, and the shareholders lost all their money.

In the midst of this despair, a few people did not give up but continued their efforts. For instance, a research team was organized to discuss the problems of commercial radio broadcasting under free competition, preparing for the day when commercial stations would be permitted.

The most important and effective continuing effort, however, was to be found in a resolution of the Judicial Committee of the Japanese Government which had been working on the reformation and interpretation of Japan's legal system. One of the basic issues was the reform of laws regulating communication. The Radio Act, which took effect in 1914, stated in Article 1 that "wireless means of communication shall be under the control of government" and that the minister may permit "private enterprise" only under special circumstances. NHK as a public corporation had been one of the exceptions where "special circumstances" were applicable. But the GHQ memorandum on the reorganization of NHK was obviously in conflict with the Radio Act, and furthermore, in Japan's new Constitution "freedom of communication" was described as one of the fundamental civil rights. The committee had to establish new laws which could accommodate both the Constitution and the memorandum and, while doing so, it came to the conclusion that the monopoly on broadcasting by NHK was not legally fair. Thus began a legal dispute between GHQ and Japanese Government. An official of the Ministry of Communication theorized that the monopoly of NHK might be necessary while Japan was under occupation, but in the post-occupation period radio broadcasting based on free competition could be the only hope for Japan.

On 16 October 1947, GHQ called a meeting with officials of the Ministry of Communication and gave its "final suggestion" in which the following four points were made clear:

The new broadcasting law should be based on: (a) the freedom of speech; (b) political neutrality; (c) responsibility for public service; and (d) maintenance of technical standards.

An autonomous public agency responsible for checking all broadcasting facilities should be established.

The agency should consist of a licensing division and its own broadcasting division to which NHK could be transferred.

Private commercial stations should be licensed.

The GHQ officials added that they did not have any intention of encouraging monopoly in broadcasting, and that they would rather suggest strongly that commercial stations be licensed at the time when "economic conditions of Japan permit such ventures". In other words, GHQ wanted to see the coexistence of both public and commercial broadcasting in Japan

This announcement flatly contradicted the memorandum issued less than a year before, stating that commercial broadcasting would never be approved. What factors had effected this policy change? As discussed in the preceding pages, "resistance" by Japanese Government and business was one of the factors; also, the conflict of occupation policy with the Japanese Constitution put GHQ in a difficult position. But there seem to have been certain internal changes in GHQ. First, GHQ became more and more conscious of Japanese public opinion. Japanese newspapers were very active in discussing the problems of broadcasting, and the opinion trends were carefully translated and studied by GHQ. Secondly, GHQ came to have a more or less optimistic perspective of Japan's future after two years' occupation, and was preparing for a "post-occupation" era. Furthermore, the U.S.S.R., whose position had been against any private broadcasting enterprise, lost much of its influence in the joint occupation committee and this enabled the United States to act more freely. In any event, the policy of GHQ changed some time between December 1946 and October 1947, and the move towards "free radio" was reactivated.[10]

The next step was to legislate a new "broadcasting law" in the Japanese parliament. The draft was prepared and submitted to parliament in June 1948. The proposed law consisted of 106 articles, but consensus was not reached between

GHQ, the Japanese Government, and other interest groups concerned. In particular, government officials, except for the few who drafted the law, were either disinterested in or ignorant about commercial broadcasting. Most of the people were simply unable to imagine broadcasting solely dependent on advertising. Even the Minister of Communication of the day was not confident about the possibilities of commercial broadcasting in Japan. There were technical difficulties as well. An official of the Ministry of Communication reported to the communication subcommittee of parliament that Japan did not have any extra wave channels, and that future prospects for them were poor. Furthermore, a Ministry of Finance official testified before the subcommittee that the ministry was not ready to encourage the banking business to help broadcasting, and he implied that those who wanted to start a broadcasting business would have to do so with their own money.

The detached attitude of both government and parliament was a mystery, but according to a Ministry of Communication official, who explained it several years later, the government was instructed not to pass the law during the session but to postpone it until the following year.

In April 1949, GHQ suggested that two key officials of the Ministry of Communication go to the United States for a month–long inspection tour of American Broadcasting. This suggestion was very important because it made the possibility of commercial broadcasting seem more real and it also provided the opportunity for Japanese broadcasting to look to the United States for model. These two officials learned a great deal. One spent much of his time studying the Federal Communication Commission (FCC and licensing procedures, and the other, an engineer, made an extensive survey of area coverage and frequency allocations. Above all, they were impressed by the development of American broadcasting stations and became quite confident of the success of similar stations in Japan.

Upon their return to Japan, these two officials worked to modify the "broadcasting law" which had been pending since 1948 and, interestingly enough, this time GHQ was in support of the modified draft which emphasized a "broadcasting committee" (an equivalent of the American FCC). In the new draft, articles concerning the "radio code" disappeared and commercial broadcasters were assured full freedom of speech. In a word, the new draft was much more liberal than the one which had been submitted in 1948. And this time, those who opposed the draft were the government and NHK rather than GHQ. In fact, the Prime Minister of the day insisted that the chairman of the "broadcasting committee" had to be one of the ministers and that the Prime Minister had to have power over the committee. Because of his strong insistence, government activity on the law was stopped.

The draft was later submitted again to parliament. Although there was opposition from both the communist and socialist parties, the law, with slight modification, finally passed both upper and lower housed in April 1950 and took effect on 1 June of the same year. In Japan today, 1 June is celebrated as "radio day" (*Denpa no hi*). It took four years and eight months from the time the Minister of Transportation and Communication advocated the necessity of free radio until it materialized, and as described in the preceding pages, there were many vicissitudes both in occupation policy and government reactions.

The business world, which had lost both interest in and money for broadcasting, recovered; and once again many applications for licences were submitted. According to records, there were eleven applications as of September 1948, when the first draft was still pending, and the number increased after the beginning of 1949. The Ministry of Communication accepted another eleven applications before February 1949, another nine before September of the same year, and by February 1950, there were forty-five applications altogether. When the second draft was submitted to parliament, the number of applications had reached seventy-two. Of these, forty-two met the standard qualifications for applicants, and in April 1951, sixteen of them were licensed. The first Japanese commercial stations to start broadcasting were New Japan Broadcasting (NJB) of Osaka and *Chūbu Nihon Hōsō* (CBC) of Nagoya; they began their programme broadcasting almost simultaneously on 1 September 1951. From the conception of "free radio" in Japan until its realization, five years had passed; it had not been easy to achieve.

It will not be necessary to discuss the communication policies during occupation in greater detail, but it should be noted that freedom of speech and expression did not come instantaneously in post-war Japan. The military occupation period which continued until 1952 was the time when Japanese people, especially those in the mass media, experienced a strange kind of "freedom".

4. Contemporary Public Policies

In May 1951, the peace treaty between Japan and most of the countries which belonged to Allied Powers was signed, and automatically Japan became an independent nation again, in which GHQ had no power. The press code and many other regulations enforced by the occupation forces lost their effect. The sole and fundamental law regulating social communication in Japan was the new Constitution, the contents of which were introduced at the outset of this work.

However, the government was somewhat uneasy because the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the majority party, felt threatened by possible violent subversive activities by left-wing parties. Therefore, after controversial discussion in the Diet, a new "Anti-subversive Activities Law" was passed in 1952. It states in its Article 3 that while the "law should not restrict the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution unduly", it is forbidden "to print, distribute, or display documents or pictures in public" which are aimed at provoking readers or viewers into taking subversive action (i.e. action to overthrow the government as defined by the Criminal Code). For example, the distribution of a document which suggests or provokes the bombing of a government building would be prohibited under this law. This was the first new legislation with potential for conflict with the constitutional freedom of speech and expression.

Another new law which bears importantly on communication policy is the Public Offices Election Law passed in 1950. In Japan, elections for public offices are basically financed by the national or local budget, and to give equal opportunities to each individual candidate, campaign communication must be fair and equal. Therefore, the law is extremely restrictive about campaign communication. For instance, a candidate for the House of Representatives cannot distribute more than 25,000 postcards provided by the Election Administration Commission, free of charge.[11] The number of posters, their size, and the places where they may be displayed are clearly and strictly designated. Every candidate is allowed to utilize radio and television for campaigning, free of charge, on an equal time basis. Candidates are also given equal space in newspapers. Any violation of these regulations on campaign communication is punishable by imprisonment.

These arrangements were made to eliminate the differences between those candidates who could afford lavish campaigns and those who could not. In this particular case, the principle of equal rights is given priority over individual and theoretically unlimited freedom, and there has been little criticism of this particular aspect of communication policy.

However, the fact remains that the distribution of money among political forces is not equal, and thus the principle of equality in communication, especially in terms of political campaigns, is an extremely complicated matter. A good example occurred in 1972, when the LDP tried to buy newspaper space for a series of advertisements very openly attacking the Communist Party as a danger and threat to the national interest. The first reaction came from the media themselves. Some major newspapers, such as the *Asahi*, refused to run the advertisements on the basis that they would violate the political neutrality of the press. According to their theory, such partisan advertisements were in conflict with the principle of neutrality and equality , especially because opposition parties might not be able to afford to buy the same amount of space. They foresaw the possibility of serious political repercussions in this respect. Other papers, especially the *Sankei,* accepted and ran the advertisements upon the receipt of their regular advertisement fee on the basis of the "right to communicate" or "right of access". In their view, the press was an instrument to be used by all to express their views and opinions unless these conflicted with "public welfare" as defined by the Constitution; they concluded that a political party had naturally the right to communicate its ideas to the people through the media. They also added that they would be happy to run a counter-advertisement from the Communist Party if that party was willing to do so and to pay the regular advertisement fee. The question, on the part of the media, was one of priority between the principle of neutrality and the principle of free access.

The Communist Party reacted against the *Sankei*'s position and protested strongly, saying that it violated the principle of equal opportunity. For the Communist Party, and other minority parties, the advertisements were a product of a conspiracy between capitalists supporting the LDP and media capitalists. The party, therefore, demanded a similar amount of space free of charge. The *Sankei,* in keeping with its original theory, categorically refused.

The case was brought to court by the Communist Party which demanded equal space. Tokyo District Court, however, dismissed the appeal in 1974 on the basis that an opinion might be published in the form of publicity and that the LDP's advertisement did not constitute a libel against the Communist Party. The Communist Party, unhappy with the court decision, demanded a revision and as of early 1977, the case was still under re–examination.[12] It should be noted that this case reveals an important area where interrelated concepts such as equality, freedom, neutrality, and public welfare conflict with each other, both in theory and practice. Indeed, even those media which emphasize neutrality may be challenged, for instance, by consumers who claim equal opportunity with big manufacturers trying to sell their products through their advertisements. Furthermore, it is often difficult in reality to discern what is political and what is not. For example, electricity companies in Japan today are spending considerable amounts of money to persuade the people through the mass media of the necessity of atomic power as the future energy resource. These companies feel they have to do this because of the strong public opinion against such a venture. As in many other countries, some groups of scientists and engineers are opposed to the use of atomic energy at this stage. In this social context, it may be argued that the electricity companies' advertisements on the issue of atomic energy are essentially *political*. In fact, it is evident that LDP is supporting the early use of atomic energy and that the opposition parties are against the idea. In a word, the use of nuclear power is an ideological and partisan issue. Can newspapers insist on their political neutrality while selling their space to electricity companies for such advertisements?

To give another illustration, there is the problem of public relations activities on the part of the government, on both the national and local levels. The Government of Japan, divided into dozens of ministries, is spending an equivalent of approximately U.S.$70 million a year on public relations. The government, of course, has a responsibility to tell the people what it is trying to do, and it spends the budget allocated for public relations on the mass media. But here again, it is rather difficult––almost impossible––to prove that such administrative public relations activities are not political. The administrative departments of the government are simply agents who put what legislative authorities decide into practice, and since the legislature (parliament) makes its decisions based on democratic rule, theoretically speaking, there is nothing wrong about government public relations activities. In fact, most themes in such campaigns are so neutral or even moralistic that nobody can argue about their political implications. For example, the ministries have urged the people, through the mass media, to conserve energy, protect the ecosystem, drive carefully, use contraceptives, and accept many other "policies" about which everybody would agree for obvious reasons. But on controversial legislative decisions, the opposition parties and their supporters could say that related public relations activities were nothing but propaganda for the LDP. In this respect, the political neutrality of the media can be considered another crucial issue in the public communication policies of contemporary Japan. The issue is less crucial in the case of printed media, however, because newspaper publishing is a free enterprise and is expected to be a partisan medium of communication. A political party, a labour union, and any interest group can, if it wishes, issue any kind of publication for information or propaganda purposes on its own behalf. At least two political parties in Japan today, the Communist Party and *Kōmeitō* (a radical Buddhist-oriented party), have been quite successful in publishing their own party organ on a daily basis, each with a circulation of more than a million. Being daily newspapers, they qualify for several privileges such as special postal rates. In other words, there can exist an unlimited number of newspapers and other forms of printed media, and there is no reason why a newspaper should be neutral, though neutrality and objectivity may be essential selling points for a commercial newspaper with a huge nation-wide circulation.

The real problem of neutrality and "public interest" is in the area of broadcasting, because the channels of communication in the electronic media are very limited in number for technological reasons. Indeed, the dominant legal interpretation held by Japanese jurists is that radio waves with limited channel capacity are a part of public property to be shared by the public at large.[13] A radio or television station, therefore, should not belong to a private party and should not represent any private and/or partisan interest. The Broadcast Law which came into effect in 1950 clearly states that a broadcasting station must serve the general public interest and that licences will be given only to those selected applicants who are qualified to serve that fundamental interest. After careful studies of the institutional and administrative aspects of licensing in broadcasting, Japan decided to follow a modified American FCC pattern: according to the Radio Wave Act (1953), a person who wishes to establish a broadcasting station must submit an application to the Minister of Communication, and the minister's advisory committee, consisting of five "knowledgeable persons", reviews the application. Only if the applicant is found to be qualified does the minister give a broadcast permit. Retention of the licence requires compliance with the principles described in the Broadcast Law.

Article 1 of the Broadcast Law defines three basic rules by which broadcasting is controlled to act in the public interest: (a) broadcasting must bring its usefulness to the public through maximum diffusion of information; (b) broadcasting should not be politically or ideologically biased, but should protect its freedom of expression by assuring truthfulness and exercising self-control; and (c) broadcasting should contribute to the desirable development of democracy, with broadcasters remaining aware of their social role. To the extent that broadcasters do not deviate from these standards, they will not be interfered with or controlled.

If someone claims that a particular broadcast gave information that was not true and thereby violated his rights, the broadcaster is required to complete an investigation within two weeks. If the information is found to be false, the broadcaster must make a public announcement correcting or cancelling it.[14] The complainant can also claim monetary and other kinds of compensation, according to the civil code. The issue of "truth", therefore, is under the strict control not only of the law but, through it, also of the general public.

The basic institutional characteristic which makes the Japanese broadcasting system unique is the fact that it is a "mixed system, i.e. one in which non-profit-making public broadcasting and commercial broadcasting coexist. As discussed earlier, broadcasting in Japan was under the direct control of the government from

1920 till 1947, and NHK, a public corporation, was the sole broadcaster in Japan; commercial broadcasting was added to NHK as a new licensee. However, in the post-war socio-political change, NHK could not continue to exist as before, and had to be "democratized". The democratic nature of NHK was made clear in Chapter 2 of the Broadcast Law, where it was defined as a corporation which broadcasted to "every corner of Japan " for the purpose of public welfare. Under the law, the decision-making of NHK is in the hands of a "managing committee" on which various sectors of the society must be represented. The committee members are appointed by the Prime Minister, upon the approval of parliament, and of the twelve committee members, eight must represent different locations in Japan, and four are chosen "at large" from throughout the nation. At the same time, the members must also represent such professional areas as education,science, labour and industry. In a word, the committee must represent a fair cross-section of the whole Japanese society. No civil servant, executive or employee of another media organization can be appointed as a committee member. The president of NHK is appointed by the committee.

Institutionally speaking, NHK is therefore strictly under public control, and efforts have been made to keep the corporation independent from the government. Since the managing committee is the representative of the whole population of Japan with the approval of parliament, its decisions are regarded as public decisions, and thus the general public is supposed to be participating in NHK's policy-making. With these premises, Article 32 of the Broadcast Law states that "Those who own receiving equipment which can receive NHK's broadcasts must make a receiving contract with NHK"; this contract requires a person to pay a monthly subscription fee. The amount of the subscription fee, as well as the whole annual budget of NHK, must be reviewed and approved by parliament through the Ministry of Communication. As of 1976, subscribers to NHK's colour television and radio (both AM and FM) inclusive, totalled 20 million, with black-and-white television, AM and FM subscribers at 5.2 million. These figures indicate that approximately 80 per cent of Japanese households (32 million) are paying subscription fees, and since some 2 million households are exempt from the contract for reasons of sickness, physical handicaps, poverty, and difficulty in reception of broadcasting, it is safe to say that almost every Japanese household is under contract with NHK. According to Toshio Kataoka, 97 per cent of those who made the contract paid the fee,[15] which is 710 yen (U.S.$2.40) a month for colour and 420 yen (U.S.$1.40) for black and white. The total annual revenue of NHK, by simple mathematical calculation, is some $500 million. Yet, because of inflation, in 1975 the budget had a deficit of some $6 million, and an increase in the subscription fee and other measures are being considered. There is no doubt that NHK is one of the largest public broadcasting corporations in the world.

In return for the subscription fee, NHK is obliged (a) to meet with public expectation by presenting rich and good programmes which can contribute to the betterment of cultural standards; (b) to produce local programmes as well as nation-wide programmes; and (c) to contribute to the preservation of the cultural heritage and to the creation of a new cultural tradition (Article 44).

At present, NHK has five major channels of broadcasting: (a) general television, eighteen hours every day (including ninety minutes of local programming); (b) educational television, for school and general education, eighteen hours every day; (c) the "1st radio", general programming, nineteen hours daily (including two hours of local programming); (d) the "2nd radio", mostly educational, eighteen hours; and (e) FM radio, with news, information, and music, eighteen hours (including approximately two hours of local programming). Also, on the instructions of the Minister of Communication, NHK engages in international broadcasting, thirty-seven hours a day aiming at eighteen different regions of the world and using twenty-one different languages. The costs of international broadcasting are covered by the appropriate government budgets, and no portion of the subscription fees is used for this category.

In spite of general agreement and support, the nature of the subscription fee has been a continuing topic of discussion among jurists. In general, the fee is interpreted as a special public allotment from each individual receiver to maintain the activities of NHK, but there is scepticism about the compulsive nature of the contract, and a small (even negligible) group of people refuse to pay the subscription fee. Hiroshi Soh, an expert on broadcasting institutions, looking at this veto-group, wrote that refusing to pay the fee might violate the principle of equal sharing and suggested administrative punishment for those who do not pay.[16]

Commercial broadcasters, in comparison with NHK, have far fewer restrictions on their activities. They are obliged to provide programming well-balanced between (a) educational and cultural; (b) news reporting; and (c) entertainment programmes. On the average, as of 1975, the ratios of these three categories were 25.6 : 13.0 : 61.4 (total 100 per cent) for radio and 36.7 : 11.6 : 51.7 for television, though the definitions of the categories, especially "educational and cultural", are somewhat ambiguous and tend to be arbitrary. Commercial broadcasters are prohibited from placing commercial messages in the educational programmers for school.[17] By law, each commercial broadcasting station, as well as NHK, must have a "programme review board" as its advisory organ. The boards consist of learned people, and usually, each board meets once a month. The advice given and recommendations made by the board do not have any compulsory authority, but the president of each station must take the advice in consideration for further planning and programming. Other than these specific restraints, commercial broadcasters are free in their programming, though they follow the self-regulatory rules and standards which will be discussed in Chapter 5. Commercial broadcasting is totally dependent upon advertising for revenue, and in 1975, the total revenue was the equivalent of $1,500 million.

Commercial broadcasters are independent of each other, but most of them are affiliated in networks. There are four major networks in Japan: Tokyo Broadcasting System (TBS), *Nihon* Television (NTV), *Nihon Kyōiku* Television (NET), and *Fuji* Television (CX). With two NHK channels (general and educational) in major urban areas in Japan today, the public can select from six television channels. However, because of Japan's mountainous geography, there still remain approximately 0.8 million households which do not have good reception, and efforts are being made by the Ministry of Communication in co-operation with NHK and commercial broadcasters to install more relay stations, often in combination with CATV.

5. Policies of Mass Media

As discussed in preceding chapters, the fundamental philosophy of communication policy in Japan is freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by the Constitution, although there are many legal conflicts, both explicit and implicit, between this constitutional right an other laws. In this social context, the most important factor in communication practice consists in the autonomous and self-regulatory policies adopted by the media. The media, for obvious reasons, should not "abuse" their right or contradict the principle of "public welfare". Unless media themselves are aware of and accept their social role and responsibilities, freedom may mean chaos and anarchy. Unless media maintain a consistent philosophy of their own, they may contribute to the destruction and degeneration rather than to the encouragement and development of democracy. In order to make their function clear and to avoid undesirable legal and moral conflicts, the Japan Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association adopted "The Canons of Journalism" in 1946 which "stress the spirit of freedom, responsibility, fairness and decency" in defence of the press as "a vital right of mankind". But at the same time, the association felt that certain "voluntary restraints" were necessary to achieve the goals of a free press in a democratic society. The "voluntary restraints" described in the canons are as follows:[18]

1. The fundamental rule of news reporting is to convey facts accurately and faithfully.
2. In reporting news, the personal opinion of the reporter should never be inserted.
3. In treating news, one should always remember to guard strictly against such news being utilized for propaganda purposes.
4. Criticism of persons should be limited to that which can made directly to the persons involved.
5. Partisanship in editorial comments which knowingly departs from the truth does violence to the best spirit of journalism.

Emphasizing the responsibility of the press, the canons also recognize the strong impact of newspapers in shaping public opinion and conclude that "newspapers and journalists, when they fail to observe these principles, will invite public condemnation and disapproval by other papers and journalists and in the end will be unable to operate or work" and that the members of the association "should make efforts to co-operate and maintain a higher ethical standard by promoting their moral unity, guaranteeing free access to news materials and assisting each other in newspaper production".

Similar self-regulatory measures were taken by broadcasters. NHK, being a public broadcasting corporation, naturally adopted very strict codes in order to achieve its goals as described in Chapter 4. Commercial broadcasters were also aware of their social responsibilities, and the National Association of Commercial Broadcasters (NAB) in Japan established its own radio broadcasting standards in 1951 and television broadcasting standards in 1958. These standards were consolidated in 1970 under the name of broadcasting standards, and the members of NAB are obliged to follow them. In the preface, the standards define the objectives of commercial broadcasting in Japan as "the development of culture, the betterment of community welfare, and contribution to the prosperity of industry and commerce" and stress the necessity "to respond to the trust placed in us by society, without fear of reprisal, abiding by the right of the freedom of speech and expression, ever in the spirit of democracy". The standards are divided into sixteen chapters containing in all some 140 detailed articles but the six basic principles are as follows:[19]

To respect fundamental human rights, and to strive for the promulgation and establishment of democratic principles.

To respect and abide by legal and social codes, and strive for the stability of social life.

To take into consideration effects upon youth and the family and to strive for the proper education of the new generation.

To strive for the progress and development of education and culture.

To provide information essential to social life, as well as healthy entertainment, contributing to a wholesome life structure.

To strive to provide commercials which are honest in content and beneficial to the broadcast audience.

The ratio of commercial messages to total broadcasting hours is not to exceed 10 per cent, so that the public shall not be exposed to excessive commercials. Also, the standards give as many as fifty specific restrictions on the contents of commercial messages; for example, publicity about medicine or cosmetics should not conflict with particular administrative laws and regulations of the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare. Advertisements from real-estate brokers who are not legally registered by each prefectural government and approved by the Ministry of Construction should not be accepted by the broadcasters.

Though not explicitly described in the standards, commercial broadcasters usually maintain "sustaining" programmes which are free from commercial sponsors in order to maintain their autonomy and independence. The ratio of "sustaining" programmes varies by station, but according to recent figures, on the average, commercial broadcasters in Japan keep 26.9 per cent of radio and 13.4 per cent of television broadcasting hours for such "sustaining" programmes.[20]

Other than the standards adopted by the members of NAB, each individual broadcasting organization usually has its own codes and standards, depending on its philosophy, locality, and other factors, and often in accordance with prefectural regulations and ordinances.

In view of the tremendous impact of the mass media, especially electronic media, upon the younger generation,[21] as far as the standards are concerned, broadcasters are extremely cautious about the contents of their programmes, especially in terms of sex and violence. Article 67 of the standards says that "matters relating to sex should be expressed in such ways as not to cause feelings of unpleasantness or consternation". Articles 55 and 56 read "Expressions of violence, regardless of their intent, shall be handled in an unfavourable, negative light" and "Expressions of violence shall be limited to minimum".

In spite of the ethical restrictions so clearly stated in the standards, and in spite of the advisory functions of programme review boards for broadcasters as prescribed in the Broadcast Law, broadcasters tend to exercise liberal and often arbitrary interpretations of self-regulatory restrictions, since the broadcasting business is very competitive in terms of "ratings". As many critics have pointed out, and as many laymen claim, the programme contents of contemporary commercial broadcasting, both radio and television, are full of sex and violence. Indeed, the public often may wonder if the broadcasters are aware of the existence of the standards.

In order to check the contents of broadcasting programmes on behalf of the public interest, an organization, Broadcasters Council for Better Programming, was established in 1965. The council is funded jointly by NHK and NAB, and consists of learned people outside of the broadcasting business who represent the public interest. The council meets every month solely to discuss the contents of current programmes and to plan better programming. The official records of the council, usually containing criticism and recommendations, are distributed among broadcasters. Because of the third-person nature of the council, the contents of its monthly bulletin are generally candid and persuasive, but the council's recommendations and resolutions are only for the reference of broadcasters and do not have any binding authority. Each broadcaster is simply expected to respect and preferably comply with such monthly recommendations.

Self-regulatory measures taken by mass media are often problematic and sometimes controversial. For example, when a television station produced a documentary programme of the war in Viet Nam early in the 1970s, the station's management decided not to put the programme on the air on the grounds that certain parts were too bloody and might upset the audience's feelings. The station's labour union, on the other hand, insisted that the public should be informed of the realities in Viet Nam, and further accused the management of being afraid of possible pressure from the United States. According to the union, the management's self-control was excessive and eventually might mean a surrender of its power.

One classical example took place in this connection in 1968 when a newscaster of one of the broadcasting companies criticized the construction plan for the new Tokyo international airport during his news programme. The president of the company spoke against the newscast, saying than an employee's freedom of speech and expression was subject to the policies of the company, and that individual freedom as a constitutional right must not be confused with the freedom of a responsible broadcasting company which had to comply with the standards. The company union supported the newscaster's position but, finally, he left the company and was elected a member of the Upper House of the Diet, representing the Socialist Party.[22]

These instances raise a complex legal problem of "editorial right". As early as 1947, the Japan Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association adopted a resolution that the ultimate "editorial right" was in the hands of the management executives or managing editors to whom managerial authorities were delegated. The implication of this resolution was that individual reporters of the press had to comply with the policies and decisions, either explicit or implicit, of the management. The "editorial right" issue has been crucial for newspaper publishers, since many unionized employees had demanded editorial participation in the process of democratization in postwar Japan, and whenever reporters submitted stories which were contrary to the managerial policies, the publishers tended to exert the "editorial right" over such stories.

The "editorial right", essentially based on the ownership of media, has been challenged repeatedly not only by labour but also by legal experts. Though the "editorial right" has often been exercised when publishers found that their employees were politically "biased" and that such biases were a threat to the principle of neutrality, theoretically the publishers also may well be "biased". Shinjiro Yamane, for instance, argued that "the sources of editorial right are Articles 12, 13 and 21 of the Constitution" and that the media employees "are endowed with the right and duty not to report information which conflicts with public interest, even when ordered by the employers to do so".[23] Similarly, Tamiya and Tsuganezawa, in their writing, took the position that the nature and function of "editorial right" was both philosophically and legally doubtful because (a) under the concept of "editorial right", freedom of speech may simply mean the freedom of owners and managers of the media, and (b) the "editorial right may restrict the 'right to know' and further may violate Constitutional rights of the public at large".

Certain media, however, solved this intricate problem by separating economic ownership and editorial management. For instance, as early as 1919, the *Asahi Shimbun*, one of the most influential newspapers in Japan,adopted a resolution at its shareholders meeting which said that "shareholders cannot interfere with the contents of editorials and stories published in the paper must be based on the separation and independence of editorial management from capital".

Another solution, which has been adopted by some media, especially newspaper companies, is to have 100 per cent of their stock shared exclusively by the "insiders", i.e. employers as well as employees. According to Shinichi Itoh,[24] sixteen out of ninety-six major newspapers in Japan are following this pattern. In other words, the Japanese media today are trying to protect themselves from pressures, including the pressures related to economic ownership of the media business. There is still another problem, and that is the relationship between the media and the public. In short, the problem can be defined as a dilemma between "reflective" and "directive" theories, According to the "reflective" theory, the media are supposed to reflect public opinion and taste, and therefore have to present whatever the majority of the public wants. This theory, of course, serves to justify the "rating" competition among broadcasters, for instance, If the "rating" of a programme is 30 per cent, it may mean that the programme is offering more to the public than one with a "rating" of only 3 per cent. The broadcaster may insist that the higher rating figure is an index of popularity which, in his opinion, means better service to the public, regardless of the contents and quality of the programme.

On the contrary, those who believe in the "directive" theory would argue that the fundamental function of the media is to improve public and taste. For example, according to the "directive" theory, a good, sophisticated programme, even if the rating is 0.3 per cent, is serving the public much better than a low-brow popular programme with a rating of 30 per cent. While the "reflective" theory tends to be another example of Gresham's Law that the bad drives out the good, the "directive" theory faces the dangers of more or less dogmatic value judgements. The media, consequently, must seek certain compromise points between these incompatible theories, and this task is a difficult but inevitable part of the policy-making process of the media.

6. Problem of Communication as a Profession

One of the most crucial issues for the Japanese mass media and journalists *vis-à-vis* "the powers", especially government authorities, has been the problem of confidential information sources. As part of the universal ethical code of the journalistic profession, journalists, including newspaper reporters, producers, etc., feel that the confidential information source is vitally necessary for news gathering and that the right to maintain such secrecy must be unconditionally guaranteed and protected. In general, therefore, people engaged in the journalistic profession do not reveal their information sources under any circumstances.

However, in some instances, government agencies demand to know the identity of sources when they consider this information vital to national security, public welfare, or other areas of public interest. To make the problem areas clear, several cases will be introduced in the following paragraphs for illustration.

A classic example is a case known as "the rejection of testimony" by a reporter of the *Asahi Shimbun*, in 1952.[25] The incident began in 1950 with an article about bribery involving an officer of the Tax Revenue Office in Matsumoto District. The reporter wrote the article transcribing the contents of warrant before the officer was even arrested. The district court was disturbed because the information could only have come through a "leak" by the police force, obviously constituting a crime under the strict laws regulating the behaviour of civil servants. Therefore, the court ordered the reporter to reveal the information source so that proper and prompt action could be taken against the possible suspect inside the police force. The court summoned the reporter to testify, but he refused to name the person, insisting that the secrecy of an information source was a part of the ethics of the press. The court found the reporter guilty for his refusal to testify and fined him. The reporter, dissatisfied with the court decision, appealed to the Supreme Court, saying that in order to have freedom of speech, a reporter had to have freedom with regard to the means by which he gathered the necessary information and that confidential sources of information were vital to the maintenance of such freedom. After careful examination of the case, however, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court decision recognized certain exceptions from "the duty of testimony", such as the professional secrecy of medical doctors, but stated that the law regulating criminal suits could not extend such exceptions to include newspaper reporters. The decision stated that "Article 21 of the Constitution simply guarantees freedom of speech and expression equally to the Japanese citizen and does not assure any exceptional guarantee to the journalists", that the article could not be interpreted "as protective of the right to refuse to testify in the sacrifice of the duty to testify when it bears vital importance for the fair action of judicial authority working for public welfare".

In a word, the decision gave priority to the concept of "fair trial" over "freedom of information", including confidential sources of information. For reporters, this case raised a problem of serious conflict between their ethical and legal duties, and this Supreme Court precedent became one of the most controversial subjects not only among journalists but also among jurists and communication researchers.

A similar incident occurred in 1969, when Fukuoka District Court ordered four broadcasting stations in the area to give it certain news films which would help the proper and prompt action of the police force.[26] Each station had had a news camera crew at Fukuoka railway station in 1967 when a violent demonstration had taken place involving destruction of public buildings and injury of people. The police on the spot, naturally, arrested, the individuals who used violence. However, since it was a mob action, certain individual identifications were extremely difficult. The police, therefore, wanted to have access to the candid news film, where what actually happened had been objectively recorded, so that they could carry out police procedures in accordance with the Criminal Code. The court, consequently, asked the broadcasters to submit the films as evidence early in 1969. The broadcasters, however, declined to present the films on the basis that it would interfere with the information-gathering activities of the media in the future, since the public and/or information sources did not expect that film might be used as court evidence. The media further insisted that such a precedent might cause distrust of the media on the part of the public who had the "right to know". And again, Article 21 of the Constitution was used to justify the media's position.

Fukuoka District Court dismissed the media's protest, and the case was brought to the Supreme Court in November 1969. The Supreme Court paid due respect to the freedom of the press, including the freedom to gather information, and further recognized that the primary function of news film was for broadcasting and that it might be inconvenient to the media if such film was used as evidence for a criminal court. "However", the decision said, "the freedom of information gathering does not imply that such activities are completely free from any restriction" and "under a Constitutional postulate such as the support of the concept of fair trial, a certain degree of restraint may be imposed upon the freedom of the media in conducting these activities." After these general remarks, the Supreme Court referred to this particular case and said:

> More than two years have passed since the crime was committed, and the accurate identification of both suspects and victims is even more difficult....The films taken by the broadcasters from neutral angles on the spot, therefore, have importance of indisputable value for proving whether the suspects under arrest were guilty or not. Especially in view of the fact that the films under question had already been broadcast to the public, the contents of the films cannot be regarded as confidential or secret.

In brief, the Supreme Court dismissed the protest and justified the decision made by the District Court.

The issue was again the question of priority between the right to fair trial and the right to freedom of the mass media, and the Supreme Court concluded that the former was more important to the public interest. The decision was supported by many jurists, while the media, supported by other scholars, were dissatisfied with it.

Another precedent related to the freedom of news gathering is sufficiently noteworthy to be introduced here. In 1952, a photographer of a local newspaper in the Hokkaido district, took photographs in a court room during a murder trial. The court notified the press that photographs should not be taken during the court session, and that cameras might be used only before the trial began. In spite of this precaution and the judge's order, the photographer jumped to the judge's seat and took pictures of the defendant. The court fined the photographer for causing interruption and disorder in the court room. The photographer appealed to the Supreme Court on the grounds that as a reporter he had freedom to gather information and that the court deprived him of his freedom. Legally speaking, the Criminal Procedure Code, in its Article 215, stipulates that permission is necessary for those who want to take photographs, but the photographer in this case challenged the article as unconstitutional, since it restricted the freedom of news gathering.

The Supreme Court ruled that the purpose of Article 215 of the Criminal Procedure Code was to keep order in a court room and to protect the fair interests of the defendants and others involved, and that the article was not unconstitutional. Moreover, in this case, the Supreme Court decided that "information gathering" consisted of "preparatory activities" for "actual reporting" and that these two stages had to be distinguished. In discussing this particular decision, Kinuko Kubota, a law professor, pointed out that in the phase of "information gathering", there were often potential conflicts with the right and freedom of other parties which had to be adjusted before publication, and therefore, the freedom of "information gathering" was a freedom approvable by the Constitution, which was different from the "freedom of speech and expression" guaranteed and protected by the Constitution.[27]

Since similar incidents involving photographers and court trials took place often even after this Supreme Court ruling, and in order to avoid unnecessary friction, the Japan Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association reached an agreement with the judicial authorities regarding news photographers' activities in the court rooms. The agreement contains the following rules: (a) News photographers are permitted to take pictures for a period of 3 minutes before a session begins; (b) the types of photographic equipment are limited to small cameras with minimum noise; (c) no artificial lighting should be used in court rooms; and (d) the number of photographers must be kept to a minimum.

The most recent and the most problematic judicial case involving a newspaper reporter was the case known as "the leak of confidential government documents".[28] Early in 1971, when negotiations about the return of sovereignty area Okinawa to Japan from the United States were in progress between the two governments, a reporter of one of the leading newspapers approached a secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and obtained copies of confidential documents from her. The "leak" of the information was revealed, and the Public Prosecutor's Office prosecuted the reporter and the secretary. Since civil servants were prohibited by the National Public Service Law from disclosing secret information to unauthorized persons, the secretary was tried and found guilty by Tokyo District Court in 1974. She did not appeal against the decision and was dismissed from her position. In the same court decision, the reporter was found not guilty because he was merely a recipient of the information. The Prosecutor's Office, however, appealed to the Tokyo District High Court on the grounds that the manner in which the reporter had solicited the information from the secretary, involving sexual seduction, could not be considered as a normal and regular information-gathering activity of media reporters, and that the reporter also was guilty. The District High Court, after two years of careful re-examination of the case, decided that the reporter's activities went beyond normal news gathering, that he apparently suggested that the secretary leak the information, and that thus his activities were contrary to the law. The District High Court's decision was made in May 1976, and the reporter, who was found guilty, appealed to the Supreme Court. As of early 1977, the case is still under examination by the Supreme Court.

In short, there have been conflicts between the media and government authorities in many respects; some of these conflicts constituted court cases where the media's rights of freedom of speech and expression were found to be restricted by other related laws and certain compromises were imposed upon journalists. Despite the many self-regulatory measures discussed in Chapter 5, the mass media in Japan have been faced with one new legal problem after another. The relationship of the media with the public authorities is a dynamic process in which the nature and function of the media are continuously re-examined. The communication professions are, therefore, not easy ones.

Certain remarks should be made here with regard to the organizational aspect of Japanese mass medial As known among communication researchers, the Japanese, mass media are often "big business", and this includes NHK. Of course, there are many local papers with a circulation between 100,000 and 200,000, but they are minor papers as far as circulation is concerned, because in Japan newspapers are often "super-mass" media. the circulation of the "big three"--*Asahi, Mainichi* and *Yomiuri*--is somewhere between 6 million and 7 million each, morning and evening editions included. No newspaper in the world can compete with the "big three" except *Izvestia*, which has an 8.5 million daily circulation.

The "big three" have some 10,000 employees each, and NHK has more than 30,000. Their activities, other than regular publishing or broadcasting, are diversified and unusual. One newspaper owns a baseball team and an amusement park. Another has been sponsoring inter-high school baseball on a national scale every summer. Another newspaper sponsors an archaeological expedition to the Near East, and yet another runs a medical centre as a public service. It is almost institutionalized for NHK to sponsor visits of eminent artists, such as the entire New York Philharmonic Orchestra or the Bolshoi Ballet of Moscow. To outsiders, the media industries in Japan may seem to be a kind of charitable organization, a foundation supporting cultural and academic ventures, entertainment and sports. Among commercial broadcasting stations, there are some which own such subsidiary enterprises as recreation parks, hotels, taxis, real estate, etc.

The "big three" newspapers and NHK are enormous organizations, and they are still expanding. Many technological innovations also are being introduced. Newspaper branch printing offices in remote places such as Kyushu or Hokkaido are receiving electronic signals from Tokyo headquarters, permitting whole pages of the Tokyo edition to be printed simultaneously in the local printing offices.

The centralization of media in Japan has had another effect, that is, the decline of local media. Until the turn of the century, Japanese media were essentially local. The transportation of bulky papers was difficult, and papers were primarily concerned with local issues. But the big media wiped out the minor media in many instances, and this led to urbanization or "Tokyonization" effects.

More important is the recent trend of affiliations and mergers of the media. as described in preceding chapters, there are four major commercial broadcasting networks in Japan, and these networks are affiliated with the major newspapers both in terms of capital investment and of personnel placement. The *Asahi* is affiliated with the NET network (the name NET was changed to Asahi Television System in January 1977), while the *Mainichi* and the TBS network are affiliated. The *Yomiuri* is subsidizing the NTV network, and the fourth major national paper, the *Sankei*, has substantial control over the Fuji Television network. A considerable percentage of the shares of the key station of each network is owned by its affiliated newspaper, and many managerial personnel of each station are ex-newspaper people who used to work for the "mother" company. Very often, an affiliated newspaper and broadcasting station work jointly in information gathering, and mutual reliance and co-operation have been common practice. In a word, the major "communication industries" in Japan today are what might be called "information conglomerates", each of which has both press and electronic divisions.

There are advantages in this type of "information conglomerate". In the first place, with its huge organization of hundreds of reporters stationed in many parts of not only Japan but also the world, a "conglomerate" is capable of abundant and high-quality information gathering. Indeed, Japanese mass media today may be proud of their global coverage of news and the promptness with which they bring such information to the general public. Moreover, an interplay between printed and electronic media in this fashion makes for a constructive coexistence: for instance, a newspaper often runs a small advertisement which says "For up-to-the-minute news, watch Channel 6", while a television station transmits a message to its audience which says "For details, read the *Mainichi*".

On the other hand, three are disadvantages and even dangers in the "information conglomerates". First, such a huge specialized organization of mass communication may, depending on the definition and context, become a monopolistic enterprise which may violate the Antimonopoly Law. Indeed, in some cases, the major "information conglomerates" may become a subject of investigation by the Fair Trade Commission. The monopolistic nature of the media, furthermore, may be a threat to smaller local media serving local communities. As pointed out in the preceding paragraphs, highly centralized super media may have a drastic impact on not only local media but also local subcultures.

7. Social Participation

The mass media in Japan are generally very sensitive and responsive to the public. Major newspapers have their own specialized research divisions which regularly conduct quantitative surveys and analyses of trends in public opinion. The topics covered in such surveys vary from time to time and according to the policies of each newspaper, but both publishers and editors are deeply concerned with the results obtained. The research data are usually published in the papers and the trends of public opinion are utilized to modify the contents of the media. For example, a survey of favourite sports revealed that professional baseball was the most popular spectator sport of the Japanese people. The newspaper, responding the outcome of the survey, increased the space given to baseball in its sports section.

Of course, here again, the question of the "reflective" and "directive" functions of the media may arise. On the one hand, the paper was "reflective" of public opinion, since the readers' interest in baseball was reflected in an editorial policy; on the other hand, it may be argued that because of the increased space devoted to baseball reports, the paper not only reinforced audience interest in that particular sport but "directed" the interest of readers to it, so that the number of baseball fans might have increased as the result of the space increase. The communicator and the communicatee in this sense have a mutual cause-and-effect relationship, and it is difficult to say simply that the media are the "reflectors" of public interest.

This point may be well illustrated by a series of news articles on the Mutual Security Treaty (MST) between Japan and the United States in 1960. The MST, essentially involving many aspects of military agreements, was criticized and attacked by the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, and labour unions and students affiliated with these parties. Their opposition to MST which was supported by the majority Liberal Democratic Party, took many forms including petitions and demonstrations outside the Parliament building. The media found these actions serious and reported what was happening. Almost every day, the headlines of newspapers were on demonstrations, and often the contents were heavily emotional. They reported that the number of demonstrators increased day by day, and tended to editorialized that the government had to listen to the "voiceless voice" of the public and to reconsider the MST issue. Indeed, it seemed that some media became excessively sympathetic of the demonstrators. Newspaper photographs showed the scenes of violent confrontation between demonstrators and police almost every day. Broadcasters also brought the news from on the spot.

With such emphasis on anti-MST movements, public interest in the issue was heightened. As Masaki Takizawa reported,[29] television viewers spent increased time watching newscasts during May and June 1960, when the series of demonstrations took place. Fifty per cent of the television audience was found to be concerned with, and at least psychologically involved in, the reports of demonstrations and confrontations. It is interesting to note that the progressives liked the live broadcasts of demonstrations and thought that broadcasters took an anti-government position. As a result, more people came to participate in the demonstration, and at its peak, almost 1 million people were involved. A student was killed and hundreds injured and/or arrested. The situation became critical.

At this point, the newspapers suddenly changed their tone. They decided that further big headlines risked bringing about a minor civil war and appealed both to the government and demonstrators to calm down. As the issue disappeared from newspaper headlines, the demonstration died down. In brief, the public is conscious and attentive to the media while the media also are sensitive to the public. Indeed, many sectors of the public are extremely active in inviting attention from the media. For instance, a citizens' organization planning to hold a meeting on local or regional problems may send a letter of invitation to the media or telephone in the hope that the event may be announced to the general public through the media. Hundreds of "press conferences" are initiated by private industries almost every day as a part of their public-relations programmes. For example, an automobile manufacturer may invite reporters on the occasion of the introduction of a new model. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to say that hundreds of invitations and/or news terms are delivered to the editorial room of a newspaper or news desk of a broadcasting station every day and every minute. In order to encourage extensive contributions of news from the general public, especially from individual citizens, major newspapers have had a "readers' line" since the early 1970s. This line, a telephone connected directly to an editorial desk, especially assigned to this particular task, rings almost constantly, and a reader can talk to the editor not only about the news but also about his or her interpretation and opinion of any subject. Naturally, the desk cannot publish all the phone call records, and certain screening is necessary, but every day at least five or six significant conversations are summarized and published in the paper.

More traditionally, there is a page totally devoted to "letters to the editor" in almost every newspaper in Japan. The number of letters the *Asahi Shimbun* receives for this page, for instance, amounts to 4,000 every month, and some ten letters appear on the page each day. Occasionally, letters criticizing the paper are published in the spirit of the readers' freedom of speech and expression. In these ways, a private citizen has opportunities to participate in newspaper production.

Most newspapers conduct a monthly "readership survey" to determine the extent of readers' interests in each section of the newspaper. For example, 20 per cent of the readers may have a clear memory of a report of a political scandal on the front page, while 5 per cent of the readers utilized a cooking recipe in the "home" section. Such differences in the degree of attentiveness are carefully studied, and according to such readership surveys amounts of space, style of presentation, and other editorial adjustments are made so that a paper can give maximum satisfaction to its readers. The survey data are also distributed among advertisers who are looking for better ways of reaching the readers.

In broadcasting as well the media are extremely interested in audience reactions. The best known and at the same time the most problematic means of obtaining such reactions is by "ratings", and other than those conducted by NHK and other stations, at least three professional companies are engaged in rating, on a commercial basis and using different methodologies and techniques. The broadcasters are very sensitive to the figures revealed by the ratings. Commercial broadcasters are particularly interested, since the number of people watching each programme is a decisive factor for sales, as well as the pricing to advertisers, of commercial messages during the programme. The rating system has been criticized, however, since broadcasters as well as advertisers tend to over-emphasize the importance of ratings and surveys of this kind usually pay more attention to quantitative analysis than to qualitative study of audience characteristics.

To supplement ratings, and to obtain more articulate audience reaction, most if not all broadcasting stations have institutionalized what is known as the "monitor" system. Usually, a station asks about a dozen citizens with various backgrounds to contribute essays on the programmes of the station every month. The essays are issued as a pamphlet for distribution to the managerial and the production staff of the station to give them some idea of the more qualitative aspects of audience reaction. An individual can apply to serve as a monitor, and stations usually pay a modest honorarium for essays, but in order to obtain more diversified opinions from the audience, monitors serve only semi-annually or annually at the most.

Audience participation in broadcasting programmes is very popular. Historically speaking, "participation programmes" started as a part of the "democratization" policy of the late 1940s. The first to be inaugurated in 1946 was a daily NHK radio programme titled *Our Opinions*. It is the equivalent of the "letters to the editor", column, and selected letters on various subjects are read by an announcer. This 15-minute morning programme still continues. To gather lively opinions and comments on a particular issue, for example, women's status, NHK also started *Voices of the street.* In this programme, a producer with a portable tape-recorder goes out in busy streets and asks passers-by for short comments on a random, *ad hoc* basis. When the programme started in the early 1950s, many people were hesitant to express their opinions, but as it became known and familiar, they became more relaxed and ready to participate. The tape is edited and put on the air.

A less serious but even more "participatory" programme which has continued for more than twenty-five years on the NHK network, both radio and television, is the *Amateur Singing Contest* every Sunday at noon. As the title indicates, this is a programme in which any person who wants to demonstrate his or her talent in singing can take part. A contestant's performance is judged by professional juries, i.e. musicians, composers, etc., but the main purpose of the programme is to encourage amateurism, and it is not an "audition" at all. The producer has been very careful not to let the programme become semi-professional, and conscious efforts are made to choose contestants of different personality, age, sex, occupation, and other socio-cultural characteristics. Every week, thousands of applications are accepted at local stations of the network, and through regional primary contests, twenty-five contestants are invited to be on the air. Commercial broadcasters are also interested in "participation programmes", and various contests, quizzes and games are broadcast almost everyday by almost every station. Commercial broadcasters, however, sometimes prefer "participation programmes" simply because they are much less expensive to produce. Most participation programmes both on NHK and in commercial broadcasts are produced in places like public halls where more of the audience can join in.

A more recent trend in broadcasting, especially radio programming, is the combination of broadcasting facilities with private telephone lines. In this type of programme, a listener can communicate with the announcer and the whole conversation is heard by other listeners; very often, each conversation on the air brings about a series of questions and answers inviting other listeners to join in. For example, a radio programme late in the morning, with an audience primarily of housewives, consists of such conversations and light music. A young housewife wanting to know how to cook a particular kind of fish may pick up her telephone and put the question to the announcer, or the master of ceremonies, of the programme. The announcer will transmit the question to all the listeners and solicit suggestions. Almost instantly, the telephone in the studio will ring, and an elderly lady with much cooking experience may give a detailed recipe for the fish. the master of ceremonies in this type of programme is a co-ordinator of various questions, answers and opinions, and composes the programme by telephone conversation, his or her own brief talks, and music--in other words, by improvisation. Sometimes, at short notice, an expert on a particular problem may be invited by telephone to join the programme. For instance, to answer a question about the safety of electric blankets, a professor of electrical engineering may be asked to explain, in plain language, to listeners about electric devices used in blankets, or a psychologist may be invited to talk about mental hygiene. The programme does not have any pre-arranged scenario, but is produced on an *ad hoc* basis, and sometimes may become "educational" in the strict sense of the term, while at others it may be a "counselling" programme. Recent technological innovations have succeeded in eliminating the noise caused by the combination of telephone circuit and microphone and in attaining better sound quality of such conversations on the air. It is not an exaggeration to say that thousands of listeners pick up their telephone to participate in such programmes, and on several occasions the line connected to the broadcaster's studio was so overloaded by hundreds of call signals which came simultaneously that it broke down.

Though there has been no systematic study of the psychological mechanism involved in participation in the mass communication processes, it may be argued that "participation" often has cathartic effects. There is no doubt that serious writers who send letters to the editors of newspapers to express their candid opinions and interpretations of current affairs are helping to improve social communications by their sincere participation, but it seems that many people pick up the telephone and talk to their favourite announcers without giving much thought to their possible public contribution. Many of the telephone conversations on the air tend to serve more for individual catharsis than for social participation.

An extreme example of such cathartic effect may be found in late evening and midnight talk programmes which millions of teenagers listen to while preparing for the extremely competitive university examinations which have made the Japanese education system famous. In these programmes, young people simply share their boredom and frustration through their letters and telephone conversations, and researchers are inclined to think that what are generally called "participation programmes", may have certain pathological aspects as well as truly constructive and participatory aspects.

8. Conclusions and Trends

In a white paper on communication (1976) the Ministry of Communication summarized major trends in Japanese social communication in reference to the increase of public access to information and said:

> During the period from 1970 to 1975, the annual per capita number of pieces of mail (by sender) increased from 111 to 126, the number of telephones per 100 persons increased from 22 to 38, the average number of daily copies of newspapers per 100 persons increased from 35.0 to 36.5, and the average annual per capita consumption of magazines jumped from 18.7 copies to 21.8.

The white paper made a further quantitative analysis of the increase of information, utilizing the indexes to thirty-four different media (including postal service, telegrams, conversation, school instructions, and other interpersonal media as well as the mass media), and concluded that between 1970 and 1975, the total supply of information showed an increase of 1.22 times.[30]

In fact, as many media critics pointed out, the term "increase" may be too modest to describe what has been happening in Japan in recent years. It is an "information explosion" rather than a simple "increase". The number of computers in use as of 1974 in Japan was almost 30,000, exceeded only by the United States. Early in the 1970s, Nippon Telegraph Telephone Public Corporation connected the private telephone system with a computer, making a data service accessible to the general public. Upon the payment of a nominal fee, a private citizen can use the computer for individual calculation, and, as was suggested in a previous chapter, the use of the telephone is the most common communication practice among Japanese people. With nationally systematized area codes, telephone connections between two points in the country are instantaneous, and the telephone cable is being used for many purpose in combination with other communication facilities. Both telex and facsimile transmission of written messages is widely used by private firms for communication between, for instance, their headquarters and branch offices. As discussed already, major newspaper send whole pages by facsimile from a central printing office to regional printing offices so that the same contents can be delivered simultaneously throughout Japan. As early as 1970, the *Asahi Shimbun* experimented with "delivery" of the newspaper to a private subscriber by means of facsimile. In this system, a small device installed in a household can receive printed pages through an electronic circuit. At present, the system still remains at an experimental stage, but experts forecast that newspaper delivery by facsimile will be used extensively before 1990.

Another experimental use of the telephone cable is the "tele-conference", and Nippon Telegraph Telephone Public Corporation has already established rooms to be used exclusively for tele-conferences, both in Tokyo and Osaka, the two largest industrial centres. Business executives who want to use the facility can rent rooms which accommodate ten participants each, and the businessmen of the two cities can have a conference by means of cable television. The rental rate, during the experimental period, is approximately U.S.$100 per hour.

Less known and yet more important is the use of cable radio in rural communities. Cable radio was encouraged by the Ministry of Agriculture in the 1950s, and with government subsidiaries and in co-operation with Agricultural Co-op, thousands of agricultural communities adopted this system. The cable network in a community, with a central switchboard usually located in a community centre, can be used as an individual telephone line, but at the same time, through the cable, messages can be transmitted from the community centre to each household. For example, early in the morning, a person in charge of cable radio may quote the current price of agricultural products so that farmers can prepare for the shipment of their products. When a primary school in the community is to have a Parent Teacher Association (PTA) meeting, the announcement can be heard in every household through the cable radio. As of 1976, approximately 5,500 rural communities in Japan are equipped with such devices.

In comparison with cable radio, the main function of which is to transmit particular messages to particular communities, cable television (CATV) in Japan is still in the developing stage. Although there are some 8,000 cable television systems as of 1976, more than 90 per cent of these are simply relay stations which transmit regular broadcasting programmes to a small community in a valley where direct reception is extremely difficult, and in these instances, very often the facilities are subsidized either totally or partially by NHK and other agencies. However, government agencies such as the Ministry of Construction are looking forward to a more systematized and autonomous "cable city". In planning Tama New Town, a gigantic housing project in the suburb of Tokyo, multi-purpose cable was installed throughout the whole area, and an experimental CATV has already been inaugurated. There is no doubt that a similar use of cable will become a popular practice in many communities, both rural and urban.

Indeed, one of the major trends in social communication in Japan today is the establishment of media on a smaller scale, i.e. community media, which are complementary to mass media. Local governments are very enthusiastic not only about prospects for their public relations activities but also about institutionalizing regional or community media of communication. For example, in the Tokyo metropolitan area, each administrative ward office publishes a monthly tabloid containing ward information on such topics as garbage collection schedules and events at the community hall, and delivers it to each household free of charge. Obviously citizens' participation can be greater in these smaller media than in the nation–wide mass media. As Norio Tamura emphasized in his article,[31] the smaller media, including community media, are the basis of grass–roots democracy, and there is no doubt that the development of the smaller media is complementary to that of the mass media both in form and contents.

Differentiations among media of communication are also observable on the personal level. As in the case of the computer–connected telephone system, technological devices have been made to "tailor" information to meet particular individual needs. One important development in this area is the use of the video–cassette tape–recorder. The open–reel video–tape recorder was introduced in the 1960s, but Japanese manufacturers developed a ¾–in video–cassette early in the 1970s. The system is used for many purposes. In a school or a private firm, for instance, it is used for educational purposes. A programme, either recorded from regular broadcasting or specially produced, can be played repeatedly at any time, at the convenience of the users. The video–cassette is especially useful and effective in the learning of foreign languages.

Starting in 1975, manufacturers finally succeeded in inventing less expensive video–cassettes primarily for home use. As of early 1977, ½–in video–tape cassette recorders are on the market with a retail price of between $500 and $700. A tape–cassette lasting 100 minutes can be purchased for $20. These are still expensive commodities, but within an affordable price range for middle–income families, and over 200,000 ½–in video–cassette tape–recorders were sold in 1976. With this equipment, a broadcast programme can be recorded at home, and the machine is so simple that even 7–year–old children can easily operate it. Market researchers forecast that these simple video–cassette tape–recorders will be among the most promising commodities of the 1980s, and the market is already rapidly expanding. With this new equipment, the nature of television viewing may gradually change. Viewers, after recording their favourite programmes, either for education or entertainment, may prefer to repeat these programmes rather than to watch broadcasting. At least, video–cassettes may become complementary to television broadcasts as phonographs and audio–tapes are to radio broadcasts. A technical problem, however, remains unsolved. As of 1977, there are at least two different technologies developed by two different groups of manufacturers. Both groups are using ½–in tape, but specifications are totally different. As a result, the video–

cassette tapes are not interchangeable. In addition, there are ¾-in cassettes and 1-in tapes. Therefore, unlike phonographs and audio-tapes, the distribution and uses of video-cassettes are very limited, and the public is pressing for standardization of the system so that it can have access to information taped in video-cassettes.

Another important social trend in Japanese communication and communication policies today is the utilization of media for educational purposes.[32] As suggested in the preceding chapters, the social needs for education are extremely high in Japan and, historically, the media have been very concerned with their educational functions. As early as 1933, NHK inaugurated educational broadcasting aimed at school classrooms, and in 1941, among 23,253 primary schools all over Japan, 16,263 had at least one radio receiving set and approximately 10,000 of them were ready to utilize school programmes. After an interval of several years during the war, in 1953, with the completion of NHK's second network, educational radio broadcasting for schools extended its service, and in that year, thirteen programmes of 3 hours and 15 minutes per day were scheduled.

Today, NHK, being a large nation-wide network organization, has a second channel in both radio and television exclusively used for education and broadcasting for approximately 16 hours every day. In the morning and early afternoon, the programmes in the educational channels are directed to classrooms from kindergarten to the high-school level. Almost all Japanese schools are equipped with television, sometimes with a set for every classroom, and 60 per cent of the schools are utilizing instructional television programmes regularly. Teachers are invited to a series of NHK seminars to discuss the effective use of programmes in their school instruction, and the board of education in each prefecture has been encouraging the use of educational broadcasting.

In the evening, the educational channels broadcast programmes for adult education, including foreign languages, physics, chemistry, music, and so forth, and NHK has a publications bureau which issues textbooks for these non-school educational programmes. Each season, about a quarter of million copies of foreign language (English, French, German, Chinese, Russian and Spanish) textbooks are sold, and when NHK began broadcasting an introductory course of computer programming, its publications bureau received requests for a half million copies of the related text.

Further efforts were made to combine broadcasting with formal education. For people who did not have an opportunity to attend high school, NHK provides special programmes through which they can earn regular high school credits. The organization, called NHK *Gakuen* (NHK School), was established in 1963.

In the first year of operation some 12,000 students registered in NHK *Gakuen* and took courses through broadcasting programmes. In order to make its service complete, NHK *Gakuen* made a contract with seventy-four high schools all over Japan so that students of various areas could have schooling opportunities in their own local communities.

As of spring 1974, there were 11,521 registered students at NHK Gakuen, and in the past ten years, 14,402 students have graduated successfully from this unique school. The drop-out rate varies year by year, but of the students who entered this school in 1963, 17.5 per cent them graduated successfully in 1967. This ratio was much higher in comparison with the success rate of the average regular correspondence high school (7–8 per cent).

In this system, upon application, a student receives a set of standard school textbooks approved by the Ministry of Education, a set of study books specially designed to supplement instruction through broadcasting, and blank forms of "reports". A student is expected to write his learning "reports" after watching the assigned programmes and send them to the headquarters, where teachers make corrections and comments and send them back to the students. A student can also ask questions in writing to any instructor who appears on the programmes, and the instructor may reply. The broadcasting hours are from 9 to 11 p.m., Monday through Saturday, and in the two hours, four independent lectures of 30 minutes each are given.

The combination of broadcasting with higher education has gone even further. In 1967, the Ministry of Education began its own investigation into the possibilities for a new university system through broadcasting, and in the autumn of 1969, the Preparatory Study Committee for a Broadcasting University was set up under the auspices of the ministry. The committee, consisting of a dozen scholars and experts, continued research and made an interim report, in which "broadcasting university" was defined as a regular university which would offer instruction by means of broadcasting. The credit requirements would be met in four years (rather than five) by two hours of listening and/or watching per day and ten to nineteen days of schooling each year. A tentative broadcasting schedule was proposed which comprised eighteen hours of curriculum broadcasting everyday, including Sundays, over both radio and television. As for schooling arrangements, the committee proposed to establish "learning centres" in each prefecture so that students would have easy access to their classroom instructions. The first experimental broadcasting is scheduled for 1978.

In concluding this study, it should be emphasized that in recent years the concept of the "right of access", including the "right to know" in its broadest sense, has increasingly attracted public attention, and as discussed in Chapter 7, social participation becomes continually more active. In this context, and coupled with the development of evermore sophisticated communication technologies which have made Japan famous in the world market, the uses of broadcasting for higher education will offer one of the most promising areas for future development of Japanese mass communication and communication policies.

Appendix: Statistical Data

Table 1. The development of radio and television broadcasting (NHK)

End of fiscal year	Broadcast stations		Subscribers		
	Radio	Television	Radio	Television	Of which colour
1924	1	–	5,455	–	–
1925	3	–	258,507	–	–
1930	9	–	778,948	–	–
1935	30	–	2,422,111	–	–
1940	38	–	5,668,031	–	–
1945	91	–	5,728,076	–	–
1950	114	–	9,192,934	–	–
1952	137	1	10,539,593	1,485	–
1955	176	6	13,253,608	165,666	–
1960	248	70	11,802,387	6,860,472	–
1965	299	783	2,361,046	18,224,213	3,995,800
1969	560	1,974	–	22,087,548	7,662,636
1970	611	2,448	–	22,818,567	11,794,279
1971	662	2,882	–	23,520,254	15,630,946
1972	706	3,333	–	24,433,463	18,335,615
1973	738	3,768	–	24,924,985	

Source: Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1975.

Table 2. The growth of commercial radio and television broadcasting

End of fiscal year	Companies		Broadcast stations	
	Radio	Television	Radio	Television
1950	–	–	–	–
1952	19	–	21	–
1955	39	2	60	2
1960	42	42	112	60
1965	46	47	145	371
1969	47	70	154	892
1970	50	80	158	1,095
1971	50	82	158	1,265
1972	53	87	163	1,421
1973	53	87	168	1,600

Source: Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1975.

Table 3. Radio broadcasting hours of commercial broadcasting (average of broadcasting companies surveyed)

Fiscal year	Daily average (hours)	Ratio by programme						
		News	Educational	Cultural	Recreational	Music	Sports	Other
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1971	21.49	12.7	5.3	17.2	7.8	49.7	5.9	1.4
1972	21.67	13.0	5.1	18.0	8.9	47.4	6.3	1.3
1973	21.67	13.0	5.1	18.0	8.9	47.4	6.3	1.3

Source: Japan Statistical yearbook, 1975.

Table 4. Radio broadcasting hours of NHK

Fiscal year	Daily average (hours)	Ratio by programme			
		News	Educational	Cultural	Recreational
		%	%	%	%
1971	19.10	44.6	2.9	28.4	24.1
1972	19.16	44.6	3.0	29.8	22.6
1973	17.82	43.6	2.8	31.6	22.0

Source: Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1975.

Table 5. Television broadcasting hours of NHK

Fiscal year	Daily average (hours)	Ratio by programme			
		News	Educational	Cultural	Recreational
		%	%	%	%
1971	18.11	37.8	10	33.4	18.8
1972	18.11	36.3	10.3	34.5	18.9
1973	17.82	35.7	10	34.3	20

Source: Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1975.

Table 6. Television broadcasting hours of commercial broadcasting (average of broadcasting companies surveyed)

Fiscal year	Daily average (hours)	Ratio by programme						
		News	Educational	Cultural	Recreational	Music	Sports	Other
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1971	17.20	11	8.6	27.9	47.4	–	3.8	1.3
1972	17	11.4	8.6	27.8	47.0	–	3.9	1.3
1973	16.96	11.2	10.8	26.8	46.7	–	3.5	1.1

Source: Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1975.

Table 7. First-run films (Japanese feature films)

Year	Total	Largest companies	Other
1960	547	545	2
1965	487	268	219
1970	423	221	202
1971	421	180	241
1972	400	186	214
1973	405	208	197
1974	574	163	170

Source: Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1975.

Table 8. First-run films (foreign feature films)

Year	Total	United States	France	United Kingdom	Italy
1960	216	121	33	14	20
1965	264	159	25	16	33
1970	236	120	24	19	39
1971	243	125	31	21	34
1972	283	138	33	31	30
1973	252	153	24	14	24
1974	241	104	33	14	32

Source: Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1975.

Table 9. Motion pictures

	Cinemas			
Year	Total	Showing Japanese film	Showing foreign film	Attendance (millions)
1960	7,457	5,132	794	1,014
1965	4,649	2,831	753	373
1970	3,246	1,758	755	255
1971	2,974	1,595	766	217
1972	2,673	1,382	694	187
1973	2,530	1,332	632	188
1974	2,468	1,297	618	186

Source: Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1975.

Table 10. Production of new editions

Year	Titles	Mean price (yen)
1966	14,988	885.73
1967	16,119	883.46
1968	16,722	1,001.27
1969	17,833	1,077.12
1970	18,754	1,275.34
1971	20,158	1,435.56
1972	20,670	1,498.89
1973	20,446	1,714.19
1974	20,940	2,293.63
1975	22,727	2,394.13

Source: Publishing Yearbook, 1976.

Table 11. Advertising turnover of selected advertising media (in 100 millions of yen)

Year	Newspapers	Magazines	Television	Radio	Direct mail	Outdoors, other
1956	405	40	20	130	–	150
1957	510	50	60	150	–	170
1958	525	55	105	157	–	210
1959	618	80	238	162	–	334
1960	684	100	388	178	–	372
1961	824	125	539	178	90	321
1962	922	144	690	173	102	353
1963	1,120	169	899	171	117	441
1964	1,297	195	1,081	170	115	546
1965	1,344	192	1,110	161	116	539
1966	1,337	211	1,247	169	168	602
1967	1,611	255	1,509	195	204	700
1968	1,884	298	1,745	233	213	799
1969	2,250	348	2,042	291	229	988
1970	2,653	418	2,445	345	268	1,213
1971	2,681	445	2,584	388	297	1,238
1972	3,024	478	2,841	428	388	1,417
1973	3,721	572	3,522	496	453	1,756
1974	3,945	626	3,917	554	493	1,896
1975	4,092	670	4,208	602	525	2,024

Source: Japan Newspaper yearbook, 1976.

Table 12. Newspaper circulation (in thousands of copies)

Year	Total	Morning and evening edition	Morning edition only	Evening edition only
1970	36,304	16,719	17,187	2,398
1971	36,562	16,839	17,507	2,217
1972	38,162	17,683	18,187	2,292
1973	39,847	18,169	19,429	2,249
1974	40,006	17,815	19,874	2,316
1975	40,512	18,067	20,242	2,203

Source: Japan Newspaper Yearbook, 1976.

Table 13. Magazines published

Publication	End of 1971	End of 1972	End of 1973
Monthly	1,767	1,868	1,889
Semi-monthly	79	77	77
Every ten days	32	35	36
Weekly	102	94	95
Bimonthly	137	142	164
Quarterly	276	362	386
Other	114	68	53
TOTAL	2,509	2,646	2,700

Source: Publishing Yearbook, 1974.

Table 14. Books published

Subject	1971	1972	1973
Generalities	536	506	444
Philosophy	1,486	1,508	1,657
History	1,848	1,864	2,144
Social sciences	5,230	4,998	5,051
Natural sciences	1,931	1,883	2,027
Engineering	2,300	2,383	2,272
Business	1,079	1,051	1,019
Arts	1,949	2,091	2,143
Philology	626	625	657
Literature	6,057	5,897	6,450
Children's books	2,238	2,469	2,436
Reference books	1,325	1,057	1,054
TOTAL	26,595	26,332	27,354

Source: Publishing Yearbook, 1974.

Notes

1. This figure includes only those daily newspapers registered as members of the Japan Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association.
2. Inclusive of relay stations. The number of broadcasters is ninety-one for television and fifty-six for radio.
3. Article 175: "A person who distributes of sells an obscene writing, picture, or other thing or publicly displays the same, shall be punished with penal servitude for not more than two years or a fine of not more than five thousand yen or minor fine. The same shall apply to a person who possesses the same for the purpose of selling it."
4. Article 230: "A person who injures the reputation of another by publicly alleging facts, shall, regardless of whether such facts are true or false, be punished with penal servitude or imprisonment for not more than three years of a fine of not more than one thousand yen. "No person who injures the reputation of a dead person shall be punished unless such injury arises in consequence of a false accusation."
5. Article 13: "All of the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs."
6. Masami Itoh, "*Nihon no Mass Communication Hōsei*" [The Legal Institutions of Mass Communication in Japan], *The Jurist* (Tokyo), October 1976.
7. Fumio Yamamoto, *Nihon Mass Communication Shi* [A History of Japanese Mass Communication], p. 17, Tokyo, 1970.
8. For details, see Hidetoshi Kato, *Communication and National Development*, a monograph to be published as an occasional paper of the Research Institute for Oriental Cultures, Gakushuin University, Tokyo.
9. Akihiko Hakuhara, *Nihon Shimbun Tsūshi* [A History of the Japanese Press], p. 248-50, Tokyo, 1969.
10. The following information is mostly obtained from *Minkan Hōsō Shi* [A History of Japanese Commercial Broadcasting], edited by the National Association of Commercial Broadcasters in Japan, 1965.
11. Article 142, Public Offices Election Law.
12. M. Horibe and K. Fujita, "*Mass Communication o Meguru Saiban*" [Court Cases on Mass Communication], *The Jurist*, op. cit., p. 353.
13. M. Itoh *et al. Hōsō Hōsei no Genjō to Tembō* [Present Problems and Perspectives of Broadcasting Institutions], p. 182 et seq., NHK Press, 1976.
14. Article 4, Broadcast Law.
15. T. Kataoka in Itoh *et al.,* op. cit., p. 262.
16. H. Soh, *Hōsō seido ron no Tame ni* [Understanding Broadcasting Institutions], p. 260, NHK Press, 1964.
17. Ministry of Communication, *Tsūshin Hakusho,* p. 286, 1976 (white paper on communication).
18. The Japanese Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association, *The Japanese Press,* p. 4-5, 1976.
19. "*Broadcasting Standards of the National Association of Commercial Broadcasters in Japan*" (English version)(Mimeo.).
20. Ministry of Communication, op. cit., p. 284.
21. Lyle, K. Goto and H. Kato, "*Television and Children in Two Cultures*" Honolulu, East West Communication Institute (unpublished paper).
22. T. Tamiya and H. Tsuganezawa, *Hōsōron Gaisetsu* [Introduction to Broadcasting], p. 88, Kyoto, 1975.
23. S. Yamane in *Shimbun no Jiyū* [Freedom of the Press], p. 69, Tokyo, 1952.

24. S. Itoh in *Genron no Jiyū* [Freedom of the Press], p. 118, Tokyo, 1974.
25. S. Agatsuma (ed.), *Mass Communication Hanrei 100 sen* [100 Legal Precedents on Mass Communication], p. 8, Tokyo, 1971.
26. S. Agatsuma, op, cit., p. 14.
27. S. Agatsuma, op. cit., p. 12.
28. M. Horibe and K. Fujita, op. cit., p. 350.
29. M. Takizawa, "*TV and Political Crisis*", in H. Kato (ed.), *Japanese Research on Mass Communication,* p. 15, Honolulu, 1974.
30. Ministry of Communication, *Tsūshin Hakusho,* p. 31, 1976, (white paper on communication).
31. N. Tamura, "*Minor Paper: A Case Study*", in Kato (ed.), op. cit., p. 50–1.
32. For detailed information, see H. Kato an R. Postgate, "*Open Learning in Japan*" in N. MacKenzie *et al.* (eds.), *Open Learning Systems and Problems in Post-secondary Education,* Paris, Unesco Press, 1975.

Trends in Communication Research in Japan

Historical Background

Though Communication research in its American sense was not known to Japanese social scientists until the end of World War II, the history of studies in social communication, in terms of 'journalism', can be traced back to the 1930s, when the commercial media of mass communication in Japan showed an extraordinary development in penetration as a result of economic prosperity after World War I and the spread of high school education. It seems worth while, therefore, to look briefly through the scope and methodology characteristic of studies of journalism during that period.

At least four types of journalistic research can be distinguished among the works published in the 1930s. The first trend may be classified as the 'ideological' approach, which is represented by Jun Tosaka, a philosopher. Tosaka, under the intellectual influence of Marxism and the sociology of knowledge, developed an original theory of ideology, in which the concept of 'journalism' is included as an important *form* of contemporary ideology. He defined journalism as 'a form of ideology rooted in the daily life of common people' and assumed that it stands at the opposite extreme to 'academism' which 'exists outside of ordinary daily life'. The former is the reflection of mobile common sense, the latter the absolute universal truth. In journalism, information is meaningful in as far as it satisfies the interests focused upon limited areas in time and space. In other words, journalistic information which is meaningful today does not bear the guarantee that it will be meaningful tomorrow too. According to Tosaka, this limited range of meaning is the nature of the function of journalism. On the other hand, in 'academism', another form of knowledge, the meaning–span must be eternal and universal. The search should be for laws applicable to any area in time and space.

On the basis of this journalism–academism dichotomy, he stressed that the two forms of ideology have, and must have, a complementary relationship. 'Academism', he says, 'can control journalism, which has the defect that it is apt to become superficial in handling problems; and on the contrary, journalism can stimulate academism, which tends to be detached from the world of reality and to confine itself in an ivory tower.' A careful reader might have seen in Tosaka's argument the similar points suggested by Robert Merton in regard to the relationship between American mass communication research and European sociology of knowledge.

The second trend may be called historical, and by 'historical', the author means the unique studies in communication by Kunio Yanagita. As a folklorist, Yanagita has been collecting oral folklore since the early years of the century, and has later become very much interested in socio-cultural changes brought about by the modernization of traditional rural communities. He has frequently pointed out how regional oral tradition has faded with the spread of newspapers, and how modern educational institutions have changed the nature and function of folklore. One of the most interesting of Yanagita's suggestions for the students of communication research, however, is to be found in his interpretation of journalism in the context of cultural history. 'In a closed traditional rural village', he noted, 'verbal expression among the members of the community was hardly necessary. Since people knew each other so well that one could understand what his neighbor was intending to communicate even from his facial expression or his slightest move. However, as the result of the development of transportation and economic activities, it became necessary for the villagers to keep contacts with people whom they did not know well. Strangers, such as travellers, peddlers and entertainers came into such communities, and at this stage, communication purely in terms of verbal expression became necessary. Until that stage, people were not communication-conscious as far as expressive words were concerned.' Thus Yanagita defined the concept of journalism as a form of communication, in the modern industrial period, where the participants are all unknown to each other. In a word, Yanagita has explored the field of non-verbal communication from the viewpoint of cultural history, and many of his points coincide with those raised by Robert Hall in his book *Silent Language*.

The third trend is characterized by its 'popular culture' orientation. From the early 1920s, Yasunosuke Gonda, a non-academic sociologist, has been working on the empirical survey of popular cultural institutions, such as vaudeville theaters, cinemas, restaurants, and so forth. Among his works, two books are important: *The World of Entertainers* and *The Problems of Public Entertainment*. The former is, as its title suggests, a study of popular artistes and entertainment service personnel, and in this book he gives a very interesting description and analysis of the economic situation, relief system, and social organizations of actors, actresses, vaudeville artistes, waiters, etc. The latter is a book of motion picture audience research. The survey was done with the informal co-operation of the Ministry of Education, and this book is the first piece of statistical audience research to be made available in Japan. Though his methodology of statistical analysis is too simple from a contemporary viewpoint, Gonda should be noted as the pioneer in this field.

The fourth trend is essentially 'technical'. As mentioned before, Japanese mass communications showed great progress in the early 1930s, and interest in journalism on the part of the communicators, i.e., editors, writers, and critics, also increased. In this connection, in 1931, a series of books under the title *Unified Studies in Journalism* was published. The series includes 12 volumes, of 400 pages each, and the subjects of newswriting, the organizational aspect of the newspaper industry, the training of reporters, typography, and other technical problems of journalism were discussed by more than 100 contributors, mostly journalists of practical experience. Among the writers, the name of Hideo Ono can be mentioned. Ono was born in 1883, and after graduation from Tokyo University, he started his career as a newspaper reporter. In 1925, he was appointed as the first lecturer in journalism at Tokyo University, and after that he acted as the pioneer in newspaper research in Japan. He has been particularly interested in the history of newspapers, and his *History of Japanese Newspapers* is still one of the basic textbooks in this field of research. He worked energetically as the president of *Nihon Shinbun Gakukai* (Japan Society of Journalism), and he has recently published *A Study in Kawaraban*, which deals with '*Kawaraban*', a type of clay-block newsprint used in the eighteenth century.

So much for a brief summary of Japanese communication research in the 1930s. After that Japan entered World War II. During the war, for obvious reasons, social communication in Japan was very much suppressed by the militarists, and there was practically no progress in communication research, except for the borrowing of propaganda theory and technique from Nazi Germany, and the mobilization of authors and publishers to write about the war and to 'educate the natives'.

The Post-war Communication Situation

Communication research in Japan has developed very rapidly since World War II, and today even laymen often talk about '*Masu-Komi*' (popularized Japanese abbreviation for mass communications). An obvious reason for this is the fact that American communication research methodology and technique have been imported by Japanese academic circles and the interest of Japanese social scientists in this field has deepened. But that is not the only reason. In the background, we must look at the new communication environment, a product of post-war Japan.

First of all, the post-war situation was new to the Japanese public in the sense that for the first time in the history of modern Japan they acquired freedom in social communication. The New Constitution of Japan says in Article 21: 'Freedom of assembly and association as well as of speech, press and other forms of expression is guaranteed. No censorship shall be maintained, nor shall the secrecy of any means of communication be violated.' This philosophy is in direct contrast to the old Imperial Constitution in which freedom of speech was the right of Japanese subjects 'within the limits defined by law'. And many 'laws' were enacted. For instance, the *Chian Iji Hō* (Public Security Act), practically prohibited all communications which, in form or content, were critical of government policies. The writers and publishers who held liberalistic opinions were often arrested and sometimes imprisoned. Jun Tosaka, whom we have already mentioned, was one of the victims of this law, and he died in prison a week before Japan's surrender.

In this connection, it is safe to say that freedom of speech was a revolutionary idea for the Japanese, and this new idea stimulated very active social communications in post-war Japan. For instance, the number of periodical publications, including many leftist magazines, increased overwhelmingly after 1945. Book publication and broadcasting were also very much activated and, as a result, the Japanese people came to have abundant exposure to all kinds of information through the various media of mass communication.

In the second place, the Japanese people learned that democracy in their social life must be based on a mutual understanding which is possible only through personal interaction. Thus, 'talk together' has been one of the basic slogans in the public life, even in the family life, of post-war Japanese. The election system, committee system, and other democratic institutions were adopted by more and more organizations, and in order to manage such institutions, people had to learn the technique and philosophy of effective interpersonal communication. The principles of general semantics, for instance, gained wide acceptance among the people who were in charge of such communication institutions. Tadatoshi Okubo, and other members of *Nihon-Kotobano-kai* (Japanese Society of Speech) were the promoters of this movement.

In the third place, we have to keep in mind that communications in terms of advertising and publicity have developed dramatically in post-war Japan. In the year 1946, one year after Japan's surrender, the total advertising expenditure was approximately 15,000 million yen (roughly 40 million US dollars), but by 1959 it had increased to 1,500,000 million yen (4,000 million dollars). In other words, advertising expenditure in Japan increased one hundredfold in thirteen years. No other industry can show figures even approaching this rate of growth. Commercial broadcasting stations, both radio and television, were established (during and before the war, the only radio broadcasting facilities were monopolized by the government), as in the United States. This huge amount of commercial information has also been a new experience for post-war Japan.

These three phenomena form the social background which stimulated and necessitated scientific research in social communication. To meet this necessity, scientists have been able to refer to American developments in communication research, and they have found that what their American colleagues were doing during and before the war has been of considerable help, both suggestive and practical, in solving present-day communication problems in Japan. They had no hesitation in learning from the United States, and Japanese sociologists and psychologists thus began to 'take in' from American research procedure.

Trends in Contemporary Communication Research

There are many types of communication research being done in Japan today. At one extreme, we have the epistemological theory of symbols, and at the other, very practical market research. One sociologist may be studying the political function of television broadcasting, and another may be interested in communication within a small experimental group. It is thus almost impossible to draw a comprehensive picture of contemporary Japanese communication research. But if we look at the varieties carefully we soon see that at least four trends are recognizable.

Research in the control of communication

It is very important to remember that one of the driving forces of post-war Japanese communication research is to be found in reactions to the experience of the war years. During the war, for obvious reasons, all Japanese news services were mobilized by the militarists to present a biased and untrue picture of the war to the public. Every day, through the newspapers and the radio, people were told that Japan was winning the war, and as a result of this propaganda, most of the people came to believe firmly that Japan really was winning the war. But they had to learn, on 15 August 1945, that all they had been told through the mass media was grossly untrue. The memory of this bitter experience was carried over into the post-war period, and most of the people still adopt a skeptical and critical attitude to mass communication. And implicitly, at least, disbelief in or doubts about the contents of mass communication have been constantly present in the minds of contemporary Japanese social scientists as well. Of course, one would not say that students in communication research in other countries too were not critical of their subject matter, mass communication. But this critical attitude is much more marked among Japanese researchers.

For instance, in June 1951, *Tembo*, an intellectual magazine no longer in existence, published a special issue on 'newspapers', and it is interesting to note that the contributors, mostly intellectual leaders, all discussed the question 'whether or not the newspapers were reporting the truth?' Their opinions were all, to a greater or lesser degree, negative, and some of them talked of the 'tyranny of newspapers', that is, the tyranny of one-sided information and manipulation of facts. The name of Ikutaro Shimizu, now a professor of sociology at Gakushuin University, should no doubt be mentioned in this connection. He has been described as a liberal sociologist, and is at the same time well known as a leading social critic and author who also has experience as a newspaper columnist. In his book entitled *Journalism*, which was, and still is, the starting point of the major trend in Japanese communication research, he gave his basic and unvarnished ideas on journalism, its necessity, management, social effects, etc. But one of his points was that in contemporary society it is hard to expect newspapers to report the truth, because of political and economic pressure.

These ideas he took up again in another book, *Social Psychology*, where he expressed a much more pessimistic view of the possibilities of mass communication. The idea of the manipulation of mass communications was more clearly expressed in the series of papers presented by Michio Inaba. According to Inaba, contemporary communication industries, such as newspapers and radio and television broadcasting stations, are directly or indirectly connected with monopoly capitalists. For instance, the management of many commercial radio and TV stations is often the same as the management of big industries, and the information purveyed by such media is thus very often distorted by capitalist interests. It would be wrong to take Inaba's points as indicating a Marxian deterministic interpretation, because (a) the monopolistic trend has always been strong in Japanese business circles (one many recall the '*Zaibatsu*' organization); and (b) unlike the United States, Japan has few medium or small communication industries able to speak for interests other than those of the big industries.

Besides the works of Shimizu and Inaba, many other studies have been made along these lines. *Newspaper Revolution* by Matao Nagashima, *The Function of*

Newspapers by Yoshimi Uchikawa, *Television and Mass Manipulation* by Akira Takahashi are a few of the representative works in which an attempt has been made to analyse the control aspect of mass communication.

Popular culture research

Another trend is the interest in popular culture materials. In this field we can distinguish two main approaches. The first is the tendency to consider research primarily with reference to politics. The consensus of the researchers' opinion seems to be that popular culture in contemporary society is a very sophisticated form of political manipulation. For instance, Joji Watanuki, in his paper 'The structure of social psychology in the age of mass society', states that the mass media today are transforming political issues into non-political issues by trivialization, fragmentation, or personalization. 'Politics is becoming a theater stage, where political figures behave as if they were actors.' In a word, he points out that a serious interest in politics is disappearing from the contemporary scene because such interest is being shifted by the mass media to entertainment values. As one can easily imagine, his discussion is very much influenced by Riesman, Mills, Lowenthal, and other contemporary American sociologists. But it is important to note here that at the same time Watanuki is cautious enough to add that in the context of Japanese society it is possible that phenomena which are regarded as crises in the democracy of the United States may have a progressive function in Japan. He says: 'In the case of Japan, entertainment and consumption orientation can serve as a resistance against the re-establishment of the old totalitarian value system where individual happiness was subordinated to the welfare of the Japanese Empire....Even the voters' political apathy is much better than the traditional boss system which is still the dominant characteristic of Japanese politics.'

If one approach is to study mass culture in terms of politics, another is to consider it as an independent cultural problem. Needless to say, this subject has been a very controversial issue here as in any other country, and there are many facets to research on popular culture so viewed. The present author, however, is particularly interested in the studies published by the members of the *Sisō no Kagaku Kenkyu Kai* (Institute for the Science of Thought). The institute was originally established in 1946 by scholars who had studied in the United States, and its major interest has been the study of Japanese ways of thinking and behavior. In this connection the members were interested in various forms of communication on the assumption that the contents of communications are the reflection of Japanese culture. *Popular Arts*, a collection of essays by Shunsuke Tsurumi, one of the founders of the institute, is probably the most representative work along this line. In this book, Tsurumi revealed considerable and original insight into the characteristics of Japanese communication, and his suggestions have since been inherited by Tadao Sato, Michitaro Tada, and many other younger researchers. The institute published a book on popular culture, under the title of *Dream and Illusion*, which includes empirical studies on motion pictures, popular songs, popular fiction and so forth, and some of the papers printed in this book were, along with several original papers, translated by Hidetoshi Kato into English with the aid of a grant from the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and published as a book under the title, *Japanese Popular Culture*.

Another organization which has been interested in popular culture studies is *Gendai Geijutsu no Kai* (Society for Contemporary Arts), a group of younger writers, critics and artists. This group has a periodical, *Gendai Geijutsu*, and the papers published in this magazine are mostly concerned with the proper and positive uses of the technology of mass communication for artistic purposes. Unlike old-fashioned artists who regard modern technological progress as the enemy of the individualistic philosophy of art, this group is seriously concerned with the possibilities of new art forms in motion pictures, television, electronic music and so on. Two books written from this point of view, *The Arts in Television* by Kiichi Sasaki and *The Energy of Masses* by Kiyoteru Hanada, were both seen as attempts on the part of artists to take up the challenge of technology of mechanical communication devices.

Audience and effect research

So far as the amount of money spent is concerned, the most well-funded branch of communication research in Japan is the audience and effect research carried out by mass media industries, advertising agencies, and other commercial institutions. Today, most of the major mass communication industries, especially commercial broadcasting stations, have their own research departments and many publish their periodical research reports. For instance, the Tokyo Broadcasting System has a well-equipped research department, and its research reports on such things as the listening or viewing rates of its programmes are regularly sent to its sponsors and advertising agencies. The basic research procedures are imported from the United States.

As a source of statistics concerning commercial broadcasting, *Mass Media Research* (MMR) is the most authoritative publication available in Japan. It is published monthly by *Chūō Chōsa Sha* (Central Research Bureau) which is financially supported by a limited membership of subscribers, i.e., stations, sponsors, and agencies. The publications of a similar nature are so numerous that it is impossible to list them all. However, to mention a few, *The Mainichi Consumer Report*, and *The Mainichi Readership Survey*, both published by the advertising bureau of the *Mainichi* Press, and *The Statistical Monthly Report* of the *Dentsu* Advertising Agency are representative source materials.

Another new development in the field of commercial communication research was the establishment of the Japan Research Center in January 1961. This institution was founded by several big firms in order to carry out market and communication research for their products. Hiroshi Minami, a psychologist, is acting as the chairman of the center, and students in psychology and sociology at graduate school level have been recruited to work on fundamental and practical research in this field.

Apart from audience research for commercial purposes, there is much audience and effect research being done from the educational point of view. For instance, as in many other countries, the possible impact of television upon younger people has been one of the most serious problems for educators and broadcasters. On this subject it will be worth while to mention the recent survey done by the Japan Association of Broadcasters. The members of the association in the Osaka area, namely the *Asahi* Broadcasting Corporation and the *Mainichi* Broadcasting System, in co-operation with the Faculty of Education of Kyoto University, carried out the research. The major findings were: (a) that there was practically no relationship between television programming and juvenile delinquency; (b) that potential delinquents and potential non-delinquents showed no difference in their selection of programmes; and (c) that the family to which a child belongs has more determining influence than the mass media. In addition to this research, the book entitled *Mass Communication Change our Children* (1960) can also be recommended as an interesting source of facts. It is a collection of papers written by school-teachers who observed empirically the changes in the culture of Japanese children brought about by movies, popular songs, and television programmes. The staff of the Osaka Metropolitan Institute of Education, headed by Hikaru Ishida, directed this research project on the theoretical aspects of attitude changes in children as the result of exposure to mass communication.

With regard to the effects of mass communication upon children, the series of papers by Kanji Hatano also must be mentioned. His major interest is in audio-visual education both in the classroom and in society as a whole, and it seems to be his consistent opinion that the effective use of audio-visual media, such as movies, television, radio, and slide projection are a promising field of educational technique. His paper on Japanese comics for children is included in Kano's *Japanese Popular Culture*.

Another important survey of the effects of television is the series of studies conducted by the Newspaper Research Institute at Tokyo University, which has been going on since 1957. One of the institute's interim reports found that there is a very significant relationship between television programming and the shopping and cooking habits of housewives. In Japanese television it is usual to broadcast cooking lessons about midday and housewives who see these programmes have a strong tendency to prepare supper on the lines suggested in the midday broadcast. However, in a series of studies, Akira Takahashi has developed a theory of 'three-step communication', adding one to the 'two-step' theory of Katz and Lazarsfeld. Takahashi agrees with Katz's contention that the small group to which an individual belongs functions as a 'filter' of information communicated by mass media, but he considers the system of intra-personal communication (predispositional pattern of perception of the individual) to be another filter again. In other words, according to the 'three-step theory' the system of intra-personal communication should be counted as a variable in the study of mass communication effects, just as much as the system of inter-personal communication.

The problems of mass communication effects have also been studied by several government offices. For instance, *Nōgyō Gijutsu Kyōkai* (Society for Agricultural Technology) has made a survey, under a grant from the Ministry of

Agriculture, of mass media effects in rural communities with regard to the dissemination of information concerning innovations in agricultural technology. Another example is the Ministry of Education's special committee on the influence of television with Kanji Hatano and other educators and psychologists as committee members.

To close this part of the discussion, I think it necessary to mention the unified mass media research carried out by *Nihon Shinbun Kyōkai* (Japan Newspaper Association) in 1959. The object of this research was to observe 'the division of labor' among various mass communication media, and by so doing to ascertain the function of printed media in the age of electronic journalism. The major findings were (a) that people tend to get their first information from the radio, and (b) that newspapers are used to confirm such information and to supply further details.

Linguistic studies

One of the crucial problems for students of communication in Japan is the problem of language. As most readers will know, the Japanese language, especially the written language, is very complicated. It consists of several thousands of Chinese characters and fifty phonetic signs so that it is not easily adapted to certain types of communication technology, for instance, the typewriter. The simplification of the language, or the development of devices for simpler communication has long been a subject of research in Japan. *The History of the Problems of Japanese Language and Ideography* by Masao Hirai tells us that the problem has been discussed over and over again since the middle of the nineteenth century. The discussion has been carried over to the post-war period. One of the post-war works in this field was *Nihonjin no yomikaki nōryoku* (A literacy survey of the Japanese), sponsored by the Ministry of Education and published in 1948, which is the first statistically valid piece of research of this kind. This research showed that though the literacy rate among the Japanese people is very high (97.7 per cent), the complexity of the written language is a barrier to exact understanding.

A continuing survey of the linguistic aspect of Japanese culture is being carried out by *Kokuritsu Kokugo Kenkyūshō* (The National Language Research Institute). This institute was established in 1948 by the government 'in order to study the linguistic life of the Japanese with a view to proposing basic information for language simplification and for the betterment of the linguistic culture of Japan'. A series of reports were published by the institute, of which *A Linguistic Survey of the Island of Hachijō* (1950), *Research in Newspaper Vocabulary* (1952) and *Research in Colloquial Japanese* (1955) are the more important.

Further Problems and Concluding Remarks

In the author's personal opinion, there seem to be at least three problems which must be solved by Japanese students of communication research in the future.

1. As is no doubt apparent, communication research in Japan is still at the stage of being an 'imported technique'. In fact, the actual English word 'communication' is used in Japan for want of a proper Japanese translation. Of course, researchers are well aware of the fact that certain techniques of American communication research are not applicable in Japan. For instance, the American-type questionnaire technique is very difficult to adapt to the Japanese interviewing situation because it can be a very distressing experience for Japanese rural people to have to converse with strangers. Again, since the main Japanese papers are 'national' newspapers, studies of American newspapers, which are more or less 'local', cannot always serve as models for research on the press in Japan. For these reasons, modification of the American methodology and technique to suit local conditions is one of the most important tasks of Japanese research workers.

Furthermore, the basic philosophy of communication (the system of meta-communication) current in Japan is somewhat different from that adopted in the United States -- but this is a field which still remains to be explored.

2. Communication between research workers in commercial organizations and those in academic institutions is very poor. As was mentioned earlier, many commercial research organizations publish their findings, but there are many others which keep their research figures secret and thus inaccessible to university research staff. At the same time, commercial research seldom gets any direct help from academic research, because university studies are generally too fundamental and theoretical, and also because the universities are often too critical of the communication industries. This gap, in a sense, is inevitable, since the interests and problems of both sides are quite different. However, in the author's opinion, the effort to communicate with each other can and should be made in the interests of co-operative action.

3. The training of communication research workers in Japan is still not systematically organized. In fact, very few Japanese universities have a department of journalism or communication, though departments of sociology and psychology often fulfil this function. Academic research organizations in this field are very few. In fact the only academic institution is the Newspaper Research Institute at Tokyo University, the others being for the most part commercial organizations with a few exceptions such as *Hōsō Bunka Kenkyūshō* (Broadcasting Institute) which is attached to NHK, the public broadcasting corporation. Thus it seems that one of the most important tasks of the future will be to plan a more systematic research organization so that personnel in this field can be properly trained.

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Some Observation on Communication and Japanese Nationalism in 1890s[1]

The purpose of this essay is to investigate the backgrounds of social system and social philosophy usually called "the Japanese Nationalism of 1890s", from the viewpoint of social communication and the behavior pattern of the people of that particular period of history.

The following discussion consists of three parts. First, we are going to see the growth of a "national communication circle" of which definition will be given later. In the second place, we shall make a brief survey of the changes which took place in newspapers. Third, we shall try to find the characteristics of communication in connection with the idea of "nationalism".

1. The Emergence of a "National Communication Circle"

Among other things, the situation of communication in the 1890s is worth analyzing for the reason that at this particular period Japan came to have a "National communication circle".

What is a "communication circle"? Our definition is this. Any social group is possible only when there is communication among its members. That there is a social group is synonymous with saying that there is a process of exchange of meaning among the individuals who constitute the group. When the amount and the speed of communication are sufficient so that the whole population involved can become a more or less permanently functional social group, we call it a "communication circle". The size of a communication circle is determined mainly by the technological means of communication. (In ancient Greece, where human communication had to be done solely through physical communication organs–i.e., mouth and ear, the communication circle took the form of "Polis" or city–state. Technological developments in communication, such as the introduction of radio, made the size of the communication circle larger.) When such a communication circle covers certain geographical territory, and when the members of that communication circle become aware of themselves as a united whole in the global context, such a unity is called a "nation state". In Europe, this "national communication circle" emerged in the 17th and 18th centuries following the age of discovery and enlightenment.

Japan up to the 1890s was, if seen from this point of view, merely an aggregate of small local communication circles, rather than a unified national communication circle. Of course, we can say that the Meiji Restoration (1867) was the declaration of independence of the "Japanese Nation" as a member of the international community. However, what was meant by the "nation" of Japan then was merely that the heads of local governments were appointed by the central government. As a matter of fact, for a considerably long period of time after the Restoration, a local administration continued to be a mixture of old local feudalism and the new central government system. Though the physical barriers of transportation and communication, which were artificially set inter-locally by feudal lords (the exchange of information and commodities among local territories was not free), were abolished in the year following the Restoration, the fastest means of communication was the person carrying a message on horseback, and it took more than five days to complete a one-way trip between Tokyo and Osaka, two major cities of Japan. Accurate and efficient communication on nation-wide scale, needless to say, was hardly expected with this type of poor facilities.

In a word, the Meiji society of the early period was very low in the amount and the speed of communications, although it was internationally recognized as a nation. Therefore, to attain more organized, integrated, and efficient communications throughout Japan was one of the most indispensable tasks for the Meiji government.

The expansion of communication in Meiji society begins with the creation of a homogeneous population able to communicate and to be communicated to. Needless to say, this was the essential condition for a large-size communication circle, because without a high literacy rate among the population, symbols were not able to reach the public. Especially in the era when the only available mass medium was that of printed language, literacy of the population was decisive for the formation of a national communication circle. (It may be worthwhile to note here the contemporary communication situation in the Near East where "modernization" began with radio rather than the press.[2] The fact that the modernization of Japan was ahead of the invention of electronic journalism might be very important in the history of communication.)

Unfortunately, we do not have any data in regard to the literacy rate in Meiji period. (The first literacy survey was done in 1931.) But it was certain that with the aid of the new school system (six years of compulsory education) the literacy rate had considerably increased.[3]

The new education system was introduced in 1876. In its beginning, there was opposition from those parents who felt the school expense as a burden, and from those parents who had to rely on their children working in farms or factories. However, statistics show that in 1879, three years after the enforcement of the new education system, the number of primary schools in Japan increased to 34,000.

Young men who, for some reason, "skipped" the primary school education were taught to write and read in the army which was a compulsory institution for all men. Especially after 1881, the regulation became more strict than before so that every Japanese boy had to spend at least a year in the army at the age of 21. The army, as a compulsory institution, was significant in the history of communication if we look at the following facts:

1) The army served as a human communication medium for the penetration of the new culture pattern to local communities. Since more than 70% of the population of the day were essentially rural, those young men from villages who joined the army had to have completely new experiences. That is, they were trained to live in the most modern material and non-material culture in Japan. Western suits (uniforms), stove, bed, electric light, the habit of eating meat, singing new army songs set to western music, etc. After they finished their service in the army, they, naturally, went back home. But the important point is that they went back home carrying the latest information and ways of life derived from the most advanced section of the country, the army.

2) The army was the place to train soldiers in reading, along with fighting. To those who finished primary school, it gave advanced courses in reading and handwriting and provided them with libraries; for those who had missed the chance, elementary courses were given. At the same time, the army functioned as a "melting pot" of dialects. Though the army language was not a good standard language, either linguistically or aesthetically, at least it made communication between two different local cultures easier and smoother. As a matter of fact, in many cases, the veterans could serve as interpreters in their home communities when strangers found difficulties with local dialects.

School education, coupled with the army institution, provided the minimum condition for a national communication circle, i.e., the homogenized and common ability to communicate and to be communicated to. What was needed, then, were the channels and means of communication, which could convey huge amounts of information quickly to various parts of the country. Now, let us examine the development of non-human facilities of communication and transportation.

In 1873, the first telegraph line was completed between Tokyo and Yokohama.[4] In Tokyo, the production of man-pulled carts (*Jinrikisha*) started in the same year, and in the following two years, the total of these vehicles in the city amounted to 25,000. In addition to this type of vehicle, various sorts of carts and wagons were manufactured and used for the prompt transportation of persons and goods. (In the feudal era, in order to limit the activities of merchants who were less favored than the farmers, the number of carts was controlled by the lords. For instance, in Old Tokyo, the number was limited to 16,000.) Roads and bridges were rapidly improved during the ten years after the Restoration.

The decisive revolution in transportation, however, did not arrive until the steam-powered train was introduced. The first railroad between Tokyo and Yokohama was completed in 1872, but it took more than fifteen years before the railroad officials celebrated their 1,000 miles of railroad construction. The expansion of railroads is extremely important from our point of view in the sense that they had the vital role in the formation of a national communication circle. In the first place, the inter-local economic activities were tremendously promoted. Local products could be easily traded, and small and middle-size local communities developed as the trading centers of each prefecture. According to Professor Watsuji's autobiography, "until sometime around 1890, my home village, as well as other communities, stayed as it had been in feudal regime. People grew crops, went fishing to provide their own food, wove their own clothes, built their houses, all by and for themselves" (Watsuji, T.; "*My Village*" the *Chūō-kōron* Feb. 1957). In other words, the expeditious developments in political, economic, and industrial structure in the center of the country, they influenced the local cultures very little. Local communities stayed as they had been for a long period of time. The dramatic change came with railroads. The influence of urban and industrial culture was brought by the trains in terms of commodities and information. At the same time, needless to say, railroads made the physical mobility of persons faster and easier. Even in the beginning of the railroad between Tokyo and Yokohama, more than 3,000 passengers travelled daily, and this number of people moving between the two points was incredibly huge by the standard of the day. When the first National Fair was held in Tokyo in 1890, more than 10,000 passengers were brought to Shimbashi station in Tokyo every day, and in the same year, it is recorded that students' guided tours became popular. Travel for pleasure came to be a common habit among the urban population in the 1890s, too. The first sightseeing train from Tokyo to Nikko on a regular schedule was introduced to the public in 1892, and some people, though not many, began to spend summers in the beach houses of Kamakura. This type of leisure activities was unknown to Japan until foreigners came. To summarize, railroads were one of the most important factors which effected the homogenization of the Japanese culture and the higher mobility of the population.

In this connection, it might be worthwhile to note that it was in the 1890s when the rental houses of the urban area came to be furnished with *Tatami* (floor mat) and *Shōji*(sliding door, or panel). Until then, there were no furnishings in the rental houses, and people had to carry a huge pile of *Tatami* and *Shōji* with them when they moved. This change may indicate the change in the degree of physical mobility of the urban population; the more they moved, the more convenient facilities in housing were needed. (Whether or not "social mobility" goes with "physical mobility" is another question.)

According to the research conducted by Mr. Yanagita, a folklorist, one of the most significant changes which took place in this period was "the change in the form of marriage". The dominant form of marriage had been "intra-community" until 1890s when the "inter-community" form became popular as the result of the disappearance of rigid psychological barriers between communities. And this development also seems to indicate an increase in mobility and the expansion of the communication circle.

The sociability among the people also became higher. One indication is the fact that the exchange of greeting cards for the new year became one of the most popular annual events some time between 1887 and 1892. After the Japanese post office adopted a new handy means of personal communication...i.e., postcards... in 1880, and especially afterwards when somebody introduced the picture postcards a little later, the exchange of nonbusiness letters among the people sharply increased. The following chart shows the changes in the amount of postal service during the period 1873 to 1892.

Year	Regular mail	Postcard	Periodicals	Books
1873	16,732,000	0	2,629,000	0
1882	49,207,000	32,894,000	15,226,000	3,042,000
1892	70,992,000	126,454,000	52,178,000	4,716,000

The communication medium which was much faster than mail was the telegraph. The telegraph was introduced to Japan before the Restoration. That is, the basic telegraph equipment was one of the good-will presents to the Shogunate from Admiral Perry, the first American visitor to modern Japan. As soon as the Meiji government was established, officials were very much concerned with the practical use of telegraph communication throughout Japan. However, because of some technical difficulties, it took approximately 20 years until the nation-wide telegraph system was completed. As a matter of fact, until a new double insulator, which was necessary for long distance communication, was improved in 1883, practically no construction was undertaken.

Moreover, the official telegraph rate was set very high. Most of the users were government officials for official purposes, and very few private parties could afford to pay the telegraph bill. Even newspapers could not use the telegraph much. And it is said to be a revolution in the history of Japanese journalism that in 1889 the Osaka *Mainichi* decided to use telegrams "as much as necessary". The *Mainichi* of the day had 50,000 Yen paid capital, but a telegram of one hundred words cost 500 Yen, or 1% of the capital! The telegraph, in a word, was not a popular channel of communication even for the press. (It was 1905 when a new special rate was set for the press.)

The telephone came into use in 1884, and the service was primarily for official use again. Even in 1893, only 1,500 telephones were registered. Telephone, as well as telegraph, could not be defined as the popular channels of communication.

However, as we have seen, the developments in railroads, telegraph, telephone, and postal service, etc. helped to increased the size, and to integrate the organization of a national communication circle. Most of the new generation (meaning the population born after the Restoration) were qualified to participate in the national communication circle in terms of literacy and in terms of life-orientation, and they were exposed to the information carried by the new channels of communication and transportation. Thus, the unification of what Ruesch and Bateson called "cultural communication" (customs, institutions) was almost completed on a "national" level, instead of a local level, during the decade of the 1890s. In this way, the Japanese "national communication circle" was shaped. The process in which local culture became gradually integrated as a part of the "Japanese Nation" can be seen from the following case studies of changes in consumption.

a) The case of Oka family, Shimane Prefecture

In 1881, kerosene oil was first purchased. *Jinrikisha* was several times hired for visits; matches and western style umbrella were purchased. In 1891, the family started to use postcards.

b) The case of Tomisawa family, Kanagawa prefecture

In 1880, western wine and toilet soap were used. For the new year, the family had a photograph taken, and more than 30 letters were sent to their relatives and friends. In the same year, they started a subscription for a Tokyo newspaper. More than ten books were bought. In May, the family took a trip to Tokyo for pleasure. In 1890, the postage bill increased to 12 Yen a year, which means that they sent more than 20 letters every month. Western suits for the men, and a wall clock were purchased.

c) The case of Hara family, Fukushima prefecture

In 1881, they bought a western hat and shirts for the men.

d) The case of Takagi family, Kanagawa prefecture

In 1879, western candies and pastries were purchased. In March, the same year, the family took a trip to Tokyo to buy a wedding dress for their daughter. The head of the family, for the first time, tried western wine. *Jinrikisha* was hired 13 times this year. Starting in 1884, an illustrated newspaper was subscribed to.

These records are not representative of the Japanese families of the day, because all of the families mentioned were rather big landowners. But it shows how urban culture was getting into local communities, and if we assume that these landowners were opinion leaders of the communities, we could safely say that they promoted the urbanization of local cultures in terms of material products.
Rural village life of 1897 was described by an observer of the times as follows: "Every household, regardless of economic and social status, has a national flag to hoist at their doorway on national holidays. One-third of the households have a writing desk, a clock, and a thermometer. Almost every family owns a *Hibachi* (charcoal heating pot), a set of *Zabutons* (soft cushions), and a tea set for guests. Western umbrellas are found in every household. One out of 30 men has a western overcoat."

The preceding discussion was to sketch the general outlook of the communication situation of the 1890s in Japan. At this stage of history, the first graduates of the new school system were at the age of 25 or a little over, and were already the core of a social force in the total population. This human factor, coupled with developments in the technology of communication and transportation, was the actual basis of the national communication circle and the national economy. However, we have talked very little about the media of mass communications. In the next section, we would like to see how Japanese newspapers have developed in the 1890s, and what social factors affected the patterns of growth.

2. The Birth of Modern Newspapers

As seen in the preceding chapter, the Japanese national communication circle was roughly formed in the 1890s. In other words, the esprit de corps of the people as the Japanese nation emerged. However, the feeling of unity and interrelatedness is reinforced when the members are exposed and attached to certain common symbols distributed by certain systematic channels of communication. The system of symbolic distribution is a part of "social control" in the broader sense, along with the system of distribution of powers.

The Meiji government was, from its beginning, very much concerned with the unification of symbols and the control of such symbols in the process of expanding the communication circle. As discussed before, the government had monopolized the major channels of transportation and communication. Railroads, telegraph, telephone, postal service, were all government enterprises, and in the case of telecommunications, the use of the facilities was practically monopolized by the government for twenty years.

The government's control over every symbolic activity was also severe with respect to the contents of communications. We have seen already that in the late 1890s, almost every household had a national flag to hoist on their doorway on national holidays. But, did they buy the flag voluntarily out of their feeling of unity and love for the country? We do not know. But there was a fact observed by a foreign visitor who wrote in his diary that he had to see "the sad scene of a policeman visiting door to door to ask the people to set their flag up" on the Emperor's birthday in 1880. As we shall see later, this style of communication, i.e., to force the people to participate in certain types of policy-communication, was related to the nature of the "nationalism".

The government control over communication was significant in the field of mass communications, too. The control over newspapers became very strict in 1890s, though it had been an intolerable one.[5] It might be useful to see the newspaper situation of the 1880s before we go to the investigation of the 1890s, because one of the most important turning-points of journalism history of Japan is to be found in these two contrasting decades.

The Japanese newspapers of the 1880s were characterized by their extreme political orientation. Major newspapers of the day were more or less connected with political parties, and functioned as their organs.[6] For instance, in Tokyo, the *Nichinichi* and the *Meiji Nippō* were connected with the Imperial party (*Teiseitō*), the *Yubin-hōchi* and the *Chōya* with the Progressive party (*Kaishintō*), the *Jiyu* with the Liberal party (*Jiyutō*). They were partly supported by the parties financially, and they acted as the propaganda department of their sponsors rather than as an information service for the public. In these newspapers, as one may immediately guess, opinions were dominant over facts, and facts were often distorted by opinions.

However, some of these newspapers were relatively successful. They were successful even commercially. Especially, the press sponsored by antigovernment Progressive and Liberal parties were prosperous in their circulation. Most of the readers of newspapers of the day were students and intellectuals, and the papers were not popular yet. Copies of newspapers were often souvenir items for the locals who came to Tokyo for sight-seeing. They bought a paper at the newsstand, brought it back to their home and kept it as the symbol of urban civilization.

So far, so good. But the politically oriented newspapers were not able to continue publication in the 1890s because of two reasons. In the first place, there were strong pressures from the government, and in the second place, the readership of newspapers changed.

A. Government Control

In the light of the upheaval of anti-government propaganda by newspapers, the government put a very strong pressure on such "subversive" papers by various means.

a) The government suggested that local governors help the circulation of pro-government papers of respective prefectures. Sometimes, a few hundred copies of such newspapers were "subscribed" to by the local government on official account.

b) New laws and regulations concerning the publication of papers were enforced so that the anti-government press was not able to publish. Especially, "liberal" newspapers had to discontinue publication. The *Kōchi Shimbun*, one of the most militant liberal newspapers, was ordered to stop publication six times. And at last, the publishing firm itself was ordered to be dissolved in 1882. The paper ended with "The Grand Funeral for the press of Honor" in the central park of the city with thousands of people making a demand for freedom of speech to the governor, though this demonstration itself was broken up by the police. Five other papers had the same experience in the same year, and there were more than 80 temporary prohibitions of publication throughout Japan. The pressure from the government became decisive when the amendments to the press regulations was enforced in 1883. The main points of amendment were as follows:

1. The Ministry of Internal Affairs reserves the right to "forfeit printing machines of the newspapers which are recognized to be extremely harmful, and when it was felt necessary to do so", along with the right to order any newspaper to discontinue publication, either temporarily or permanently, at the Minister's discretion. (Article 16)

2. A publishing firm, which publishes more than one newspaper, must stop the publication of all the papers, when one of the papers is ordered to be discontinued. (Article 17) And "the owner, editor, and printer of the paper of which publication was once forbidden cannot be the owner, editor, and printer of any other newspapers within two years after the prohibition". (Article 24)

3. The Ministry of the Army, the Ministry of the Navy, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reserve the right to order the press to keep any report or commentary out of print if they feel it necessary. And at the same time, through the arrangement with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the printing machines of newspapers can be forfeited if it is felt necessary". (Article 34)

These amendments of regulations were apparently intended to stop the circulation of liberal newspapers in Japan. And for many editors and reporters, even for those who belonged to a "neutral" type of newspaper, the time was a very hard one. The historical statistics of the circulation of newspapers show the strength of the pressure most vividly: the annual circulation of papers in 1881 was 64 million copies, but it decreased to 59 million in 1882, and 57 million in 1883.

B. The Changes in Readership

The politically oriented newspapers were forced to change their forms and contents by government control, but aside from this external factor, there also was another internal reason why they had to change. The upward curve of literacy, coupled with the same curve in consuming power and total economic production, made the readers of newspapers different from those of the previous decade. In the 1880s, roughly speaking, the readers were an elite. They were officials, professionals, and students. They were interested in serious political issues, and newspapers, in a sense, reflected the readers' interest.

However, the new readers, the popular audience, or masses were not interested in political issues as such. They were more or less gossip-minded, fact-minded and entertainment-minded. The first newspaper which aimed at this new kind of readers was the *Jiji Shimpō*, established by Y. Fukuzawa in 1882. Fukuzawa, the founder of Keio University, "felt the necessity of a newspaper which can lead public opinion independently from any particular political pressure". His observation was right. In contrast to the decline of political newspapers such as *Nichinichi*, of which circulation decreased from 12,000 in 1882 to 6,000 in 1889, the circulation of the *Jiji* showed tremendous increase, though correct figures are not available. We may call *Jiji* one of the "new" newspapers. What was new with "new" newspapers?

a) The organization of newspaper publishing was new. The case of the *Hōchi*, another new press, will be a good illustration. F. Yano, the chief editor of that paper started "reform" of the firm as soon as he came back from his inspection trip of newspaper business in Europe and America in 1886. First of all, he organized the editors and reporters on a departmental basis. Instead of rather anarchistic editorial organization where a reporter looks for something new regardless of the subject matter, some reporters were asked to get news in police headquarters, while some others were assigned to look for stock market information, etc. In the second place, he organized the prototype of a Newspaper Association on a nation-wide scale so that the editors of various newspapers could exchange information. Along with this, Yano also established a new independent information service agency, under the name of *Shimbun Yōtatsu Kaisha* (Newspaper Service Cooperation).

b) The idea that a newspaper is a commodity came to the minds of editors. In the period of party organ newspapers, the press was primarily a channel of political propaganda, and the owners and editors paid very little attention to the profit-making aspect of newspaper business. They wanted to sell political ideas and ideologies, not newspapers. The cost of running such newspapers was very cheap, since the news sources were limited, in many cases, to one, i.e., the party. As a matter of fact, according to the editors of *Nichinichi*, a daily circulation of 4,000 was enough to cover all the expenses early in 1880.

However, the increased new readership wanted to know the latest happenings in various fields, and to get more entertainment. In order to satisfy the needs of this new audience, much more money was needed to dispatch reporters to the places out of the town, get serial fiction by distinguished authors, scoop confidential news from individual parties, etc. and the only way to cover that huge expense was to sell more copies. Especially in the case of Osaka papers, which were located 400 miles from Tokyo, and still had to get Tokyo news as fast as possible, the problem of satisfying the readers was very serious. The editor of an Osaka paper wrote "Tokyo journalists are, I am sure, not able to imagine the amount of the telegraph bill which comes to my desk every month" ("70 years of the *Osaka Mainichi*". Strange to say, however, this handicap of the Osaka papers turned out to be an advantage in the following ten years, because they had to promote circulation to pay for the telegraph bill for Tokyo source, and consequently they had to install the most modern printing machines and to meet increased circulation. Thus, a newspaper as a modern big industry came to the Osaka area first. (Two major contemporary newspapers, namely the *Asahi* and the *Mainichi*, were both founded in Osaka at this time). In a word, newspapers of Japan have changed, and had to change, from small-scale enterprises to a big commodity-producing business.

c) As the result of commercialization of papers, naturally, the management and sales aspect of newspapers became more important than the editorial aspect. Or, let's put it this way: in the previous years, the responsibility of the sales division was just to try to sell what editorial people produced. But now, the relationship between editors and sales people, in a sense, was reversed. Editors were expected to make headlines so that the paper could be sold. Devices which might appeal to the popular audience were practiced. Serial fiction and illustrations were used and in 1885 Fukuzawa of the *Jiji* tried to use pink paper instead of ordinary white paper to attract newsstand customers. The sales system through local agents was also established around the year 1890, and the subscription rate in general was cut down for sales promotion purposes.

With regard to the increase of readers, one of the most important facts is that the rural population, more than 69% of the total population of the day, began to subscribe to newspapers. Since farming gradually became commercialized as the result of economic expansion, farmers, who then were paid cash for their product, were very much interested in the day by day market price of agricultural products. The newspapers provided that information. And so came the age when not only the urban population but also rural people read newspapers.

As to the actual circulation, we have the following statistics: "according to the police headquarters in Tokyo, the number of newspapers and circulation in December 1888 are as follows: number of papers 45, and total circulation 4,514,705" (Government Information Bulletin, Feb. 1, 1889). This figure means that little more than 150,000 copies of newspapers were circulated in Tokyo area. If the rough estimate of the total households in Tokyo of the day was 250,000 to 300,000, we can say that newspapers reached one out of two households, at least in Tokyo.

In brief, the newspapers of Japan in the 1890s can be characterized by 1) neutralization of their political implication, 2) the rise of commercialism, and 3) increase in circulation. For the new mass market which was already cultivated and fertilized by the enlightenment movement and higher economic activities, the newspapers started their prosperous business as mass media.

3. The Style of Communication in the Age of "Nationalism"

As we have seen in the preceding chapters, not only the basic means of communication and transportation, but also the mass media of communication had almost completed the initial step for the formation of a "national communication circle". The idea of a Japanese nation had penetrated into the local communities, and people were able to think of themselves as belonging to the nation. This idea of "belonging" is a part of any nationalism. However, there are many types of nationalism depending on how this feeling was shaped. By revolution? By inevitable defense? By voluntary participation? By power?

From the viewpoint of political communication, the style of communication which characterized the 1890s was what Lasswell called the style of "despotism". He says, "Since nondemocratic elites demand superiority, they interpose barriers of 'distance' and 'height' between themselves and the rank and file. Symbols and signs are among the instruments employed for the purpose of being 'remote' and 'above'. Hence the outstanding style of despotism is effect-contrasting. 'Commands' are issued; 'obedience' is compulsory".[7]

The illustration given by Lasswell is that of the British monarchy, but it is much more true with the Japanese communications originating from the Emperor. The "effect contrasting" style in Japan took the form of the "the Words from His Majesty the Emperor" (*Chokugo*). On various occasions, and frequently, "the Words" were issued, and these words produced the "distance" between the ruler and the subjects. This communication from the Emperor came to a climax when "the Words from His Majesty the Emperor concerning Education" was issued in 1890, which then became the most important one along with "The Words from His Majesty the Emperor to the Officers and Soldiers in His Majesty's Army and Navy" which had been issued ten years before.

The reason why we have to mention this form of communication is that the "Words" were more effective and persuasive than any other forms of communication, including mass media. We have already pointed out that the new school system and the institution of the army were very important factors in the process of the formation of a national communication system. But now, we must add that the "Words" had to be followed in both groups.

In school, on every national holiday, boys and girls, from elementary level to university level, were asked to attend a ceremony at the school auditorium, and listen to the "Words" (concerning education) read by the principal or president of the institution. Of course, they had to be extremely quiet, and while listening they had to bow to the "Words". As a matter of fact, the Ministry of Education proclaimed a code governing the practice of reading, and the head of every educational institution received a copy of the code. (This "Word" reading has continued up to 1945).

In the case of "Words" for servicemen, the situation was more extreme. In the army and the navy, the soldiers had to read the "Words" aloud solemnly by themselves every morning and evening, that is, twice a day.

We must remind ourselves here that both school and army were compulsory institutions. A person can reject other media of communication. But the "Words" were compulsory to be received and only to be received. (The receiver was not allowed to send a message back to the original communicator, the Emperor.) In a word, every man who was a Japanese citizen had to attend school and join the army, and that means he had to be exposed to the "Words" repeatedly.

Moreover, the students and soldiers had to bow to the portrait of the Emperor, which was usually hung in the center of the school auditorium behind a curtain which was opened when the "Words" were read. The principal of the school, then, acted as the agent of the Emperor, so to speak. Anyhow, the point is that this "Words" communication was quasi-personal between the Emperor and the people, and it depended entirely upon an audio-visual channel.

The "Word" communication was, in any case, unconditionally superior to any other type of communication. Sometimes, controversy and confusion in the Congress were settled by the "Words". In the old Japanese society, the "Words" were the communication which determined the validity of all other communications. Every communication was ultimately supervised and controlled by the "Words". Even legislation was not an exception: that is, if the law and the "Words" conflicted, it was considered that the law was unconditionally wrong.

Therefore, from our point of view, the "nationalism" of the 1890s is characterized by the use of Emperor symbols which were independent and unconditional. The symbols of the Emperor system penetrated to the public not through mass media but by means of the "Words", and the effect was tremendous. There is no doubt that the popular conception of the Japanese nation overlapped with the concept of the Emperor, and the core of "nationalism" was nothing but the Emperor system.

As we have seen before, newspapers in the modern sense came to the scene in the 1890s, but at the same time, the "Word" communication became institutionalized. And the publishers were reminded to obey codes governing the specific style and editorial technique when they reported affairs of the Imperial family. (The following episode is suggestive. Under the Emperor system, when a misprint was found in an article in a newspaper which reported something about the Imperial family, the editor was purged from the firm.)

4. Summary

The whole discussion is summarized as follows: 1) Technological and intellectual developments which started from the time of Meiji Restoration reached the stage where a "national communication circle" could be formed in 1890s. 2) From the "national communication circle", there emerged a political and social philosophy of "nationalism". 3) In the case of this specific "nationalism" of Japan, it should be remembered that the core concept of the nation was identical with the Emperor, and the enlightenment movement itself had been under the control of the Emperor system.

Notes

1. Slightly abridged translation from a chapter in "Studies in the nationalism of 1890s" edited by Y. Sakata, *Miraisha*, Tokyo, 1958
2. Larner Daniel: The passing of Traditional Society: modernizing the middle east. 1958
3. There are reasons, however, to think that the literacy rate before the Restoration was relatively high. There were informal "*Terakoya*" schools, i.e., community-supported educational institutions where either Buddhist priests or jobless *Samurai* acted as teachers of reading and handwriting. At the same time it is recorded that in late 18th century there were several best-selling popular fiction with sales of more than 30,000 circulation each.
4. Not only telegraph but also railroads and telephones were constructed first between Tokyo and Yokohama, and this fact shows that the Meiji government was very conscious of the need to have access to foreign information which came to the port of Yokohama.
5. The first press regulation enforced in 1871 is attached as the appendix to this paper.
6. Political parties were voluntarily organized as the result of the democratic movement among intellectual circles. But they stayed as informal political groups until 1890 when the Imperial Diet was established.
7. Lasswell, H.D.: "Style in the Language of Politics" in *Language of Politics*. p.29 ff.

REGULATIONS FOR NEWSPAPERS (*Shimbun shi Jōrei*)

July 19th, 1871 Japanese Government

1. The newspapers must aim at the enlightenment of the people.
2. By "the enlightenment of the people" it is meant to abolish the old inflexible narrow-mindedness and to lead the people to the realm of civilization. Therefore, newspapers must report important facts, both domestic and international, in order to broaden man's knowledge, and to serve the nation's prosperity and security.
3. Newspapers may report any human affairs and social happenings as far as they do not conflict with the government's interest. Since the nation's relationship with other countries of the world became more and more important after the Restoration, it is prohibited to use disgraceful expressions to describe foreign countries, or to exaggerate the news about such countries without having reliable information.
4. It is prohibited to dispute the government's policies.
5. Religious propaganda is prohibited.
6. It is prohibited to treat an individual person with discourtesy on the basis of uncertain rumor.
7. It is prohibited to translate and publish any article from foreign newspapers if the original publication is anonymous.
8. Information which is educational or instructive for the people, or information which may serve the public interest, such as the information about new technological inventions, are encouraged to be published.
9. Jokes and humor which are harmless may appear in newspapers. However, it is warned that this must not lead to obscenity.

10. Any doubtful information must be published with a note which refers to the nature of the said information. When information is found to be false or incorrect after publication, correction must be made in the next issue.
11. As a rule, expression must be plain and understandable. Do not use intricate phrasing.
12. Editors and reporters are reminded that they are historians writing a part of history. By doing so, they can avoid possible danger of careless expression. At the same time, it is wise for them to think of themselves as if they were the writers of popular fiction, because hard and academic treatment of facts and information cannot reach the popular audience.
13. Editors and reporters must make their readers interested in reading newspapers and make them aware of the importance of newspapers. However, fictitious or exaggerated reports, or agitative and misleading expressions, are prohibited.
14. Eight copies of each issue must be sent to the government.

Continuities and Discontinuities in the Japanese "Motion–Pictures"

--An Aspect of Early History--

When the first Japanese Ambassador to the United States arrived at Washington in 1858, he was invited one evening to a reception where an optical projection of still pictures were shown. The intention of the host, needless to say, was to entertain the guest from the Far East with the new American device, and the Ambassador enjoyed the hospitality of the American host. But it is interesting and important to note the fact that the Ambassador, after the reception, wrote in his diary as follows:

There was a projection of pictures in a spacious hall. The pictures were mostly scenery and they were pretty. Same as ours.

In other words, the guest was not so much surprised by the show as the host might have expected. He calmly wrote "Same as ours", and this small incident invites us to look back at the traditional Japanese art of pictorial projection in the 19th century.

The prototype of Japanese native "motion–pictures" is *Kage–e* (shade–pictures) or *Te–Kage–e* (hand–shade–pictures), originally a children's play. The play is very simple. It is the projection of the figures composed by hands and fingers to *Shōji* (paper sliding door) with candle–light. The fingers can compose, for instance the shape of the head of a fox, the shape of a man's face, and so forth. All you need is to extend your hands and fingers between candle–light and *Shōji* and move them, and the audience will enjoy the performance from the other side of *Shōji*.

It was an anonymous invention of *Shōji* and candle culture. Indeed, before the arrival of television and fluorescent light, *Kage–e* used to be one of the most popular winter entertainments among Japanese children.

This art later became an adults' play, too. The oldest written record about *Kage–e* can be found in "*Rakuyosyu*", a collection of essays published in 1680, and according to this book, *Kage–e* could be an amateur theater. That is, a group of adults and children making up a play by hand–shades. The educators in the pre–industrial period used to stress the educational value of *Kage–e* very often. For example, a book titled *The Book of Kage–e*, published in the 18th century, says:

> "The most desirable way of raising very young children is to let them develop their own abilities, but because of their nature, they do not like

complicated arts. Such arts are beyond their understanding and they cannot enjoy them. On the other hand, to give ordinary toys is also not ideal for children. Since toys are shaped in particular forms, they cannot absorb children's interests. They are bored by toys sooner or later. *Kage–e* meets with the psychology of children, because the shapes can be flexible. *Kage–e* is one of the most desirable educational means for young children".

It should be noted that the toys are defined as "shaped in particular forms". The essence of *Kage–e* is on the other extreme of something "shaped in particular forms". The basic characteristic of *Kage–e* is that it lacks "forms". Five fingers, sometimes with the aid of small items, such as chopsticks or matches, can produce various forms on *Shōji*. (In regard to the varieties of *Kage–e*, *Katei Hyakka Jiten* [Home Encyclopedia] of 1925 illustrates 31 basic forms.) A very minor move of finger can change the figure of a dog into the figure of a cow, and this sort of unexpected change is the joy of *Kage–e*. It is fundamentally different from such well defined games as a jig–saw–puzzle. It was an "informal" art of pre–industrial Japan.

The art of *Kage–e* has developed into a new stage by the invention of *Nishiki–Kage–e*. It was an optical projection of still pictures with the aid of candle–light to *Shōji* screen, and the invention is described as follows:

> "The art of *Nishiki–Kage–e* was devised by a man named Toraku, who used to be a professional painter. By some chance he succeeded in projecting pictures painted on a small piece of glass enlarged by a lens of lookingglass. Thereafter, he painted picture stories on pieces of glass, and performed this art at vaudeville theaters (*Yose*), and as it became popular, he trained disciples in this new art."

In short, this was a kind of picture–slide projection using lenses. The lens itself might have been an import from the Netherlands, but the combination of glass–painting and *Shōji* screen was the original device by Toraku, and it should be emphasized that Toraku's invention was not only experimental, but also commercially successful as a vaudeville art. It was an established genre of popular culture in pre–industrial Japan.

As a matter of fact, the city people of the day seemed to be most interested in the projection, and many essay journalists of late 18th century referred to this invention. Since the audience reaction was very active, the performers, i.e., Toraku and his disciples, were encouraged to refine the art. The painting became fullrange color, and the performance came to be accompanied by music. The stories were taken mostly from *Kabuki* script. Indeed, a conservative critic was somewhat disgusted by the "color and music" and wrote that "the essence of *Kage–e* is in a quiet, small group setting, not in noisy vaudeville theaters." And such remarks remind us of classicist response to Cinemascope which insists that the best of movie is in standard size screen with monochrome effect.

The development of *Nishiki-Kage-e* (which later was called *Utsushi-e*), however, continued all through the first half of the 19th century, and as a result, Japanese *Kage-e* artists finally succeeded in making "motion-pictures" with multi-screen technique, and this evolution of pictorial projection was most impr essive.

The inventor of the "motion-pictures" is unknown. But a man by the name of Bunraku Tamagawa who lived in the suburb of Tokyo in early 19th century was a well-known performer of the multi-screen, and his projectors and slides (glass-paintings) art still being kept in good condition.

In this multi-screen projection, five projectors called *Furo* [meaning "box"] with candle-light were used, under one-man operation system. Each projector is equipped with different series of pictures, consisting of parts of the total screen, and the operator changed the slides so that the motion-effects on the screen could be produced. For example, the first projector from the left projects the shape of a tree from the beginning to the end. In the second projector, there is a series of man's posture which changes its place on the screen and the third projector succeeds the man's movement to the right. The fourth projector is for the moon in the sky, and the fifth is to make cloud effects over the moon as the story progresses.

The art of this multi-screen projection requires extraordinary skill, and an observer of this type of "motion-picture" wrote about Bunraku, the performer, as follows:

> It is a wonderful one-man art. He moves from one projector to another incessantly and the changes of pictures are perfectly synchronized with music. Years of intensive training is the basis for this performance.

In this cultural context, it is understandable that the first Japanese Ambassador saw the American version of pictorial projection as " same as ours", and if he were familiar with the "motion-pictures", his remark actually could have been an understatement. Many things may be said in regard to the independent and unique development of Japanese pictorial perfection and "motion-pictures" befor e the arrival of modern motion picture devices from abroad, and the most important is the fact that the Japanese public was well prepared for the acceptance of more mechanical projection equipment.

In the spring of 1897, a man by the name of Shibata came back from the United States to Japan with a new projection device, Edison's Kinetoscope. Shibata was the producer-manager of the Japanese section at the Chicago World Exposition in 1893, and since his exhibits of the Japanese tea ceremony and *Geisha* Dance were so successful, he gave performances at Atlantic City, San Francisco, and other American cities. Kinetoscope was in a sense a "souvenir" from the United States. And interestingly enough, he brought back a film of a *Geisha* Dance which was taken in Chicago. Upon his return, Shibata immediately demonstrated Kinetoscope for his friends in Tokyo. The films were very short, but his friends were very much impressed by this new machine. Among the viewers of this demonstration, there was a well-known journalist of the day, Ōchi Fukuchi, and he suggested that the projection could be commercialized.

A few weeks later, Shibata and his friends rented a theater in downtown Tokyo and publicized the arrival of new "motion pictures". Though admission was extremely high (the equivalent of $2.00 of the day), people were full of curiosity and all the seats were sold out for the period of 18 days, resulting in the balcony of the theater falling down because of too many people standing on it. This was the beginning of modern Japanese motion pictures.

The most interesting thing in the early history of motion pictures in Japan, is the fact that, after Shibata's first demonstration, the people who saw the possibility of the "motion pictures" as mass entertainment were the salesmen of *Kage-e*, the traditional Japanese "motion-pictures". As mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, Japanese popular artists had developed their own projection devices, and they were able to understand the revolutionary meaning of Kinetoscope imm ediately. The audience also was culturally prepared to accept modern motion--pictures because they were used to seeing projections in vaudeville theaters. It is natural for the salesmen of *Kage-e* to perceive Vitascope as the "next" step. In other words, the import of modern motion-pictures was accepted by the Japanese people without any cultural panic or friction. Of course, Vitascope, as well as Cinematography which arrived from France almost at the same time, was "new", but they were "new" in the sense that they could be a "new *Kage-e*". As a matter of fact, the tradition of *Kage-e* caused certain technical misunderstandings of Vitascope and Cinematography. As seen before, *Kage-e* was a *Shōji* art where the audience looks at the screen from the other side of a projector (the same was true with *Nishiki-Kage-e*). And the Japanese *Kage-e* man, who was regarded to be the expert of Kinetoscope, projected the film from the back of the screen as a matter of course. Naturally, the picture was extremely poor and vague, and the expert sprayed water over the screen to make it as transparent as *Shōji*. It took some time until be found that the American "motion-pictures" must be projected from the other side of the screen.

Indeed, technical curiosity of Japanese motion-picture people was the generator of the movie industry in Japan. It is symbolic that the first Japanese movie theater established in 1903 was named "*Denki-Kan*" (Electric Pavilion), and the audience was not only exposed to movies but also the various kinds of electric mechanism and their experiments. The contents of the movies were, naturally, an attraction, but people were more interested in the technology itself. This mechanical curiosity played an important role in the development of Japanese movies in later stages, and that tradition was inherited by the electronic industry in contemporary Japan. As a matter of fact, Japanese people today are often more sensitive about the clearness of pictures than the contents of the TV program, and by the same token, they are more interested in hi-fi "sound" than "music" effects. Like that man who was impressed by the "skill" of multi-screen projection 100 years ago, the Japanese today also are more or less, technology-oriented in audio-visual communications.

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The Birth of A "Free Radio"

--Broadcasting Under Military Occupation--

Japan has always been very responsive to new developments abroad. And in the technological fields, she has been particularly watchful of the American scene. The field of radio broadcasting has been no exception. Immediately after the successful start of radio broadcasting in Pittsburgh in 1920, Japanese businessmen as well as technicians became keenly interested in the broadcasting business, and as early as 1922, several experimental radio broadcasts were conducted. Many people, especially newspaper people, were looking forward to the possibilities of radio broadcasting as a new business, and in 1923, some 55 applications for broadcasting licenses were submitted to the Japanese government. Takeshi Inukai, at that time Minister of Communication, investigated the applications carefully and decided to suggest that the applicants merge and form new bodies in three major cities in Japan, i.e., Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya. The three stations thus founded started operation in 1925, and they were legally independent public corporations financed by private capital.

However, in the spring of 1926, the government ordered the three stations to consolidate into a single system called "Japan Broadcasting Corporation" (*Nihon Hōsō Kyokai*), and nominated former officials of the Ministry of Communication as the directors of the new corporation. In spite of strong resistance on the part of the broadcasters, government power at last forced them to consolidate, and they completed the network system in 1928. Needless to say, this was the beginning of NHK, or the public broadcasting system of Japan. It is safe to say that NHK is extremely peculiar in the sense that it has been under direct government control but still financed by private capital. And NHK had to became a "government agent" during the war for obvious reasons. The private investors who founded NHK had disliked the increasing government pressure on their stations, and it was natural for them to see the end of the war as a great opportunity to establish "free radio."

In September 1945, only few a days after the formal surrender of Japan to the Allies, Mr. Jinkichi Terada (the son of Jinyomo Terada, who tried to establish the first radio station in Osaka in early 20's) inaugurated a "preparatory office for the new broadcasting company." By the end of the same year, Mr. Terada and the editorial staff of the *Mainichi* newspaper had merged to establish a new station called "New Japan Broadcasting Company Limited." Their application for a license was submitted to the Ministry of Communication.

In addition to this new company, several other groups were interested in the broadcasting business. In Nagoya, Mr. Tsunejiro Miwa, the president of the Chamber of Commerce of the city, initiated "*Chūbu Nihon* Broadcasting Company Limited," and in Tokyo, Mr. Chu Funata, the chairman of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce, took the initiative in inaugurating the "People's Broadcasting Company Limited."

Government officials were also looking into the possibilities of new broadcasting system, since part of NHK's facilities had been confiscated by the Occupation Forces, and General Headquarters (GHQ) was said to have a radical plan for reorganizing Japanese mass media. Dr. Shigeyoshi Matsumae, the Minister of Transportation and Communication, foresaw the reform of NHK and the communication industry, and began to encourage the establishment of a new broadcasting system based on private capital. His idea was to make this new broadcasting system complement NHK, and the proposal was approved in a cabinet meeting in September 1945.

The proposal then was sent to GHQ for examination and was accepted favorably at that moment. However, for months, GHQ did not respond to the prospectus and every time that Dr. Matsumae and his staff visited the officers of GHQ, they were told that the matter was "pending" or "under consideration." Indeed, GHQ officers did not have much time for or interest in the new broadcasting system, since they were more concerned with the reform of NHK.

On 11th of December 1945, GHQ released a memorandum on the "Reorganization of NHK" which suggested (1) abolition of Government control over the NHK organization; (2) the establishment of a new, autonomous public broadcasting system; and (3) the appointment of a new committee, representing the people of Japan, which would select the chairman of NHK and advise him. In addition to the memorandum, the officer of GHQ made the oral comment that they were not considering permitting any private broadcasting, since democratization of NHK would be sufficient to respond to the new needs of the public. The committee suggested by the memorandum was organized. At that time, the idealism of New Deal prevailed at GHQ, which preferred to have more or less progressive (left wing) people in the committee. Conservative candidates recommended by the Ministry of Transportation and Communication were rejected by GHQ. In a word, GHQ's policy was to make a revolutionary change in the organization and management of NHK, bringing in the most radical elements.

The committee nominated Mr. Iwasaburo Takano as the chairman of NHK and made a series of recommendations for the reorganization of NHK. GHQ's orders and advice for NHK programs were two-pronged. In the first place, they instructed NHK to produce such anti-militaristic programs as "This was the truth," "The people who defended freedom," and "School for the people." And at the same time, they tried to bring in the American programming pattern--15 minute time-modules, entertainment such as quiz and participation programs--which had not been known to Japanese broadcasting.

Mr. Matsumae, the minister who initiated and encouraged the move toward new free broadcasting systems, found himself in an awkward position under the reform policy of GHQ in which the reorganization of NHK took priority over a new radio system, and he had to recommend that applicants for broadcasting licenses petition directly to GHQ, since he had no authority as the coordinator between applicants and GHQ. The applicants had a difficult time with GHQ, which had ultimate power over broadcasting.

GHQ's reluctance to give broadcasting licenses was somewhat understandable from the viewpoint of occupation policy. On December 11th of 1946, GHQ asked the Joint Occupation Committee (consisting of delegates from China, Britain, the Soviet Union, and the U.S.A.) for their decision on the broadcasting system of Japan under occupation. The British representative said that, for the purpose of checking on and controlling broadcasting programs, a single system (NHK) was desirable at that stage. China was of the opinion that the Australian model (having both public and commercial stations) was the ideal. The Soviet Union, after a month-long study, came to the conclusion that the concentration into a single system would be advantageous for occupation policy and opposed the idea of commercial broadcasting on the basis of possible commercial manipulation by capitalists. In short, the resolution of the committee was to maintain the *Status quo* in Japanese broadcasting and not to permit any new broadcasting system. They fundamentally agreed to maintain NHK, under the control of GHQ, as the only system. The Ministry of Transportation and Communication, in effect, was advised by GHQ to confirm the cancellation of all applications for broadcasting licenses and to report that decision and action to the cabinet meeting. All of the applications were rejected and applicants were informed that their applications would be "kept on file."

The decision of the Joint Committee and GHQ was, needless to say, catastrophic to the people who had been working for independent stations. In most of the preparatory offices in the broadcasting field, the initial capital was almost exhausted and investors lost interest. Moreover, on the 4th of February, 1947, GHQ purged the central figures among the applicants, such as Mr. Terada and Mr. Funada, on the basis of their business activities during the war. Most of the offices, therefore, were disbanded, and the shareholders lost their money totally. As Mr. Terada remarked on the occasion of the final dismissal meeting of shareholders, "the hope of yesterday has been replaced by the disappointment of today."

In the midst of this despair, there were continuing efforts on the part of a small number of people who did not give up. For instance, Mr. Hideo Yoshida of the *Dentsu* Advertising Agency organized a research team to discuss the problems of commercial radio broadcasting under free competition, preparing for the day when commercial stations would be permitted. Mr. Daikichiro Tagawa, a Christian pacifist who advocated free radio, wrote a memorandum to General MacArthur in which he said "The broadcasting institutions of a society are vital to the culture of the society. What you promised us at the beginning of your occupation was freedom of speech, but I am afraid that the concentration of broadcasting into a single public broadcasting system is contradictory to what you promised. I heard that the Allies already have permitted free radio in Italy. I do not think the

Japanese people are inferior to Italians" (retranslated from Japanese text in the absence of the original).

The most important and effective continuing effort, however, could be found in a resolution of the Judicial Committee of the Japanese government, which had been working on the reformation and interpretation of Japan's legal system. One of the basic issues was the reform of laws which regulated communication. The Radio Act, which came in effect in 1914, stated in article 1 that "wireless means of communication shall be under the control of government" and that the minister may permit "private enterprise" only under special circumstances. NHK as a public corporation had been one of the exceptions where "special circumstances" were applicable. But the GHQ memorandum on the reorganization of NHK was, obviously, in conflict with the Radio Act, and furthermore, in Japan's new constitution "freedom of communication" was described as one of the fundamental civil rights. The committee had to establish new laws which could accommodate both the constitution and the memorandum, and while doing so, the committee came to the conclusion that the monopoly on broadcasting by NHK was not legally fair. Thus begun a legal dispute between GHQ and the Japanese government. Mr. Hiroshi Torii of the Ministry of Communication theorized that the monopoly of NHK might be necessary while Japan was under occupation, but in the post-occupation period, radio broadcasting based on free competition could be the only hope for Japan.

On October 16th, 1947, GHQ called a meeting with officials of the Ministry of Communication and gave its "final suggestion" in which the following four points were made clear.

1. The new broadcasting law should be based on
    a. the freedom of speech
    b. political neutrality
    c. responsibility for public service, and
    d. maintenance of technical standards.
2. An autonomous public agency responsible for checking all broadcasting should be established.
3. The agency should consist of
    a. a licensing division and
    b. its own broadcasting division to which NHK could be transferred.
4. Private commercial stations should be licensed.

The officials of GHQ added that they did not have any intention of encouraging monopoly in broadcasting, and that they would rather suggest strongly that commercial stations be licensed at the time when "economic conditions of Japan permit such ventures." In other words, GHQ wanted to see the coexistence of both public and commercial broadcasting in Japan.

This announcement flatly contradicted the memorandum issued less than a year before, stating that commercial broadcasting would never be approved. What factors affected this policy change? As discussed in the preceding pages, "resistance" by Japanese government and business was one of the factors; also, the conflict of occupation policy with the Japanese constitution put GHQ in a difficult position. But there seem to have been certain internal changes in GHQ. First of all, GHQ became more and more conscious of Japanese public opinion. Japanese newspapers were very active in discussing the problems of broadcasting, and the opinion trends were carefully translated and studied by GHQ. Secondly, GHQ came to have a more or less optimistic perspective of Japan's future after two years' occupation, and was becoming prepared for a "post-occupation" era. Furthermore, the Soviet Union, whose position had been against any private broadcasting enterprise, lost much of its influence in the joint occupation committee and this enabled United States to act more freely. In any event, the policy of GHQ changed sometime between December 1946 and October 1947, and the move toward "free radio" was reactivated.

The next step was to legislate a new "broadcasting law" in the Japanese parliament. The draft was prepared and submitted to the parliament in June 1948. The proposed law consisted of 106 articles, but consensus was not reached among GHQ, the Japanese government, and the other interest groups concerned. In particular, government officials, except for the few who drafted the law, were either disinterested in or ignorant about commercial broadcasting. Most of the people were simply unable to imagine broadcasting solely dependent on advertising. Even the Minister of Communication of the day(Mr. Matsumae had retired already) was not confident about the possibilities of commercial broadcasting in Japan. There were technical difficulties, too. Mr. Amishima of the Ministry of Communication reported to the communication subcommittee of the parliament that Japan did not have any extra radio wave channels, and that future prospects for them were poor. Furthermore, an officer of Ministry of Finance testified for the subcommittee that the ministry was not ready to encourage the banking business to help broadcasting, and he implied that those who wanted to start a broadcasting business had to be ready with their own money.

The detached attitude of both government and parliament was a mystery, but according to Mr. Amishima, who explained the mystery several years later, the government was instructed not to pass the law during the session but to postpone it until next year. Indeed, there is a very interesting passage in the June 30th records of the communication subcommittee, in which the chairman ordered the stenographer to keep off record for several minutes and then continued "...therefore, it will be quite difficult to reach any resolution before the end of the session; but I feel that this is a good opportunity to inform the public of some of the ideas the government has." In all of the government records during the occupation period, it was customary to have an "off-record" portion where the directives and suggestions from GHQ were reported. One can suspect, in this context, that GHQ was still reluctant to license commercial stations. It did not disapprove the idea of free radio. It even encouraged it. But there seemed to be the judgment that is was "too early" for commercial broadcasting in Japan.

In April 1949, GHQ suggested to the two key officials of the Ministry of Communication, namely Mr. Torii and Mr. Amishima, that they go to the United States for a month-long inspection tour of American broadcasting. This suggestion was very important in the sense that it made the possibility of commercial broadcasting seem more real and it also provided the opportunity for Japanese broadcasting to look to America for a model. And what these two officials learned was tremendous. Mr. Torii spent much of his time studying the FCC and licensing procedures, and Mr.Amishima, being an engineer,made an extensive survey of area coverage and frequency allocations. Above all, they were impressed by the development of American broadcasting stations and became quite confident of the success of similar stations in Japan.

Upon their return to Japan, Mr. Torii and Mr. Amishima worked to modify the "broadcasting law" which had been pending since 1948, and interestingly enough, this time GHQ was in support of the modified draft, which emphasized a "Broadcasting Committee" (an equivalent of the American FCC). In the new draft, articles concerning the "radio code" disappeared and commercial broadcasters were assured full freedom of speech. In a word, the new draft was much more liberal than the one which had been submitted in 1948. And this time, those who opposed the draft were the government and NHK rather than GHQ. As a matter of fact, Mr. Shigeru Yoshida, the Prime Minister of the day, insisted that the chairman of the "Broadcasting Committee" had to be one of the ministers and that the Prime Minister had to have power over the committee. Because of his strong insistence, government activity on the law was stopped. Mr. Yoshida declared that unless there was a "directive" from GHQ, he would never approve the law. GHQ, instead of giving him a formal "directive," sent out a private letter from General MacArthur to Mr. Yoshida in which he was assured that lack of direct government control over broadcasting would cause no difficulty. Mr. Yoshida reluctantly surrendered, saying that he would interpret the "private letter" as a kind of "directive."

Immediately after Mr. Yoshida's bitter compromise, the draft was submitted to the parliament. Although there was opposition from both the communist and socialist parties, with slight modification the law finally passed both upper and lower houses in April 1950 and came into effect on the 1st of June of the same year. In Japan today, the 1st of June is celebrated as "*Radio Day*" (*Denpa no hi*). It took four years and eight months from the time Mr. Matsumae advocated the necessity of free radio until it materialized, and as described in the preceding pages, there were many ups and downs both in occupation policy and government reactions.

The business circle, which had lost both interest and money for broadcasting, recovered; and once again many applications for licenses were submitted. According to records, there were 11 applications as of September 1948, when the first draft was still pending, and the number increased after the beginning of 1949. The Ministry of Communication accepted another 11 applications before February 1949, another 9 before September of the same year, and by February 1950, there were 45 applications altogether. When the second draft was submitted to the parliament, the number of applications had reached 72. Among these 72, 42 met the standard qualifications for applicants, and in April 1951, 16 of them were licensed. The first Japanese commercial stations to start broadcasting were New

Japan Broadcasting (NJB) of Osaka and *Chūbu Nihon* Broadcasting Company(CBC) of Nagoya; almost simultaneously, they began their program broadcasting on the 1st of September, 1951. From the conception of "free radio" in Japan until its birth, five years had passed. The birth was not an easy one.

Global Instantaneousness and Instant Globalism

--some observations on the significance of popular culture in developing countries--

This is the age of coating. Medical tablets are sugarcoated;book covers, wallpaper, and other durable paper products are plastic-coated; optical lenses are silicone-coated;many of the things around us--furniture, automobiles, and appliances--are paint-coated. Even the planet on which we live is coated! The earth at the start of the last quarter of the twentieth century took on a unique coating of its own--an "electronic coating." The earth's surface is now covered by innumerable, though invisible, electronic waves. To ascertain the existence of such waves just turn on the switch of a transistor radio. You will hear sounds originating from many parts of the world, twenty-four hours a day, without intermission.

Radio waves are active all the time, covering the earth, and the transistor radio could be viewed as a Geiger counter for such radio activity.

The electronic coating began when Marconi succeeded in his trans-Atlantic wireless communication in 1901; the invention of the vacuum tube followed, and then came the inauguration of broadcasting in 1920 in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. In the initial stage, the coating was local, covering only a small geographical segment; as the number of broadcasting stations increased, a wider coating, the "network" evolved, first in the United States. By the early 1930s, most of the countries in Europe and Japan had begun to have national radio broadcasting coverage. The coating had reached a national level, and the same coverage was achieved in most of the "developing" countries as well by the end of the 1950s. With the invention of the transistor, millions of people today own their own receivers. The electronic coating, however, was found to have a unique characteristic, in contrast to the older media of communication, such as the press, with its circulation primarily limited to national boundaries. If the power is strong enough, the territory which a single broadcasting station can "coat" can be expanded to such a considerable degree that the people in nearby countries can listen to the programs. The messages go beyond the national borders. Moreover, if a relay system is mobilized, a program originating at a particular spot on the earth can be broadcast around the world instantaneously. Global broadcasting was experimented with as early as 1932, when the tenth Olympic Games were held in Los Angeles. Though the area covered by international broadcasting of the 1930s was limited, for the first time in history, millions of people in different parts of the world were hearing one message simultaneously. In particular, the combination of television and communication satellites made reception of clear audiovisual messages possible in many areas. With the initiative of BBC in the summer of 1967, the first global television broadcasting was conducted with great success; needless to say, we are already used to watching programs various parts of the world via satellite. Incidents in Tokyo are seen in New York instantaneously and vice versa. Events in Saigon were watched by millions of families in Europe and vice versa. And with the introduction of jet transportation, we are often inclined to think that the world is indeed small. The sense of distance, both psychological and physical, is now becoming weaker, if not disappearing. John McHale suggests that as a result of global networks of communication and transportation, "global shrinkage" has been taking place. Global instantaneousness, generally speaking, has advantages in the sense that the human population on the planet can be informed of major happenings of the world without delay. Global communication technology also has great potential for better understanding among peoples.

However, certain aspects of global communication are problematic; among other things, in the field of popular culture, the emergence of a "world popular culture" has negative effects as well as positive ones, especially for developing countries.

One of the striking effects of global communication in developing countries is that the popular culture materials to which the people od these countries are exposed are too "equal" to those which entertain the peoples of more developed societies. Take, for example, television programs. As a recent UNESCO survey pointed out, most of the television stations in developing countries in Asia, Africa, and South America broadcast, to a considerable degree, programs produced in more developed countries. In an extreme case, in Guatemala imported programs occupy 84 percent of the total broadcasting time; in Zambia, the figure is 64 percent; in Malaysia, 71 percent; in Singapore, 78 percent; and in Hong Kong, 40 percent. The people of these countries are now watching programs for which the original target audience was the urban middle-class families of the more developed countries, especially the United States and Japan. On the screen, regardless of the type of program, middle-class values are presented--the actors are surrounded by durable commodities, material conveniences, and many aspects of the "affluent society." Though there has not been any systematic research on the matter so far, the impact of programs produced in more industrial societies upon the minds of the people of developing countries must be profound.

The contents of America and Japanese programs are, generally speaking, consumer oriented, and it is not presumptuous infer that the viewers in developing countries are influenced by this consumer philosophy. Indeed, one of my friends in the Philippines reports that the children there are extremely fond of TV commercials. The danger is that the people of developing countries, not only children but also adults, may acquire more of a sense of consumership than producership. In the process of development, consumption must accompany production. However, in certain developing countries interest in consumption comes before interest in production. Does this trend suggest any possibility of a newer type of "development"? We do not know the answer yet. One optimistic interpretation may be that the interest in consumption can stimulate an interest in production (a "We–want–a–refrigerator, let's–make–one" philosophy). Because the developed countries of the world are now suffering from over–production of most industrial products, the importation of these products by less developed nations would be a more likely solution than the expansion of industrialization. One compromise would be for more developed countries to subsidize production in less developed countries where labor is less expensive, and to export the products to profitable markets. According to the classic formula of development, the first stage is the accumulation of capital followed by industrial production. After a few centuries, there comes the age of consumption. It seems that the developing countries today do not fit into this scheme. Instead, a consumer culture is approaching maturity while substantial production is still lacking.

There is an irony in this trend, because the broadcasting system itself often has been a part of "foreign aid" programs that aimed at the promotion of development.

In a broader context, there seems to be a contradiction between evenness in the flow of information and the unevenness of material wealth. Exposure to information, or popular culture materials in the context of this paper, is evenly distributed. The people of the world, regardless of area, are exposed to the same values as transmitted by Tv, radio, and movies; yet the economic conditions of nations vary from the extremely rich to the extremely poor. Isn't it a tragedy to see a people watching the theme of affluence on a TV screen while all around them people are starving to death?

The area of popular culture presents us with a different kind of potential tragedy: With the diffusion of popular culture through mass media in developing countries, even their sense of national identity becomes endangered. In a recent study conducted in Thailand, it was discovered that the popular heroes are mostly Japanese TV stars, rather than "local" figures. The children and teenagers of the country can name the foreign stars with whom they are familiar through daily exposure on the TV screen, but because of the relative lack of programs produced in Thai, they do not see or hear about their "national"popular heroes. (Some of their names do appear in school textbooks.) The sense of nationalism is, as many scholars have pointed out, essential for the social and economic future of developing countries. But what has been happening in the past several years discourages nationalism on the popular level. At the least, "foreign" popular culture does not serve to promote national identity and nationalism.

It is easy for us to talk about the "age of world popular culture," an age in which the Beatles, Elvis Presley, James Bond, and many other popular heroes are universal heroes, liked and appreciated by mullions of people across national boundaries, and this observation may be quite correct. However, the implication of the existence of these "universal" heroes is that there may be a danger of "instant globalism," where less emphasis is given to national identity.

Globalism today is only another name for internationalism, and inter–nationalism presupposes solid national integrity and nationalism. The more developed countries already have experienced the age of nationalism for a century or so, and they have learned that nationalism must be counter–balanced by internationalism. In the case of developing countries, however, the situation is very complex. On the one hand, national unification and integrity are essential for development, while at the same time, popular culture materials present cosmopolitan values which are not necessarily compatible with the fundamental stages of nationalism. [After all, James Bond may be a secret agent whose mission is to confuse the efforts toward nationalism and independence in the developing countries which were colonies of the west until only a few decades ago!]

Another important aspect of popular culture in developing countries is the fact that the newer media of communication often have a profound impact upon the traditional media. For example, the traveling story tellers and singers are disappearing as the result of the wider diffusion of broadcasting. In the case of Japan in the early 1930s, when the radio and the phonograph were introduced, hundreds of street singers and traveling story tellers were replaced by the electronic transmitters of popular culture. The same trend is apparent in the developing countries of Asia today on a more drastic scale, because the electronic technology of the 1970s, especially television, are much more advanced than those of the 1930s. If the traditional values specific to a culture are translated to the newer media, then it won't cause too much of a problem; but usually, broadcasters prefer not to produce electronic versions of traditional communication. Instead, they are content to broadcast imported programs.

Even when conscious efforts are made to preserve traditional values, the newer technology places constraints on older modes of communication. A classic example, again from Japan, is the change which took place in *Sumō* wrestling. Originally, *Sumō* was a part of religious ritual performed in the yards of shrines to entertain the deities; as secularization went on, it became purely a spectator sport. Yet *Sumō* as an entertainment retained some of the symbolic significance of its original form. For instance, the four corner pillars supporting the roof of the arena represented a Chinese philosophy of the universe; the *Sumō* performers even kept the old ritualistic manners until broadcasters decided to transmit the game to the general public. In the first place, an artificial time element was introduced. In the ancient game, two wrestlers were given ample time facing each other before a match started. It was necessary to wait until the time became "mature," and two opponents could spend more than ten minutes before their match actually began.

Radio broadcasters, however, did not like this ritual, for obvious reasons. They succeeded in limiting the "waiting time" to three minutes so that the day's series of matches could end at 6:30 p.m. This change in the form of the game took place in late 1930s.

When the TV camera came into the *Sumō* stadium in the late 1950s, the producers found the supporting pillars obstructive to the camera. Another negotiation took place, and finally, the *Sumō* association agreed to take out the pillars to give a better view of the arena to TV camera. The form of this traditional sport had to adapt to the newer communication technologies.

In the countries of Asia, the traditional arts are the oldest and richest in the world. And to establish continuities between traditional media and newer electronic media will be a great task for the people of these countries.

The basic problem in designing such continuities and in promoting more "local" efforts is essentially an economic one. For example, the high ratio of imported programs broadcast in developing countries is simply a result of economic deliberation on the part of broadcasters. The importation of programs, especially TV programs, is much less expensive than local production of programs would be. A series of 13 one-hour programs can be purchased for several thousand U.S. dollars, while a local production of one 30-minute program would cost at least $3,000.00; it is doubtful if locally produced programs can be competitive with the imported programs. In short, the easiest way to attract a large audience for TV in developing countries is to broadcast American or Japanese programs that can be imported for a nominal fee (which the producers in more developed countries think of as an "initial investment"). China is probably the only country in Asia which avoided the danger by restricting the importation of popular culture from abroad, especially any importation from the capitalistic bloc. As a matter of fact, a UNESCO survey shows that there is very little importation of TV programs in China, and the few imported are from Eastern Europe. By doing so, China seems to have succeeded in preserving traditional culture and in constructing nationalism, although the arrangement had certain apparent shortcomings, such as the isolation of the people from much of the intercultural communication which other people enjoy. Burma and some other countries are following this pattern of communication isolation. They prefer to establish solid nationalism rather than to become "instant globalists"; no one can criticize their decision at a time when the sophisticated electronic coating is often country to the success of national development.

I am not suggesting that developing countries must follow the Chinese pattern. Rather I would like to suggest that there may be alternatives, where peoples of developing countries can take on a global coating and at the same time can be assured of their national identities. For example, if developed countries can put more emphasis on the export of the software techniques of program production rather than on canned programs, then independent, "local" programs, which serve national development, could be produced. And, if such local programs are produced successfully, then they should be multi-color, multi-participatory, and even multi-coated. The present danger is that the electronic coating is being done by a few countries, who use the same color--a color which other countries may not value.

A Cultural Balance Sheet of Big Media

1. What are "Big Media?"

Japan today is one of the media-saturated (or perhaps over-saturated) countries of the world. Every Japanese household subscribes to at least two newspapers a day, one in the morning and another in evening. Nearly 100 percent of Japanese families have at least one television set--most are color. There are six or seven TV station in each major city, broadcasting about 20 hours a day apiece. The diffusion of radio is even more extreme. Not only does each household have a radio, but also each individual, including the young children. There are some 30,000 kinds of magazines, published either weekly or monthly. In 1976, 15,000 new book titles were published and the total number of books sold reached 300 million copies, which means that each Japanese individual purchased approximately three books during that year. Advertisers are very active in the whole area of mass media,and they spend an equivalent of US $500 million each year to sell their commodities and services.

People are really absorbed by media. A series of surveys conducted by broadcasters and research corporations revealed that an average Japanese spent three hours every day watching television. The most enthusiastic viewers were found to be women, who spent some five hours watching television. As for newspapers, it was discovered that on the average, a Japanese spent about 30 minutes each day reading them. Radio is essentially for the youth, and one can find many young people between the ages of 10 and 18, listening to radio most of the time, even while studying. Indeed, they are the children of the age of media; often they cannot get along without some media, especially radio. They carry small transistor radios wherever they go. Even when they go to the mountains and forests for hiking, they prefer listening to a disc-jockey rather than to the sounds of the birds and the streams. As a critic once printed out, for the young people, nature has to be accompanied by music because they are used to seeing nature with music in the movies and on television. "Silent nature" is a somewhat alien experience for them.

Millions of white collar workers who commute between suburban communities and a central urban business district are absorbed by weekly magazines while they are on the train. In spite of the incredible crowding, they somehow manage to read the magazines. A researcher found that 30 percent of the older people, over age 60, thought that television was indispensable for their lives because, for them, television was the only joy left for them. At the peak viewing hour on Saturday evening during the summer, when television broadcasts professional baseball, the electric power companies reported a critical draw on their electric supply as people turned on their TV as well as their air-conditioners.

Once a popular song is introduced to the public through radio and television, the manufacturer of the disc may see more than a million records flowing into the market. When new cosmetics, hair-style, or fashions are advertised in junior magazines, thousands of teenagers would look for these products in department stores. At supermarkets, small children often pick up candy-bars or toothpaste they have seen on TV commercials. There are only a few examples that suggest the relationship between the media and the people in Japan today. People live with media, and media provides all information for the people. For better or worse, the life style of contemporary Japanese people is shaped by the various media, and the people cannot escape from it. These observations are not peculiar to Japan. Many countries of the world today share the same experiences and same problems. As a matter of fact, such areas of concern as the impact of television on the lives of children are becoming common topics not only among developed countries but also among the countries in their developing stage.

However, on closer examination, one will find that Japanese mass media have one characteristic that no other country shares, that is, the Japanese media are dominated overwhelmingly by "big media."

In the newspaper business, what are known as the "big three" (the *Asahi*, the *Yomiuri*, and the *Mainichi*) are the dominating papers. Each paper has a circulation of some seven million copies a day; in view of the fact that there are approximately 20 million households in Japan, we can infer that the entire Japanese population is reached by one of the "big three." Each of the "big three" has several thousand employees and at least four headquarters in the nation, one in Tokyo and others in Osaka, Fukuoka, and Sapporo. The archipelago of Japan is very small (much smaller than the state of California) but the island stretch from north to south for 3,000 kilometers; these four headquarters are set up to cover the four major sections of the country.

Newspaper anywhere have to face the problem of distribution. Until recently, the train was the major method of transportation; thanks to the well-developed railway system of the nation, the Japanese press did not have much difficulty in sending papers that were printed in Tokyo to other parts of Japan, although in some areas, delivery took more than 24 hours. The readers of these areas were thus left one day behind the news. With the arrival of regular jet service, the "big three" immediately began sending papier-māche molds of the day's paper to each headquarter so that the actual printing could be done locally. The local production of the paper "jet lagged" several hours behind the master printing in Tokyo, but this method was much more efficient than transporting the print run by train.

Further technological innovations were introduced. In the early 1960s, facsimile devices enabled a paper to be produced simultaneously in four headquarters. By this method, a key-puncher in Tokyo's central office types up a copy (involving a few thousand Chinese characters), and the copy is transmitted electronically to Osaka and other headquarters. There is practically no time lag between the Tokyo and Hokkaido editions, and the people of Japan are able to get the same news at the same time.

Prior to the introduction of jet freight, when the only means of delivery was trains, there was a chance for the small local newspapers to compete with the Tokyo-based "big three." As a matter of fact, the local newspapers has good access to news agencies, so many people preferred the papers to a Tokyo paper that came a day late. There are, of course, more than 3,000 local papers in Japan; after the arrival of the electronic age, when the "big three" began nation-wide operations, these local newspapers suffered from aggressive competition from the "big three." In many cases, the small local papers lost the battle; in some cases, when a local paper had had a solid tie with communities, the "big three" could not build a profitable market. But, generally speaking, local papers today are not so popular as they used to be. As a matter of fact, the "big three" have been extremely aggressive in their marketing into the area where local papers had established a solid market previously. The big national papers put tremendous amounts of money into promotion, giving one month's free trial delivery, free gifts for new subscribers, etc. In the Japanese language, this "newspaper war" became known as *Nabe Kama Sensō* (the war of sauce pans and rice cookers) because the major national papers gave away sauce pans, rice cookers, and many small household items in their sales promotions. The "war" was not only between local papers the big national papers, but also among the "big three." If one of the "big three" gave a rice cooker, another challenged with the gift of a blanket. Consequently, the big national paper reached even the small mountain communities of remote prefectures. The most recent "newspaper war" was fought in the Nagoya area where a well-established local paper,the *Chūnichi*, had enjoyed an almost monopolistic market since the nineteenth century. In 1976, the *Yomiuri*, after careful preparation, started a severe attack against the *Chūnichi* by offering lower subscription fees, free gifts, and so forth. The case was brought to the attention of the Fair Trade Commission and is still under investigation. But even during in the past year, the *Yomiuri* has been quite successful in the Nagoya market, and in terms of circulation, the paper became the leader of the "big three" followed by the *Asahi* with a difference of some 100,000 copies a day.

The broadcasting business in Japan also is big business. NHK (*Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai*), a public broadcasting system, probably is the world's largest broadcasting network--three radio channels (two AMs and one FM) and two television channels. The organization is supported, through special regulations approved by the Parliament, by the subscription fees from listeners and viewers. By law, every Japanese household equipped with radio and television is obliged to pay a subscription fee of US$5.00 per month. Though there is no penalty for not paying the subscription fee, Japanese citizens are extremely cooperative with NHK and more than 95 percent of the households are paying their fee regularly. Since there are about 20 million families in Japan, the total gross revenue of NHK is an estimated US$190 million every month. With that money, NHK operates more than

500 stations all over Japan, with tens of thousands of full-time employees. Naturally, the huge revenue from subscriptions is being used for the production of better programs both in radio and television. Because it is public broadcasting, there is no commercial, and the law states that NHK must make its best effort to provide service to the nation. Therefore, NHK has built many small satellite stations in mountainous areas so that every household can enjoy good reception. The programming of NHK is modest and decent, but yet, its rating is high. Indeed, the most popular TV program of NHK, a four-hour music program broadcast on the evening of December 31st every year, sometimes reaches 60 percent of the possible audience.

Commercial stations have undergone the process of organization and reorganization, and at present, four major networks are almost completed. There is network coverage from Hokkaido to Okinawa, in other words, from the northernmost to the southernmost point of Japan.

Interestingly enough, until the 1960s, local stations used to be more autonomous than they are today. they produced their own programs even though they were affiliated with major stations of Tokyo or Osaka. It used to be quite common for a local station to produce and broadcast its own programs several hours a day, while buying programs from its affiliated key stations for the rest of the broadcasting time. But local stations found it more profitable to reduce the local production, because the major stations could provide good programs (at least in terms of their rating) sponsored by firms that had nation-wide market. Local stations, of course, have their own local sponsors (mostly spot commercials) but, thanks to an automated transmission system, they do not have much difficulty in inserting some local commercials at intervals in the programs they get from the key stations.

As a result, most of the local commercial stations came to prefer to be totally dependent upon the programs they get from the Tokyo-based stations. The studios that had been built for local productions often became warehouses or bowling alleys. The only productions besides spot commercials are the news programs broadcast several times a day for five minutes.

The domination of "big media" in Japan is in contrast to the situation of other media-saturated societies, such as the United States, where local media, especially local print media, still serve each community. As a matter of fact, in the United States, even the ideas of a "national" newspaper seems to be alien. In other words, the Japanese term "big media" is another name for highly centralized media with great power, while American media are more or less decentralized. And, as is obvious from what has been discussed, the "big media" have become more and more centralized in recent years with the advance of electronic technologies. No other people in the world are exposed so overwhelmingly to a media of national scale that bring nationally uniform information.

2. Information Conglomerate

The source of the concentration and centralization of media in Japan are historical. In the first place, it should be noted that the government, either directly or indirectly, encouraged the emergence of "big media." This was especially true with broadcasting. Historically, when idea of radio was first introduced to Japan in 1923, the Japanese business circle was keenly interested in it as a new "business" in its strict sense. Of course, nobody could foresee how profitable radio could be, but many progressive businessmen of the time thought that commercial radio might bring a new horizon in business. Therefore, license applications for commercial broadcasting were submitted to the government one after another, and at one point, it almost seemed that broadcasting would begin as commercial radio. At the last moment the government decided to organize a special non-profit corporation as the heart of broadcasting in Japan. The first license was given to the corporation established in Tokyo on 1925, and then to similar corporations in Osaka and other major cities. After two years of licensing individual stations, the government suggested that the stations merge so that a single body could efficiently handle broadcasting throughout Japan. This was the beginning of NHK. Moveover, NHK thus organized came under the direct control of the government.

This was the time of international tension, and the Japanese military was ready to make its move into China. A highly centralized and government-controlled radio network was vital in this time of emergency and for the authoritarian government. It was during the war period that the diffusion of radio receivers was completed. The government transmitted many urgent messages and propaganda to the public, and the public vitally needed access to the news. Indeed, at the time when the American air force bombed major parts of Japan almost every day, the people had to be alert to the air-raid warnings at all times. Thus, the government encouraged the production and distribution of radio sets. In a word, Japanese radio began as a means of propaganda and emergency information.

The centralization of the newspapers had another historical development. As early as the 1850s, there was a move toward the publication of newspapers, and after the Meiji Revolution (1868), the dissemination of information through newspaper was very much encouraged by the government. Indeed, many policy measures were effected in order to give the people access to newspapers. Local governments were instructed to subsidize "good" newspapers, meaning the progovernment press, or even to let somebody start the business. Usually, each city had a "newspaper reading stand," a small hut where people could read the newspapers free. As a result, the newspaper business in Japan grew very quickly in the second half of the nineteenth century. Hundreds of papers appeared. Those that were too critical of government policies were suppressed, and those that favored the government were encouraged. Like the press of nineteenth century America and elsewhere, Japanese newspapers were also quite partisan during that period.

In the course of history, the Japanese press learned two things. First of all, they leaned that the major, if not the only, information originated in Tokyo. Since the Meiji government was trying to centralize its power in every respect, the flow of communication was heavily Tokyo-centered. Very often the communication pattern of the Meiji period was one-way. The central government in Tokyo made the decisions, and orders and instructions were transmitted to each local prefecture where local governors administered these decisions. The press, mostly local at the beginning, found that the news from Tokyo was the most necessary news to the readers. At the same time, they had to face the fact that to obtain news from Tokyo was very costly. In the 1890s, the telegraph was the only way to get news from Tokyo, but the cost was great. In order to compensate for the high cost of telegrams, the management of local papers had to try to sell more copies. It is interesting to note here that two of the "big three." the *Asahi* and *Mainichi*, were not Tokyo-based papers. They were local papers of Osaka, the second largest city in Japan, and these two papers grew into big papers because they had to sell more copies to cover telegram costs! In contrast, Tokyo papers of the nineteenth century were satisfied with what they were (10,000 copies a day) because they had such easy access to the major information source--the central government. It has been an irony that the "handicapped" papers of Osaka because "big media" because of their handicap, and then moved to Tokyo in the 1920s.

The second lesson the press of the nineteenth century learned was the principle of neutrality--a non-partisan approach to current affairs. Neutrality was, according to their experience, the safest way to survive under the dictatorship of the Meiji government. They also discovered that the readers, generally speaking, were more supportive of a non-partisan press. By the turn of the century, the partisan press had almost disappeared in Japan, and the circulation of "neutral" papers grew. This neutral stance, also discovered by local papers (notably by the *Asahi* and *Mainichi*), helped them to grow. In the late 1930s and early 1940s, the government encouraged the merger of newspapers, partly because of a shortage of paper and printing facilities and party because the government wanted more controlled news reporting. Many local papers had to merge. Thus, the emergence of "big media" in modern Japan is largely, if not totally, the result of governmental communication policy.

"Big media" after 1945 grew much faster than ever before. There have been more communication needs in the changing world in the past 30 years, and for the first time in modern history, Japanese were given freedom of speech and expression as a Constitutional right. Not only the mass media but also the communication industries prospered, especially after 1960, when post-war economic reconstruction was nearly completed.

By that time, "big media" were well prepared to expand their business.

In the first place, when the first commercial radio broadcasting was licensed in 1948, newspapers showed great enthusiasm for this new business. Without a single exception, newspapers in Japan, not only the big national papers but also major local papers, submitted their license application to the Ministry of Communication. In their applications, they cited good justification for being the first licenses--they though that in terms of news gathering and reporting they were the only qualified, experienced applicants. Since their approach was so aggressive and persuasive, the Ministry finally gave a license to the newspapers. Other applicants, such as the local business circle, decided to merge with the newspaper-dominated commercial stations. The news reporting on the radio was, needless to say, quite different from that of the newspaper, but newspapers were able to provide their affiliated radio stations with news to be broadcast. There are two or three commercial radio stations in Japan today that do not have any affiliation with the newspaper business; by subscribing to news agencies they have had no difficulty in news gathering and reporting. By the late 1940s, newspapers had an advantage in the broadcasting business. When commercial television began in 1953, again the newspaper business took the initiative in organizing new television stations. The *Yomiuri*, which failed to obtain a license for a radio station, was most aggressive (almost militant), in launching a new commercial television station, which is known as Nippon TV, completed its experimental broadcast with NHK. The *Asahi* and the *Mainichi* were put in a rather awkward position because there was only one channel available for them. These two papers had already made a joint radio venture in establishing Tokyo Broadcasting System (TBS), and they decided to continue their joint venture in television also. In the spring of 1976, after more than ten years of strange partnership, the situation was finally resolved; both the *Asahi* and the *Mainichi* got their own affiliated television station in Tokyo.

In Osaka, the newspaper–broadcasting combination took place more easily. The *Asahi* founded *Asahi* Broadcasting Co. (both radio and television), the *Mainichi* created *Mainichi* Broadcasting System (both radio and television), and the *Yomiuri* established *Yomiuri* Television. The important point is this: the "big three" in the newspaper business in Japan are also big in their affiliated broadcasting businesses. Since a similar affiliation and combination were in progress in Tokyo, it was natural for them to combine their respective broadcasting station with Tokyo. Thus the "big three" became huge information conglomerates.

Often criticism is raised regarding the monopolistic character of these conglomerates, but the management of each group would say that the newspaper and its affiliated broadcasting station are independent and autonomous corporations. As a matter of fact, very recently, a letter to the editor of the *Asahi* expressed openly the doubt about that paper's relationship with its affiliated station. The editor responded warmly and said that the paper and the broadcasting station were cooperating with each other, but both companies were independent and might have different policies. In fact, though the two companies are legally independent of each other, the top people of these affiliated station are usually those who have worked for the "mother–newspaper"; it is not unusual to se as a news commentator of a TV station, a retired columnist of the paper to which that particular station is affiliated. Indeed, they are cooperating each other. An affiliated station airs " house ads" for its "mother–newspaper" more than ten times a day, and in return, the TV page of the paper highlights programs of the affiliated TV station.

"Information conglomerates" in Japan are very active in other media industries. For instance, the publication department of each newspaper publishes a weekly magazine with a circulation of at least a half million copies. They also publish several kinds of monthly magazines and print more than 100 titles of books every year. A conglomerate is a self–contained "information kingdom," so to speak.

Moreover, they are interested in expanding into other service sectors of the economy. *Asahi* Broadcasting Co., of Osaka has built a magnificent hotel adjacent to the main office building of the company. The *Yomiuri* has become famous as the owner of a professional baseball team, *Yomiuri* Giants, which has been at the top of the national league. Of course, the *Yomiuri* conglomerate is in full support of the team, and the popularity of the team, in return, makes the *Yomiuri* more famous. The affiliated TV station, for the obvious reason, monopolizes the live broadcast of the baseball games whenever and wherever the Giants play. If the balance sheet of a newspaper company or a broadcasting company is looked at individually, the scale of its management may look modest. But if the gross revenue of the affiliated companies are totaled, the figure would be tremendous. A conglomerate has its press division, radio division, publication division, TV division, baseball division, hotel division, and even real estate division. No one can estimate the total capital assets of such conglomerate.

Since an information conglomerate is so huge, its financing is another interesting aspect to be examined. Though details have been disclosed, each information conglomerate has its main financing bank. In order to maintain neutrality, newspapers usually do not sell their stock on the market.
Instead, shares are distributed only among "insiders," namely, management and employee. But the capital thus formed is usually not sufficient to run the gigantic newspaper organization with its hundreds of bureaus, its sophisticated machines, and vast communication system. Therefore, they need financiers from outside. Major Japanese banks have been helping the newspapers by offering long term loans, good interest rates, etc. Moreover, since banks are also financing other media-related industries--paper mills, manufacturers of printing machine, electronics products--the hotel scale of their assistance to the newspaper business may amount to a fantastic figure. As business experts have pointed out in their research papers, the activities of banks in Japan are so broad that through banks, advertisers may be acquainted with media, too. In this fashion, as critics often point out, a media conglomerate may be interwoven into a larger conglomerate centered around a huge banking operation. In this sense an "information conglomerate" may mean more than the words narrowly interpreted.

3. Good Things about "Big Media"

Though people criticize "big media" for the many obvious defects and dangers, there are advantages in "big media."

In the first place, it should be again emphasized that "big media" played a significant role in nation-building of japan in the nineteenth century. The Meiji government was vary conscious of the media and did not hesitate to use government appropriations to promote newspaper business. The officials of that day though that the nation-wide diffusion of information from the government was vital for national integration. This was especially true with japan in the middle of the nineteenth century when she was trying to catch up with the West in a very short time. In retrospect it may be said that the government of Japan in the latter half of the century was the government of transportation and communication. A huge amount of the government's budget, which came from a centralized internal revenue system, was invested in the construction of railroads. As early as 1872, four years after the Revolution of Meiji, railroads connecting Tokyo and Yokohama (neighboring port-town) was completed and regular service was begun; in 1889, the whole Tōkaidō Line, a construction of some 500 kilometers linking Tokyo and Kōbe, was completed. Between 1868 to 1890, numerous local railways were constructed; thus, after 1890, the major cities of Japan were connected by railroads.

The importation of the telegraph came very early, too. In 1869, as soon as the new administration came to power, telegraph cable was installed between Tokyo and Yokohama, and in 1872, communication by means of telegraph became available between Tokyo and Kyoto. Further, the first underwater cable successfully connected Hokkaido, the northernmost island, with the main island of Japan. It is no wonder that the government could take quick action against a military riot in the southern part of Japan in 1877. The riot, headed by Takamori Saigō, an eminent military leader of the day could have been a drastic coup d'etat if the central government had not been informed of the incident. As soon as the central military headquarters received the telegram, hundreds of thousands soldiers were dispatched immediately to the riot area, by railroad and by ship. The retaliation was so swift that the subversive group, which was on its way to Tokyo, was intercepted only 200 kilometers from the point of departure. The coup failed because the new government was equipped with the most sophisticated means of transportation and communication. A historian has remarked that the overwhelming victory of the central government vis-a-vis General Saigō's coup was a victory of communication. Moreover, because of wider dissemination of newspapers throughout the country, there was very little social panic during the unrest. The government could assure the public, through newspapers, that there would not be anything to worry about. The newspapers functioned as a tranquilizer for public, which otherwise could have been an additional disturbance for a government no yet solid and stable.

One may argue that a centralized communication system, combined with the centralized power of the government, should have been a terrifying experience for the people. It is easy, naturally, to label the Meiji government as an absolutist government. But at the same time, if there had been no centralized transportation and communication systems under the direct control of the new government, it is doubtful if Japan could have launched her rapid modernization. It may be too idealistic to apply a contemporary concept of freedom to a particular phase of history. Indeed, even in the United States, newspapers of the nineteenth century were extremely partisan, and top executives favored papers that supported his policies. (Though not well known publicly, the title and function of local postmasters of the United States was given, until 1904, only to merchants who supported the President, and therefore they changed as the administration changed.) Control over communication was probably a necessary stage for modern nation-building.

"Big media," historically, has had a tremendously integrative function, and Japan is a good illustration. In order to permeate the nation with a central political power, the Japanese government encouraged the people to read newspapers. A special postal rate for newspapers was established as early as 1872. Many prefectures distributed a copy of newspaper to each rural community where the priest of the local temple or a school teacher read the paper aloud for the villagers. It might be quite true that the contents of the papers thus distributed were partisan and very biased, but somehow, the government was successful in disseminating information throughout the country and in establishing an "informed public" of its own kind.

On the contemporary scene, too, the existence of "big media" brings many advantages. One of the characteristics of Japanese " big media" today is the fact that, because of their scale, they can afford to have many information sources of their own. For example, the "big three" newspapers as well as NHK, have hundreds of local bureaus and numerous branch offices abroad. News from Paris is covered by a group of permanent staff writers stationed there; news may come from Jakarta where at least one correspondent is permanently dispatched. Name any city in Japan with a population of more than 50,000 and there will be a correspondent for each media there, ready to phone the headquarters office if anything happens. As a matter of fact, it often seems that "big media" today are the world's most elaborate rather systems--hundreds of men and women all over the globe watching and reporting minute by minute that, couple with modern communication technology, gives an average Japanese citizen excellent access to the reports from both domestic and international sources.

Furthermore, because of having tens of millions of viewers, listeners, and readers, "big media" cannot afford to be irresponsible. A minor mistake in a news report may create millions of "mis-informed public," and therefore, the "big media" are extremely careful about the quality of news content. In a word, their bigness itself has became a strong backstop to keeping "big media" more or less honest and candid in their news reporting as well as in editing. They are a part of the "public domain," and they have to be always aware of their public role.

If we use newspaper reporting in the United States as a standard of comparison, for instance, the articles and stories that appear in the Japanese papers often seem to be too modest and even timid in their approach. Though modesty does not necessarily mean objectivity, "big media," by nature, must make their best effort to avoid any subjective statements in the press. As a matter of fact, if a paper makes a biased interpretation of an issue, the editors must be prepared to handle hundreds of letters of protest from the readers next morning, and this is the worst thing the editors of "big media" can anticipate. As a result, on a controversial issue, editors are conscious of allowing the same amount of space for different options. as we noted earlier, for the Japanese "big media," neutrality is of primary importance; this principle is not only well established within the media but also widespread among the readers as well.

The neutrality and modesty of the "big media" have created great public trust. When the size of media was relatively small and contents of such media were, to a certain extent, biased because of their affiliation with political parties, the readers did not have much trust in the contents. The readers used to hold certain reservations on what was reported and make their own judgments and interpretations. But with the rise of nationwide "bid media," people tended to be exposed to them without much cautious attitude, because they came to believe in the neutral position of the media.

There was another socio-psychological factor that reinforced the belief oh the public in "big media." Quite simply, people are tempted to believe in whatever is reported by "big media" simply because they know that millions of other also share the information. When seven million fellow readers are reading the same article, or when ten million other viewers are watching the same program, how can a single individual be skeptical about what the media present? The fact that millions of people share the same information is itself sufficient to make the public very confident about "big media,"

In a public opinion survey conducted recently, in answer to the question "What would you do when earthquake hits?" Eighty-five percent of the Japanese stated that they would turn on their transistor radio and listen to the newscast and instructions from NHK. They were sure that NHK's newscast would be fast and accurate and that NHK was one of very few reliable information source in case of emergency. It may be safe to say that NHK, as well as other "big media" in Japan, is trusted, appreciated, and thought to be very authoritative by the majority of Japanese people. As will be discussed later, this kinds of trust may be dangerous, bunt at the same time, to have a trusted media is a good thing in many respects.

In the case of broadcasting, the advantages of "big media" is tremendous. As defined st the outset, "big media" means big capital, and big capital means that the media can afford substantial production costs. The amount of money invested in program production, of course, does not guarantee the quality of the program, but usually, given a group of talented people, a station can produce a better program, either educational or entertainment, if the budget is generous. Without sufficient production cost, one cannot expect good programs. NHK and major networks affiliated with the "big three" information conglomerates, have the budgets to finance big programs.

For instance, NHK has successfully produced a yearlong series of programs "Heritage for the Future," an ambitious multi-million dollar project about archeological expeditions to various parts of the world. The series was well accepted by the general public (the program was on the regular broadcasting channel rather than the educational channel); it also won international recognition. Educational broadcasting in Japan, which probably is the most advanced both in terms of quality and quantity in the world, was made possible because NHK big enough to have put huge amounts of money into the development of educational broadcasting since 1932.

If media business were essentially small and local, their operation would also have been limited in scale. It is doubtful if a newspaper with a circulation of 30.000 could provide extensive global news reports. "Big media," because of their large-scale operation, can make the public aware of international affairs and open new perspectives for the common people, who otherwise might remain fundamentally provincial. "Big media," in this context, probably were the agents that diffused and accelerated more cosmopolitan viewpoints. Bigness in media operation implies many good things and advantages not only for media themselves but also for the national interest and for the people at large.

4. Bad Things about "Big Media"

Though there are many good things about "big media," there are also many bad things about them. Some of the points discussed in the preceding section can be seem as bad things at the same time.

It is true that because of the emergence of "big media," Japan was able to accomplish her national integration. However, hindsight may also reveal that the integration, which was done so hastily, was achieved at the sacrifice of small autonomous local communities. The priority for the people of Japan in the last one hundred years has been to think about the national interest rather than the local interest. A notorious tax system, which was adopted in 1872, was designed to increase the budget of the central government, and prefectural governors were appointed by the central government. The money flow was almost entirely in one direction, that is, all tax money went to Tokyo; each prefectural governor received the budget for prefecture as a "rebate" so to speak. The power of central government was strengthened while local autonomy was in danger. In terms of the function of media, the news content tended to be the trends of the central government and relatively little attention was paid to local news; local governors favored the news from Tokyo since their responsibility was to keep the people informed about policies of the central government. Until the revolution of 1868, Japan was under a feudal regime; by definition, feudalistic social structure is essentially decentralized. Local societies were relatively independent of each other; feudal loads, who had their own autonomous governments and policies, ruled, with only loose control imposed upon them by the *Shōgun*.

A local society had its own unique–culture, developed for centuries, and the people were very proud of their heritage, including their dialect. The diffusion of Tokyo–based "big media" almost completely destroyed the local dialects, especially after the introduction of broadcasting media. Indeed, media mediated language habits and the Tokyo dialect became "standard" simply because Tokyo was the dominant power. Conscious efforts to adapt were made in the schools, too. The children were taught "standard" Japanese––Tokyo dialect––instead of leaning their own local vocabularies and idioms. As a result, local dialects, many of which had delicate and intricate expressions, faded away. What made the situation even worse was that local people began, to feel inferior to Tokyo and the people of Tokyo, especially those within the central government, felt themselves to be culturally more advanced. According to linguistic studies, what is now known as "standard" Japanese is actually a strange combination of a kyushu dialect and the ancient court language of Kyoto, and this combination was invented in the 1870s. It is not even Tokyo dialect. As a matter of fact, those artisans and merchants of downtown Tokyo who have preserved the authentic Tokyo dialect are still indignant about the "standard" Japanese.

The power of the big broadcasting media was so overwhelming that "standard" Japanese because at least a "common" language for whole population of japan. A critic once commented that what is known today as "standard" Japanese is nothing but a peculiar language invented by NHK and proposed labeling "standard" language as "NHK language," NHK, which started business in the late 1920s, may be the Noah Webster of Japan--at least in the sphere of broadcast language--with less research and consideration than Webster.

This conflict of "standard" language and local dialects is still visible in contemporary broadcasting programs. Either on television or on the radio, without exception, those who speak local dialects are the comical figures and the other characters as well as the audience laughs at them. As a matter of fact, many young people with local backgrounds suffer because of their local accents when they go to get a job in Tokyo or the other major cities where the use of "standard" language is expected. They feel inferior about their language skills, and in extreme cases, some have committed suicide.

It should be noted that "big media" have been, more or less, destructive to local economy. Take for example the brewing industry. Brewing of *sake* and soy sauce have been traditionally local business; both products were heavy liquids that could not be easily transported. And for centuries, local brewers worked to give a unique taste and flavor to their own products. The market for each brewer was limited, but most of the brewers established a good reputation in each prefecture. The rise of "big media," especially commercial broadcasting, changed the market structure totally; a few large brewers spent millions of dollars to advertise their brands to the entire nation. Thanks to the modern transportation system, these manufacturers did not have difficulty in supplying millions of gallons of *sake* or sauce from their factories to any part of the country. The consumers, for obvious reasons, were tempted to by the nationally advertised products rather than local products they had brought before the age of commercials. The switching of brands meant the decline of local brewers; some brewers surrendered to the advertisement and marking activities of name-brand manufacturers and decided to be franchised by the "invaders." The local brewers today are still in business. They often seem to be more prosperous than before. But their factories are producing either *sake* or soy sauce that meet the specifications of name-brand brewers. The products are shipped in barrels to the central warehouse of the large brewer with whom the local brewers are affiliated, and at the warehouse, the liquid is bottled with the label of the big brand and sent to various parts of the country. One might thus see an ironical scene where the bottled and labeled products are shipped to a small town where the contents had originally been produced several days earlier.

Coupled with the diffusion of "standard" language and of name-brand merchandise, local communities in Japan are apt to lose their confidence in their socio-cultural autonomy. Until two decades age, the busy streets of local cities were called by the names that had persisted for centuries, but these days, the streets are referred to as "the Ginza." Ginza is the name of the busy shopping street in Tokyo, and the implication of the change of the name of the streets is that the local streets are trying to be mini-Ginza. In a word, local communities are trying to follow Tokyo standards in their city planning and life style in general. Very often, the "Tokyo-nization" of local communities bring some strange and ironical effects.

For example, for the young people in Tokyo, TV programs with an urban setting are perceived as unreal since the viewers known the reality of the city through their own experience. Therefore, the teenagers of Tokyo are capable of checking the fantasies brought by television against reality. However, the youth of the small local communities do not have any means to check the contents of the programs and they tend to believe that what is depicted on television is real and true. As a result, for instance, the clothes they were, the cosmetics they use, the manner they assume, are often straight and direct imitations of what are advertised through television, magazine, and other "big media." Unfortunately, these teenagers do not have any means through which they can mediate what they saw on TV screen. A tragic happened in northern part of Japan when a certain number of people ordered prefabricated house as advertised through "big media." The construction materials were shipped, and the construction was completed. But the merchandise was designed and tested in Tokyo where there is practically no snow fall. The consumers who bought the prefabricated house in the snow country had to find out, through their winter experience, that the house was not study enough for heavy snow. Their ancestors, through centuries experience and wisdom, designed a house which could persist for at least 200 years in the snow country. The contemporaries, who made the wrong choice of an urban prefabricated house over traditional construction of the area, have had bitter experience.

Generally speaking, the penetration of "big media" has made the people less concerned about the communities in which they live. The headlines of the front page are always about international affairs or parliamentary debate, and most of the articles and stories are also Tokyo-based or Tokyo-oriented. A reader in a small town in a local prefecture is well informed about what is going on Washington, D.C., about how Arab nations are reacting to the UN, but he is not well informed about the budget of his community or days of the week when the garbage collector comes to his neighborhood. Even Tokyo residents often find it difficult to know what is happening in their neighborhoods. It is a good thing that the "big media" always keep the public informed about the international situation and parliamentary issues, but it is apparently defect of "big media" that they are not able to inform the public about important happening in the local communities. A Japanese proverb is frequently quoted in criticizing "big media" in this context--"the doorstep of the lighthouse is dark." Because of their world-wide orientation, it may be hard for "big media" even to provide a small flashlight to help people take a closer look at their doorsteps.

Since "big media" is big, the size of audience is big. In order to keep the audience satisfied, " big media" have to suffer from a serious problem in looking for "greatest happiness of the greatest number." There are so many various in the audience that this task seems to be almost impossible. An editor of one of the "big three" said that since there are 200,000 readers who are interested in chess he could not stop the daily column on chess, and since there are another 200,000 people who are fond of poetry, the poetry section could not be cancelled. And after listing hundreds of such examples, he concluded that a big newspaper had to be a hodge-podge of information. furthermore, "big media," by definition cannot take a partisan view; therefore, the information has to be mediated through several screening and checking process. A report cannot present a "sharp" viewpoint however justifiable that viewpoint is. In a mathematical metaphor, "big media" have to find the greatest common divisor. Often the solution is very dull. A "little" media is better able to take a less restrained view and can concentrate on particular issues and neglect chess and poetry. Small media are like small motor-boats with the flexibility to run around. "Big media," in contrast, are like the 200,000 ton super tankers that cannot maneuver in small spaces.

Perhaps the worst thing about "big media," however, is the fact that there cannot be any medium through which the "big media" can be effectively criticized. Newspapers might be a good medium for criticism of broadcasting. Weekly magazines could be the medium for the criticism of newspapers. But as noted in the preceding section, "big media" are conglomerates. How can a newspaper criticize the TV programs produced by another member of "the family"? Media without criticism are dangerous, not only for the public but also for the media themselves.

5. The Future

A sociocultural balance sheet of "big media" is very difficult to calculate. Without "big media," national integration might have been impossible, but on the other hand, they were unable, by definition, to serve the local communities."Big media" can afford to have hundreds of bureaus all over the world, but at the same time, in order to keep neutrality, they cannot make sharp comments. "Big media" helped national advertisers to sell their products, which they made it difficult for small local industries to survive. "Big media" contribute to conveying the new urban life style, but on the other hand, the values and traditions of each local community, preserved for centuries, were altered. An item listed in the credit column is always counter-balanced by an item in the debit column. Whether the balance is in the black or in the red is extremely difficult to determine. It seems, however, that the balance should be viewed in the historical context. When a society is in the stage of nation-building, or when it is in a critical period, such as war, it may need more centralized "big media" rather than the aggregate of decentralized, small local media. For Japan of the nineteenth century and mid-twentieth century, probably the balance was constantly in the black, although black figures were made possible only at the sacrifice of many people and many values.

It is hard to make a judgment on the contemporary "big media" since most "big media" in Japan today have grown into huge information conglomerates and their operations are often monopolistic. As a matter of fact, it has been a common practice for the "big three" newspapers to issue announcement of subscription rate increases on the same day, with the same. Though they insist that their simulta-neous announcements are "coincidental," many people are skeptical because such a beautiful coincidence cannot happen without hidden negotiations among the media. Such negotiation, if it really did occur, would have been in violation of the Anti-Trust Law, but there are no public agents who can question the "coincidental" hike in subscription fees. Usually, the "big media" represent the public in casting doubts about oil. steel, electronics, and other major industries that might be conspiring to fix prices and so forth, and usually the "big media" are indignant about "big industry." But on the topic of a possible conspiracy of the "big media" themselves, they are quiet. Such concentration of "information power" in contemporary Japan seems to be a dangerous sign in spite of the goodwill of the "big media" themselves and public support given to them.

It is important and interesting to speculate on the future of "big media," though forecasting is a difficult task. First of all, it should be noted that "big media" grew steadily until the early 1970s when the competition between them reached the saturation point. In the field of newspapers, since practically all Japanese households subscribe to at least one, the total circulation cannot continue to increase. A household may switch from one paper to another, but it is very unlikely that a family would bey another kind of newspaper in addition to what it has already. As a matter of fact, until the late 1960s, while the economy was growing, there was trend among middle-class families to subscribe to more than two papers. The oil crisis of 1973, however, stopped further growth in many sectors of economy. Many of those who had two papers decided to cancel one. There is no room for further growth of newspaper business. The most symbolic recent event is that, because of financial difficulties, the *Mainichi*, one of the "big three" was almost bankrupt as of June 1977. The others are also having difficulty. The *Asahi* stated a new adult education school, mainly to disperse its work force. The school, known as *Asahi* Culture Center, has been successful since its inauguration in 1972. The curriculum is advertised through the paper, and they have now about 10,000 students enrolled. But the mere fact that the *Asahi* had to start a new side business at this time means that the newspaper business today is not an easy one.

On the part of the public, there have also been many changes. In the first place, with the rise of citizens' participatory movements everywhere, people became aware of importance of the communities in which they live. Instead of talking about a great "world revolution," the young people began to take a closer look at the community and the neighborhood and to undertake small but meaningful and realistic innovations there. These people, for obvious reason, started small, non-profit (often at their own expense) community papers, which they labeled as "mini media." The number of subscribers are, by definition, very few, but the readers are loyal. The news these "mini media" carry are trivial if seen from the viewpoint of global or domestic politics, but important for community life. "Mini media," by their nature, cannot compete with the "big media," but many people are aware of the complementary nature of "mini media" to mass media, especially to "big media."

"Mini media" are popular not only on citizens' movements, but also in many other areas of life. Local governments, both prefectural and community, are keenly interested in publishing their own "mini papers" to inform the public of the policy, budget, and services of the local governments. For example, labor unions may have their own "mini paper," and a group of people who share *Haiku* as a hobby may publish a "mini paper." In this fashion, there are hundreds and thousands of "mini media" in Japan today and their number is increasing. In spite of the fact that typesetting the Japanese language is very complicated with its three thousand Chinese characters, a simple typewriter has been designed, and with that typewriter and a duplicating machine, anybody can produce a "mini media."

Technological innovation in electronics have also made for some interesting developments. Originally, radio and televisions were designed to be the receivers of regular broadcasts, but the combination of cassette tape recorders with radio, and more recently, of video-cassette with television, has given the audience an active part in programming. For instance, youth today are enthusiastic about "editing" their own tapes by mixing sounds from many different program sources, AM and FM radio, records, live sound, etc. A group of students once "produced" a song and had it taped. The tape was duplicated over and over again among the students, and eventually a radio station put it on the air. The students who "produced" the song did not have any intention of commercializing their work. It was simply the product of their hobby. After the radio station began playing it, the song became a hit. In other words, with modern electronics, the public, and especially young people, are now able to use mass media rather than to be manipulated by them, Because the youth can mix their own music, the radio stations may lose them as a steady audience.

Though it is still in its early stage, video-cassettes are changing the structure of viewing audience also. At present, a video-cassette deck sells for about US$500 and cannot be called inexpensive, but since the fall of 1976, some 150,000 sets are sold every month. In the future, the number of homes with video-cassettes will reach one million. An interesting change is taking place among those families who own the machine. Instead of watching regular TV programs, they tape the programs and "edit" them, For instance, a serial drama, which is broadcast 15 minutes every day, can be spliced as a two-hour, full-length program. A movie on television can be edited as a movie without commercials. NHK's educational programs can also be recorded. After collecting 10 or 20 shows in their "video-library," people tend to play the tape rather than watch the regular programs. Before the introduction of video-cassettes, people watched whatever was available. But with this new device, people can watch the program they want to see, at any time. Moreover, they can "produce" their own program with a video-camera, which can be attached to a video-cassette.

"Big media" were so successful mainly they were the "senders." The audience had to read, listen, and watch the information they provided. People did not have an alternative. But tape recorders and other recording duplicating machines have made the people much freer to choose information. "Big media" has to face a tiny, but strong opponent in these small domestic, even personal, communication machines. As many sociological surveys have shown, people, communication machines. As many sociological surveys have shown, people are more influenced by communication with close friends than by the mass media. The mutual exchange of information through the personal media--telephone, tapes, and even video--may have considerable effect on people. At least, these effects will be competitive with those derived from mass media. With these new developments, the "big media" of Japan today seem to have come to a crossroad. On the one hand, "big media" will continue to grow bigger and bigger, but on the other hand, "big media" of the future cannot be they have been, The public today has access to diverse information sources and it knows how to use them.

Coffee, Tea, or What?

--The Role of "Stimulants" in Human Communication--

The Diffusion of Tea Drinking

According to a Chinese legend, tea was first tried by the Emperor Shen Nung sometime around 2000 B.C. The tea that he drank was allegedly brought to him by a group of explorers who had gone to a mountain area of Yunnan, close to the Chinese border with Assam. The fragrance, taste, and the refreshing effects of tea attracted Chinese nobles in the court, and thus it became a favorite drinking beverage among Chinese.

Tea was especially well received by Buddhist monks, who were prohibited from taking alcohol and found tea a worthy substitute because it contained caffeine and tannin and had a comfortably stimulating and awakening effect. Another story tells of Darma, a legendary Buddhist patriarch who devoted himself to seven years of sleepless meditation, and who was the first person to use tea in order to keep himself awake.

Tea at this early stage, however, was not served in the way we are familiar with. A Chinese document of the 3rd century A.D. says that the tea leaves were pressed like a brick; when it was served, it had to be crushed and mixed with onion, ginger, orange, and other spices, and then hot water was poured over the mixture. Tea was used at this stage as a medicine rather than as an ordinary beverage.

No matter who the discoverer was, there is no doubt that the Chinese were the tea drinkers who first started this habit thousands of years ago. Moreover, in the following centuries, tea became a necessary accompaniment to social gatherings of literati as a medium of better and more sophisticated intellectual discussions. Scholars, highranking officials, and monks sat together with a cup of tea, enjoying the most philosophical discourse for hours. The Emperor during the 5th century owned the best tea garden in the country, and drinking a good cup of tea became an obvious status symbol.

It is no wonder then that tea itself became a subject of intellectual inquiry in China. In 780 A.D., a scholar by the name of Lu Yu wrote a classic three-volume treatise on tea titled "*Ch'a Ching.*" He described the wisdom of growing and manufacturing tea, and at the same time he gave instructions on the proper manner of drinking tea, including twenty-four instruments essential to fine brewing. These volumes marked the beginning of the worldwide diffusion of tea drinking.

Japan probably was the first country to import the tea drinking habit from

China. As early as the 5th century, when Japanese monks were sent to China to learn Buddhism, they accepted tea as a part of their new "life style." But as was the case in China at that time, tea was regarded as a special beverage for use only by the holy occupation who took it as a medicine. Thus tea was not known to the public. Centuries passed and in the middle of the 13th century, a revolution took place. Eizai, a Japanese monk who brought *Zen* Buddhism from China to Japan, was summoned by the *Shogun* who greatly appreciated Eizai's prescription, and started drinking tea habitually. Encouraged by the event, Eizai wrote a look titled "*Kissa Yōjō ki*" (*Tea for Health*; after that, tea drinking became fashionable among the upper-class elites.

Because of the good climate for tea growing, the speed of diffusion of tea drinking in Japan was almost miraculous. By the end of the 14th century, even the poor peasants grew their own tea shrubs and were drinking tea.

The Arabs knew tea as a beverage in the 9th century. In central Asia, tea was brought from China during the Tang Dynasty (7th century); for the nomads of Tibet and Mongolia, tea was the most valuable source of Vitamin C, as they were unable to get green vegetables in the steppes of central Asia. As a matter of fact, the Chinese government during the Ming and Ching dynasties was able to manipulate these threatening "barbarians" by trading tea with them.

In comparison with the Asians, from Arabs to Japanese, westerners learned to appreciate tea much later.

The first record of tea in the West is found in the writings of Giambattista Ramusio, who found this new beverage called "Chai Catai" upon his visit to the Near East. In his volume, "*Navigationi e Viaggi*," published in 1559, he notes, "They take of that herb, whether dry or fresh, and boil it well in water. One or two cups of this decoction taken on an empty stomach removes fever, headache, stomach-ache, pain in the side or in joints, and it should be taken as hot as you can bear it."

Like their eastern counterparts, the Buddhist monks, the Jesuits also became very fond of tea as a substitute for alcohol. It is worthwhile to note that the 15th to 16th century was the period when Europe began to learn about Asia by way of the Arabs (indeed, the outer sea navigation know-how was brought by Arabs), and the "East-West Center" of that period existed in Baghdad. Tea was, in this sense, one of the earliest and the most important medium of intercultural communication; in Denys Forrest's phrasing it was "a regular East-West article of commerce."

The first tea export from China to Europe took place in 1606 in Bantam, Java where traders brought tea from China to be shipped to Holland by the Dutch East India Company.

Like all new products and novelties, it took some time for tea to become popular in Europe. By the middle of the 17th century, however, tea was the most fashionable item in Paris. Racine, for instance, was a tea addict. But, of course, the people who showed the greatest enthusiasm for tea were the British. The first advertisement of tea (then called Tcha, Tay, or Tee) appeared in a British weekly magazine "*Mercurius Politicus*" in September 1658. The advertisement said that this new import from China was excellent and was approved by "all physicians";

that marked the beginning of the tea craze in that country. Especially after her colonial expansion to India and Sri Lanka (Ceylon), Great Britain became successful in establishing tea plantations, and London became the center of the tea trade from the turn of the 19th century on. As a matter of fact, in order to facilitate quick tea transportation from China to London, Britons built "tea clippers" and competed with each other in speed. According to the detailed investigation of "tea clippers" by David R. MacGregor, after the Napoleonic wars, ships with better sailing abilities were designed and built. The first of such new boats was the *Scottish Maid,* built in Aberdeen in 1839, followed by the *Stornoway* and other schooners.

Tea was thus a great spur to shipbuilders' technology, which continually advanced since that time. In 1885, a ship called the *Eagle Wing* succeeded in shortening her voyage time from Hong Kong to London to 83 days. This was a remarkable speed in comparison with the average of 120 days in the 1830s. The tea trade undoubtedly accelerated the incredible technological innovations of the mid–19th century. The races became a matter of British national pride, with Blue Ribbon Prizes being given to the fastest ships. What the tea clippers did in the 19th century can be compared to what NASA's space program did in the U.S.A. approximately one hundred years later. (Ironically enough, it should be added that the finest tea clippers were designed by Americans who had been prejudiced against tea since their famous rebellion against the British in 1773--the Boston Tea Party.)

Russians also became very fond of tea. The first export of tea from China to Russia can be traced back to the middle of the 17th century, but after the treaties of 1689 and 1727, the transport of tea by land began regularly. A caravan of 300 camels, each loaded with 600 pounds of tea, made a desperately slow 40 kilometers per day on the 16 months' journey from China to St. Petersburg. As in most of the countries in Europe, tea was first used only among aristocrats, but by the middle of the 19th century the Russian public were tea–lovers like the Britons, and the samovar (meaning "self service") had become a necessary part of Russian literature and drama.

In a word, the 19th century was the age in which the diffusion of the tea drinking habit extended all over the old continent. Even Americans, who pretended to be non–tea drinkers, were looking for tea by direct trade with China (bypassing London), and when the American Navy fleet came to Japan in 1853, they sought to buy tea from Japan. Indeed, the capital accumulation necessary for the modernization of Japan was made possible through her tea and silk trade with the United States.

With the opening of the Suez Canal (1869) and the Siberian Railroad (1891), the transport of tea from the East to the West was greatly eased. The people of the world, with almost no exception, came to use tea as a part of their everyday life before the end of the 19th century. According to the statistical data of the United Nations, the total production of tea in the 1950s was approximately 500,000 tons, and it increased to 740,000 tons in the 1960s. More than 90 percent of the production was, of course, in Asia, especially in India and Sri Lanka.

Tea and Sociability

The most important function that tea has performed in the past several thousand years, especially the most recent few hundred years, was as a medium of interpersonal communication and it opened a new horizon in social interaction.

As was discussed earlier, the great Chinese scholars of ancient and medieval times enjoyed intellectual discourses over a cup of tea, and surely they never could have had such a leisurely exchange of ideas without tea. Dynasties changed one after another, and political systems have changed in China, but tea drinking as a cultural institution has not changed. As a matter of fact, tea is a necessary item in any social occasion in the People's Republic of China today. (A cup of tea was the proper beginning of such important talks as the Kissinger–Mao meeting.)

Tea in Japan followed a similar development. After Eizai publicized the benefits of tea in the 13th century, it became a means of sociability among the elites.

Historical documents reveal that in the early 14th century, there were "tea parties" among the nobles, where they invited each other and with Buddhist ritual, served tea along with delicacies. The Japanese tea parties of the 14th century evolved into what is now known as the "tea ceremony" during the 15th century after Hideyoshi Toyotomi succeeded in unifying Japan and establishing his centralized government. Hideyoshi himself was very fond of inviting his subordinates to tea parties, and for the high–ranking *samurai* of the day, it was the greatest honor to be invited. Sen Soeki (more commonly known as Rikyū) came onto the scene at the tea parties of Hideyoshi. He developed philosophical justifications for tea and the tea party and established "*Cha–dō*" (The Way of Tea) as a discipline. He appraised the values of simplicity, quietness, and intimacy that the tea party created, and he also developed standard instructions for the proper manner for drinking tea and specified the appropriate accoutrements for the tea parties. Good tea cups became treasures;in an extreme case, a *Daimyō* (feudal lord) was glad to exchange his huge estate for a tea cup imported from China.

The most important social aspect of tea parties in Japan, however, was that they were instrumental in breaking the class lines of the feudal system. Rikyū strongly emphasized in his philosophy of tea that, regardless of one's social status, once he was in the "tea room" he was equal to everyone who shared tea in that room. The militant *samurai*, who carried their swords with them at all times, were asked to leave the weapons outside the tea room. The room had to be a sacred and clean place where people met without their secular attributes. A millionaire and a poor peasant, different in wealth and social status in their secular lives where they might never see each other, were as equals once they were in the same tea party. They were simply human beings sharing the same time and space in the tea room, and the tea served on such occasions was the medium that connected all these persons with otherwise quite heterogeneous backgrounds.

Indeed, a small tea party in a small tea room was a good place for such a dominant figure as Hideyoshi to meet his subordinates informally and privately. In a "formal organization," a subordinate had the role of merely receiving orders from his master. Communication was heavily one-way. But in the tea room, by definition, there was no master-subordinate relationship. A subordinate was able to speak to his master as an equal human being, and the master had an opportunity to listen to his subordinates. It might be a secret meeting for administration; the "tea party" justified everything. In a word, "tea party" was a great device to solve the communication problems of the feudal period.

As a matter of fact, Hideyoshi, who was very publicity-minded and knew the importance of public opinion, held an historically famous "great tea party" in 1595 where "...everybody, including youth, m(a)rchants, and farmers who are interested in tea, if he does have a cup..." were invited. According to records, several hundred people joined the party, and Hideyoshi tried to converse with everybody. In this sense, a tea party had a liberating effect by providing "free" time and peace in the rigidly structured feudal society.

The farmers too began holding tea parties to justify their secret meetings. The feudal lords of Japan were very cautious, for obvious reasons, of the possibility of agrarian revolts and petitions, and they prohibited the farmers from gathering at any time under any circumstance. But because the "tea party" had been so encouraged by Hideyoshi and other elites, even the farmers were permitted to invite each other for tea parties. Such parties were, naturally, a good excuse and disguise for conspiracy, and according to historical accounts, tea parties in rural Japan during the medieval period were hotbeds of agrarian revolt.

It is interesting and important to note that this "class-line breaking" effect that accompanied the growing popularity of tea in Japan also occurred in England, with the acceptance of coffee in the 17th century. In his book, *Tea and Coffee*, Edward Bramah examined the origin of coffee drinking in Britain:

> Oxford lays claim not only to being the place where coffee was first drunk in England but also possessing the first English coffee house. The former claim is substantiated by a reference in Evelyn's diary of 1637, where we learn of its being taken by a member of Balliol College. The coffee house, which was called the *Angel*, was opened thirteen years later by a Lebanese named Jacob.

From that time, the "coffee house" became very popular among Britons, and hundreds of coffee houses were opened, especially in urban areas; these establishments assumed a new social function that had been unknown. "The coffee houses," J.M. Scott says, "where all classes met in an otherwise most class-conscious age, were ideal for conversation. Coffee and tea were both available, with pipes and tobacco to go with them. Clear brains were prompted to exchange ideas freely and on any subject."

At their peak, it is said that there were some 2,000 coffee houses in London alone, and people belonging to different social classes and with diversified backgrounds could meet and exchange ideas. Unlike his Japanese counterpart, Hideyoshi, who was in favor of tea parties, Charles II, the ruler of England, decided in 1675 to suppress coffee houses, because for him, these new establishments were "nurseries of idleness and pragmaticalness." But in spite of his efforts to suppress them, the establishments continued to exist and flourish.

The situation grew worse for the conservatives (or for the most conservative) of England, because the public invented a more sophisticated institution--the "tea-garden"--an outdoor tea-drinking place. The tea-gardens with their flowered paths, and tables and chairs for tea service, were found mostly in the Chelsea and Bayswater suburbs of London. J.M. Scott describes the scene.

> The gardens were open from May to September. In the evenings they were gaily lit with thousands of lanterns. There were concerts and fireworks displays. Tea-gardens catered for every stratum of society from royalty to the kitchen maid and her young man. As with coffee houses, there was little or no class distinction here. Tea-gardens were not expensive. The inclusive charge was generally six pence or a shilling.

Clearly, the tea-garden broke not only the class-line but also the sex-line. For certain mysterious reasons, tea has been associated with the female; at least, there has been a firm belief that it had to be poured by women, never by men. Even today, in English usage, the person who is in charge of pouring tea at a gathering is called the "Mother" although the party is exclusively for men. Because of this socio-psychological association of tea with things feminine, women were permitted to go to the tea-garden. Moreover, once in the tea-garden, a lady could take the initiative in approaching a man by asking "Will you treat me to a dish of tea?"

Tea-gardens in England(imitated by New Yorkers for a period of time), in this context, can be seen as a prototype of amusement parks, and at the same time, as one of the places where the emancipation of women began. Coffee houses and tea-gardens were places where people gathered and mixed freely across class, status, sex, age, and other social lines. They were, to exaggerate, the "liberated sections" of modern urban life in western Europe, where people could talk with each other and express themselves freely. Indeed, the whole French Revolution started in 1789 as an outgrowth of cafe society. Considering the role of tea in the American Revolution of the 1770s, it is safe to say that tea was responsible for two major revolutions of the 18th century.

Feudal Japan in the 18th century was less developed and less liberated, but as in London and Paris, "tea houses" were very prosperous. At this time the metaphysics of the "Way of Tea" was still appreciated by elites, but the common people preferred not to be bothered by the complicated rituals, and they looked upon tea as a casual and social drink. An incredible number of *Cha-ya* (tea houses) were established after the middle of the 18th century. According to tax revenue records (each establishment had to pay a fixed annual rate of tax), there were about 20,000 tea houses in the old city of *Edo*(Tokyo) and its environs. The population of the city at that period is estimated at approximately two million, and the number of tea houses implies that there was a tea house for every 100 people. An essayist of the time said "at tea houses, hot water is boiling in a kettle all the time, and when you enter, you are served a cup of tea. The tea houses are under the management of ladies, and the ladies compete, through their beauty, to attract more patrons, and patrons emulated each other to attract more attention from their favorite hostesses." The size of the tea house varied from a very small one that could accommodate only two or three people to an establishment that served 50 people. The smaller ones were "portable," that is, the whole shop could be folded into a package so that the owner could move to another place (a fore–runner of mobile ice cream vendors). The larger ones were permanent buildings, and the owner–hostesses of such reputable tea houses not only made a huge amount of money but also were listed in a "catalogue of beauties"; the wood–block prints of these ladies were sold to the public. It is safe to say that the hostesses of 18th century Japan were the forerunners of the beauty contestants of the 20th century.

An important parallel should be noted here. As was discussed earlier, tea has been associated with things feminine (if not feminism) in England, and in Japan, too, tea in the public tea houses had to be served by women. Furthermore, it is quite probable that the "tea house" was the first business institution in Japan that women were permitted to own and run. Here again, tea had a liberating effect on sex discrimination.

The tea houses in Japan were a multi–purpose communication media. "Regulars" could leave messages for their friends with the hostess; young people could assemble at their favorite tea house for casual conversation; retired people could spend hours at their leisure. Moreover, the philosophy of "The Way of Tea" in its secularized version existed, and the people belonging to different social classes met at the tea house for appointments. This aspect was extremely important because the *samurai* class of the 18th century were not warriors any more, and they often had to be good bureaucrats, able to make transactions and contracts with the merchant class. For business negotiation, the offices of both *samurai* and merchants were inappropriate; a status distinction was clearly defined therein. But in the tea house, where the atmosphere was informal, a *samurai* could meet and conduct business with a merchant as an equal and vice versa. In other words, the tea house was the place where the "strip tease of status" was possible and desirable.

The discovery of the socio–cultural convenience of the tea house accelerated the evolution of the establishment. Because the tea house was the ideal meeting place for everybody, it lacked privacy. Consequently, for the purpose of business negotiation, the merchants began to seek a separate room in the tea house; such a demand produced a new type of tea house––one with several separate rooms for privacy. The name of "tea house" was retained, but functionally, this new type of tea house was quite different. At the request of the patrons, alcohol and food were served, thus "tea house" evolved into a restaurant. The prototype of Japanese sociability in the past two hundreds years can be found in this new institution, and even today, it is customary for Japanese business executives to use "tea houses" (still called *Cha–ya*) for their "informally formal" business talks.

As can be easily imagined, the "tea house" also served as a place for dating. A young couple could get together at a tea house; there were striking similarities in social function with the tea–gardens of England. Tea, in a word, was the medium of liberation and social relaxation in many ways in the East and in the West.

Socio-Cultural Functions of Stimulants

Tea became a medium of social interaction for several noteworthy reasons. In the beginning, in both East and West, tea was used by the people belonging to holy occupations as a substitute for alcohol. Of course, tea is much milder in comparison, but the caffeine and tannin contained in tea were stimulating enough to keep a person awake.

Physiologically speaking, tea is a stimulant that comfortably refreshes and excites the brain. Or, to exaggerate, tea can change the "ordinary" state of mind to something special, as most other "stimulants" do.

Alcohol is an extreme example of a substance that alters the ordinary state. When a certain amount of alcohol is taken, both physiological and psychological changes take place. The heart beat becomes faster, physical movements get slower, mental judgment becomes obscure, the brain is stirred up; the more a person drinks, the more he becomes"intoxicated." An alcoholic sees strange visions and images, and he loses his "ordinary" intellect and judgment. We know that people become more talkative and more cheerful when they drink a certain amount of scotch or whatever. Indeed, an individual often appears as a different "persona" (if not personality) when he is intoxicated.

As may be true in many other cultures, the ancient Japanese regarded alcohol as something "sacred" and a person who acquired a different "persona" as the result of drinking alcohol was thought to be under the special influence caused by the "magical" power attributed to alcohol. They thought that the person with that special "persona" was temporarily the medium of messages transmitted from the gods to human beings. In a word, a person who was under the influence of alcohol was a shaman, and therefore the use of alcohol was, initially, limited only to shamans. Alcohol was a necessary raw-material by which a shaman could be a medium between the "sacred" and the "profane" world, to use the Durkheim-Eliade dichotomy.

It may be worthwhile, at this point, to look at the origin and diffusion of tobacco, another stimulant whose cultural and religious function was originally very similar to that of alcohol. It has been said that it was Columbus who "discovered" tobacco, but the honor of the first discovery must be attributed to the people of ancient Maya. Like many other societies, in Maya, the dominant holy figure was the Sun, and in its Sun-cult both fire and smoke were associated with the sacred sun. The monks of this isolated great civilization discovered tobacco as a medium of communication between the Sun-god and the people of the Empire. They dried tobacco leaves and made smoke on the alter; after inhaling the smoke, they exhaled it toward the Sun and toward the four holy directions--North, South, East, West.

They believed that the spirit of fire was contained in the holy smoke, and that this inhaling and exhaling of smoke was a process of communication with the "Sacred" world. In his voluminous book, *Shamanism*. Eliade suggests that the smoke of Maya had essentially a shamanistic effect. Like alcohol, tobacco stimulates the nervous system, and by inhaling the smoke, a smoker experiences a certain physio-nervous excitement that creates a state of mind different from the "ordinary" experience.

The minimum requirement for becoming a shaman is to be obsessed by something and to become a different "self"; to achieve that "transformation," there are several means. According to comparative shamanism dancing is one of the most popular means to be detached from the "ordinary" world; the practice of shamanistic dancing is found among American Indians, tribes in Siberia, Korea, Japan, and many other Mongoloid cultures. Drinking alcohol and inhaling tobacco smoke also were means to achieve the same goal. By taking such stimulants, a person can easily be under a different "persona." Ancient Maya can be seen as the place where tobacco use of as a shamanistic medium was initiated.

The monks of Maya used the holy smoke of tobacco as a medicine, and the smoke was sprayed over the body of the sick. Today, in many cultures in Asia, including Japan, it is believed that holy smoke of incense on the alter of certain Buddhist temples can cure almost all illnesses. In the center of Tokyo, in such a popular temple as *Sensoji*, hundreds of people come daily to take the smoke of incense in the palm and rub it on the painful areas of their body.

The mysterious Empire of Maya disappeared in an earthquake in the middle of the 7th century, but the smoking habit had been transmitted to the Aztec. When the Aztec civilization came to its peak in the 15th century, it had built the Kingdom of Montezuma with pyramids for the worship of the Sun-god. To express their gratitude to the Sun-god, the Aztec burned tobacco leaves continuously at their shrines, and the smoking of tobacco in thin pipes was practiced by the general public before the 15th century. Tobacco smoking was known not only to the Aztec, but also was apparent in most parts of the American continent; in the middle of the 15th century, the tobacco smoking habit was transmitted to greater North America as far as to the tribes along the St.Lawrence River.

One important aspect of tobacco smoking was related to sociability. Native North Americans exchanged a puff of pipe tobacco as a token of friendship (as we know from John Wayne movies), and sharing the same pipe of tobacco became a symbol of social intimacy in many cultures, including the Japanese. In many countries, until the cancer warning came in the early 1960s, it was customary among gentlemen to offer a cigar or cigarette at the beginning of all social occasions. With a puff of smoke a conversation began.

The first non-American tobacco smokers were the sailors who landed on the new continent with Columbus. But when they carried tobacco seeds back home, tobacco was appreciated as an exotic plant rather than as a smoking material. It was in Lisbon in the middle of the 16th century that tobacco smoking started. In 1561, tobacco came to be recognized by the holy stratum of European societies when the seeds were accepted by the Pope as a medicine.

Tobacco was taken to France in 1559 by Jean Nico, the French ambassador to Lisbon, (the name "nicotine" came from Nico's name), and the leaves of the new plant were first used in the French royal family as a remedy for headache. As the smoking habit spread to the French public, Luis XIII saw a great potential tax revenue from the sale of tobacco. The rebels of the 18th century, who gathered at the Cafe for the political intrigue that led to the French Revolution, were smokers; their first act after the Revolution of 1789 was to eliminate the monopoly sales of tobacco and to abolish the hated tobacco tax. Here again is a significant relationship between stimulants and socio-cultural revolution.

The point, however, is the historical fact that, like alcohol, tobacco also has been considered a special material that could transform a person's "ordinary" self into a different self. And as was discussed relative to tea, both alcohol and tobacco were associated originally with, and monopolized by, the people of the holy occupation--shamans, priests, monks, and bishops. The "stimulants" were the materials by which the holy occupation could justify their special status, as the "stimulants" could make them "different".

The "self-transformation" effects of "stimulants" continued even after the use of such materials was "secularized." A good example is the use of alcohol in Japan. The use of alcohol ceased to be under the monopoly of shamans, and became diffused among the public in a very early period, but yet, as far as Japan is concerned, until the beginning of the 20th century, people did not drink alcohol except on special occasions, such as festivals and ceremonies. Moreover, alcohol drinking was limited to the late evenings which were regarded as the "holy hours." (Indeed, even today, one of the culture shocks that Japanese visitors to the western cultures usually experience is the fact that in the United States and in Europe, people start drinking during the day.)

According to the writings of Kunio Yanagita, founder of Japanese folklore studies, it was only one hundred years ago that drinking *Sake* became a part of everyday life. Furthermore, the Japanese people today regard a person's "self" when drinking alcohol (or drunk) as different from his "self" of ordinary circumstances. It is for this reason that the Japanese are, more or less, permissive with each other for conduct while drinking that would otherwise be inexcusable. It often happens in Japan, for instance, at a banquet, that a lower-ranking employee may tease or even insult his (or her, but usually his) boss in intolerable words, but nobody cares what he says simply because he is intoxicated. Next morning, the man may go to see his superior and apologize for his speech, but the boss usually says, "never mind, that was an affair with *Sake*."

In other words, the level, or even the quality of social tolerance can be changed with the aid of alcohol. The world where people share alcohol is different from the ordinary world. The organization, moral structure, ethics, and the whole value system is transformed. An "ordinary person" cannot blame a person under the influence of alcohol. From the viewpoint of social engineering, a banquet in Japan is a safely valve by which formal organizational frustrations can be released.

Though the situation is not that extreme, many societies, including the "country of Freedom," the United States, share a certain social view of alcohol. At least, the level of tolerance at cocktail parties (especially "wild" ones) is usually mach higher than in "ordinary" institutionalized situations.

Self with Many Faces

One of the contributions of Japanese folklore to the other disciplines of social science and the humanities may be the dichotomy of *Hare* and *Ke*. *Hare* means "special occasions" and *Ke* means "everyday life." It may seem to be another version of the "sacred" and "profane" dichotomy of which French sociologists are very fond, but *Hare* is not necessarily "sacred." It includes, of course, "sacred," but in the usage of Japanese folklore, *Hare* can include more things and events. For example, travel, a vacation, a party, going out for shopping, and many other areas and behaviors that do not belong to "everyday life" are called *Hare*. It simply means "special(non-everyday) life occasions." As the "sacred" and "profane" dichotomy, in spite of its seemingly clear definition, is often ambiguous, the discussion of this paper so far may fit more into a *Hare* and *Ke* dichotomy as a part of Japanese enthnomethodology.

On *Hare* occasions, one observable characteristic is the change in people's clothing. When people travel, they usually pick up better clothes. On vacation, they may feel happier and take more informal outfits. These are not "sacred" occasions, but "different" occasions, and as the token of being "different," people wear the costume which they do not wear in *Ke* or "everyday life" situations.

In Hawaii, every Friday is "Aloha Friday," and people are expected to be in Hawaiian attire. At least, Aloha shirts or muumuus are permissible and encouraged in the office where more formal dress is required on other weekdays. From the viewpoint of Japanese folklore, apparently "Aloha Friday" is a *Hare* occasion. *Hare* is a change or detachment from everyday life, or *Ke*.

In contrast to, and often complementary to, the changes in clothing on *Hare* occasions, the "stimulants" (tobacco, alcohol, coffee, tea, etc., if not "drugs") are the means by which a person can change his inner "self." Many of us can share many experiences of this sort. In a formal organization, a business executive wears grey flannel suits (not in Hawaii, of course) and he works diligently at his desk. It is a *Ke* situation--a very ordinary, usual, and routine business day. But over the weekend, when he "changes" from business suit to sports jacket and takes some scotch, he experiences a "different" self. His external look is different and his internal self-image is different with the aid of stimulants. Thus, a *Hare* experience is completed. A person has become different from his ordinary "self".

It may be worthwhile, in this context, to refer to one of the most obsolete yet most popular themes of Science Fiction--the metamorphosis of "self." In its most popular version, we have children's naive TV programs such as "*Kikaidā*" (made in Japan) in which the hero, usually a common and ordinary fellow, changes himself, at a critical moment, into a super-human creature with the aid of a magical ritual. The prototype of this genre, of course, was "Superman," who, in daily life, was Clark Kent, mild-mannered newspaper reporter. But when something beyond human control occurs, such as a boy hanging from the top of a skyscraper (no explanation given as to how he got there), this ordinary reporter, after a few minutes' black-box process in his bathroom, becomes Superman--"able to leap tall buildings in a single bound, more powerful than a locomotive, and faster than a speeding bullet." He comes out with a strange costume that was conspicuously recognizable. "*Kikaidā*" and others are variations of "Superman."

The psychological implications of "Superman" and others, however, are serious, because there seems to be within each of us an inherent need or desire to change one's self. Even those intellectuals who despise "Superman" as a cheap, vulgar product of commercialism cannot resist the theme of Franz Kafka's "*Metamorphosis*." As far as their basic philosophy is concerned, the distance between Kafka and "Superman" is not too great. All of us want to change and to see and experience our different "self" or "selves."

It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the history of the philosophy of "self" from G.H. Mead to Irving Goffman, but as A. Strauss brilliantly discussed in his book, *Mirror and Masks*, a person is multi-faced. The same person appears wearing different masks (or "persona") under different circumstances. And if one looks into social interaction and sociability, we must admit that some "change," both external, and internal, takes place on many occasions. The problem of the multi-faced-ness of our being brings up another obsolete question, that of "identity crisis"; it should be stressed here that, quite contrary to the common assumption that the "crisis" is a product of an over-organized society, people have a true desire to change and to have several self-images. Sociability is an interaction among masked people (in its extreme, we have masquerade!) and masks may have positive value as well as negative. One may appreciate the diversity of one's "selves" and by doing so, may find new alternatives and possibilities.

Indeed, the ideal of Karl Marx was, as he wrote in *The Critic of Political Economy*, the social condition where "the same individual can be a farmer in the morning, a fisherman in the afternoon, and a poet in the evening." Does this communist ideal involve "identity crisis"? The brighter side of "identity crisis" may be connected with the concept and ideal of "whole man," another German philosophical tradition. Probably, "stimulants" are the medium by which people can change and appear under different masks to enjoy social interaction.

It is probably for this reason that repeating the toast of Vodka is a necessary part in establishing a *Hare* occasion in the Soviet Union, a cocktail party in the United States, *Kava* among Pacific Islanders, and tea in China and Japan.

II. Education

Education and Youth Employment in Japan

1. The Role of Education in Modern Japan

One decisive factor in the incredibly rapid industrialization of Japan over the past 100 years has been the consistent emphasis on and efforts given to education by successive governments. Even though the contemporary term "manpower" was unknown until recently; what the policy makers of this country successfully implemented during the past century was in actuality a carefully designed "manpower strategy."

The leaders of modern Japan who emerged after the Meiji Restoration of 1868 recognized the importance of education in building a new nation and took strong initiatives in instituting a nationwide school system. As early as 1868 the first primary school was inaugurated, and in 1871 primary-school education became compulsory throughout the country. Institutions of higher education were also encouraged by the government. A medical school and a foreign-language school, which had continued from the pre-Restoration period, were integrated and transformed into a new university system in 1868. The university was totally financed by the government and in 1877 was reorganized as Tokyo University.

There seemed to be two major targets in the education policy of the Meiji government. The first was to make primary schooling widely available so that everyone could become literate. The second was to use higher education as a means of developing the talents of a small number of highly competent people. In a word, the government believed that both a literate public and an intellectual elite were essential to the development of the nation, which was far behind the West.

The government did not hesitate to invest a considerable amount of money in education, especially higher education. To speed up society's adoption of advanced science and technology as well as the sociopolitical institutions of the West, the government invited to Japan hundreds of scholars, doctors, and engineers from Europe and the United States, paying them salaries much higher than those of Japanese ministers, including the prime minister. At the same time, after careful examination and screening, the government sent some 400 bright young people abroad to study every year. As a result of such extraordinary investments, Japan was able to become self-sufficient in human resources in the 1890s. It is no exaggeration to say that the education policy of Japan in the middle nineteenth century produced one of the most radical and dramatic experiments in the history of education.

The most important aspect of this promotion of higher learning was the underlying philosophy that evaluation and recruitment of youth was based strictly on achievement rather than on social status. A young man, regardless of his family background and social status, could be selected as a prospective member of the country's elite if he demonstrated intellectual excellence. The youths selected were given full support for their academic pursuits, often including the opportunity to study abroad. Upon graduation from the university or their return from abroad, the government, as well as the business community, usually provided these young people with responsible positions. Their status, of course, was accompanied by good economic compensation and social respect. It is not surprising, therefore, that many ambitious young people took the official examination to enter universities, especially the prestigious Tokyo Imperial University.

Indeed, it was in this context that Yukichi Fukuzawa, an eminent thinker and educator of the nineteenth century, wrote his famous book *An encouragement of Learning* (1872). The book began with a clear and crisp paragraph:

> It is said that heaven does not create one man above or below another man. This means that when men are born from heaven they are all equal.... Nevertheless, as we broadly survey the human scene, there are the wise and the stupid, the rich and the poor, the noble and the lowly, whose conditions seem to differ as greatly as clouds and mud. The reason for this is clear. In the *Jitsugokyo* we read that if a man does not learn he will be ignorant, and that a man who is ignorant is stupid. Therefore, the distinction between wise and stupid comes down to matter of education.

This book had an incredible circulation (3.4 million copies) and a wide reputation in the latter half of the nineteenth century. It strongly encouraged upward intellectual and social mobility. It is hard to find a level of "achievement motivation" as high as that of Japanese youths of the nineteenth century.

The policy of evaluating and recruiting youths by their achievement was, though it may sound strange, inherited from the Chinese system. Since the sixth century, government officials in China had been recruited by examination,and the only criterion was achievement, regardless of the candidate's birth, locale, and social class. Opportunities were provided on a literally egalitarian basis. Great respect for intellectual achievement and intellectualism was built into Chinese society. Both Japan and Korea adopted this philosophy, and quite contrary to the popular assumption that Japan was traditionally a rigidly structured society, in reality social mobility was extremely high in the academic and intellectual areas even during the feudal period. The new Meiji government wisely reactivated the system and combined it with the modern egalitarian philosophy of the West.

Aspiration toward intellectual achievement was thus mobilized, and ambiti ous Japanese youths with a variety of social backgrounds came to the academic and intellectual centers of the country, especially Tokyo, to take the entrance examination for prestigious institutions. Hundreds of thousands of young people traveled to Tokyo from every corner of the country, many on foot--sometimes with bare feet. Metaphorically speaking, what happened in Tokyo in the late nineteenth century was comparable to the "gold rush" in the United States. The difference between the American "gold rush" and the Japanese "university rush" was that in the former people looked for tangible objects by chance, while in the latter they sought intangible achievement by skill.

The competition to enter Tokyo Imperial University was very severe. It was not unusual that only one out of thirty applicants would be finally taken after the three-day examination. Those who were accepted were given full governmental support, encouragement, and above all, a bright future. Many who failed still looked for a second chance; they stayed in town, working during the daytime and attending preparatory school in the evening. The Japanese youth of that period might be seen as exemplifying McLelland's "achievement motivation " theory (1961).

The tradition of intellectualism and an egalitarian examination system have been preserved--or at least have survived--throughout the modern history of Japan. It is still the firm belief of the majority of the Japanese people that higher education is the only means through which one can get a good job, a stable income, and reputable social status. Parents who missed educational opportunity often stress to their children the need to be equipped with higher education. Recently, a cartoon depicted an "education-oriented" mother telling her unwilling son: "Don't be like your father. He is a loser who could not enter Tokyo University."

In reality, of course, it is a modern myth that a college diploma is an assurance of success. In 1976, almost 100 percent of middle-school graduates in Japan entered high school, and approximately 38 percent of the high school graduates were accepted by colleges and universities. As will be discussed in detail in the following chapters, society can no longer guarantee "success" for the half-million youths who graduate from universities annually. But belief seems to be much stronger than objective facts, and more and more young people are competing for the better universities. Educators forecast that more than 50 percent of any given age group will go on to the universities before 1990.

The zeal, or craze, for higher education in Japan is somewhat hard to believe for outsiders, but for many Japanese youths, the entrance examination to universities is a matter of life and death, at least socially. During the period of the entrance examination (February--March), the mass media calculate the "competition ratio" of each university, and weekly magazines publish special issues devoted to the entrance examination, with information on average scores, trends of test, and so forth. Major hotels near the big academic centers, such as Tokyo and Kyoto, are fully booked by the applicants during the season. Also, it is not unusual for high school graduates who failed the examination to wait another year or two in order to challenge the intended university again. To accommodate those who failed, hundreds, of "preparatory schools" are in business, and the more eminent ones are commercially very successful. They even give their own entrance examination, and Japanese high school graduates must withstand severe competition to be accepted by preparatory schools as well.

In reviewing the pattern of development of higher education in Japan over the past two decades, however, one very important feature emerges in comparison with similar development in the United States. According to government statistics, the percentage of university graduates in Japan in the over-65age group is 3.9 percent, while in the United States it is 10.1 percent. For the 25 to29 age group, the percentage of university graduates is 16.9 percent in Japan and 25.6 percent in the United States. The implication is that the gap between older and younger age groups is more drastic in Japan than in the United States. Also, it should be noted that in the United States, it took some 20 years (1940--1960) for the rate for the over-25 population to grow from 5.4 percent to 9.7 percent, while in Japan a similar growth from 4.5 percent to 10.1 percent was achieved in only ten years (1960--1970). In a word, the rate of higher education's growth in Japan has been twice as fast as that of the United States. This rapid growth, as will be discussed later, had a sudden impact upon many areas of society, including the labor market and employment structure.

The belief in higher education is extremely wide and deep in Japan today, and youth as well as their parents still anticipate very good occupations upon graduation--in spite of the fact that opportunities have almost reached the saturation point for university graduates. Higher education in Japan is still expanding, while opportunities for university graduates are declining. It is true that university graduates, until several decades ago, were almost unconditionally guaranteed full employment in the managerial sector of the society, but it is doubtful that even 10 percent of today's graduates will finally attain managerial positions in either public or private organizations. It is against this historical and social background that the relationship between educat ion and employment must be reexamined and that realistic educational planning must be developed. The following sections will introduce some of the facts and problems in this area, with special emphasis on the alternatives of education and employment for contemporary Japanese youth.

2. Contemporary Youth Problems

The diffusion of higher education has been one of the most remarkable characteristics of the contemporary youth culture in Japan. The change in the educational structure naturally has had a tremendous impact upon employment in recent years. Table 1 shows the drastic change in the composition of those entering the labor force in the past 15 years.

In 1965, college and university graduates formed only 10 percent of those entering the labor force; they were a minority. However, it is estimated that in 1980, only 8.3 percent of the new labor force will consist of those whose education stopped at the junior high level--they will be the new minority. In a word, the figures for junior high graduates and college graduates are almost reversed, while the proportion of senior high graduates remains relatively stable. Indeed, in 1975,

Table 1. Educational Background of Persons Entering the Labor Force

	Junior high	*Senior high*	*College/Univ.*
1965	44.5%	44.9%	10.6%
1970	21.7	58.3	20.0
1975	12.3	57.0	30.7
1980 (estimate)	8.3	53.2	38.3

SOURCE: Japan, Ministry of Education, 1976.

the absolute number of junior high graduates who went straight into the labor market was only 100,000 throughout Japan. It is safe to say that those who take jobs upon graduation from the nine years of compulsory education, at the age of 15 or 16, are almost negligible in number. Most youths tend to start working after completing either senior high school or university education.

Like other industrial countries, Japan faced an economic crisis after 1973, and the employment situation also became difficult. However, in comparison with most of the countries in the West, the degree of unemployment has been less serious. According to the recent edition of the *White Paper on Labor*, the rate of unemployment in 1976 was 2.4 percent. The figure was much worse than the 1.1 percent in 1969, but much better than the unemployment rate in western Europe and the United States in the same year. The socioeconomic and politico-cultural background of this relatively low unemployment ratio is complex. The lifetime employment system of Japanese organizations, the financial adjustments and subsidies of the economy by the public sector, the profitable export market, and many other factors have helped keep employment stable. In any event, Japan has been successful in avoiding a serious unemployment problem.

As far as youth are concerned, employment opportunities are very promising, at least statistically. The ratio of demand to supply was 5.9 for junior high school graduates and 3.4 for senior high graduates in the labor market in 1975. In other words, the labor market is a seller's Market for Japanese youth today. Though the ratio is more severe for university graduates, they are also free from the unemployment problem if they are willing to take any kind of job. It is safe to say that Japanese youth today enjoy full employment, though they may not be quite satisfied with the jobs they have.

There are some youthful minorities who are not given equal opportunities for employment. For instance, women are generally handicapped in finding jobs. Many firms recruit only men for managerial positions, and unemployment among women college graduates is potentially serious. Though Japan does not have much of an ethnic problem, Korean and Chinese youths are not likely to be given equal opportunities. They are, in spite of their Japanese citizenship, more or less discriminated against by employers as well as by the general public.

An additional problem is that though employers are willing to hire the young, they are not necessarily pleased with their education. Employers are astonished by the fact that new graduates have not had enough professional training to meet the requirements of practical work; they also find young people immature. Therefore, it is a common practice for employers to provide special training programs for newly recruited young employees. In some cases, to substitute for apprenticeship systems and to satisfy the educational aspirations of junior high school graduates, employers have established their own senior high schools to give the necessary vocational and general education to future employees. These company-owned senior high schools, though few in number, are approved by local education commissions and authorized by the Ministry of Education, and their graduates receive a diploma equivalent to that of a regular high school.

The social change that has taken place in Japan in the past three decades is so revolutionary that there seem to be more discontinuities than continuities between traditional culture and youth culture today. For example, on the level of material culture, it is found that the younger generation prefers meat and "Westernized" foodstuffs, while the older generation is more fond of fish and other traditional foods. An opinion survey showed that youth today seek happiness and a leisure-oriented life-style for their future, while the youths of 30 years ago saw as their mission a contribution to the betterment of their nation. Though family ties in Japanese society are much stronger than in other industrial countries, the role of the family as a socializing agent has been replaced by other agents, especially mass media. Generally speaking, youth today look for a model in the mass media rather than in their parents. Furthermore, contemporary Japanese youths are often labeled "young aristocrats," meaning that they have the most flexible disposable income in the society. They are the children of affluence, with few obligations, and they do not hesitate to spend their earnings for overseas travel and for expensive commodities and services which their parents in their 40s and 50 cannot afford. Marketing experts have been very successful in selling goods and services to this "youth market."

The mass media find in youth their largest audience, and it is no exaggeration to say that the primary target radio broadcasting is young people. Moreover, thanks to freedom of speech, certain media have been trying to sell sex and violence, responding to the naive and curious minds of youth. Observers may be struck, for instance, by the poor quality and bad taste of comic magazines widely read among young people in Japan today.

Relative to the impact of mass media, it is important to note that juvenile delinquency has gradually become a social problem. In 1975, some 160,000 young people under 20 years of age were arrested for violations of the criminal code and another 210,000 for traffic violations. Juvenile crimes include violence, sexual crimes, prostitution, stealing, blackmailing, and so forth, and criminologists point out that youth today tent to commit more violent crimes than those of ten years ago. Some high school dropouts in urban areas have even belonged to underworld gangster organizations, and while the use of drugs is almost unknown among Japanese youth because of severe police control, among younger teens, paint-thinner "sniffing"is often found in urban centers.

As suggested earlier, the severe competition in schooling peculiar to Japan borders on the pathological. The entrance examinations to colleges and universities--even high schools--are extremely competitive, and the method of examination is generally rigid. An applicant, for instance, is expected to give the exact year when Buddhism was imported to Japan. The correct answer is 538, and such answers as "the 530s" or "the early sixth century" are rejected. Preparation for the entrance examinations thus requires a lot of memorization, often without much relevance. A young person who wants to be accepted by a college must memorize exact historical chronologies, names of various places in the world, formulas in mathematics, physics, and chemistry, and so forth. A person is never tested for his or her creativity and imagination. The entrance examination, therefore, is an irritating and frustrating experience for all young men and women intending to enter colleges and universities.

Senior high schools function essentially as preparatory schools for the university entrance examination, so the high school curriculum is also affected by the methods and contents of the entrance examination. As many critics have pointed out, the high school in Japan today is a "cannery" where fragments of knowledge are canned and packed. High school, for many Japanese youths, is a gloomy place.

Problems with the education system do not stop here. Those fortunate students who are accepted by universities have another problem: When they were preparing for the entrance examination, they at least had a goal. But with that goal achieved, it is rather natural for a sensitive freshman to wonder why he or she came to a college or university. At the beginning of a new academic year in April, students are full of joy and excitement. But after several weeks, they find that university education is not what they had expected, and some of them become neurotic. What is known as "May syndrome" takes place.

For those who failed the entrance examination, there are several alternatives. Many ambitious young people enroll at once in another preparatory school, hoping for a second chance the next spring. Less ambitious people, or those who have a different philosophy, may decide to enter a professional or vocational school to become stenographers, television mechanics, cooks and so forth. Another group of young people may decide to work. As mentioned before, there are huge demands for high school graduates in the labor market; it is not difficult for them to find jobs. But among those who failed the entrance examination, there remains a frustrated and desperate group of young people. Some of them commit suicide--though the number is declining in recent years. Others become "spontaneously unemployed," losing their ambition and aspiration for either school or work. They spend meaningless hours at home or on the street, doing nothing. With the increasing affluence of the society, this group is becoming a new pathological problem.

Working conditions for youth are generally good in terms of both income and work load. But there is a gap between those who are working for big industries and those who have jobs in small-scale organizations. As will be discussed in Chapter 4, as far as income and working hours are concerned, the differences between the two groups are nominal; but the employees of big industries enjoy incomparably better fringe benefits than those in smaller firms. For instance, the former have access to a clean and inexpensive cafeteria, a good company hospital, and dormitories or vacation houses in the mountains and on the beach, while the latter have none of these. In Japan today, there is no class distinction in the traditional sense, but it is apparent that there is a distinction between big industries and minor firms in terms of fringe benefits; often the term "fringe" is an understatement.

A recent Japanese phenomenon related to working conditions is groups of "motorcycle crazies" who speed dangerously through the main streets of metropolitan areas. It has been found that they consist of high school dropouts and the employees of minor firms. Driving a motorcycle is a catharsis for young people who feel that they are "underdogs." Their frustration, even hostility, against those who have obtained a "ticket for success"--university students and employees in more prestigious organizations--lead them to show off with their shiny motorcycles and dangerous driving, even to the extent of racing police cars. They have very little feeling of loyalty to or solidarity with the organization they belong to, and this group is part of the "alienated youth" of contemporary Japan.

Neither university students nor high school students have much difficulty getting part-time job; for example, small retail shops, restaurants, and service stations are suffering from a labor shortage, but do not want permanent full-time employees because of the fluctuation in their business. Depending on the nature of the job, a student can earn the equivalent of $1.25 to $3.00 per hour. Another job possibility emerges from the entrance examination itself: many parents of high school students are more than willing to have private tutors at home. University students, including graduate students, if they are bright, will not find much difficulty getting jobs as private tutors for $5.00 an hour. According to a survey conducted by the Ministry of Education, some 80 percent of university students have taken part-time jobs to earn extra income, creation an area where very flexible and informal labor transactions take place. This part-time work, interestingly enough, is called "arbeit"(or *arubaito*) by students, because the students of three decades ago used this German term to show off their intellectual sophistication. In the early 1950s, university students were an elitist minority, and the general public were sympathetic to those young intellectuals engaged in "arbeit." The social context has changed, but the term itself survived, and of the millions of young "arbeiters" today, it is doubtful that 1 percent can speak German.

Unemployment social security is generous in Japan. Those who lose their jobs can receive approximately 60 percent of their previous income from the local Employment Security Office every month, and they also receive counseling when they come to the office to pick up their checks. Because of high demand, it is not difficult for young workers to find new jobs through the Employment Security Office. However, youths of today are very particular about the kinds of jobs they take. In 1975, some 250,000 employees under 20 years old left their job of their own volition. The major reason was either that the job "did not fit them" or that they did not like the "human relations" in the office or factory they had worked for.

Surprisingly, very few people left their jobs because of "low income." In a word, youths today are more concerned with relationships in their work than with their incomes.

As is widely known, the Japanese salary system is characterized by a "bonus" paid to almost every employed person, including civil servants. The amount of the bonus varies, depending on the policy of each company and on the company's earnings in each year. If a company has made a huge profit, the management may decide to pay a bonus amounting to more than 10 months' salary to every employee. The bonus is usually paid in June and December, and since the amount is so substantial, both white-collar and blue-collar workers can use the extra income for the purchase of durable goods, overseas travel, and other unusual expenditures. In the case of civil servants, it has become established practice for them to receive the equivalent of 2.25 months' salary in June and 2.75 in December. In other words, a worker is usually paid 17 months' salary annually. This institutionalized extra income makes the Japanese economy unique, and in the case of young people, the bonus comprises very flexible disposable income.

However, it may be misleading to assume that youth are uncritical spenders. It is true that the "youth market"--consisting of clothes, cosmetics, stereos and other durable goods, travel, and so forth--has been prosperous, but at the same time, youth are very savings oriented. A survey revealed that as of September 1975, 89.3 percent of youths had their own savings accounts, with average individual savings equivalent to $2,300. The major purpose of saving, according to the respondents, was "to prepare for marriage." On the average, they set their savings goal as $9,000, and this amount seems to be feasible, considering the extra income from bonuses. Furthermore, among urban middle-class youths it is a common practice for them to live with their parents until they get married and to save most of their own income. In some cases, they may contribute a nominal amount of money for the household, but parents tend to encourage their children to save their money in preparation for their future independence. Therefore, especially among young urban middle-class women who commute from their parents' home to their offices, it is not unusual to find savings amounting to more than $10,000.

Opinion surveys conducted by the prime minister's office show that the ideal of the majority of Japanese youth is a peaceful and cozy middle-class life-style, and that the political radicalism that prevailed in the late 1960s seems to have disappeared. Certain groups of political extremists who were active from 1968 to 1970 find themselves totally isolated in their early 30s today. They reached a "point of no return," however, and in desperation they still engage in occasional subversive activities. It is worthwhile to note that, without exception, the activists who engage in urban bombing, hijacking, and other political crimes are not youth any more--they are aged 32 to 35. However, it is also important to observe that whenever these "aging" radicals take the initiative--in demonstrations, for instance--they still can attract a considerable number of followers. The followers usually are temporary sympathizers, but depending on conditions and the historical context they may turn out to be new activists. Their potential cannot be underestimated, especially in view of the fact that, as discussed before, there are frustrated deviant youths who are handicapped either in education or in employment.

3. Youth and Unemployment

Unemployment among youth in Japan is not a serious social problem. According to the White Paper on Youth (Japan, Office of the Prime Minister, 1976), the absolute number of working youths in 1975 was 7.9 million, indicating that 96.9 percent of youths (except those in school) had jobs. Further, the apparent 3.1 percent unemployment rate is incorrect, because there were young people who did not want to be employed, including many young women who preferred to stay at home helping their mothers with housework.

Among those 7.9 million working youths, 1.6 million (20.4 percent) were in the 15 to 19 age group, and 6.3 million (79.6 percent) were 20 to 24 years old. Obviously, the majority of working youths were over 20, and the number as well as ratio of working young people under 20 has been declining as a result of the diffusion of higher education. Among the 7.9 million, 4.2 million (52.6 percent) were men, while 3.8 million (47.2 percent) were women. The young labor force accounted for 15.2 percent of the total working population in 1975, and there was a decline of 1.3 percent in comparison with 1974.

The majority of working youths (89.9 percent) are employed outside the family; 7.7 percent are household workers (for example, young men working on family farms); and 1.8 percent are self-employed. In terms of the sectors of the economy, the majority of youths are working in manufacturing, sales and distribution, and service industries. The number of youths in the primary sector of the economy (agriculture, fisheries, and so forth) is apparently becoming more and more negligible, especially among women. Figure 1 shows the occupational distribution of youths in 1975.

The recent economic recession, especially since 1973, has had a serious impact upon employment. In 1975, the number of unemployment reached almost one million, and the unemployment rate rose to 1.9 percent. In January–March of 1976, the unemployment rate temporarily went up to 2.4 percent. As Figure 2 shows, these figures were the worst in the past 10 years. Obviously, the postwar Japanese economy, which has enjoyed a high growth rate for two decades, is now coming to a turning point in terms of production, consumption, and employment.

Relatively speaking, however, younger people were less affected than others by the economic recession. As a matter of fact, demand exceeds supply in the youth labor market, and employers compete in the recruitment of promising young people, especially those in the 15 to 19 age group. It is almost impossible for many employers to find junior high school graduates who are willing to work rather than to go to senior high school. For example, in the Tokyo metropolitan area in the spring of 1977, some 260,000 young people graduated from junior high school, but only 2,500 of them--less than 1 percent--decided to take jobs upon graduation.

The rest, the overwhelming majority, entered senior high school without paying much attention to the alternative of work. Indeed, since the middle 1960s, when

Figure 1. Occupational distribution of young workers; ages 15 to 24, 1975



Job opportunities for 15-year-olds (Demand/Supply)

	Men	*Women*
1971	7.5	6.3
1972	5.9	5.2
1973	5.9	5.7
1974	6.9	6.5
1975	6.2	5.7

more people started to go to senior high, employers began to refer to junior high graduate workers as "golden eggs," valuable yet difficult to obtain, and it is customary for employers to make "journeys in search of golden eggs." They visit

Figure 2. Unemployed rate and number of unemployed persons, 1965–1975

small rural junior high schools where fewer graduates are heading for senior high, and try to persuade the young people to come to their offices and factories. Therefore, in the past 10 years, a consistent 30 percent or more of those taking jobs upon graduation from junior high school at the age of 15 migrated into the employment area, especially urban centers, from their home districts. As the following figures shows, the ratio of demand to supply in the employment market for 15–year–olds has been very high, even during the economic recession. In a word, the chances are only one out of five or six that employers can get a 15–year–old worker.

Furthermore, in 1975 33 percent of those who decided to work at the age of also enrolled in senior high school, either in night classes or by correspondence.

Thus, roughly one-third of junior high graduates working in offices and factories are working for senior high diplomas simultaneously. This number, according to estimates of various government agencies, is increasing rapidly; by 1980, it is expected that 50 percent of the workers aged 15 to 19 will be working senior high school students. As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6, with the inauguration of the Broadcasting University scheduled in 1978, working youths may have even more opportunities for higher education.

The majority of junior-high graduates work in the secondary sector of the economy, that is, in manufacturing industries as blue-collar workers: 71.8 percent of the men and 60.7 percent of the women who took jobs at the age of 15 in 1975 are in manufacturing industries, followed by service industries.

The shortage of labor among 18-year-olds (senior-high graduates) has also been severe. The ratio of demand to supply in the labor market for this group has been very high. Though the ratio is lower than that among 15-year-olds, demand significantly exceeds supply. The following figures show the labor-market trends for senior-high graduates, who might be referred to as "silver eggs."

Job Opportunities for 18-year-olds
(Demand/Supply)

	Men	*Women*
1971	5.3	2.9
1972	4.0	2.5
1973	3.9	2.6
1974	5.0	3.1
1975	4.3	2.7

However, the distribution of occupations is different in the case of senior-high graduates who get jobs at the age of 18 from that of junior-high graduates. In 1975, among some 600,000 senior-high graduates who found employment, men and women inclusive, those young people who were employed in manufacturing industries amounted to 31.3 percent, while 24.3 percent took jobs in wholesale/retail services, and 11.7 percent in banking, insurance, and real estate. Among men, 38.3 percent obtained jobs in the secondary sector (manufacturing), while 25.0percent of the women worked in this sector--significantly lower figures than those for junior-high graduates. Among senior-high graduates who take jobs upon graduation, an almost equal number go to both the secondary and tertiary (trade and service) sectors of the economy.

In the 18-year-old group, too, the geographical balance between demand and supply is uneven. Such urban centers as Tokyo and Osaka have to recruit senior-high graduates from communities all over Japan, and approximately 30 percent of the workers in this group are migrants from rural districts to more urban areas. Every spring, hundreds and thousands of young people, including junior-high graduates and senior–high graduates, are brought to industrial centers of the country, often by chartered trains.

Obviously, junior and senior high school graduates at ages 15 or 18 are quite secure as to job opportunities; ironically, it is among college and university graduates that there is insecurity about employment. In 1974, among 430,000 college and university graduates, 330,000 took jobs, 25,000 decided to enter graduate school, and 3,000 worked at hospitals as medical interns; but for the rest––more than 50,000 in number––what happened after graduation is unknown. Some of them went to vocational schools for further training; some may be working on their own; and some women may have become housewives. But it is not unlikely that a considerable number of university graduates are unemployed––most of them by choice. Many university professors in Japan today are familiar with graduates who do not take jobs simply because they feel that the opportunities offered to them are not appropriate to their diploma. For example, a graduate in economics may feel that the only position becoming to him is in the banking business. If he fails to get one and is offered a job as a salesperson in a department store instead, he may either take the job rather reluctantly or withdraw. Among this group of students in a changing society, there seem to be complicated socio–physchological conflicts of expectations.

In the past, when fewer than 10 percent of youths were in the prestigious situation of being admitted to universities, there was an implicit, and often explicit, promise that they would be given stable managerial jobs in either the public or private sector upon graduation. Therefore, a university diploma was regarded as a "ticket to success." Indeed, until two decades ago, even the student poorest in achievement did not have much difficulty in finding a promising position in a firm if he had a university diploma; employers as well as the society at large expected that any university graduate would be much more talented than "ordinary" young people of his age group, and that expectation was usually warranted. The two expectations––the expectation of university students that they would be hired as junior executives and the employers' expectation that those who had university diplomas would be capable people––did not conflict with each other. Insofar as university graduates were a minority, they turned out to be an "automatic elite," and society confidently approved this automatic association between higher education and employment opportunities.

However, after the mid–1960s, when there was a population explosion of university graduates, a serious dissonance in these expectations began to take place. On the one hand, students still expected to fulfill their future dream of being government officials or business executives, although their specific expectations were more ambiguous than those of 20 years earlier; on the other hand, potential employers for these young people became aware of the fact that university graduates were not what they used to be. Employers today can no longer accommodate all new graduates with good positions, and at the same time they have learned from experience that the quality of university graduates is generally disappointing.

Actual unemployment among all youth aged 20 to 24 years old in Japan, however, does not appear to be a serious problem. In 1975, the unemployment rate for this age group was about 1.5 times the national rate--a considerably lower ratio than that prevailing in a number of other industrial countries. The ratio had risen somewhat in the late 1960s but after that remained relatively stable. Relative unemployment rates for youth 15 to 19 in Japan are also low by international standards and only slightly higher than for the 20 to 24 age group.

According to a survey conducted by the Japan Recruitment Center in late 1976, more than 80 percent of university students were still looking forward to obtaining positions in either government agencies or big business; but obviously, there were far fewer vacancies than students looking for them. Thus the conflict of expectation has become more and more serious; it seems that those most affected by recent economic changes are university graduates 22 to 24 years old.

There are, of course, those graduates who recognize the changes in the labor market and do not hesitate to take jobs which a university graduate of 20 years ago would never have accepted. For instance, a recent survey revealed that 40 percent of the police force in the Tokyo metropolitan area were university graduates, and occasionally one finds a taxi driver or waiter with a B.A. degree. This new movement of university graduates into nonmanagerial areas may be regarded as a threat by the less educated, who previously monopolized these areas.

Indeed, a tragic irony is emerging in the relationship of job opportunities to education. A series of interviews with business executives conducted in the course of researching this study reveals that university diplomas are often barriers to employment. A top executive of a big trading company said that his company would not take any university graduates as secretaries. He stated: "I would rather have a junior college graduate who can type and file than a university graduate who majored in medieval history." In a word, the more education (especially nonpractical education) one attains, the narrower his or her job opportunities may be.

Moreover, business firms evaluate university graduates rather harshly. Among representative business executive in charge of personnel administration, 55.6 percent felt, according to a survey of 1975, that the caliber of university graduates had been declining considerably. In order to recruit the best young people, 34 percent of large firms (those with more than 5,000 employees) send out recruitment announcements to only a handful of prestigious universities. In other words, unless admitted to "name universities," students have no chance to take tests for and be interviewed by the big companies. This practice of the major firms accelerates the already high competition in entrance examinations for those "name universities," creating an additional disturbance in the Japanese education system.

Though the majority of Japanese youths feel that a university education is desirable for their career in terms of prestige, an objective observer recently calculated the gains and losses of higher education from monetary aspects and came to the conclusion that university education as an economic investment does not pay in the long run. The calculation was done by the editors of the Sunday *Mainichi*, a representative weekly magazine. According to the magazine, the gap between the earnings of a university graduate and those of a senior high school graduate has narrowed over the past 10 years. In 1960, the average starting salary of a senior–high graduate was only 62.3 percent of that of a university graduate, but this figure rose to 71.4 percent in 1965, 75.9 percent in 1970, and 84.2 percent in 1975. Moreover, it was revealed that the lowest 10 percent of university graduates' starting salaries in 1976 were below those of the highest 10 percent of senior–high graduates. The difference in monetary earnings between university graduates and senior–high graduates is becoming more and more negligible.

There are, however, more opportunities for promotion for a university graduate, and in a lifetime, on the average, he or she will earn about $440,000, while the total earnings of a senior–high graduate will be around $330,000. But hypothetically, if a person invested the same amount of money as the cost of university education in a trust bond at the age of 18 and started working, then that person's total income (from earnings and interest) would be more than $550,000. In other words, the economic benefit of university education is not so great as people tend to imagine. Indeed, in several business firms, management has already adopted a salary scale without any distinction relative to employees' educational backgrounds. Statistics in the *White paper on Labor* also indicate that the starting salary of high school graduates increased 21.9 percent over previous years in 1975, while the increase in the rate for university graduates was only 18.3 percent.

One of the problems of those young people who take jobs at the age of 15 or 18, however, is the high percentage of people who leave their jobs. During the calendar year of 1975, some 250,000 workers under 20 years of age (17.6 percent of the age group) were reported to have left their jobs. A more detailed study conducted the Ministry of Labor showed that of those who obtained a job upon graduation from high school in 1970, some 20 percent quit the job within a year, 30 percent within three years, and another 20 percent within five years. In all, therefore, 70 percent of the new workers of 1970 were not on the same job in 1975. These figures are striking. They include, of course, women who married and quit work, and an additional number of young people might have decided to go back to school But the majority of the people quit because they felt more or less alienated. They thought that the jobs they took were not what they had expected, complained that their work was too dull or monotonous, or felt that the human relations aspects were too difficult to handle. Fortunately, because of the high demand for the young labor force, these young people who quit do not have much difficulty in finding another job; but it is likely that these young workers will discover other jobs also to be dissatisfying and disappointing.

Except for the ambitious and fortunate few who achieve upward mobility by changing jobs, many young people turn out to be "wandering workers" who hop from one job to another, dreaming of satisfying employment. The police and courts have discovered that significant numbers of juvenile delinquents happen to be "job hoppers." Therefore, it is too optimistic to conclude that full employment provides youth with a satisfactory sociopsychological environment. Quite the contrary, full employment has created hundreds of thousands of "straying sheep," who believe that there must be a better job than the one they have.

Another problem in the current youth labor market of Japan is the status of women. Except for very limited areas of employment, such as civil service (including teaching jobs in public schools), women are treated differently from men. For instance, the banking business will recruit hundreds of women who have graduated either from senior high school or junior college as tellers and secretaries; these positions are exclusively for women. But the university graduates recruited by the same bank are men who are hired exclusively as future executives, and it is quite improbable that a woman would be given such an opportunity. Generally speaking, it is safe to say that women are expected to perform supplementary clerical work for men.

Naturally, many women are indignant about unequal employment opportunities, but employers justify their reluctance to hire women with the fact that young women seldom stay on their jobs. Top executives of business firms repeatedly claim that women usually work only for two or three years and then get married and settle down as full-time housewives. This is especially true among university graduates, who come to work at the age of 22 and get married at the age of 24 or 25. "Two years are just a training period," one executive sighed, and continued, "They leave at the very time when they become competent." Therefore, executives prefer to have 18-year-old senior high school graduates or 20-year-old junior college graduates, because they may be willing to work for five or six years. Indeed, young women, especially in urban middle-class strata, often admit that work is a temporary "experience in the real world." They spend two or three years, partly for fun, as an intermediate period between school and married life. Labor statistics of 1975 show that, on the average, women work only 4/3 years.

4. Employment Policies and Practices

Government agencies have attempted to stabilize youth employment, particularly through career guidance to both junior-high and senior-high graduates, who tend to be careless in their choice of occupations due to the high demand for them from prospective employers. The Employment Security Offices (ESO) urges employers to provide accurate information to enable youth to compare specific working conditions with their own characteristics and expectations before they decide which job to take. ESO also investigates this information and issues warnings to employers who do not give correct information to prospective employees. In extreme cases, ESO has refused to help recruit for irresponsible employers. Since ESO is the only official agency through which employment information is exchanged, a suspension of its information flow is a serious punishment for employers.

ESO, in cooperation with high schools, also provides a lecture series for students who are looking for jobs, and most local ESOs have a counseling section where a student can discuss his or her own work-related problems with professional counselors. The students are encouraged, at the same time, to take vocational aptitude tests, readiness tests, and other tests sponsored by ESO so that they can be more fully aware of their own potential. In 1952, ESO began to hire professional vocational counselors, and by 1976 there were 581 counselors working all over Japan.

High schools are not able to afford a full–time vocational counselor; usually the head of the school is nominally in charge of educational guidance, and teachers spare some class time for counseling. But on the university level, the administration offices usually have a vocational guidance section with a small full–time staff. For example, at Keio University, one of the most famed private universities in Tokyo, 16 staff members work to coordinate student employment. Employers send recruitment announcements to this office, creating a "mini–library" for student use. Members of the staff visit companies to obtain information, transmit this information to students, respond to questions from students, and assist students in finding and applying for available jobs.

Firms seeking qualified and capable young university graduates compete in recruitment. For example, a student with high scholastic achievement in business administration or in computer science will receive job offers from a handful of large firms. These companies once even recruited the top students a year or two before their graduation. In some cases, companies "reserved" brilliant students by giving them financial assistance while they were still on the campus. This method, usually called "early harvesting," became so disturbing from an educational point of view that the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Education, and industrial organizations jointly agreed on a "recruitment embargo." In 1975, firms were permitted to start recruitment and examinations only six months before the date of graduation.

In addition to ESO and university administrations, a private organization called Japan Recruitment Center has been a very active information clearinghouse for employers and students, and at the same time gives vocational aptitude tests and personality tests for employers who do not have staff psychologists.

Each local government has schools that give specialized skill training in automobile repair, plastics, textiles, and so forth: there were 437 such training schools in 1975, and some 210,000 young people took their courses as trainees. The instructions are given free of charge, and the trainees may borrow a modest amount in monthly aid, without any interest, which they are to pay back after they get jobs. Among these 437 training schools, there are 11 schools specially designed for the physically handicapped; as of 1975, some 2,000 handicapped youths were enrolled in training programs.

The most interesting trend in vocational training in contemporary Japan, however, is the establishment and maintenance of training facilities by private industries. As of 1975, there were 365 such institutions authorized by prefectural governors. A remarkable example is Tōden Gakuen of Tokyo Electric Power Co., which was authorized in 1959. Providing electricity requires highly specialized practical skills as well as solid theoretical knowledge, so the company decided to have its own training school rather than recruit regular senior high school graduates. Each spring, approximately 200 junior–high graduates (one out of four applicants) are taken into this school through a competitive examination, and for three years these young people are full–time students in the equivalent of a regular senior high school. The campus is located in a suburb of Tokyo; students live in a clean dormitories, and excellent facilities are provided for various sports and extracurricular activities. Classes meet from 8:30 A.M. to 3:30 P.M., and the curriculum consists of 150 units, including 100 units in history, math, English, political science, arts and so forth––the same courses in a normal high school curriculum––plus 50 units of highly technical classes on generators, transformers, civil engineering, and so on, which are indispensable in the practice of electrical work. The students in this special vocational school are, in other words, given more knowledge and practical skill than regular senior high school students.

What makes these students even happier than regular students is the fact that their tuition fee, dormitory fee (including meals), uniform, physical education clothes, and other expenses are all taken care of by the company, and moreover, each student gets about $40 monthly as an allowance for incidental expenses. Upon completion of three years of academic work, students get a diploma equivalent to that of a senior high school, and at the same time they are given positions in Tokyo Electric Power Co. as full–time employees. With their concentrated training, they have no difficulty in adjusting to the work situation. From their first day of appointment, they are capable of working on a construction site as junior electrical engineers.

The graduates are obligated to work for the company on a full–time basis. However, if a person is given a high evaluation by his supervisor, he can go on to a higher company–operated training school equivalent to a junior college after a minimum of three years' work. This training course provides young employees with a more sophisticated curriculum in such courses as electrical engineering, economics, applied mathematics, statistical analysis, and so on, and for a period of two years they study as full–time students. During these two years, the students are paid a monthly salary by the company as regular employees. Upon graduation from this course, the employee–students have to go back to work, but again, if they wish to, they may attend a company–operated university course after a minimum of two years' work, with arrangements similar to the junior college course. The students are paid their full salary, and on this level the curriculum is highly technical, including thermodynamics, atomic energy, high–voltage engineering, and computer science. After finishing their graduation thesis, these people of back to the company as supervisors, chief engineers, and other managerial personnel.

These junior college and university courses are, in spite of the excellent instruction, not formally approved by the Ministry of Education, so graduates are not given formal degrees, but within the Tokyo Electric Power Company, they are treated equally in terms of salary scale and promotion with those who graduated from other colleges and universities.

Other major electric power companies have adopted systems similar to that of Tokyo Electric Power Company. They recruit young people at the age of 15 and train them in such a way that they can attain both academic achievements and job opportunities.

In Japan, electric power companies are semi–public corporations, but many firms in the private sector have also established their own training facilities. For example, Matsushita Electric Company, the manufacturer of Panasonic products, has very intensive and extensive training programs. This company also has its own high school, but in addition to recruiting "out-side" students, the company recruits 80 distinguished workers among its thousands of employees every year on the recommendation of their supervisors. The young workers selected spend a full year as trainees at the Matsushita Engineering School and are trained in mechanics--both theory and practice. Classes meet 750 hours annually, and students spend another 1,000 hours operating various new machines so that they can keep up with rapid technological innovations. Upon completion of training and final tests, they are given "skill grades" and are exempt from skill tests conducted by the government.

There are apparently many advantages in these training schools operated by private industries. On the part of management, these schools are the most reliable source of manpower, especially in view of the fact that the graduates meet so perfectly the specific demands and requirements of each firm. The morale of the young people is, for obvious reasons, much higher than that of ordinary high school students. Of course, the establishment and maintenance of this kind of school are expensive, but in the long run, management believes that the return in terms of high-quality labor will exceed the invested money. Moreover, such schools enable companies to avoid the waste, and sometimes risks, involved in recruiting regular high school graduates.

The young people who are accepted by these schools naturally see many advantages as well. First of all, they can have job security at the age of 15; companies that have their own private schools are, without exception, big organizations, so students at these schools will hardly be disappointed in the work awaiting them. Above all, students can concentrate on their academic and technical work because they are free from tuition fees and other educational expenses and they do not need to worry about the severe entrance examinations which are the major concern of the majority of regular senior high school students. Therefore, the private technical and vocational schools are attracting the attention of competent junior high school graduates who wish to work as skilled workers with a wide range of possibilities for promotion in the future.

Local governments, under the authorization of the Ministry of Labor, conduct Skill Grade Tests for certificates in 82 different occupations involving 153 particular skills. Tests are divided into First Grade and Second Grade. In 1975, approximately 60,000 young workers took the test for the First Grade and 25,000 of them passed. For the Second Grade, 40,000 out of the 100,000 applicants qualified. Possession of a certificate increases the confidence of young people and also leads to promotion and other advantages in working conditions. Both public and private schools trainees are encouraged to take these tests; skilled workers are in high demand not only by private firms but also by the national economy at large.

Working conditions of Japanese youth are not totally protected. Labor laws in Japan prohibit the work of youth under 15 and place restrictions on employers with regard to workers under 18 in such areas as working hours, night work, sanitation, and number of paid holidays. In larger firms, the employers generally abide by these regulations, but in smaller industries working conditions are far less protected. In 1975, the Ministry of Labor discovered that 108,000 employers out of 165,000 (65 percent) violated labor laws and regulations. These employers were given warnings by public administration offices in charge of labor affairs, and some of them were legally prosecuted. The significant gap between the quality of working conditions in big industries and minor industries naturally makes youth with to work for the former, and as a result smaller firms cannot get competent young workers. This situation creates a vicious circle: smaller businesses do not have enough qualified young workers, so they cannot increase productivity; the less successful they are, the less competent youth are willing to work for them.

Women's labor also suffers from a vicious circle. As discussed earlier, employers usually do not want women, especially university graduates, because young women often work for only three or four years and then quit their jobs when they get married. There seems to be a mutual expectation between employers and young prospective female employees that the employment of women is temporary and auxiliary to men's work. In fact, in certain banking businesses and trading companies, women are employed on the condition that they retire at the of 30. The implication is that women over 30 have no opportunity for promotion to executive positions, and employers are not willing to pay high salaries to women of that age. Also, there is a traditional sociopsychological tendency to look upon female workers as "the flowers of the office." In the department stores of Japan, for instance, employers assume that customers expect only charming young women to serve them; this assumption may be unwarranted, existing only in the minds of the employers.

All of these assumptions about working women seem to be accepted by the women themselves. Many young women persuade themselves that they are needed only as temporary and auxiliary workers, and this makes them much less motivated than men, which in turn justifies the employers' tendency to hire young women on the assumption that they will not work for long. In a word, women are generally regarded as a temporary, flexible, and cheaper source of labor which employers can draw on as they wish.

Ironically, women's temporary labor has been in high demand in times of economic recession. Figure 3 shows the changes in labor demand during recession compared with previous years. As is apparent from the figure, the labor demand for men in July–December 1974 was 46.5 percent less than that of the same period of 1973, probably the worst in the past decade, and recovery of employment for men has been very slow, although the figure came up to 7.7 percent in January–March 1976. In contrast, the recovery of the demand for female workers and temporary workers was quite remarkable. It attained +0.3 percent and +1.0 percent respectively, early in 1976, while the recovery rate was still minus for men and full–time workers. It is safe to conclude that employers wanted to hire temporary female workers because they were more flexible and less expensive than full–time workers.

Indeed, temporary hiring of women has become more and more popular in recent years, especially since 1960. On the one hand, there are many employers looking for flexible labor because of the fluctuating economy; on the other hand,

Figure 3. Changes in labor demand, 1974–1976



there are many women, including housewives, who can spare a few hours a day and are willing to earn extra income. Therefore, a small sewing firm, for instance, may circulate an announcement in its neighborhood saying that the firm needs several part-time workers for certain periods of time, a few hours a day, with modest pay. The work in this case may be simple sewing, and it is not difficult for the firm to recruit housewives in the neighborhood.

Part-time female labor of this kind became so popular that recommendations were made by advisory committees to the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Social Welfare in 1969 aimed at protecting part-time female workers. It is encouraging, in recent years, to see independent and professional women working in many sectors of society, though their number is still very small. But it remains important to cut the vicious circle not only by raising the status of women but also by training more professionally capable female workers. This is an area where more policy measures must be taken in the future.

5. Impact of Changes in Education

As discussed in Chapter 2, the great majority of junior high school graduates--those who finish compulsory education--choose to attend senior high school. Indeed, senior high school education in Japan today is, at least culturally, semicompulsory. Figure 4 indicates the speed of the growth of advanced education in Japan in comparison with other major industrial countries. It is quite possible that during the coming decade, the youths who enter senior high school upon completion of compulsory education will reach virtually 100 percent. And in spite of the heavy learning load, most of those who enter senior high school will finish. According to the statistics of the Ministry of Education, in 1975, 97.1 percent of the youths who had entered senior high school three years earlier graduated. In other word, the rate of high school dropouts was only 2.9 percent. As will be discussed in Chapter 7 some of these dropouts become involved in juvenile delinquency and crimes, but it should be noted that the drop-out rate in Japan is amazingly low in comparison with other industrial countries.

The drop-out rate is relatively low on the university level as well. Among those who entered colleges and universities in 1969, 79.1 percent graduated in 1973, and an additional 8.8 percent graduated in 1974 after studying an extra year. The rate varies by departments: generally speaking, students in natural sciences found normal graduation after four years of study much more difficult (in physics, for instance, only 60 percent graduated in 1973) than the students in humanities (the highest being home economics--nearly 90 percent). These figures mean that more than 10 percent of those who entered the university dropped out, although some of them might have graduate in their sixth year. The percentage of university students who graduate after the normal four years of study, however, has been declining. For 1974 graduates, the percentage was 78.4 percent, and for 1975 graduates, it dropped to 75.0 percent. In other words, as their number increases, college and university students find it increasingly difficult to graduate.

Furthermore, as indicated earlier, even those who graduate face increasing difficulty finding jobs appropriate to their educational backgrounds. It is an embarrassing experience for a philosophy major to take a job as an automobile salesman, or for an economics major to work for primary school. Of course, a fortunate few still obtain "elite" careers as government officials or as junior executives in a big steel or chemical company, but for the majority of university graduates, the job opportunities are not as they (or their parents) expected. The person seeking a secure occupation may find it wiser to take more practical vocational training rather than go to a liberal arts college.

In order to cope with this particular new problem of education vis-à-vis employment, in July 1975, a new law was passed by parliament amending the School Education Law to give official recognition to professional schools as alternatives for postsecondary education, and partially to subsidize these professional schools with government funds.

Figure 4. Percentage of junior high school students who entered senior high school, selected countries, 1960–1975



Source: Japan, Ministry of Education (1976), p. 32.

Under Japanese law, in addition to the official schools there is a category called *Kakushu Gakkō*, meaning "miscellaneous schools." This category includes cooking schools, driving schools, flower-arrangement classes, foreign-language schools, sewing schools, accounting schools, and many others. These schools are under local jurisdiction and are simply approved by local authorities. They are easy to establish, and for the general public, including young people, it is easy to get accepted, usually without entrance examination. Upon completion, students acquire a certificate for the particular skills attained, but these certificates are not equivalent to the formal diplomas which accredited high schools, colleges, and universities give to their graduates. In 1975, there were 8,000 major "miscellaneous schools" scattered all over Japan with 1,200,000 students, the majority of whom were young people. The parliamentary amendment of 1975 classified some of these "miscellaneous schools" as "professional schools," placing them under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education.

Professional schools, as defined by law, are educational institutions whose goal is "to promote the abilities necessary for various professions and/or for everyday practice," and there are three minimum requirements: (1) a professional school must give at least one year of continuous education; (2) it must give more than 800 hours instruction; and (3) it must have a minimum of 40 full-time students. A professional school which takes junior high school graduates it called a "professional high school," and one which accepts senior high school graduates is simply called a "professional school." The law also defines the qualifications of teaching staff. For a "professional high school," teachers must have (1) at least four years of teaching experience during school, (2) at least two years of experience after graduation from junior college, or (3) a B.A. degree. For "professional schools," teachers must have (1) at least six years of research or teaching experience, (2) at least two years teaching experience after graduation from universities, or (3) an M.A. degree.

When a school meets these requirements, the Ministry of Education gives its authorization, which is accompanied by various privileges. For example, an authorized professional school is eligible to receive long-term, low-interest loans from a foundation subsidized by the government. Such a school is also exempt from most national and local taxation, and its students are allowed to purchase commuting tickets from Japan National Railways at a discount.

The graduates of authorized professional schools are given diplomas which qualify them as professionally trained people and which are advantageous when the graduates look for jobs. For instance, a professional-school graduate trained in shorthand will without doubt be hired as a professional stenographer; in fact it is very likely that a business executive would prefer such a professional stenographer to a university graduate who majored in Greek philosophy of Chinese literature. In a word, these new schools are designed to meet the demands for a professionally trained labor force.

The establishment of new professional institutions does not imply, of course, that the government has shifted emphasis from the regular institutionalized school system to more practical professional education. Rather, it has shifted from a monolithic educational philosophy to a pluralistic view of education. By establishing and encouraging professional schools, the Ministry of Education seems to be reshaping the model of the educational system in Japan. Figure 5 shows the emerging system--a system which means more alternatives for advanced education in Japan.

As far as employment opportunities are concerned, even before the authorization of the professional schools in 1975, certain "miscellaneous schools" demonstrated that they provided expert training and promoted high achievement in many professional areas. For example, graduates of a baking school in Tokyo were in extremely high demand. Major hotels, restaurants and pastry shops had been suffering from a shortage of expert manpower, and these establishments competed with each other to recruit the graduates of this particular school.

Business managers, too, are tending to reconsider the "manpower mix." As a matter of fact, business consultants have discovered that firms which had been so eager to recruit the graduates of big-name universities were overloaded with

Figure 5. Patterns of progression of students through educational system



executives. These executives were well educated, of course, but they did not want to work as supervisors of factory work. They were even reluctant to work for the sales department. Being "elite." these people took it for granted that the only positions appropriate for them were managerial posts in the headquarters office. As a result, these firms became "top heavy" and less productive. The consultants suggested that it was a management illusion to think that young men who achieved excellent academic grades were also men of highly motivated talents in business. Therefore, the consultants proposed a better "manpower mix" of university graduates, high school graduates, and professional school graduates as indispensable to improve productivity and morale in a business firm. One successful example is the case of Panasonic. Of the 26 members of its board of directors, only 12 were university graduates; the rest, including the president, had finished only compulsory education. Thus, the newly instituted professional schools are promising both in terms of solid job opportunities for graduates and in terms of morale and self–awareness of students.

Indeed, by definition the goals of professional school students are more sharply focused than those of liberal arts students. They know what they are and what they can and will be, while the self–images of liberal arts college students are more or less ambiguous. Like the trainee–students of the electric power company discussed in Chapter 4 , students in certain professional schools are very confident about their particular skill and talent, and many employers look forward to firing professionally trained young people along with, if not instead of, graduates of regular colleges and universities.

It is important to note that, compared with "regular" educational institutions, professional schools are extraordinarily flexible in their adaptation to changing societal needs. For example, two decades ago, when the computer emerged, a "miscellaneous school" specializing in computer sciences was established. The school attracted not only future–oriented young people but also mid–career business executives. Those who completed the course became the first Japanese people literate in the new technology. Such an instantaneous, flexible response could hardly be expected of "regular" schools. Indeed, it was at least ten years before major universities set up courses in computer science, partly in response to the computer courses established in the less prestigious "miscellaneous school." Universities, as many critics have said, are so rigid and conservative that they are often unable to cope with innovations, technological as well as sociocultural. In this sense, some professional schools may be seen as innovators in education. As of 1977, there are 152 authorized professional schools in Tokyo and more than 400 all over Japan.

One of the most neglected segments of the young population in Japan today is the small number of young men and women working in the agricultural sector of the economy. Rapid urbanization and industrialization, coupled with mechanized farming, have significantly decreased the agricultural population in general and the number of young farmers in particular over the past two decades. Government agencies, especially the Ministry of Agriculture, have been making efforts to provide training opportunities for youths in rural communities.

One of the first steps was the inauguration in 1968 of the Farmers' University, a subsidiary of the Ministry of Agriculture. Every year, 50 senior high school graduates under 25 (male only) with a minimum of one year's practical experience in farming are admitted to the university, where for three years they are trained in both the theory and practice of modern agriculture. All students live together in dormitories, and the cost is totally subsidized by the government. In addition to the Farmers' University, there are 318 training centers of various types for young farmers. Among these, 56 are devoted to intensive agricultural education at the senior-high or college level, and students are trained for a year or two on a full-time basis. These training centers are all public, and operated mostly under the auspices of local governments. In 1976, some 4,200 young people were being trained at these centers at a cost to the government of approximately $1 million.

Furthermore, the national government offers financial aid to encourage young farmers to succeed their parents on the family farm instead of migrating into industrial urban areas. For instance, young farmers interested in trying some new agricultural technology or crop can borrow $700 to cover the expenses of their education and experiments. The loan must be paid back within three years, but at no interest. When a young farmer decides to start a new agricultural venture, a government loan of $6,000 is available. This loan also is interest free, and repayment must be completed within five years. In 1975, another financial-aid program for young farmers was established. Under this program, a young farmer can get $1,800 while he is trained either in training centers or at qualified farms. Again, the loan is to be repaid in five years, and no interest is charged, In 1976, these special loans totaled almost $35 million.

Similar policies were adopted, in terms of both training facilities and financial aid, for youth in other areas of the primary sector of economy, such as forestry and fishing. The growth of government subsidies in these fields has been significant in recent years.

In another effort to encourage young workers, both in agriculture and industry, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Labor,in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are conducting international exchange programs. In 1975, 75 selected young farmers between the ages of 18 and 30 with high school educations were sent to the United States (47), Canada (5), and western European countries (23). These farmers spent a year on foreign farms to study modern farming technology and to bring back their experiences to their own farms in Japan. Also, since 1968, bilateral exchange programs for young factory workers have been established with the United States and West Germany. In 1975, 13 skilled young workers between the ages of 21 and 29 were selected and sent to these countries.

On a different level, the Prime Minister's Office charters a passenger boat called "The Youth" every year and conducts a cruising tour in the Pacific, mostly in the Southeast Asia area, for six weeks. In 1975, some 350 young people joined this tour to improve their international understanding. The tour is fully subsidized by the government and the participants must be young workers between 20 and 24. Students are excluded from this program. Though the number of youths who participate in these programs is very small, there is no doubt that the existence of the programs is very encouraging for millions of working youths.

6. Access and Equality of Education

With the growth of GNP, per capita income in Japan has also increased in the past two decades. The ratio of disposable income total earning of each household and each individual has also risen. The income–tax policy, with its heavy emphasis on progressive taxation, has succeeded in shaping Japan as a typical middle–income, middle–class society. The distribution of income among the population is represented by an almost perfect normal curve, the median being approximately U.S.$10,000 per year. The consumer market has been showing tremendous expansion, and the distributive sector of the Japanese economy is dynamic and expanding.

However, by definition, a normal curve means that there are many households in which income is below average. For those in the lower to middle income bracket, the relative cost of education for their children is very high, and it may be safe to infer that many young people who take jobs at the age of 15 are the children of these lower–income families. Moreover, with the rise of education costs, even middle–income families often find it difficult to finance their children's education. As a matter of fact, government statistics show that, on the average, parents must pay at least $50 per year for a public primary school child to cover miscellaneous expenses.

The cost of higher education, especially at the university level, has become more and more expensive, and it is not unusual to find tuition fees of over $1,500 per academic year among the more expensive private universities. In addition, parents often must buy school bonds, contribute to the construction of new buildings, and so forth. Therefore, when students are accepted by a university, they or their parents must be prepared to pay up to $2,000 a year altogether. According to a survey conducted by the Ministry of Education in 1974, a student in an average private university paid $900 in tuition fees and $1,200 for housing and living expenses, and considering the incredible inflation that took place after 1974, there is no doubt that a student in a private university today would have to have a minimum of at least $2,000 a year and in many cases far more. This, of course, creates a very heavy burden for the student's parents.

Moreover, there has been an ironic development in the relationship between social class and type of university. As discussed earlier, Japanese national universities were founded in order to recruit competent young people, regardless of their family backgrounds. This tradition has continued until today, and the tuition fee of the national universities remains extremely low––a nominal amount of $200 per year––which most households in contemporary Japan can afford. However, recently it was discovered that the majority of the students at national universities came from middle– or upper–middle–class families with annual incomes exceeding $20,000. The reason is that in upper–middle–class households, each child is given not only his or her own private room but also all necessary study aids, including good private tutors. As a result, these privileged young people tend to have an advantage in the competitive entrance examination to national universities, especially in Tokyo and Kyoto. Those children less privileged in terms of living conditions are likely to fail the examination and therefore go to private universities where tuition and other expenses are much higher than those of national institutions. In a word, the trend indicates that the children of well–to–do families have more opportunities to enter inexpensive and prestigious universities, while youths in the lower social strata are more or less obliged to go to expensive private universities.

This is the reverse of the popular image of national and private universities of a few decades ago. Formerly, the image of a national university student was that of the brilliant young person from lower social strata with high aspiration, while a private university student was the son of a wealthy family. The underprivileged, bright young man was compensated for his social handicap by inexpensive tuition fees at the national university, in contrast to the privileged young man of the upper class, who attended expensive private institutions. An invisible equalizing effect was working in the division between public and private educational institutions. But in recent years, the equalizer dose not appear to be working.

In view of the higher cost of education and the financial difficulties of students, not only in college and universities but also in junior high schools, the Japan Scholarship Foundation, a government subsidiary, has been expanding its financial-aid program for underprivileged young people. On the senior high school level, a student is qualified to apply for a scholarship of $150 to $260 a year if his or her family's annual income is below $12,500. On the university level, children of families with income of less than $15,500 are eligible to apply for a scholarship of $500 to $1,000 per year. Special arrangements are made for working students who are taking courses in correspondence universities. In their case, a maximum of $2,000 is awarded as a scholarship. In 1976, the Japan Scholarship Foundation spent $160 million, and the number of student recipients was approximately 330,000.

Even though the scholarship programs help many young students, the absolute amount to money they receive each month is far from sufficient, and students often have to look for other financial sources to supplement scholarships and allowances given by their parents. As mentioned before, some 80 percent of college and university students have part-time jobs, known among students as "arbeit." The most desired but most difficult job to obtain is that of private tutor for primary or junior high school students. Children's admission to a prestigious university is the ultimate goal for many parents, if not for the children themselves, so good private tutors are desired among urban middle- and upper-middle-class families. Because private tutorial instructions by qualified university students may mean a great advantage during the entrance examination. A student who can get this kind of job may earn something like $3.00 an hour, 30 to 50 hours a month. Indeed, looking at this private tutorial market, one may feel that a quasi-Keynesian economy is in action: on the one hand are students at the age of 21 or 22 who have passed the entrance examination to the university, and on the other hand are millions of young people between the age of 10 and 17 who hope to succeed in the severe competition. Thus the universities and their students expand the market for tutorial services. But here again, a social irony emerges. For obvious reasons, parents prefer as tutors students of good national universities; therefore, those who are privileged to begin with are also more privileged in this particular job market. Though private tutorial service is not organized as an "industry," simple calculation demonstrates that the aggregate earnings from tutorial service amount to at least

$10 million each year.

Of university students working part time, 24 percent are private tutors. The remaining "arbeiters" are either clerical or unskilled laborers, who work mostly during summer vacation. However, it is important to note that approximately 15 percent of university students are working on a full–time basis. For some of them, means often turn out to be ends, and Japanese university administration officers are familiar with students whose names are registered but who scarcely ever show up in person. As seen in Chapter 5, more than 10 percent of those who are admitted do not complete their course, and it is very likely that a considerable portion of these dropouts overlap with students working full time. Indeed, it seems that the boom in higher education has placed an unbearable economic burden on many students'(or their parents') shoulders. High aspiration coupled with the conformity psychology in higher education is fine, but one must also have a solid economic basis on which to materialize this aspiration.

Article 26 of the Japanese Constitution states that "All people shall have the right to receive an equal education correspondent to their ability, as provided by Law," and young people in economic difficulty may claim that they have a constitutional right for their handicaps to be compensated. The scholarship programs discussed earlier are only one of many efforts to provide access to higher education for less privileged young people.

There is an unusual institution through which working youths can earn senior high school as well as university–level credits through correspondence. NHK (the public broadcasting system) started a special educational radio program in 1953 and a television program in 1960. By law, if a person wants to obtain a senior high school diploma, he or she must send an application to an organization called the NHK Gakuen (NHK School) and pay a very modest tuition fee. There is no entrance examination, and a student receives textbooks and other instructional materials from the headquarters of the school. The broadcast curriculum is identical to that given at regular high schools and meets the requirements and regulations of the Ministry of Education. On weekdays, NHK broadcasts the special program from 9:00 to 11:00 P.M. over its educational television channel land from 8:00 to 11:00 P.M. over the radio. For the convenience of students, a certain number of hours are broadcast every sunday as well.

The students, mostly working youth, watch and listen to these programs after working hours, taking notes and consulting textbooks and other printed materials. They are expected to spend another hour or two on homework. The programs are scheduled in such a way that students can be exposed to eight different subjects. Students may send their questions to the headquarters, where a teaching staff answers them. NHK Gakuen is affiliated with some 70 high schools all over Japan, and correspondence students may come for "schooling" in these schools on specified dates, usually for a few days at a time. The "schooling" allows students and instructors to have some personal exchange of ideas and feedback, which they cannot experience through impersonal broadcasts. After watching or listening to the programs and participating in the "schooling" sessions, the students take tests to earn credits. As already seen, the number of youths who leave school after the junior–high level has considerably decreased; among this minority, it is estimated that more than 50 percent now take senior high school correspondence courses. This is only one of the alternatives for those who cannot go on to the "normal" senior high school.

Interestingly, the average age of students in correspondence schools has gone up, and ap present is 25. The reason is that many middle–aged people missed educational opportunities during World War II and still wish to acquire higher education. A housewife at the age of 45 who was unable to attend high school 30 years ago may be interested in widening her knowledge, for her, the correspondence high school provides a precious second chance. In a word, correspondence high schools serve not only 15–year–olds who cannot afford a senior–high education but also the older generation who missed opportunities in the past.

On the university level as well there are social devices through which underprivileged youth can attain a formal B.A. diploma. Japanese education law permits university–level instruction by correspondence. Under this arrangement, a person with a senior high school diploma or equivalent is admitted as a student and must earn 124 units for credit during a five–year course. Sixteen universities and eight junior colleges in Japan today offer correspondence courses. Here again, there is no entrance examination, and students are admitted on a first–come, first–served basis. Once admitted, students receive textbooks and other printed materials for study and given assignments by a tutor. The assigned written papers must be sent to the tutors, who make comments, give advice, and send the papers back to the students. The students and instructors communicate continuously through correspondence. The tutorial instructors are the regular teaching staff of the universities; the correspondence course is an extra load for the professors, but the university pays an extra honorarium accordingly. The textbooks and other reference materials used by correspondence students are identical to those used by regular students. In that sense, there is practically no difference, in either the status or treatment, be tween regular students and correspondence students, except that the latter have to spend five years instead of four, while the tuition fee for the correspondence course is much less than that for regular students. Because of the flexible time schedule, a working youth who wishes to achieve university–level education often finds correspondence universities convenient and rewarding. In 1974, there were approximately 150,000 students in correspondence universities, of whom 40 percent were women. Here again, there are many middle–aged students who wanted to recover opportunities missed in the 1940s.

However, one should not be overly optimistic about correspondence universities. In the first place, under the law, correspondence students are obliged to earn at least one–quarter of their credits (30) in residence, which means that they should be on campus for a period of intensive personal instruction. In order to fulfill this requirement, a correspondence student must be a full–time regular student for a period of two or three weeks at least. For many working youths, this requirement is very difficult to achieve, because with few exceptions, employers do not want their employees to leave their jobs for weeks. Civil servants who want to take a degree in law school are encouraged to take leave for "schooling" and are even protected by regulation in doing so. But young workers in the private sector, even if they study very hard on assignments at home, seldom can achieve a degree because of the difficulty of getting the required leave of absence from their jobs.

Moreover, in spite of the fact that the students of correspondence universities are, upon completion of their credit work, awarded a formal B.A. degree, their degree is often regarded as "lower" than that of regular students at four-year colleges and universities, without reason. Graduates of correspondence universities thus still find themselves socially handicapped, and consequently, for those who wish to use a B.A. degree as a "ticket to success," correspondence universities are a somewhat frustrating experience. Financial aid to correspondence universities from the Ministry of Education is also far from sufficient.

In order to solve the problem of university-level education not being able to meet the "popular demand" and to provide equal access and opportunities for the general public who wish to get a university education, the Ministry of Education finally decided to start a Broadcasting University, and independent educational institution utilizing the most sophisticated television technology. Kato and Postgate (1975) studied this new university for UNESCO and made the following observation (pp. 242–243):

> The aim of Broadcasting University is "to cultivate a capacity for understanding problems, the intelligence to solve them and a creative policy to plan for the future in changing world." If the plan goes ahead, this will be achieved through a degree course lasting for a minimum of four years, composed of three terms of 15 weeks, with broadcast programs on seven days a week for the first two years....Initially the university will operate only in the densely populated Kantō area (in which Tokyo is situated) and in one rural area. An initial entry of 8,000 is contemplated,building up to a student population of 40,000 in four years. Expansion into other areas will depend upon the experience of the first year.

The inauguration of the Broadcasting University was originally scheduled for 1976 but was postponed until 1979. Despite its being a grand public investment which can be only partially redeemed through tuition fees, it is now definite that this new institution will materialized. One of the most important aspects of the Broadcasting University, however, is that its goal is to renovate––if not revolutionalize––the conventional curriculum of the traditional university. The students will have a much wider choice of elective subjects, and the courses will be interdisciplinary and free from conventional departmentalization. The success of the Broadcasting University may contribute not only to a new equalizing effect but also to a breakthrough in the traditional and often stagnant university system in Japan.

7. Values and Deviants

A survey conducted by the prime minister's office in 1975 revealed that the majority of youths today, quite in contrast with their popular image, were more or less satisfied with what they were and with the conditions under which they lived.

As Table 2 shows, to the question "Are you satisfied with your present life?" 19.8 percent answered "Yes, very much" and another 53.8 percent said "Yes, mostly." Only 21 percent answered "Not so much," and 4.9 percent that they were "Dissatisfied." The data also show that men are less satisfied than women and that the older group (20–24) are more dissatisfied than the younger group (15–19). These figures indicate, however, that youths today are less frustrated than the public tends (or wants) to perceive. Indeed, it seems that any basis for the stereotypical image of "rebellious youth" has almost disappeared, replaced by "soft" young people. The replacement of rebellious youths by gentle young people can be seen from other data. In 1970, a survey revealed that 24.1 percent of youths answered "Yes" to the question, "Do you have any worries," but in 1975, the percentage significantly declined to 14.1 percent.

Table 2. Degree of Satisfaction of Young People, 1975

		Very much	*Mostly*	*Not so much*	*Dissatisfied*	*No Response*
Total		19.8	53.8	21.0	4.9	0.4
Men		18.4	50.7	24.9	5.8	0.3
Women		21.0	56.3	17.9	4.3	0.6
Men	15–19	21.5	48.5	23.6	5.8	0.5
	20–24	14.3	53.5	26.5	5.7	--
Women	15–19	23.4	54.4	17.2	4.4	0.6
	20–24	18.6	58.2	18.6	4.1	0.5

SOURCE: Japan, Office of the Prime Minister

The widely publicized "generation gap" also seems to have become less serious in recent years. Again, according to a series of surveys by the prime minister's office to the question "Do you talk with your father often?" 51.8 percent of the youths answered "Yes," in 1975, while the figure was only 45.6 percent in 1970. Youths are found to talk more with their mother: to the similar question about mothers, in 1975, 81.1 percent of young people said "Yes," while the figure in 1970 was 78.6 percent. If the frequency of conversation with parents is an index of the depth of the generation gap, then it is safe to say that the "gap" is much narrower than people usually expect. Indeed, it is rather surprising that in 1975 only 3.1 percent never talked with their fathers and only 1.1 percent never talked with mothers.

One implication of the changes in these figures is that youths in 1970 were different from their succeeding age group. Indeed, youths 20 to 24 in 1970, who were born sometime between 1946 and 1950 were products of the "baby boom," and their life histories and the sociohistorical context in which they lived were dramatically different from those of younger youth groups, as Table 3 indicates.

Two characteristics are obvious. In the first place, the "baby boom" generation was poorly accommodated by society in comparison with succeeding generations. Though their childhood experience was incomparably better than that of preceding groups, who suffered from severe food shortages and poor housing, the "baby boom" generation still had to carry a slight stigma of the postwar period. Their parents, who are in their 50s to early 60s, were the generation who spent their adolescence during the war and had little opportunity for education. Above all, these parents experienced a drastic change in their value system in 1945, and therefore could not be, and still cannot be, confident about themselves as well as about the education of their children.

Furthermore, the "baby boom" generation is exceptional in the sense that they were babies of the radical, "pure" democracy. They were exposed to the extremely idealistic philosophy of democracy brought from the West, especially

Table 3. Selected data for young people born in 1946–1950, 1951–1957 and 1958–1963,Japan

	Age in 1977 and period of birth		
Item	27 to 31 years born 1946–50	20 to 26 years born 1951–57	15 to 19 years born 1958–63
Number (in millions)	2.7	1.8	1.6
Infant mortality rate	61.7%	44.6%	30.7%
Attendance rate in kindergarten	20.1%	31.1%	47.2%
Primary school class size (number of pupils)	31.7	29.2	25.8
Index of household power consumption	54.6	77.9	100.0
Television ownership	15.9%	91.2%	99.0%
Senior high school attendance rate	70.6%	81.6%	91.0%
Percentage born in urban areas	59.0%	60.0%	67.0%
College and university attendance rate	22.2%	37.5%	–
Per capita daily calorie consumption	2,068	2,106	2,273
Woman as percentage of university students	22.5%	31.6%	–

the United States. The new constitution guaranteed freedom and equality and abolished military power; the constitution, most idealistically interpreted, has been the "Bible" for this generation. Teachers in the classroom taught these ideals with extraordinary zeal, and children readily accepted them. The parents were in ideological confusion and unable to give proper instruction to their children. Some of the children of this generation even condemned their parents in the name of democracy and in this sense appeared to be "angry young men."

In addition, this generation experienced heavy psychological pressures from sheer density: their absolute number was 2.7 million; and they found that their lives were extremely competitive, both in school and in employment. This age group was destined to feel as if they were permanently packed in a commuter subway at rush hour. Indeed, in the late 1960s, observers commented on the physical overflow of students in the major urban universities. Classrooms were overcrowded, libraries were packed, and campus cafeterias had not nearly enough seats. Unable to go anywhere, the students who missed seats even in neighborhood coffee shops had to spend their lunch times on the street.

The sense of overcrowdedness combined with democratic idealism to lead this generation easily to overall frustration and resentment. The violent campus unrest that took place in Japanese universities in 1968–1970 may have its origin in the demographic, sociopsychological, and ideological characteristics of the students of the day. As a matter of fact, it is noteworthy that without exception, the radical activists, including the internationally notorious "Japan Red Army," who engaged in the bloody massacre at Tel Aviv, belong to this particular age group. The occasional terrorism still taking place in Japan is committed by criminals (or suspects) whose ages range from 29 to 33, the former "radical youth" of 1968. At the present time, they find themselves to be "radical early middle-age." An important point here is that this age group failed to recruit any younger followers. Naturally they appealed to the younger age groups to strengthen their power, but these age groups generally were negative. The reason is apparent from the data in Table 3. The potential younger followers, in their teens and twenties, are more satisfied with what they are and they imagine they will be. Their parents, in their 40s or early 50s, were more adaptable to the postwar situation than the parents of the "baby boom" generation, so that better communication and continuities were established between parents and children. The children who were born after 1951, and especially those borne after 1958, are less frustrated in many respects. The feeling of density is reduced among this group––they find more "elbow room," both in the physical and in the psychological sense. In terms of economic conditions, these younger people feel more secure than preceding age groups. The following figures show the percentage of young people whose families are troubled by low income.

	1970	*1975*
Total	22.0%	15.6%
Men	25.2	19.9
Women	18.7	12.3

The problem of low income declined considerably from 1970 to 1975. However, among younger age groups, the impact of the mass media is much stronger than it was on preceding age groups. Younger people in their teens and early twenties today are the children of electronic media. They have been exposed to television since birth, and their parents half jokingly and half seriously regard television as a free babysitter. According to a survey by *Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai* (NHK), the public broadcasting corporation, in 1976 young people between the ages of 16 and 19 spent 2 hours and 13 minutes watching television on weekdays and 3 hours and 58 minutes on Sundays--20 percent more than the hours spent in television viewing in 1970. There in no doubt, thought it is difficult to prove, that the behavior of youths today is more or less influenced by the messages of the mass media, especially the electronic audiovisual media. And as in many other countries, the values transmitted by mass media often conflict with the values taught at home and in school, so it is quite probable that the conflicts internalized in each individual young person may create yet another psychological problem for the

Figure 6. Responses to the question "To whom do you talk about your troubles?" (1976)



Source: Japan, Office of the Prime Minister (1976).

younger generation. (See Kato, 1977, for an extensive study of communication regulations designed to protect the youth from undesirable media content, such as sex and violence.)

The young people of Japan today also seem to look to their peers as a source of reassurance. About 73.8 percent of young men and 81.7 percent of young women in Japan today express a definite desire to have close friends with whom they can talk about anything frankly. It is interesting to note that the need for such close friends is felt more among the 20 to 24 age group than the 15 to 19 age group for men, and the pattern of this need is reversed among women.

The peer group seems to function as the dominant frame of reference for young people. The *White Paper on Youth* revealed that, in case of trouble, young people today tend to consult with their close friends than their parents. Figure 6 shows the distribution of the sources of personal consultation among youth. (The respondents were permitted to nominate more than one source, so that the total exceeds 100 percent.) The psychological that youth feel with their friends is often very close: 36.4 percent of women and 30.3 percent of men feel that friends are much closer than parents, whereas 24.8 percent of women and 23.5 percent of men think that the psychological distance from friends is almost the same as that from parents. In other words, among many young people today, the people who belong to the same age group are considered the most reliable source of self–assurance and psychological security. Assuming that the common knowledge that youth share with their friends is gathered from the media, it seems that they are oriented toward their horizontal contemporaries rather than toward vertical transgeneration relationships. In this particular sense, there is an apparent "generation gap."

However, the ideal image of parents held by today's youth shows strikingly different attitudes toward the preferred roles of fathers and mothers, as seen in Table 4. The majority of youths are inclined to see their fathers as active in work,

Table 4. Ideal images of parents held by young people in Japan,1975

The ideal image of father	
Absolutely devoted to occupational life	12.6%
More concerned with occupation than family life	35.3%
More concerned with family life than occupation	38.7%
Devoted to family life	12.3%
No answer	0.8%
The ideal image of mother	
Absolutely devoted to family life	58.2%
More concerned with family than with social activities	37.3%
More concerned with social activities than family life	2.0%
Devoted to social activities	2.1%
No answer	0.4%

SOURCE: Japan, Office of the Prime Minister (1976), pp.298–299.

while they want to see their mothers engaged in domestic affairs. But it is important to note that 38.7 percent of the youths hold the ideal image of a father who gives priority to family life over occupational life. Indeed, altogether, the ideal image of the father in Japan is quite domestic. Lacking statistical data for the past, a historical comparison cannot be made here; but until a decade ago, the ideal image of a Japanese father was that of a man devoted to social and occupational service, and it may be safe to say that the ideal image has made a significant recent shift from a job-oriented image to a family-oriented one.

These images are very likely projections of the values held by youth concerning themselves. According to a survey conducted by the Japan Recruitment Center in 1974, to the question "Where is the happiness in your life?" 48.8 percent of young men and 41.6 percent of young women answered "challenging job" while 42.0 percent of men and 54.1 percent of women said "family life"; family-oriented youths are as prevalent as job-oriented youth. Indeed, there seems to have been a shift of values from a hard-working life style to the new life-style in which a happy family life dominates. Japanese journalists often refer to this tendency as the "new family" or "my home-ism."

The incidence of juvenile crime and delinquency among Japanese youths has varied markedly in recent years. The number of youths who committed crimes

Figure 7. Juvenile crimes and traffic accidents involving youths, 1966–1975



Source: Japan, Office of the Prime Minister (1976), p. 117.

declined until 1972 but moved upward from 1972 to 1975. Traffic accidents involving human injury peaked in 1969 and since then has steadily decreased (Figure 7). Among juvenile crimes, according to a 1976 statement by police headquarters, violent crimes such as burglary and rape have decreased significantly in the past two years, but theft, especially the stealing of automobiles and motorcycles, has increased. It is also clear that more female crime and delinquency have been discovered in recent years. The number of young women under 20 who were arrested by the police in 1975 was about 11,000, a 10.2 percent increase over the previous year, the comparable number was only 8,500 in 1969. Also significantly, in 1975 most of the juvenile crimes were committed by young people between the ages of 14 and 16. The absolute number and percentage of juvenile crimes by each age group are as follows:

14	22,087	18.9%
15	26,331	22.5
16	25,700	22.0
17	18,364	15.7
18	13,448	11.5
19	10,852	9.3

Fluctuation in juvenile crime by age group over the period 1966 to 1975 is shown in Figure 8.

Figure 8. Juvenile crimes, by age of offender, 1966–1975



Source: Japan, Office of the Prime Minister (1976), p. 134.

The interpretation of these facts and figures is extremely difficult; in fact, no persuasive interpretation has been made yet. However, in comparison with other industrial nations of the world, it seems fortunate for Japan that juvenile crime and delinquency are relatively low. Generally speaking, Japanese youths still have high aspirations and morale in spite of the competitive educational system and other difficulties. There are, of course, deviants and deviant behavior, both in reality and potentially, but the overall climate of the youth culture is relatively stable and "gentle." It does appear, however, that youth culture in Japan today is entering a new phase never before experienced.

8. The Future

The youth problem in Japan is an extremely complicated one. Facts and research findings often contradict each other, and under such circumstances, it is almost impossible to make any forecast as to what will happen to Japanese youth in the future. But, several problem areas can be defined here.

Problems of Transition

In the first place, it seems that the process of transition from youth to adulthood has become an extraordinarily complicated one. On the one hand, as pointed out by sociologists and psychologists, "early sophistication" has marked the young people of the past few decades. A child at the age of 14 may know what a child of the same age 50 years ago did not, could not, or was even forbidden to know. Fourteen-year-olds today, exposed to media and living in a permissive environment, have easy access to information. "Accelerated growth," represented by early beginning of the menstrual function, has been significant, too. And in that sense, many youths today may be defined as substantially "adults." but on the other hand, subjectively the youth often feel that they are not adults yet.

According to a recent survey conducted by the *Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai* (Japan Broadcasting Corporation) Research Division, it was discovered that 51 percent of 18-year-olds felt that they were not adults, and surprisingly enough, even among 27-year-olds, 15 percent said that they were not adults yet (Figure 9).

In such survey research, of course, a question may be raised regarding the definition of adulthood: each respondent might interpret the term "adult" as he or she pleases. But it is quite probable that for the majority of young people today, "adult" means sociopsychological maturity and preparedness or readiness to act as responsible individual citizens, and the figures shown in the graph imply that many young people are skeptical about their own individual maturity. Therefore, it seems that there are ambiguities in the process of transition from childhood and adulthood.

The source of these ambiguities is obvious. In the first place, because of the diffusion of higher education, many young people experience prolonged dependency upon their families and other socializing agents. Even at the age of 20, when young people become treated as adults legally in terms of constitutional rights and duties, they find themselves still dependent upon their families. Indeed, to celebrate their legal adulthood, the Japanese government in 1948 adopted January 15th as "the day of adulthood," a national holiday. Each year on January 15th, 20–year–olds are congratulated on their legal adulthood both at home and at public places like community centers. As a matter of fact, "the day of adulthood" may be seen as a social institutionalization of the rite of passage in a contemporary context. But as Figure 9 shows, at the age of 20, close to half of the youths psychologically do not regard themselves as adults. This high percentage may represent a self–warning defensive reaction to the public recognition of adulthood, which they are not ready to accept.

Figure 9. Percentages of young people who said they did not feel like adults, by age



Source: Tabulated from Nippon Hoso Kyokai, *Public Opinion Polls* (1976).

Such ambiguities did not exist before. When most young people began working in their late teens, their economic independence made them feel like adults; furthermore, among men, compulsory army drafting at the age of 20 clearly marked their adulthood. But today, young people as well as society at large are puzzled about where the borderline is between childhood an adulthood, in spite of (or because of) the official celebration of "the day of adulthood," How can a graduate student at the age of 25, commuting from his parents' house and depending mostly on his parents, prove that he is an adult? Psychologists could argue that sociopsychological regression on a mass scale has been taking place in Japan in recent years.

As discussed in Chapter 2, 80 percent of university students are engaged in part–time "arbeit" of some kind in order to obtain extra income. It is true that part–time jobs are needed by some students for economic reasons, but there are many young students with upper–middle–class backgrounds who need not worry about extra income but who also take part–time jobs. In their case, the motivation for "arbeit" seems to be more psychological than financial. Even though the money they earn is nominal, it may function as a psychological compensation for their feeling of dependency. Even then, they cannot identify themselves either with "kids" or "adults"; they are somewhere between, in the area which advertisers and marketing experts label as "young adults."

This complicated and ambivalent psychology is typified by a letter from a young male student, 23 to his parents: "Hello, Father, I am short of money as usual. Would you please help me a bit? Incidentally, I am going to get married. Mother, how are you? Don't work too hard." This letter was read by a disc jockey over the radio. The young man, now ready to get married, apparently is an adult, but still depends upon his father financially. The most important point is that, like many of his contemporaries, he does not sense any contradiction in what he has said. Youth––to the extent that they are represented by this letter––have found a comfortable position in society where they advantage of the privileges and advantages of both childhood and adulthood, while rejecting the handicaps of childhood and responsibilities of adulthood. Such an image of youth is quite revolutionary in modern Japanese history. Future exploration and research efforts are needed in this area.

Dilemmas in Education

The importance of education to employment in Japanese society has been emphasized throughout this paper. The media, especially the serious newspapers, have been extremely energetic in criticizing the current educational system, and there is a popular image and assumption that unless one has a good education (meaning a diploma from the big–name universities), one will not have good opportunities for employment. Schools specializing in preparation for scholastic entrance examination competitions are extraordinarily prosperous in contemporary Japan, and these competitions start even at the kindergarten level as the result of a strange chain reaction. Many parents believe that good kindergartens promise preparation for a good primary school, and good primary schools give their children qualifications for a good junior high school, and after a series of similar good influences, the good university will be the final result. To exaggerate the situation, a three–year–old child must be in a famous kindergarten if his parents (not the child himself) want him to be accepted by a prestigious university 15 years later.

According to a study completed by the ministry of Education in early 1977, there are thousands of private "supplementary schools" (known as *Juku* in Japanese) for primary and junior high school children. The *Juku* classes meet early in the evening on weekdays and often all day over the weekends The children finish their regular school around 3:00 P.M. and then attend *Juku* to get supplementary and more advanced curricula for two or three hours. In the Tokyo metropolitan area, it is estimated that more than 30 percent of primary school pupils are enrolled in *Juku*, which is essentially a preparatory school for junior high schools. Since junior high school is compulsory, every child is accepted by the local public school, but hundreds of thousands of parents look forward to seeing their children accepted by a prestigious private school which can be a starting point for successful higher education, which implies, eventually, a successful career.

The result is that many young children in Japan today do not have enough time to rest. From 8:30 A.M. to 3:00 P.M. they attend school, and from 4:00 P.M. to 7:00 P.M. they study at *Juku*. They have to sacrifice weekends for study. Moreover, as discussed in preceding chapters, many families are willing to pay even more money for private tutors at home. In a word, from primary school age on, Japanese children must live in an extremely competitive world, and the only and absolute good for them is to be admitted by big-name universities. Since *Juku* and other extra-school means of instruction apparently are placing tremendous pressures upon young children, a parliamentary subcommittee has taken up this subject as one of the urgent issues in Japanese education. As pointed out in Chapter 1, "craze" is a much better word than "zeal" to describe Japanese education today.

The social implications of the craze for education are diverse and grave. For example, when Tokyo business executive is transferred to a branch office located in another part of the country, he seldom takes his family with him. He moves to his new office alone, rents a small apartment, and comes back to Tokyo by plane over the weekends. The reason he does not take his family is simply that such a move is a disadvantage to his children, especially the children who are attending a good school. Such family separations due to children's education are rather common practice among the mobile urban middle class, and it is very likely that such separations cause psychological problems for the entire family. Newspaper reporters often criticize this issue, arguing that separation is undesirable for family mental health; but the reporters themselves, when transferred to a local bureau, usually do not take their families because they also feel that their children's education is more important than family togetherness.

Quite contrary to the craze for education, however, there are several indications that the relationship between education and employment is a myth. The "inflation" of university education has made it impossible for university graduates to be assured of managerial jobs in "big industry" (firms with more than 5,000 employees). In the spring of 1977, approximately a half million young people graduated from colleges and universities, but 16 percent of them were fortunate enough to find employment in government offices and big industries. Even graduates of such prestigious national universities such as Tokyo or Kyoto had to meet severe competition to be taken by big organizations. All the educational effort--all the sacrifices made since the age of four--did not guarantee anything. It has become simply a matter of statistical probability, and the probability for success is becoming lower and lower. Indeed, one can see a pathological trend in the increase in the number of schools. Of course, there are many bright graduate students who are looking forward to achieving an academic profession in the future, but there are also many young students who decided on graduate school simply because they were unsuccessful in employment. These students have only postponed their critical moment for a few years, and for them, graduate school is just a period of waiting.

Another aspect of Japanese education that deserves keen attention is professional schools as an alternative to university education. More and more ambitious young people who want to become professionals are choosing professional schools, because by definition some of these schools guarantee employment opportunities. During the coming decade, it is probable that more and more parents and young people will become aware of this alternative. The Ministry of Education is encouraging the expansion of professional schools and industries are becoming interested in recruiting professionally trained young people who have graduated from professional schools rather than ordinary liberal-arts college graduates, whose potentialities are grim. As a matter of fact, according to a survey by the Japan Recruitment Center in 1976, 18.6 percent of the youths thought that a professional-school diploma would be more advantageous than a university diploma for getting job, even though the majority of youths still felt that universities might give them a better job or a higher salary upon graduation.

Strangely enough, a cross-cultural survey conducted by the prime minister's office in 1972 revealed that, compared with youths from other countries, Japanese youths did not feel that education was a factor in job discrimination (Japan, Office of the Prime Minister,1976, p. 270). To the question "Do you think that people are unduly discriminated against in work because of their educational background?" as seen in the following figures, very few Japanese youths answered "yes."

Country	*Percent answering yes*
Japan	17.5
United States	34.8
England	32.7
West Germany	46.3
France	51.8
Switzerland	42.4
Sweden	17.5
Yugoslavia	67.6

What Japanese youths feel or think might be quite different form reality, but as far as their attitudes are concerned they seem to be more optimistic about their jobs and careers relative to their education than their peers in many parts of the world.

Attitudes Toward Work

The same cross-cultural study (Japan, Office of the Prime Minister, 1976), also discovered that Japanese youths were more work oriented than the young people of the rest of the world. To the question "What is the ultimate value in your life?" the percentage of the young people who answered "challenging work" was conspicuously higher than that in other industrial societies:

Country	*Percent answering "Challenging work"*
Japan	28.0
United States	8.9
England	13.3
France	8.8
Sweden	20.7
Yugoslavia	7.5

(German data were not available)

The general public tends to regard contemporary youth as leisure oriented and as a somewhat easy-going generation; and this general image may be correct. But it is important to note that over one-fourth of Japanese youths at least state that they find the value and meaning of their lives in their work. Moreover, in another survey conducted by the Japan Recruitment Center (Japan, Office of the Prime Minister, 1976, p. 263), to the question "Why is work meaningful to you?" 52.5 percent of 18-year-old high school graduates answered "self-realization through work" while 36.6 percent said "income." In other words, for the younger generation today, work is the means by which they develop themselves rather than the means to obtain economic benefit. It is true that youth today are the children of affluence and that they are great spenders and consumers. But at the same time, Japan is one of the very few countries where the work ethic has not disappeared, and high respect is still given to hard work. These research findings may seem to contradict points discussed in earlier chapters, but it is safe to say that in Japan, in cross-cultural comparison, there seem to be more continuities in values and ethics, in spite of the well-defined "generation gap."

In mobile society, especially a society totally dependent upon overseas trade, it is almost impossible to predict the future. But there is one thing that is very certain: Toward the end of this century, the demographic structure of Japan will be quite different from that of today. Life expectancy is becoming longer and longer, and the birth rate is declining. In the year 2000, the "baby boom" generation will reach their early 50s, and society as a whole will be dominated by an old and middle-aged population. At present, Japanese youth enjoy full employment, but it is doubtful if this situation will prevail 25 years from now. More social welfare measures must be taken to prepare for the forthcoming demographic structure, and this may mean a greater burden for the very young generation who are under 10 at present. As an eminent futurist aptly remarked, "The future is not what it used to be."

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Ethics, Education, and Society

1. Relativity of Human Values

Most anthropologists and social psychologists seem to have agreed that "the need for new experience" is one of the basic needs which is shared by all human beings throughout history, and regardless of race or ethnicity. This need may be translated into, in our popular terminology, "curiosity." The origin and structure of "curiosity" is not clear at this stage, but scientists who are engaged in primate research claim that curiosity-based behavior can be found even in the evolutional stage of monkeys. Indeed, we are creatures full of curiosity. In our daily conversations, many of us ask "What's new for today?", and advertisers often inform and appeal to us about their products shouting "It's new!", whether the product is a detergent or an automobile. We look for "news" all the time. Thanks to satellite communication technology, wherever we are, we watch CNN and other news media. Anything "new" satisfies every one of us. Most of women are interested in new fashion and new home appliances. Scholars in their ivory towers are keen to find out new theories and discoveries. Children are fascinated by new video games and toys, while their fathers are looking for new business opportunities.

When such various typers of curiosity are integrated as a system in the minds of individuals, we call it as an act of "learning". We decide to learn a certain subject, such as mathematics, painting, foreign language, music, and numerous areas of inquiries. And all of us are, more or less, "learners" of something. You may be a learner of piano, bookkeeping, history. A small peasant in deep tropical forest is a learner of agriculture and forestry, just like a scientist at Princeton University is a learner of sophisticated physical paradigms. In other words, this is the world where everybody is a learner of something. And because of such "learning needs", human beings gradually invented social institutions called "education". As a matter of fact, as Phillip Alias and others pointed out, not only the concept of "education" but also that of "childhood" belong to very recent discoveries. In this connection, it is natural for some pedagogical experts to define "education" as a social invention of which the primary task is to facilitate assistance for learners. Spontaneous appetite for learning has been the basis for the development of human intellectual history.

In saying so, however, it should be also remembered that, in order to establish continuities among generations, "teaching" became a vital part of human endeavour. Schools as social institution were inaugurated for the masses of people in 19th century, and in most of the countries today, young children are obliged to attend schools for 6 to 9 years so that they can be "taught" fundamental knowledge and skills which are necessary to keep the society alive and active. Children may not like to be taught. They may not understand what teachers say. But wether you like it or not, you are encouraged and compelled to go to school. We should admit that school today, almost all over the world, bring up many "problems", and we know that certain scholars and critics, such as Ivan Illich, Paul Goodman, were looking for alternatives for institutionalized education system. These alternatives, however, still have something to do with teaching. Without "teaching" of some kind, a person cannot be "socialized". This is the truth held since the time of David Hume who postulated his famous concept of "tabula rasa".

Then, the question is what should be taught. There must be hundreds of answers to this simple and profound question. Educational philosophers as well as administrators engaged in educational affairs are very much concerned with this basic problem. At the same time, "education" today is everybody's business. As a matter of fact, every individual has something to say about education. Education is one of very few topics about which everyone of us can express his/her opinion immediately. In that sense, today, almost all citizens are potential educational philosophers and administrators. What's wrong with education? What should be done for the reform of education? What government must do vis-a-vis education? These are the issues about which all of us argue from time to time, and never reach consensus.

Moreover, education is a socio-cultural product, and therefore, philosophy, practice, and policy, related to education differ among societies and nations. For instance, in the countries where political system is dominated by despotism, strong indoctrination to a particular ideology may be strongly emphasized. Where a specific religion is designated as national religion, religious education is compulsory. The contents as well as methods of education vary from one country to another, and each nation's educational policies are essentially relative. Also, they are relative in each historical epoch of a society. Education has been re-examined by successive governments and powers. Even such seemingly neutral curriculum as mathematics and physics are often perceived differently depending on socio-cultural and historical backgrounds of a nation state. Therefore, it may be safe to say that "education" is both policy-bound and culture-bound by nature.

If such view is valid, then "education", by definition, is a part of the value system which each society holds. For example, American education is a reflection of American values and Japanese education is inseparable from Japanese values. In other words, there is practically no universality in education as far as its philosophy and curriculum contents are concerned. It may be true that, regardless of social system, "education" is thought to be important, but still, in terms of social policy, the priority given to education may differ among the societies throughout the world today. In some countries, to let people get higher education is encouraged, while some other countries look at higher education simply for a limited elite. Some governments may regard education as the basis of national development, but some other governments give a rather minor role to education. In this respect, it may be worthwhile to see education from a "particulalistic" viewpoint as well as a "universalitic" one. The discipline called "comparative education" should play its most significant role in this area.

If these statements and views are correct, the relationship between education and ethics is more than obvious. Since education is a part of, and reflections of values, "ethics", in its broadest sense of the term, is working behind education all the time. In the light of the tradition of axiology, values are is defined as the goal and product of "selective behavior" in which people select, ultimately, an alternative among numerous spacial–temporal possibilities. For example, how to spend this evening can be decided, either consciously or unconsciously, by every one of us at his/her will. The selected time–space complex, i.e., to go to a theater, to read a book, to go out for dining, to continue the day's work, to watch television, or to go to bed early, and many other possibilities, is the manifestation of one's choice of value. The fact that you have chosen one alternative among many possibilities means that you disregarded other options, and other "selves". Such serious thinking may lead you to existential contemplation.

Thus considered, then, education is, more or less, a compelling power to narrow down such alternatives to children and masses of learners. A school textbooks give you a only a tiny portion of the store of human knowledge and wisdom. In other words, textbook writers and educators are responsible for the choice of alternatives they have made. Teaching western elite history without paying much attention to the history of masses in south–east Asia, for example, is not only a problem of attitude or philosophy, but also a deeply value–based decision. In organizing curriculum, wether to allocate several hours for the learning of foreign language at the sacrifice of physical exercise, for instance, is another example of value selection and value judgement. And because of the relativity of values and cultures, it would be contradictory to try to discover "universal" values in education. One may argue that such virtues as "love" have universality, but "love" in the Judeo–Christian tradition may have different connotations and expressions if comparison is made with the Islamic tradition. In an extreme case, one may be struck by the fact that the equivalent of the word and concept of "love" itself does not exist in some cultures. In fact, in Japanese culture, until mid–19th century when new Western thoughts and concepts were introduced, there was no equivalent term and idea which corresponded with "love".

At the same time, it should be remembered that even in the same culture, depending on different historical stages, values are not necessarily consistent. In feudal society, both East and West, basic value was essentially status quo. But as the society evolved into the modern industrial stage, social mobility was encouraged and such values as freedom and equality emerged. In other words, values and their social expression, i.e., education, change in our time–space complex.

2. Imperial Philosophy

Japan is no exception. Its value system experienced tremendous change in the past one century. As most of the people know, Japan decided to abolish its feudalism in the middle of 19th century, and started its best efforts to industrialize the nation following the patterns demonstrated by the West, especially western Europe. The shift took place in the most dramatic and drastic form in the sense that the planned social change had to be carried out in a matter of only twenty years. The country which had maintained a stable feudal social structure in combination with traditional monarchy had to change itself into a modern nation-state with centralized government, modern legal system, free competitive economy, and well equipped military forces in order to catch up with industrialized nations of the West.

One of the basic policies shared and emphasized by the new government was to promote education, since a well-educated public was thought to be the basis for socio-economic developments. And their action was extremely quick. Only 5 years after the revolution, the new government inaugurated elementary school compulsory education in 1872, and altogether, some 50,000 elementary schools all over the nation began to accept children. Thanks to the tradition of the respect for education, which will be discussed later, Japanese public reacted favorably to this new legislature. Though there was a shortage of school teachers, there were thousands of competent people, mostly former *Samurais* who could teach elementary arithmetic, reading and writing. In fact, according to a series of studies, even before the introduction of the modern education system, the literacy rate of Japanese public was incredibly high for mid-19th century. It is estimated that more than 50% of Japanese at that time were literate. Therefore, the institutionalized new education system could be seen as a complementary and reinforcing factor in the zeal of education which had been deeply rooted in Japanese culture.

The differences between feudal education and modern education were obvious. In the first place, the education which used to be given to *Samurai* class was essentially based on Confucian philosophy and ethics, and emphasis was put on reading and reciting. Among the merchant class, arithmetic using abacus was the key. With the rise of Japan as a modern nation-state, the needs and nature of education had to change. For the citizens of the newly developing country, the utmost purpose was to obtain knowledge of the world, and to enlighten themselves in such a way that they can serve for the improvement and betterment of the nation, which was quite behind the first-rate industrial nations of the day. However, there seemed two trends in the philosophy of learning and education.

On the one hand, those who were aware of the change of the time on the basis of democratic ideals appealed to or even agitated the young generation saying that each individual is free and equal by nature, and, therefore, one had to achieve his/her self by one's efforts. And on the other, there emerged, as the reaction to the egalitarian educational thoughts, nationalistic view on education. Let us examine the former trend first.

Yukichi Fukuzawa, the founder of today's Keiō University, probably was the representative of the advocate of such a new wave of thinking. Inspired by the writings of Benjamin Franklin, he published the renowned best selling book of the day, "*An Encouragement of Learning*" in 1872, which begins with his famous sentence "It is said that heaven does not create one man above or below another man". This publication was one of the few early democratic and precious writings of the 19th century. He was very much concerned with the equality of man, and said "--human rights are the great moral obligations that give dignity to individual human life, protect one's fortune and possessions, and value his honor and reputation. When heaven gives birth to man, it gives him his faculties of body and mind and powers to realize his rights in practice. He really "encouraged" young men and women through this book, and some two million copies of this book were sold throughout the country. The number of people who read this particular book is estimated at five million at least.

One of the readers of the book was Inazō Nitobe. Born in a *Samurai* family in the northern part of Japan, Nitobe was inspired by Fukuzawa, and knowing the democratic ideas and society of the United States, decided to attend a new agricultural college in Hokkaidō, the "frontier" of the new nation where an American scholar, Dr. William S. Clark, was hired by Japanese government as the president. Clark stayed there only several months, but he left the famous words "boys, be ambitious", and these words continued to linger in the ears of Nitobe and other students. Incidentally, it is interesting to be see that Fukuzawa's portrait is printed on \10,000 notes and Nitobe on \5,000 bill. The two most important liberal educators of the 19th century are still remembered in Japanese currency today.

These figures, who represent early Meiji enlightenment movement, however, came from the private sector. In fact, Fukuzawa's book explicitly criticized aristocracy, and praised the common man's way of life, often from the "merchants' vie" of society. And the tide of democratization went much further. Taisuke Itagaki, Chōmin Nakae, and other thinkers were influenced strongly by the French Revolution, and took a more or less radical position in politics. They were not satisfied with government policies, and rigorously criticized not only policy issues but also Imperial monarchy, which was seen as instrumental to the government power of the day.

The government was, naturally, not comfortable with these movements called *Jiyū Minken*, and suppressed them by various means. At the same time, the government top administrators discovered that there were no clear guidelines for education. And in response and reaction to liberal movements, the second stream of educational philosophy emerged from conservative government power. In order to clarify educational philosophy and practice, with absolute authority of the Emperor, the government issued famous Imperial Rescript on Education (*kyōuiku chokugo*) in 1890. The Rescript begins with this sentence ;

"Know ye, subjects: Our Imperial Ancestors have founded Our Empire on a basis broad and everlasting and have deeply and firmly implanted virtue---This is the fundamental character of Our Empire, and herein also lies the source of Our education".

The Rescript further gives the following thoughts and practice;
"Ye, Our subjects, be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husbands and wives be harmonious, as friends, true; bear yourselves with modesty and moderation; extend your benevolence to all; pursue learning and cultivate arts, and thereby develop intellectual faculties and perfect moral powers; Furthermore advance public good and promote common interests; always respect

Constitution and observe the laws; should emergencies arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth".

From an ethical and educational viewpoint, it seems that nothing is wrong in the statements. Rather, one may be struck by the crisp and plain style as well as its contents. However, in spite of the fact that the virtues contained in the Rescript were admirable, this statement issued under the name of the Emperor, essentially and fundamentally gave an idea that education was an instrument through which national development had to be achieved based on the Emperor system. Moreover, in practice, each elementary and secondary school in Japan was forced to have a copy of the Rescript along with a portrait of the Emperor in a "Sacred Shrine". On each ceremonial days, such as new year's day, Emperor's birthday, the day of entrance and graduation, the principals of schools solemnly opened the door of the shrine, and read the Rescript to the students. Thus, Emperor–based nationalism became the dominant theme in modern Japanese education, rejecting liberal philosophy represented by Fukuzawa and other enlightening intellectuals.

Indeed, the Imperial Rescript was defined as the source of Japanese education and learning, and as the result, all school curriculum had to be placed as the extension of the Rescript. Most importantly, because of nationalistic education, its aim was set for the good of the nation, and self–sacrifice for the sake of Japanese Empire was preached by educators. Small children and university students alike, were obliged to recite the whole text, and, surprisingly, this practice continued until 1945 when Japan surrendered to the Allies in World War II. Furthermore, since the Emperor has been regarded as "living God" for almost a century, the voice of school principals who read the Rescript sounded like the voice of God.

In this historical and cultural context, it is natural that "ethics", in its narrowest sense of the term, turned out to be the most important key issue in curriculum organization in Japanese education. A curriculum called "*Syūshin*", literally translated as "self–development" was taught in every school, and school teachers were mobilized to propagate patriotism and glory and honor of being the subjects of the Emperor to their students. The fact that school textbooks until 1945 were supervised, edited, published, and distributed by the Ministry of Education was enough to indoctrinate the minds of the people to nationalism, militarism, and imperialism. In fact, "*Syūshin*" was nothing more than the deductive teaching of the Rescript. School teachers, in this sense, were missionaries of Imperial Japan and Japanese Empire.

3. Changing Expectations

After 1945, Japan had to face a kind of anarchy. The old value system, especially Emperor–centered social and cultural beliefs, was denied, and Emperor himself declared that he was a man, not a God in 1946. Social circumstances were chaotic. However, it did not take much time until major reforms were planned and brought into practice. Along with agrarian reform, dissolution of old *Zaibatsu*, tax reform, reformation of education became one of the most urgent and important tasks of the post-war government and policy makers.

As for education, the most significant change was a legislative action which resulted in The Fundamental Law of Education which came into effect on March 29, 1947. The Law describes the aim of education as follows:
"Education shall aim at the full development of personality, striving for the rearing of the people, sound in mind and body, who shall love truth and justice, esteem individual value, respect labour and have a deep sense of responsibility, and be imbued with the independent spirit, as builders of the peaceful state and society".

This new legislation was the beginning of a new era in Japanese education as well as ethics. The "aim" of education as seen in the quotation is full of moral virtues to be achieved. And as far as the statements are concerned, there was no objection on the part of the public. The Law has been observed and respected as the basis for both personal and social development. In order to make the propositions and philosophy more concrete and practical, Central Education Council, which was instituted in 1953, submitted its recommendation to the Minister of Education under the title of "*Expected Personal Values*" (*Kitai sareru ningenzou*) in 1963. This recommendation, though forgotten by most of the people today, was the first landmark in post-war education and ethics. In its 40 page report, the Council resolved 17 items as desirable codes of human morals and behavior. To sum up, these items were:

a) As an individual: to be free, to develop individuality, to cherish one's self, to have strong will power, to respect the sacred
b) As a member of family: to make one's home full of love, to look for home as the place of relaxation, to make home as a place of education, to make home open to society
c) As a social being: to be loyal to one's work, to contribute to social welfare, to be creative, to respect social codes
d) As a member of the state: to have decent patriotism, to respect and love the Royal family as the symbol of the state, to develop good national character

The resolution and recommendation of the Council were exposed to public criticism especially from left-wing and liberal sections of the society. Major criticism and opposition came against two issues. In the first place, respect for the "sacred" was attacked. In the text, the document stated that "the sources of all religious sentiment are the respect and benevolence to the origin of lives" and that under such recognition "let us be aware of the existence of a 'way' which is truly consistent with heaven and earth". Religious beliefs must be respected, regardless of sects and schools, but a group of intellectuals claimed that this statement might encourage religious education in schools. This particular point, when combined with another code, i.e., "respect to Royal family", made many people worried because the recommendation could have meant revival of Emperor system. And those who compared the contents of recommendation with those of Imperial Rescript, which was totally abolished in 1945, expressed skepticism that the Council was trying to secure old educational values under disguise.

These criticisms, anxiety, and opposition had good basis. In the first place, after the war, as pointed out already, the Imperial Rescript, which ruled Japanese education overwhelmingly, lost its authority and legitimacy. The implication of that fact was that Japan was in discover a "moral vacuum" after 1945. New standards for ethics and education were, therefore, looked for. Extremists insisted that ethics and morality belonged to each individual's judgement, and should not be interfered with by state and other public authorities. But majority of people agreed that articles of new Constitution which declared equal opportunity of education, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and other matters based on democratic ideas, were too abstract and that more concrete guidelines and action plans were needed. The Fundamental Law as well as series of resolutions of Central Education Council, in this connection, were prepared to meet these needs. And on the part of schools, based on these guidelines, "ethics" or "civics" was set forth as an integral part of curriculum organization.

However, this issue is still under discussion because the term "ethics" itself often reminds of old "*Syushin*". Certain portion of parents and school teachers say that they "smell" the revival of old moral codes, as represented by the Rescript, which was given and forced by government power and authority. Especially those who had the experience of "*Syushin*" education in their school days are the most concerned group. They claim that they do not like to see again the "nightmare" from which they suffered during or before the war. The "moral vacuum" is, both substantively and nominally, still existing in Japan today. As a matter of fact, this question was raised even at the time of enthronement of Emperor Akihito held in November 1990. Not only radicals but also some religious organizations, particularly some groups of Christians, protested on the basis that the ceremony held in accordance with *Shinto* ritual and tradition was simply a matter of the religion of the Imperial "family", and it could not be regarded as a public event. The interpretations of Imperial family, in conjunction with religious matters are still some of the fundamental ethical and educational problems in today's Japan.

4. Moral dilemma

Such controversy may sound to a non-Japanese audience somewhat strange, especially in view of the fact that Japan proved itself as a diligent and successful society in past several decades. One may wonder why, for instance, crime rate in Japanese society has been surprisingly low, and why Japanese workers are doing their job so hard and are so loyal to the organizations they belong to, despite the total lack of ethical guidelines or standards in school and in social education. How and why a country can be integrated without ethical education? Or, how a person can be ethical in the absence of formal ethical education?

Another group of people may like to pose on opposite series of questions. They may argue that Japanese commercial firms and capital are totally in lack of corporate ethics and out of the country. They may claim that Japanese government did not show its international ethics in this mobile and difficult age of human history. They may wonder if any ethical education is given in the Japanese school system.

Both groups of questions are quite adequate. And in order to "decode" ethical and educational problems, if not mysteries, of today's Japan, it seems necessary to go back in history so that one may be able to have a clue to the peculiarly Japanese situation and phenomena. To begin with, it is worthwhile to know that Japan, for many centuries, did not have a monotheistic religion. In terms of religion, most Japanese believe in Buddhism of various sects, and the teaching of Buddhism may have something to do vis-a-vis Japanese way of thinking and behavior, but that does not mean that they are devoted believers in Buddhism. Furthermore, Japanese Buddhism is quite different from that of Thailand or Sri Lanka, where teaching of Buddha himself is observed. This is not the place to elaborate the religious character of Japan, but awareness as Buddhists does not exist in the everyday life of Japanese people. Other religions such as *Shinto*, Christianity, may "coexist" not only in Japanese society but also in the minds of Japanese people. There seems to be no spiritual or philosophical contradiction if one's birth is celebrated is held by the *Shinto* priest in the neighborhood, has a wedding in the Catholic Church, and the funeral according to Buddhist riten. Japan does not have, except for a very minor portion of the population, a consistent "core" religion. This, however, does not mean that there is no solid basis for ethics. Though it is difficult to say in a word, the fundamental ethical basis for Japanese people seems to be in the Confucian way of thinking in a variety of versions. Needless to say, Confucian philosophy and ethics were established by Kong Zu (B.C.551-479), and his teaching was imported to Japan as early as 7th century first by Chinese, and then by Japanese Buddhist monks such as Kūkai and Saichō. In fact, Kūkai, the founder of *Shingon* sect of Buddhism, upon his return to Japan in 806, immediately wrote his famous script titled "*Sankyōu Shiiki*" or "*Guide to ree Teachings*" in which he introduced there major ways of thinking which should be learned and observed. The three included Buddhism, Confucian philosophy, and Taoism. It sounds quite strange that a devoted Buddhist monk paid his attention to other streams of philosophies, but his attitude is indicative of Japanese "syncretism" where seemingly different ways of thinkings are not only aggregated but also integrated without contradiction. For him, like others, Buddhism was for the life beyond, Confucius philosophy for the guiding principle in secular world, and Taoism as profound cosmology. For Kūkai, and other Japanese thinkers, these three were not contradictory, but complementary to each other. As a result, as far as secular matters are concerned, not only intellectuals but also general public tended to refer to, more or less, Confucian teachings.

Especially, after 17th century, when the newly emerged *Samurai* class came to dominate society as the ruling power, they took Confucian texts as the basis of their knowledge and the guide for their behavior. Each feudal lord inaugurated his own school known as "*hankou*" for top class young *Samurai*, and the major curricula taught in these schools was readings of Confucian logic and ethics. Nitobe, whose name has already appeared, thought that the way *Samurai* class formulated, based on Confucian philosophy was a very important moral factor which shaped Japanese culture, and wrote his famous book "*Bushidou*" in which he emphasized that there were virtues and values in Japan which were comparable with modern Western ethics. Nitobe said that though "*Bushidō* was not a written code (at best it consists of a few maxims handed down from mouth to mouth), five important principles of relational morality i.e., "between master and servant (the governing and the governed), father and son, husband and wife, older and youn ger brother, and between friend and friend" were the basic ethical codes. These are simple moral truths. But Nitobe elaborated these moral codes extensively and intensively so that non–Japanese readers could have deeper appreciation of ethic s and education in Japan.

Not only *Samurai* class, but also merchants acquired knowledge and moral codes from Confucius, and such system of learning as *Shingaku*, founded by Baigan Ishida, diffused among consciencious town–dwellers, in particular merchants of Kyoto. They devoted themselves, utilizing their knowledge of Confucius, to social welfare and charity.

What, then, were the characteristics of *Bushidou* and *Shingaku*? In short, the key concept here was "heaven" ('Tien' in Chinese, '*Ten*' in Japanese. 'Tien en mien' means 'the gates of haveuly peace'). "Heaven" in East Asian philosophy does not mean "God". Heaven is a superhuman and supernatural force which is working behind every human and natural phenomena and affairs. Japanese children, even today, are often told how almighty heaven is. For example, people often say that "heaven knows, earth knows, and I know". In other words, even when nobody is watching what you do and what you think, heaven, eaith, and yourself are always looking at you. In this sense, Japan had a tradition of a reflective "self", quite contrary to many observations and studies conducted by Western scholars who concluded that Japan never had clear idea of "self" and individualism.

A careful observer might have found that this particular term "heaven and rarth" has appeared very often in the discussion so far. The idea was implicit in Imperial Rescript, but the idea is unclouded in Fukuzawa's writing and even in today's recommendations of Central education Council. One may be surprised, also, to know that the entrance examination for Imperial Universities of mid–19th century was conducted mostly in Chinese classics, especially the writings of Confucius. Young men competed in their knowledge and interpretations of what Confucius said. One of the most important concepts there, also was that of "hea ven and earth". In the culture where there was no tradition of a monotheistic "God", metaphysical concept of "heaven" has been the dominating and leading power which guided human behavior. Indeed, without proper understanding of this concept, not only Japanese but also cultures of East Asian region will remain the "mysterious Orient". Though contemporary Japanese are rather unconscious of "heaven" in everyday life, "heaven cult", so to speak, appears often in our daily conversation, too. A suspected person in criminal court, when he insists he is innocent, may say that he is not guilty and he can swear it under the name of "heaven and earth". Indeed the combintion of, heaven, earth, and man seems to be the basic trilogy in Japanese culture. In Japanese traditional flower arrangements, too, the fundamental formula of arrangement is based on this trilogy. The flower which gives decisive theme in the center of an arrangement is called "heaven", while a complementary and balancing flower is known as "earth". The third, a minor but final touch, without which the whole figure cannot have aesthetic quality, is known as "man". Flower arrangement, in this connection, may be regarded as a microcosmic symbol of Japanese culture. "Heaven", as discussed before, is not a "God", even not an equivalent of "god". And it has been exactly the point about which policy-makers as well as intellectuals of mid-19th century up to present frequently contemplated whenever they had to encounter or compare Japan with other cultures, especially, Western cultures. In fact, in order to be a member of industrialized countries, Japan had to invent comaparable concepts and institutions with the West, where Judeo-Christian tradition was shared.

The most important, and interesting invention was, on the part of government officials, the placement of Emperor as a "living God", in *Shintoist* interpretation and context. According to studies of historians, when a group of political leaders headed by Tomomi Iwakura made an extensive inspection trip to Europe and the United States in 1870, they discovered that Christianity provided the deeply rooted and shared values to most of the peoples of the Western nations, and that even in the world of politics, administrators swore by the Holy Bible . The Japanese mission wondered if there were any "equivalent" to the Christian "God" and the Holy Bible. A historical anecdote tells us that, during their visit to Europe, Hirobumi Ito, who later became the first Prime Minister of modern Japan, visited Herbert Spencer and consulted with him on the issues of nation-building based on parliamentary monarchy, where there was no Christian tradition. Spencer, responding to Ito's question, is said to have suggested that the Emperor might be "used" as an equivalent or substitute for Christianity. This private conversation encouraged Ito, and upon his return to Japan, he and his group reinforced the power of the Emperor, which they could manipulate, and as the result, they made the Emperor a "sacred" being. In fact, in his early days after enthronement, Emperor Meiji was a human being who conversed with common people in common language. He even visited the homes of high government officials. But after 1880s, Imperial family were secluded from the public, and Emperor was given his special status as a "God". It should be reminded here that Japanese word "*Tennou*" which stand for "Emperor", literally translated, means "the King appointed by Heaven" or "Son of Heaven". In other words, the Emperor system as such is another version of the "heaven cult" which helped Japan's nationalistic development in the past.

Since the idea of "heaven" has been so dominant and penetrating in Japan for centuries, this concept attracted popular support. And therefore, it turned out to be the key in Japanese ethics and ethical education. The question, then, is how to follow the lessons given by "heaven"? In this context, another idea known as "way" (*dou* or *michi*) plays an extremely important role. "Way", in Confucius philosophy, is the means by which a person can reach a heavenly state of mind and being. And there are many "ways" through which a person can satisfy the expectation of heaven. As a matter of fact, most of Japanese traditional arts are known and recognized as "ways". For example, a widely known tea ceremony in

Japanese is "*sadou*" or "the way of tea", flower arrangment is "*kadou*", or "the way of flowers" Calligraphy is "*shodou*", "the way of brush writing". In fact, the title of Nitobe's book "*Bushido*(u)" means "the ways of *Bushi* (warriors)". In the areas of martial arts, Japanese fencing is "*kendou*", the way of swords, wrestling "*Judou*", "the way of wrestling" and so forth. From serious learning to hobby, from childhood to old age, "ways" are important daily practice and ethical achievement.

The term "*dou* or *michi*" is very often used in our conversation today, too. If a journalist makes flalse report, he may be blamed as having done something against "the way of journalist", if a small merchant commits tax evasion, he is said to have deviated from his "merchants 'way". In other words, we have each individual's "way" as a professional, and as a private person. "The way of man" (*jinrin* or *hitonomichi*) is the path given by the heaven in accordance which a person must behave and live. You should observe the "ways" prescribed by heaven each moment wherever you are. This is a priori mandate and instruction which came from heaven. And Japanese behave on these assumptions. To a certain degree, this assumption is shared by Chinese and Korean peoples, too.

Ito decided to make Emperor as an equivalent of Christianity, and it may be safe to say that, metaphorically speaking, modern Japanese thinking, the respect for the "ways" have been the expression of their beliefs. The sacred feeling, which may or may not comparable to that of Judeo-Christian tradition, has been in existence in the minds of Japanese for centuries, and because of this analogy, modern Japanese thinkers often found similarities with the West, and more often discovered heterogeneity between Japan and the West. Philosophical and moral dillemma thus produced made Japanese thinkers skeptical about their identity as modern individuals and their country as a modernized nation.

5. Ethics and Education in perspective

As stated at the outset, values are relative, and ethics and education are also relative both in their forms and contents. Textbooks which were published and used fifty years ago are naturally obsolete today. What parents told to their children on ethnicity, sex, and other delicate subjects twenty years ago are out-dated today. Looking at the future, if we imagine parents, teachers, and educators in mid-21st century reading the proceedings of this conference dated 1990, it is quite sure that they would say that what we are discussing today were strange, and even funny. Like all other human endeavors, education is evolving every year, every day, and every minutes.

Keeping that unavoidable relativities in mind, however, we must face with the challenges and problems of today's education and ethics. What are the majo r tasks awaiting for us? At least five major problem areas should be identified and some suggestions should be given to conclude this paper.

A)Beyond relativism

Though it may sound contradictory with what has mentioned in the above paragraph, it may be worthwhile and necessary for us to ask ourselves if there is any values which have been and will be consistent in human history. In the discussion so far, this paper dealt with particular characteristics of Japanese ethics with emphasis on the concepts of "heaven" "way" and so forth, in order to give better understanding of Japanese situation today. A cultural relativist may say that if such historical and socio-cultural peculiarities exist, then each country or each culture should stay as it is, and further encourage that each culture must respect and understand these differences. However, such cultural relativism is weak and even obsolete in the world where international relations cannot allow any nation and culture isolated from others. Cultural heritages of every nation state must be respected each other, but at the same time, more efforts should be made to find out similarities among different cultures and their ethical codes. For example, even though the United States and Japan have so many differences, both cherish such virtues as hard work, honesty, respect for family life. The roots are different, and phenomenological forms are different, but there must be the point of deep and sincere recognition and appreciation of many similarities. The days when different cultures look each other with exoticism are over. At least, as far as the United States and Japan are concerned, both of us belong to highly industrialized civilization being led by, for better or worse, Hi-Tec. We both are looking for, for instance, common ethics on energy consumption, ethics on preservation of tropical rain forest and other environmental issues. Both of us are wondering if there are any ethics relative to foreign aid programs. Both of us are in the midst of ethical arguments on the problems of transplantation of internal organs between human beings. We share similar ethical problems on the definition of "death". Not only scientists, but also policy-makers along with the sacred occupation, wether they are Christian or Buddhist. Is "brain death" is the "real death" ? Hitherto existed ethical codes and teachings cannot give definite answer to these huge areas where new ethics are looked for.

Suppose, if Aristotle and Confucius are both here with us, and exchange their ideas and interpretation of these issues, they will come, after careful and deep contemplation and dialogue, to an agreement. We should be aware of the fact that there are more similarities than differences among cultures.

B)On religion

Needless to say, religions, inclusive of "primitive" tribal religions and highly systematized "world religions" such as Christianity, Hindu, Buddhism, Islam, and others, have been one of the major sources of ethics. In Buddhist temple and Christian church alike, monks and priests have been teaching not only cosmolog y but also everyday practice. They tell us what is right and what is wrong in secular world. Devoted believers, everywhere in the world, listened to the preaching, and obsereved their own behavior. These religious beliefs and practices should be admired and cherished. By saying so, however, it seems that most of the established religions with many centuries' history are losing their believers and followers. The number of regular church goers has been decreasing, and religious preaching do not attract much attention. When asked, of course, many people would say that they are believers, and they respect church, temple, shrine, and other religious institutions. But in reality and practice, people are paying much less attention to their religious life than before. In the awareness of danger of religion, efforts were made on the part of churches and temples. A Christian church start ed a "new look" with rock music. A Buddhist temple inaugurated kindergarten to attract neighbors. Even Roman Catholic church, in past decade, modified its orthodox theology and practice several times in the light of changing values. Such questions as abortion, for example, has been under hot discussion, and restrictions given to those who are engaged in sacred occupation are relaxed. But these efforts did not make much change in the minds of masses of people. If not discontent or dissatisfaction, certain sense of skepticism and indifference in religious matters changed people in various ways. Among those who were not satisfied with existing religions, we can find devoted believers of "new religion", especially among younger generation. Japan alone, as of 1990, it is reported that there are some 1500 new religions registered, with millions of believers. In many parts of the world, upon your arrival at airports in past decade or so, you might have had experiences of being greeted and approached by young men and women who try to persuade you to listen to their religious beliefs. Often, these new religions are combination of Oriental cosmology and "new science", and we usually do not know what they are. This is not a place to comment on these new religions, but we should be reminded that we are now living in the world where hundreds of thousands of new religions are at work, appealing and attracting millions of people. They may be a "iller" for "moral vacuum" about which this paper discussed earlier, and looking at the situation realistically, it seems that such "vacuum" is not peculiar to Japan, but one of shared problems.

C) Changing family structure

Family has been a place where initial education is offered to children. Newly born child is taught and trained in its home, surrounded by family members. By definition, therefore, family plays extremely important role in shaping up the personality and value attitudes of a person from his/her early childhood. However, the structure and function of family have changed drastically in recent decades. In the first place, instead of traditional extended family, what sociologists call "nuclear family" came as the majority and typical form of family. Children today, for instance, do not know much about their grand-parents. In the past, "grandpa" and "grandma" were important "socializer" for children. They were tender and strict in transmitting values to their grandchildren. But today, in an nuclear family, child ren are trained by their parents and siblings only. In other words, we are living in the age when "small family" is dominant. The family is getting even smaller by lowering birth rate. Looking back the past, we used to see a typical American family with at least three children driving out for Sunday picnic in station wagon accompanied by a big dog or two. Nowadays, contrasting to this old image of a family, we see many families with only child. The image and reality of parents, especially mothers, also changed. Until very recently, mothers usually stayed at home, working very hard in housekeeping, taking care of their children. Mothers were with children. They took children to school, and when children came back from school, mothers were ready to offer milk and cookies while listening to children who talked about what happened in school. However, this old image of mothers disappeared in past few decades. Thanks to the improvements of women's status with equal opportunity act, coupled with advancement of higher education for women, majority of mothers have their jobs. They do not spend much time with their children, and instead of big "family car", husband and wife has his/her own sportscar. Family driving out in big station wagon is not a typical picture of a family anymore. Extremists claim that family was already "disorganized" and even common sense observation gives us a serious awareness that family has changed for better or worse.

As the number of "two income" families increased, children are getting less attention. Children today, who come back from school to their home will find a memo from their mothers on refrigerator door which tells them what to eat, what they are supposed to do. These children in Japan are called "*Kagikko*", meaning "children with house keys", because they have to carry house keys since they cannot find anybody at home. In Japan today, the birth rate is reported to be 1.57 or less, and among younger generation, many couples decided to have no children. Also, 65% of married women in Japan have their jobs. Family is becoming smaller and smaller, and with the advance of women's social status and equal opportunity act, coupled with diffusion of higher education of female population, the meaning of family itself is changing. Two decades ago, kitchen was the place where carefully prepared dinner dishes were cooked. Today, people "cook" TV dinner in microwave oven. Moreover, as the result of high divorce rate, a single child with single parent is not rare in contemporary society. This also may be a common ethical problem which both the United States and Japan share today.

D)Media and ethics

Sociological investigations of contemporary society tell us that mass medi a are taking place of family and school in terms of their socializing force. The ethics which give lessons to the masses of people cannot be neglected if one is seriously concerned ethical issues today. Media often act as the judge of what is wrong and what is right in the societies we live. Television commentator's views of diversified questions of everyday life are much more stronger than those of top administrative executives of a nation. Furthermore, media even can expel political leaders. This question is so important, that extensive footnote is attached to this paper as a sub-text.

E)Identity Crisis

As was mentioned above, family life underwent tremendous change. A family is not as it used to be. Above all, parents and children do not have many things to share in terms of values. You may call it simply "generation gap". Older people say that they cannot understand what younger people are thinking and doing, and visa versa. If a family is not the group with which one can identify, what, then is the reliable social group which can prove and approve one's identity. Old fashioned patriots would not hesitate to say that their nation is the source of one's fundamental values, and that the nation is the only place to which one should devote his/her life even in literal sense of the term. The organization one belongs to, such as commercial firms and government agencies, may give feeling and idea of one's identity. But usually, you cannot find real friends with whom you may want to identify, though there are number of "friendly people".

When a society was organized based on sedentary agrarian communities, one had, and had to, clear idea of neighborhood. But at the age when people move from one place to another in incredible velocity, one's neighbor, if any, is temporary in nature. Our neighbors are nothing more than passengers who happ ened to sit to your next seats in aeroplane with whom you chat for few hours at best. Very often, you never talk to the passenger next to you. In other words, we are lonely. In a big metropolitan area such as New York, you are surrounded by millions of people. But these people are totally strangers. Instead of traditional ethics which preaches to you to love others, new urban ethics warn us "do not trust other people, watch your pocket". To see such new ethics is sad, but which ethics are more realistic ? Do you really believe that all other people are nice and can be trusted, or do you think you had better to see all other people with suspicion in order to be safe ? Unfortunately, the latter seems to be better and more realistic choice. In the societies where urbanization has been taking place, and where strangers mix all the time, we are forced to confront with "identity crisis". As matter of fact, more than hundred people arrived to JFK as new immigrants yesterday. Though less than that in number, Tokyo had new people intending to work in Japan, too. As individuals, they are in the dark in these new urban environments. They have no idea of identity. But at the same time, we should remind ourselves that we, too, are nothing better. This new urban ethics is anot her area where both countries can carry out research and find solutions.

More than a century has passed since Fukuzawa first visited the United States, followed by Nitobe and many others. Especially, in past forty years, millions of people from the United States and Japan made their visits mutually. They include businessmen, politicians, scholars, artists, students, and surprising number of tourists. At the same time, hundreds of bi-lateral conferences and meetings were held to deepen understanding and to cooperate each other. In spite of these efforts, however, we must admit that both people are still ignorant abou t their partners. It is important, of course, to continue dialogues between th two nations across the Pacific.

By recognizing so, however, we must be aware of the fact that another important and urgent task is awaiting for both of us, especially in terms of ethic s and education vis-a-vis international relations today. In this mobile and chan ging world, we often wonder, for instance, if there is any universal values and ethics on human rights. In certain countries today, based on particular religion and/or ideology which are basically different from our shared values, hundreds of thousands of people are arrested or executed for the reasons which are beyond our understanding. Even an extreme cultural relativist would not agree with the philosophy and practice of countries where demonstrators are indiscriminately killed by military forces.

We are wondering, if nature conservation and anti-pollution measures are shared value among all nations. "Ecology" movements are warning us the dang er of the earth and , more or less, we accept these warnings not only in terms of science but also in terms of ethics. But in reality, there are many countries whic h do not pay much attention to environmental issues in their public policy. Does our ethics on environment preservation have universal value ? How can we prove it ?

These are only few examples of ethical questions to be asked at this age of globalization where all nations cannot survive without mutual interdependence. The dialogue between the United States and Japan are important, but at the same time, it seems necessary to work on multi-lateral relations in immediate future. In this process, education also should be encouraged to change, both in its forms and contents, in particular in international education. In this context, it is recommended that, research on comparative ethics and comparative education in global scale should be conducted in such a way that both of us can have concrete action plan for the improvements and reform of education for the generations to come.

Media and Ethics

(Sub-text submitted to join conference on ethics, H.Kato)

From sociological and social psychological view, a person's personality, behavior pattern, and even way of thinking, are affected and determined by many "socializing agents". A person, after his/her birth, usually, is socialized by parents. They learn language, toilet training, manipulation of utensils, the way to wear clothes, and other numerous manners and customs. At the age of five or six, most children mix with their peers both in nersery school/kindergarten and in neighborhood "gang group". The peer group is another agent which shapes one's personality. Then, they attend to school where teachings are conducted by professional instructors. They learn, for instance, grammar, arithemetic, history, elementary physics, and other curriculum. Their classmates as well as neighborhood "gangs" still continue to be peers. They may be socialized further in church or temple, if they are encouraged by their parents. At the age of 18 or 20, most of us enter to "real life", or the world of "jobs". There, a person has to be trained in business, public administration, and other areas so that they can contribute to the society. They learn new knowledge and technology, such as legal practice, medical care, which parents, peers, and schools did not teach. It is not necessary here to re-examine basic and classic theory of socialization in reference to "primary group" "secondary group" and so forth. The point is that a person is, universally, socialized by plural agents, and that without such agents a person cannot live as a social being. In addition to these agents, in late 20th century in which we live today, a new and extremely strong agents emerged all the sudden, and unexpectedly. They are called mass media. A group of Japanese scholars in late 1960s called mass media as "the third school", the first being family, the second formal school. By reflection and in our daily observation, this classification seems to be quite appropriate. A child learns from his/her conversations with the parents and siblings over dinner table, and learn school curriculum from teachers in the classroom. But at the same time, children today learn from media, especially television. Today, in most of the countries of the world, it is reported that where television is accessible, children spend some two hours a day with television. Television stations are interested in attracting children as a devoted audience group, and make special hours for children, for instance Saturday morning cartoon series. Not only in terms of hours they spend, but also in respect to the "quality" of attitudes.

It is natural that many scholars and critics have been observing and studying the impacts of television upon the lives of children since late 1950s. Some of the works in this area of research are major sociological contributions in past fewdecades, and according to their findings, the way children think and behave is deeply and often seriously influenced by the television programs they watch. And one of the problems which was brought to the attention of educators and parents was the fact that the ethics they teach children were contradictory to the teachings given by parents and teachers. For instance, in family life as well as in school classroom, children are taught that law enforcing police are always observing social justice, and are defending the lives of citizens. However, in television programs, law enforcing officers, especially top administrators, are depicted as corrupted people who receive bribes from underground figures. In order to bring peace and safety, you should wait until such "lone wolf" type hero as Dirty Harry who drop out regular police organization. In home and school, violence is taught to be as the worst vice, but on television screen hundreds of people are killed by respectable heroes. Parents and teachers tell the children that humble and simple life is the virtue in one's life. But television programs and commercials encourage to dream luxury and lavish life as a model. The alliance of the "first school" or family and the "second school" i. e., formal school, is always readay to fight with the "third school". The result of such conflicting values is often tragic and desperate. Children are caught up in the middle of various lessons. And children tend to believe that the lessons given by the "third school" are better and more reliable than those teachings provided by their parents, teachers, and the church they belong to. It was some 40 years ago when Karen Horney pointed out the conflict which took place between family and school. According to her, one of the sources of neurotic tendency in today's society is the contradiction between two values, one being family education and the other school teaching. For instance, children are taught in school and church that they should love their friends and sacrifice themselves for the good of neighbors. But parents say that the friends are competitors, and neighbors are not always trustworthy. This ethical conflict still exists in most of the nations. And in addition to this contradiction in moral education, we have now the third agent whose lessons are more attractive and persuading.

Not only children, but also adults are suffering, though they are more or less critical to see the situation than children. The devoted audience of such programs as "dynasty" say that the story is a fiction and it does not represent American reality, but at the same time, they have a mixed feeling of envy, anger, sympathy, and hostility. Like other fantastic fictions, people do not believe in it. However, these "soap operas" along with commercials bring to us many lessons of what to buy, what to do, and what to believe. We argue about "media ethics", but we should pay proper attention to the new ethics which media produced and distributed. Is a life with Rolls Royce, beach house, first-class cruise, and huge amount of deposit in Swiss Bank a good life ? Media say yes and no. Is an honest, decent, and religious life of a poor peasant life a respectable one ? Media answer yes and no. But, essentially, in view of the fact that major broadcasters are commercial stations, media in general seem to be encouraging people to spend money, borrow money by your credit card, enjoy yourself today, do not worry about tomorrow. What Martha Wolfenstein and Nathan Leites aptly labeled as "fun morality" is prevailing our consumer society today. These "virtues" seem to be contrasting and contradicting with our common understanding of "ethics", but they should be seen as a new version of "ethics" in broadest sense of the term since they are guiding forces for masses of people all over the world today. As a matter of fact, except for very few intelligent persons, any established ethical codes cannot beat, even compete with, this new ethics.

The question, then, is what to do with the "third school" of which educational power is extraordinarily strong in comparison with the "first" and the "second" schools. Are families and schools obliged to surrender to media power ? One solution is, of course, to continue "surveillance" over media. Parents and teachers are frequently criticise, blame, and protest against media. And these actions are necessary. However, we may take another look at media. If a television program, especially popular soap operas and situation comedies, are carefully examined, we are struck by the fact that there is an explicit dichotomy of "good guy" and "bad guy", and "good guy" always is the winner in game, competition, and war. Of course, there are many versions in this dichotomy. Seemingly "bad guy" at the beginning of a story may turn out to be a "good guy" at the end, and visa versa, an extension of Wolfenstein's" good-bad girl" concept.

Furthermore, it should be noted that in recent media world, certain profound ethical implications are explicit. For example, internationally famed American movie "starwars" is full of metaphysical lessons. Partially influenced by, in suspect, Taoism, a small old man, Joda, gives lessons on justice, self control, and concentration of mind to the young hero so that the war should be fought and won. Millions of audience must have had, more or less, philosophical experience while watching the movie. Another space opera "2001 Space Odysseia", too, gave another metaphisical lesson. The beginning of human life, its evolution, the combination and integration of past and present, mysteries beyond scientific knowledge and computer technology, and many other interesting and educational topics can be found in this great movie. In Japan, too, for example a movie series of "*Tora-san*", with tremendous popularity, depicted the life of small vending merchant who discourages everyday vices, must be studied as an agent of ethical education. A television serial called "*Oshin*" also made a great hit, not only in domestic scene but also abroad. As a matter of fact, "*Oshin*", a story of the life of a woman who came from poor peasant's family, and finally achieved her success with patience, honesty, and sincerity, was accepted by many countries in Asia. Chinese, Indonesian, and even Iranian governments as well as general public supported "*Oshin*", and as a result, we are now seeing what might be called as "*Oshin* syndrome" in many parts of Asia. In other words, among the messages which media bring to us, there are quite a few ethical values which should be considered and appreciated. The "third school", is not necessarily a "bad guy". Efforts should be made to utilize media for educational purpose. And as far as Japan is concerned, government communication policy has been definite in encouraging educational broadcasting since mid 1930s, and distance education through media has been attracting masses of people, especially at the time when continuing education and recurrent education are widely recommended and accepted.

However, educational media is not the only solution. There are many other alternatives to look at media as socializing agent, with high ethical values. If values and value system are relative in nature, and if new values are seeked for, media can work together with families and schools. At least, it is a wrong and inappropriate perception and assumption to regard media as the enemy of ethics and education, without serious and unbiased study of the realities of "the third school."

IMPERIAL RESCRIPT ON EDUCATION

(1890)

Know ye, Our subjects:
Our Imperial Ancestors have founded Our Empire on a basis broad and everlasting and have deeply and firmly implanted virtue; Our subjects ever united in loyalty and filial piety have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of the fundamental character of Our Empire, and herein also lies the source of Our education. Ye, Our subjects be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husbands and wives be harmonious, as friends true; bear yourselves in modesty and moderation; extend your benevolence to all; pursue learning and cultivate arts, and thereby develop intellectual faculties and perfect moral powers; furthermore advance public good and promote common interests; always respect the Constitution and observe the laws; should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth. So shall ye not only be Our good and faithful subjects, but render illustrious the best traditions of your forefathers.

The Way here set forth is indeed the teaching bequeathed by Our Imperial Ancestors, to be observed alike by Their Descendants and the subjects, infallible for all ages and true in all places. It is Our wish to lay it to heart in all reverence, in common with you, Our subjects, that we may all thus attain to the same virtue.

The 30th day of 10th month
of the 23rd year of Meiji.

(Imperial Sign Manual. Imperial Seal.)

THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF EDUCATION

Fundamental Law of Education, for which the concurrence of the Imperial Diet has been obtained, and cause the same to be promulgated.

Signed: HIROHITO, Seal of the Emperor

This twenty-ninth day of the third month of the twenty-second year of Showa (March 29, 1947)

Countersigned:
Prime Minister
YOSHIDA Shigeru
Minister of Education

TAKAHASHI Seiichiro

Law No. 25
THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF EDUCATION

Having established the Constitution of Japan, we have shown our resolution to contribute to the peace of the world and welfare of humanity by building a democratic and cultural state. The realization of this ideal shall depend fundamentally on the power of education.

We shall esteem individual dignity and endeavour to bring up the people who love truth and peace, while education which aims at the creation of culture general and rich in individuality shall be spread far and wide.

We hereby enact this Law, in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution of Japan, with a view to clarifying the aim of education for new Japan.

Article 1 Aim of Education

Education shall aim at the full development of personality, striving for the rearing of the people, sound in mind and body, who shall love truth and justice, esteem individual value, respect labour and have a deep sense of responsibility, and be imbued with the independent spirit, as builders of the peaceful state and society.

Article 2. Educational Principle

The aim of education shall be realized on all occasions and in all places. In order to achieve the aim, we shall endeavour to contribute to the creation and development of culture by mutual esteem and co-operation, respecting academic freedom, having a regard for actual life and cultivating a spontaneous spirit.

Article 3. Equal Opportunity in Education

The people shall all be given equal opportunities of receiving education according to their ability, and they shall not be subject to educational discrimination on account of race, creed, sex, social status, economic position of family origin.

The state and local public corporations shall take measures to give financial assistance to those who have, in spite of their ability, difficulty in receiving education for economic reason.

Article 4. Compulsory Education

The people shall be obligated to have boys and girls under their protection receive nine years' general education.

No tuition fee shall be charged for compulsory education in schools established by the state and local public corporations.

Article 5. Co-education

Men and women shall esteem and co-operate with each other. Co-education, therefor shall be recognized in education.

Article 6. School Education

The schools prescribed by law shall be public nature and, besides the state and local public bodies, only the juridical persons prescribed by law shall be entitled to establish such schools.

Teachers of the schools prescribed by law shall be servants of the whole community. They shall be conscious of their mission and endeavour to discharge their duties. For this purpose, the status of teachers shall be respected and their fair and appropriate treatment shall be secured.

Article 7. Social Education

The state and local public bodies shall encourage home education and education carried out in places of work or elsewhere in society.

The state and local public bodies shall endeavour to attain the aim of education by the establishment of such institutions as libraries, museums, civic halls etc., by the utilization of school institutions, and by other appropriate methods.

Article 8. Political Education

The political knowledge necessary for intelligent citizenship shall be valued in education.

The schools prescribed by law, shall refrain from political education or other political activities for or against any specific political party.

Article 9. Religious Education

The attitude or religious tolerance and the position of religion in social life shall be valued in education.

The schools established by the state and local public bodies shall refrain from religious education or other activities for a specific religion.

Article 10. School Administration

Education shall not be subject to improper control, but it shall be directly responsible to the whole people.

School administration shall, on the basis of this realization, aim at the adjustment and establishment of the various conditions required for the pursuit of the aim of education.

Article 11. Additional Rule

In case of necessity appropriate laws shall be enacted to carry the foregoing stipulations into effect.

Supplementary Provision:

The present Law shall come into force as from the day of its promulgation.

Glossary

Akihito	明仁
Bushi	武士
Bushido(u)	武士道
Dou	道
Fukuzawa, Yukichi	福沢諭吉
Hankou	藩校
Ishida, Baigan	石田梅岩
Itagaki, Taisuke	板垣退助
Ito, Hirobumi	伊藤博文
Iwakura, Tomomi	岩倉具視
Jinrin	人倫
Jiyu Minken	自由民権
Judou	柔道
Kadou	華道
Kagikko	鍵っ子
Kendou	剣道
Kitai sareru ningenzou	期待される人間像
Kong Zi	孔子
Kukai	空海
Kyoiku chokugo	教育勅語
Michi	道
Nakae, Chomin	中江兆民
Nitobe, Inazo	新渡戸稲造
Sadou	茶道
Saicho	最澄
Samurai	侍
Sangou Siiki	三教指帰
Shingaku	心学
Shingon	真言
Shindou	神道
Syodou	書道
Syushin	修身
Ten	天
Tennou	天皇
Zaibatsu	財閥

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Changing Images among Youth in Modern Japan

The Meiji Period: Ambition

Starting in the autumn of 1902, a novel by Kenjiro Tokutomi, *Roka* or *Notes of Reminiscence*, appeared serially in a daily paper, *Kokumin Shimbun*. Soon it became popular among the youth of Japan and among a wide range of readers. There was an even greater response when the novel was published in book form in 1903. Readers felt an empathy with the sentiments of the book, sensing that, with fortitude and resolution, one could overcome hardships and discouragement. The novel gave expression to a certain vitalizing spirit that appealed to the youth of the Meiji Period (1868–1912).

Notes of Reminiscence portrays an idealized image of youth that was prevalent in the latter half of the Meiji Period. Shintaro Kikuchi, the hero of the novel, was born in Kumamoto in northern Kyushu on the eve of the Meiji Restoration in 1868. He comes from a family of wealthy winemakers that enjoys high prestige in the village. However, Shintaro's father goes bankrupt during a period of serious inflation and then has bad luck in his new business enterprise. His house and all his belongings are taken away, and he dies from the great shock of his misfortune. Shintaro and his mother then move into an uncle's house not too far away. *Notes of Reminiscence* describes how a youth with no property and no rights grew up in late nineteenth–century Japan. How is he to live, and what goals should he choose?

As Shintaro is leaving his village after his father's death to move to his uncle's house, Shingo, a former servant and now a charcoal–maker, says farewell and urges him, "Please come back as a person of great renown. It is not worthwhile to stay in a village like this." On several later occasions, Shingo again says, "Strive for renown." In another scene, Shintaro's mother admonishes him to be ambitious and successful.

Some years later Shintaro goes to Tokyo, and the first letter he receives from his mother contains the following passage:

> You have the great task of rebuilding the house of Kikuchi. Please think well upon it and be careful not to disgrace the name of Kikuchi. It is my hope that you will always strive for renown.

Her phrase, "strive for renown," echoes in his mind, but how can Shintaro be successful? He decides that there is one sure way–by studying hard and diligently. First of all, he enters Nishiyama Private School near his uncle's house and learns classical Chinese. But when he is fifteen the school closes because classical Chinese is no longer in demand for the future of Japan. Teachers at the school now encourage all the students to study other foreign languages instead. Meanwhile, a school called Ikuei Gakusha has just been established. To it comes a teacher of foreign studies named Tetsujiro Komai. He provides Shintaro's first contact with foreign studies. Komai leaves the school after a short while, but Shintaro now hopes fervently to study foreign ways in Tokyo. He decides to go there and, after some difficulty, studies first at Kwansei Gakuin University and then at Tokyo Imperial University.

In this period away from home, Shintaro confronts many hardships and troubles. On one occasion, he has to surrender his coat because he does not have the money for a bowl of noodles at a restaurant. He works delivering newspapers, but he never gave up his ambition.

Studies form a significant part of Shintaro's life. At night he quietly lights a small lamp in a closet and studies mathematics. He never misses his English classes, which meet twice a week. He often finds a quiet refuge in a corner of a library when the dormitory is too noisy. Once in a while, Shintaro sits under a tree by a pond and indulges in meditation. At Tokyo University, he tries his best to economize on school supplies. This is Shintaro's college life, and he graduates with the highest grades from Kwansei Gakuin University and is then second in his class at Tokyo University.

Shintaro's prime purpose in studying is to attain fame and success. Yet he tries not to be dependent on anyone. He makes his decisions without regard to what other people think, basing them solely on his own judgement of what is just and right. When he becomes discouraged, he recalls his determination to succeed on his own.

At Tokyo University, the other students are superficial in their commitment. All are interested in renown and success after graduation, but many hope to find a short cut to social success by seeking favors from men with prestige and influence. Shintaro objects to this, and he expresses himself as follows just before his graduation:

> When the time comes and there is a chance, I will sit on a golden chair. But for unexpected success, I cannot beg and make silly faces at the door of somebody influential.... Thus, my principle is that if I become successful through my own efforts, I shall gratefully give thanks to heaven. Success and social fame attained justly I shall gladly accept. However, if I have to give up my own integrity as the price of success, I shall maintain my principles and carry my head high until it is cut off.

For Shintaro, life is a battlefield. The entrance examinations for the university are his first battle. As he says, "This battle must be fought with all my might, so that my disgrace can be washed away, my hardships rewarded, my honor maintained, and my mother comforted."

For Shintaro, friends are rivals. Matsumura, his grade school friend, is the son of the president of a large company. He goes to Tokyo before Shintaro does. Most of his friends at Kwansei Gakuin University come from wealthy families, but Shintaro must first earn his tuition and his living, and then excel his friends in studies.

In the end, Shintaro wins his battle and attains fame and success. Among his friends, Matsumura has also had a successful career, and friendship is reaffirmed among those who have succeeded. For those who have failed there is sympathy, but not much attention is paid to them.

The Taishō Period: Human Feelings

The young people of the Taishō Period (1912–25) found it difficult to project and plan their future clearly on a straight, single track as Shintaro had done. No clear pattern of means and ends existed in the process of attaining goals. Perhaps for this reason, the relationships that young people established in the course of attaining their goals became more important than the goals themselves.

The novel *Friendship (Yūjō)* by Saneatsu Mushakoji gives the flavor of youthful attitudes in the Taishō Period. Nojima, the protagonist, falls in love with Sugiko, the sister of a friend. Omiya, another friend of Nojima's, tries his best to help the couple, but, ironically, Sugiko falls in love with Omiya. The novel is largely an exploration of the feelings existing between Nojima and Omiya.

For Shintaro Kikuchi in *Notes of Reminiscence*, there are almost infinite possibilities to choose from in planning his future. Nojima, on the other hand, is shy and takes fewer chances. He often spends time reflecting on people whom he admires. At twenty-three, Nojima is not at all self-confident; he thinks he has little ability and regards himself as worthless. His perceptions are directed inward. He often thinks about how other people think of him. As a result of this extreme introversion, he becomes bored with life and then desperate. He analyzes his longing for Sugiko:

> Some think marriage provides a good chance for promotion in one's job or brings primarily a dowry. Some look on marriage as a trifling thing, or something sweet, but I cannot stand such ideas. Sugiko looks as if she does not know about such things, but I should feel kind of lost if, after all, she really did have such hopes.

Nojima is wrapped up in contemplation about himself, the delicate feelings of other people, and his changing relationships with them. Then, in reaction, he sinks into despair and tries to forget it all. For example, when Nojima, who is not a very good table tennis player, plays the game at a friend's house, he tries to think that being a poor player is nothing to be ashamed of.

> That is a good excuse, but if I were good, I wouldn't feel such inferiority. Oh, I would feel great if I were really good. Since I am so poor a player, I think there is no need to show off, but if I were skillful, I would never have to bother with such petty thoughts; I would feel much better.

Note that the word "feel" is used several times. It expresses the various thoughts about certain incidents that appear and disappear in Nojima's mind. He is upset when he sees Sugiko with her friend at the beach, but he thinks that it is stupid to be jealous, feels a little ashamed, and then tries not to think about it. He is not certain of his identity and worries about it. Always uppermost in his mind is a concern about a small social circle consisting of a few friends and their families.

Youth of the Meiji Period found the world to be a place of vast, almost infinite opportunities for the future. In contrast, Nojima's world is merely the small society in which he lived. He is happy in this well-protected and comfortable world. In one of his frequent chats with Omiya, there is this exchange.

Nojima: I've started to write a novel.
Omiya: Yes, I feel like doing something. I should study, too.
Nojima: Let's help each other to do well.

In Shintaro's case, success is a matter of personal effort, but for Nojima it is a joint effort. Nojima's ideal is to maintain a good relationship with his friends; his friends provide the context within which security and peace can be found.

When Nojima falls in love with Sugiko, Omiya acts as a sincere adviser. Because Nojima is too bashful and modest, Omiya counsels him to meet more often with Sugiko so that she will have a chance to get to know him better. He tells Nojima not to be shy and pretends to act coldly toward Sugiko himself. Unfortunately, Sugiko is drawn to Omiya, who decides to go to Europe so as to be away from Sugiko and to encourage Nojima and Sugiko to get together after all. Omiya writes to Sugiko from Europe:

> I am not trying to praise Nojima simply because he is my friend, but because he is actually one of the few persons I admire. It is a great delight that he likes you. I hope you will spend time with him.

Nevertheless, Sugiko feels drawn more to Omiya, but Omiya is puzzled and does not know what to do. After a long period of uneasiness, Omiya finally accepts Sugiko's love. He tries his best to reassure his friend, but in the end he marries Sugiko. At this point, the friendship between Nojima and Omiya ends. It is a great blow to Nojima. The secure and well-protected microcosm that had been his life has finally crumbled, and he envisions the future as dark and desperate. The novel ends with Nojima facing constant loneliness. He writes his last letter to Omiya and then scribbles in his diary: "I have withstood my loneliness up to now. Do I have to endure it any further by myself? God, help me!"

The Shōwa Period: Action

The generation born in the early years of the Shōwa Period (1925-)

differs somewhat from that of Shintaro or Nojima. An example of Shōwa youth may be found in *Season of Violence (Taiyō no Kisetsu)* by Shintaro Ishihara, a well-known contemporary writer.

If Shintaro Kikuchi devoted most of his time to his studies and to competition and if Nojima anxiously contemplated his and others' feelings, youths in *Season of Violence* find excitement in action. They try to pick up the first girl who comes along; they go out to dance and enjoy themselves-plunging ahead from one act to the next. It is in action that they find their identity.

Tatsuya, the central character in *Season of Violence*, is fascinated with boxing. Boxing is a direct method of reassuring oneself of one's physical existence. Beaten down in the ring, with blood streaming from cuts, Tatsuya revels in physical sensation and enjoys the fact that he is really alive.

For youths in *Season of Violence*, sex is linked with action. Youth of the Taishō Period had a somewhat restrained idea of love; their attitudes were more or less platonic. For Tatsuya's generation, love is a temporal satisfaction and not at all grand or holy. The characters in *Season of Violence* almost regard the word love as something laughable; for them, it has a mawkish and silly connotation. Indecent remarks are made to those who have not yet had sexual relations with girls.

One day, Tatsuya becomes acquainted with a girl named Eiko in the downtown area of Tokyo. For Eiko, sex is its own purpose. Tatsuya thinks of boxing and action as being their own purpose and as providing a means of finding himself. Thus, Tatsuya's attitude toward boxing and Eiko's toward sex are parallel. After a sexual encounter on a yacht on a quiet evening, they fall in love. As Tatsuya says, "For human beings, love and affection are emotions that cannot be kept burning forever. Does love not seem to burn most brightly when flesh and flesh are one? Men and women only find themselves physically one at this moment." The incident on the yacht deepened Eiko's feelings for Tatsuya, but it makes him feel shy and anxious. Her love frightens him, and he begins to be cruel to her. Tatsuya is frightened because his generation regards human relations as something dry. They scorn friendships like Nojima's and Omiya's and those of their fathers' generation and consider them soft and uncalculating. Although the Shōwa generation acts courteously in a group, there is no touch of that good-natured friendship that had been the norm for high school students in earlier decades. Friendship for the Shōwa generation has little of the element of personal sacrifice. A careful debit and credit balance sheet is recorded, and those who cannot repay debts are automatically erased from the list.

Nojima experiences loneliness for the first time as a result of the terrible breakup in his friendship with Omiya, but for Tatsuya man is a lonely creature from the beginning. One lonely creature becomes friends with another merely by chance, and it is by chance that one finds a girl to play with. In this sense, there is no place for love in Tatsuya's world, but once a feeling of love does appear, it is likely to threaten the concept of a relationship as a balance of debits and credits. Although Tatsuya is afraid of Eiko, he helplessly feels a growing attraction to her.

For Meiji and Taishō youth, love as an end in itself had been hidden behind a romantic veil. In contrast, Tatsuya's generation thinks of sex as a purpose and method by which to find oneself. But once love has slipped in, the concept of sex as an end in itself starts to crumble.

Eiko becomes pregnant, but peritonitis sets in after a Caesarean operation and she dies. As the author comments: "Her death was her supreme challenge. Tatsuya has lost his favorite toy, the toy he could never break no matter how much he battered it."

After Eiko's funeral, Tatsuya goes straight to a college gymnasium to hit punching bags. Eiko's words come back to him: "Why can't you love me in a more straightforward manner?" For a moment, he sees Eiko's smiling face in the punching bag, and he strikes at it madly. Tatsuya's world rejects love as if it were water that must be kept away from a dry object. Each individual lives with a fence around him, and it is through these fences that each must find ways to socialize. If the fences are cleared away, it is unbearable, because "good fences make good neighbors."

The Trend Toward "Micronization" in the Images of Youth

Although it is doubtful that these three characters represent the only characteristic images of the youth of their respective periods, each novel was widely read and accepted in its own period. Each belonged to its time and might not have appeared or been accepted in other periods. By comparing the values expressed in the three novels, it is possible to draw several conclusions about changing attitudes of youth in the three periods of Japan's modern experience.

First, it becomes clear that the frame of reference for individual lives has tended to become smaller over the years. Shintaro Kikuchi's frame of reference is Japan as a nation. He is like a rocket shooting out from a small Kyushu village. His concern is nationalistic, and he always refers to and relates his interests to national concerns.

The youths of Taishō, Nojima's generation, find their frame of reference in a small social circle composed of friends and their families. Nojima and his friends have created a world with a salon-like atmosphere; the image of an entire society or a nation lies somewhere in the hazy background. What, then, is the frame of reference for Tatsuya? Actually he does not have any group to relate to, but perhaps he may be said to be his own frame of reference. As the frame of reference has shifted from the nation to a group of friends and finally to the individual, its scope has become incredibly small.

Second, within society the role of the individual has changed. For Shintaro, the independent individual is the ultimate principle. Life is a course set on a straight track, and he dashes toward a fixed goal without worrying about what other people think. He is stern and single-minded. But the Meiji Period was a time when single-minded persons could get ahead. Nojima's life is not characterized by individualism but is tinged with isolation and loneliness. When he loses his friends, he is alone and helpless. Tatsuya has a sense of loneliness, but he places positive value on solitude. He regards aloneness as something good and enjoyable and feels threatened when "love" becomes a part of this world.

The youth of Meiji was single-minded, the young man of Taishō wore himself out nervously worrying about his relationships with the people around him, and the youth born during the early Shōwa Period was neither simply single--minded nor much concerned about his neighbors. He just did not care too much about conforming to his surroundings. In general, the youth of Shōwa has been filled with a sense of anomie.

These different concepts of life naturally led to changes in ideals and goals. Shintaro's goal is to go to Tokyo and be successful. The members of Nojima's generation encourage each other to succeed, but success as a goal does not have real significance. Tatsuya's generation judges the word "success" to be outdated jargon. Had there been youths like Shintaro and Nojima in Tatsuya's group, they would have been laughed at and perhaps beaten up. An individual's goal is something distant; "success" sounds too optimistic; the Shōwa youth wants to experience immediate satisfaction. The future is not important to him; rather, the present is his ultimate concern.

We may call these changing characteristics of youth "micronization", for we can see that the frame of reference narrows from nation to a group of friends and finally to an individual.

There was a time many decades ago when the phrase "Boys, be ambitious" thrilled the youth of Japan. However, the presumed infinite possibilities in Japanese society have now been filled by such people as Shintaro. In the crowded society of today's Japan, there are fewer possibilities. The stories of Shintaro, Nojima, and Tatsuya, therefore, can be seen as the history of shrinking physical space, declining opportunity, and narrowing concepts of the individual and his life.

Distance Education in Japan

1. Historical Backgrounds

The term "distance education" which is literally and tentatively translated as "*Enkaku Kyōiku*" has been alien to Japanese lexicon until very recent years. As a matter of fact, even a professional encyclopedia of education of 1988 edition does not list this particular terminology. However, the word "*Tsūshin kyōiku*" which stands for "correspondence education" or "education through correspondence" has been commonly and popularly used since late 19th century.

To be more exact, the first practice of modern correspondence education took place in May 1883, when a school called *Hōubunkan* offered courses in Chinese literature to off-campus students. In September of the same year, it is recorded that another school by the name of *Tōkyo Gakkan* inaugurated correspondence program in stenography and bookkeeping. The scale of the operation of these early schools is unknown because original documents are not accessible. But it may be safe to say that 1883 was the year when modern correspondence education was founded.

In 1885, an established college *Igirisu Hōritsu Gakkō*, the forerunner of present *Chūō* University, instituted correspondence course for off-campus learners, and about a dozen of universities followed suit. As a result, toward the end of the century, it is recorded that the courses thus offered to the general public reached some 300 altogether, and the number of students increased accordingly. For example, *Wafytsu Gakuin* in 1894 counted 8000 students. Another institution called *Shisei Gakuin*, which seemed to have been engaged solely in correspondence courses, proudly stated that the total number of students was 20,000 as of 1900 , and that the students' geographical distribution covered not only various parts of Japan but also China, Korea, and even Hawaii. According to an expert research, yearly number of students who took these correspondence courses came to between 250,000 and 300,000 at the turn of the century.

As will be discussed later, most of the learners who took correspondence courses in those days were not qualified for formal diploma, and their major concern was to get training in vocational knowledge and skill. However, considering the fact that the number of students who registered at regular universities in 1900 was merely 20,000, the figure just mentioned is extremely significant and important, as it indicates the aspiration for higher learning among Japanese public, and at the same time, implies potential quality of manpower which did not appear in official statistics.

The reasons for the popularity of correspondence education were multi-fold. In the first place, needless to say, higher education in late 19th century was for selected and privileged few, while there was high demand for higher and/or professional education on the part of general public. Most of the correspondence schools were open to almost everybody, and they did not give any competitive entrance examination. The tuition fee was, generally speaking, affordable for most of the people. The incentives upon completion of the courses often were attractive. For instance, *Meiji Kogakkai*, which was founded in 1894, served for teachers' training and licensing. Modern Japanese school system was legally instituted in 1972, and the government decided to give compulsory elementary school education to every Japanese citizen. The number of elementary school thus decided was 53,700 throughout the nation, and in order to meet this requirement, tens of thousands of school teachers were needed. Though seven national teachers colleges were established between 1972 and 74, the qualified school teachers were naturally in short supply. Therefore, in the transitory period, teachers could be, and had to be, appointed with minimum qualifications. Correspondence education was, in this connection, an effective means to produce school teachers. As a matter of fact, *Meiji Kogakkai* attracted some 4,000 students annually until enough teachers with diploma filled their positions.

In the second place, the advancement of stenography made university lecture series available for general public. Historical survey reveals that Japanese stenography was invented by a person by the name of Koki Tagusari in 1882, and one of his students, Kanzo Wakabayashi started to bring this new technique into practice in 1883. Wakabayashi and his colleagues transcribed, among other things, lectures delivered by eminent university professors. As a result, such transcription of university lectures were published in the form of books, and circulated among the public. The most famous series was produced on the campus of *Waseda* University and they came into the book market under the name of *Waseda* Lectures since late 1890s. With these lecture series as textbooks, another form of correspondence education came into existence. It should be also noted that these lecture series were deposited at major public libraries throughout the country so that anyone could have access to higher education.

Japanese postal system, which was legally instituted in 1871, was another encouraging factor for correspondence education. The Ministry of Post made special arrangements for educational materials used in correspondence education, and from, these materials were classified as 4th class mail at considerable discount.

2. Social Context and legal status

Though the tradition of distance education thus created continued in the past century, there seems to have been several changes, especially since the end of the World War II. First of all, it should be emphasized that education, inclusive of correspondence education, in Japan today is a right secured by the Constitution. The new Constitution which came into effect on November 3,1946, states in its article 26 that "All people shall have the right to receive an equal education corresponding to their ability, as provided by law". The "law" which is subject to this article is Fundamental Law on Education which was instituted on March 31,1947. According to this law, it is compulsory for every Japanese citizen to take 9 years' elementary and secondary education, and such compulsory education shall be free of charge (article 4) The law also states clearly that the "aim of education is to grow autonomous and healthy citizen," and "the aim shall be materialized at any opportunity at any place" (article 1,2) Since to receive education is a constitutional right and education should be given at any place at any time, the whole educational structure changed drastically.

At the time when these fundamental laws were enforced, there was a considerable population that had not received secondary education. And in order to satisfy those who needed secondary education, article 105 of School Education Law, which came into effect along with Fundamental Law, permits to give secondary education only to the age group who finished their elementary education before March 31, 1946, as a temporary and transitory arrangements. As of 1990, there are two junior high schools, one in Tokyo and another in Osaka, which give secondary education by correspondence. The number of students who took this secondary school correspondence school in its initial phase is not certain, but from obvious reasons, the number has been declining. And it is reported that in 1980s, people who registered this program were mere 200 altogether. It is estimated that correspondence school on secondary level would diminish substantially before the end of this century.

After 1945, especially in 1970s, post-secondary education turned out to be quasi-compulsory and, on average, 96% of junior high school graduates what on to senior high school. However, there are groups of the young who cannot register at senior high school for various reasons. In order to give opportunities for this group, School Education Law made special arrangements. In article 45, the law says that "Senior high schools may have correspondence program". This article was revised in such a way that those students who reside out of a regular school district can take courses. Such "wide coverage" correspondence high school can be exemplified by the one which was initiated by NHK, or Japan Broadcasting Corporation, extended its arm, as a public service, to this area, and created a new correspondence high school in 1961. The advantage of this new school, which is called NHK High School, is its full use of broadcasting facilities, both radio and television. Registered students are obliged to listen to and watch designated program delivered by broadcast, read textbooks, and take term examinations. And upon completion of courses, they can obtain high school diploma. As of 1990, there are 78 "local" and 5 "wide coverage" high schools which give education by correspondence. The number of students in high school level correspondence course is altogether 164,422 (male 80,420 and female 70,312) in 1990.

At this point, it should be added that, in 1988, new high school based on "unit system" was instituted by Ministry of Education. This new system was introduced primarily for those adult population who missed the opportunity of attending high school as well as for high school drop-outs. These people can, under this system, report to designated high schools the units they earned already, and continue their school works until they complete necessary credits. In 1990, there are altogether 13 designated schools throughout the country, and they are, without exception, those schools which already have either night courses or correspondence courses. This system also provides chances for general public to take courses they want, as a part of continuing education.

On the level of higher education, Japanese junior colleges are permitted to give degrees to students by correspondence. Upon the decision of the Ministry of Education of March 23, 1982, a new standard was set on this matter. According the regulation called "standards for junior college correspondence programs", the instruction of correspondence course in junior colleges can be given " by sending printed teaching materials, by broadcasting and similar means, classroom instructions, or the combination of these methods" (article 3). But the courses given by correspondence are limited to "those curriculums where correspondence method is appropriate and sufficient educational effects are expected" Though the regulation is only 8 years old, as of April 1990, 9 junior colleges offer correspondence courses with 24,450 registered students. All the junior colleges which took this advantage are private institutions.And upon completion of 62 units, a students is given a degree equal to that for "on-campus" students, on the condition that at least 15 units out of 62 must be earned by classroom instructions, and each college provides, usually, special session for these off-campus students.

Four years' colleges and universities were encouraged to offer correspondence courses in 1961 when Fundamental Law of education was amended. But its original text said only that "universities can have correspondence programs", and did not specify their standards until 1981 when " Standards for university correspondence program" came into effect. The contents of the regulation are similar with those of junior college correspondence program, except that total units to be earned are 124 including compulsory 30 units in classroom instruction. University correspondence program regulation further limits the kind of courses delivered to off-campus students. To be more exact, only departments of literature, education, law, economics, management, physical sciences, and home economics are approved to give such off-campus courses, and correspondence education on the subjects of medicine, engineering, and other university departments, where experimental laboratory work is needed, are not permitted to establish such correspondence programs. As of 1990, there are 12 universities offering correspondence programs with total student number of 92,250.

The implication of the series of legal arrangements of correspondence education, which took place in very recent years, is very important in the sense that the correspondence education, which has been so popular in the past century, were not recognized as a part of institutionalized educational system. In other words, the degree given by many universities in the past was not officially recognized one. Considering such already existing programs, the regulations made an exception saying that "those universities and organizations which had correspondence programs before the date of this legislation can follow their own precedents for the time being". Because of this exclusive article, old correspon–

dence university education was able to survive as an accredited institutions.

A careful observer might have been curious while reading in these regulations that "broadcasting" is counted as one of the means of instruction, and at the same time that such legislation is extremely recent. The reason why legal actions on higher distance education were taken so recently, and "broadcasting" is included as a part of such programs can be interpreted and understood only in connection with the fact that University of the Air Foundation Law was passed in the Japanese parliament on June 11,1981. The University of the Air has been a national project since mid 1960s, in which government agencies, especially Ministry of Education ,took initiative. The objective was to deliver university level lectures by means of broadcasting so that every Japanese citizen in every corner of the nation can have access to higher education. Because of budgetary and many other obstacles and considerations, it took more than a decade until the special law was debated and passed the parliament. The initial stage was to cover Tokyo metropolitan area, and the University, with its own independent FM radio and UHF television station, started its operation in March 1984.

The university gives instruction by the combination of printed textbooks, broadcasting, and classroom instructions in accordance with the standard which was introduced before. From a legal stand point, the University is one of correspondence universities by definition, but because of its full use of broadcasting facilities (the university broadcast lectures from 6:00 a.m. to midnight everyday, or 18 hours a day) it differs from others. Keeping this new idea and practice in mind, policy makers expected and hoped that University of the Air's programs could be utilized and shared by other institutions, both conventional and correspondence colleges and universities. In that sense, the birth of the University of the Air marked a milestone not only in the history of correspondence programs but also that of higher education in Japan. It has been attracting some 30,000 students annually since its inauguration, and it is being planned to put the programs on broadcasting satellite in 1997 so that the university can be a nation-wide operation. For the time being, in order to meet with local needs, the university set up 5 "video study centers" from the northernmost island of Hokkaido to the southernmost Okinawa islands in collaboration with national universities situated in each prefecture.

3. Diplomas, qualifications, and licenses

The discussions so far were concerned and concentrated on distance education as part of institutional education from junior high school to university level. However, as in most of other societies, education is an extremely complicated process.

In the first place, it should be stressed that formal and institutional education has often nothing to do with officially recognized qualifications and or licenses. Of course, there are several cases when a diploma or certificate automatically qualifies a student for a certain occupation. For instance, university students who finished "teachers' training program", meaning the completion of certain designated curricula within the obligatory 124 units, can get a license which certifies that he/she is eligible as school teacher of elementary, secondary, or high schools, depending on the person's department and expertise. Or those who took necessary courses such as social education, audio-visual education, and others at universities are licensed as deputy museum curator. But in most of the cases, a diploma does not allow a person to take particular occupations.

For example, upon completion of graduate medical school, a student obtains the degree of Medical Doctor. But such diploma does not permit him/her to practice medicine. In order to get such license, the person must take national examination. The examination for medical practice is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Social Welfare. Another example. In order to be licensed as an architect category I, it is required that the person must be a university graduate with architecture as major plus a minimum of two years' practice in architectural companies and offices and then must apply for licensing examination given by the Ministry of Construction. Legal profession also requires national examination. In order to be a judge or lawyer, a person, regardless of his/her educational backgrounds, age, sex, must take entrance examination for Legal Training School, and only after two years training there, they must take final examination given by the Ministry of Justice. And these national examinations are often very competitive.

In other words, these highly skilled specialists must face further examinations after their completion of university diploma. In the case of medical doctors, in 1990, some 10,000 applicants took national examination and 8,800 were licensed. As for architect category I, in the same year, only 6,472 out of 52,672 were licensed. Legal examination is known as the most "tough" one. The statistics of 1990 shows that there were 23,202 applicants, and only 505 passed the examination. In this particular case, the ratio of success in licensing was mere 2.19%. University diplomas do not suffice relative to particular qualifications and licenses.

Even minor, if not unimportant, occupations require national examinations. For example, those who are interested to be barbers should take national examinations conducted by the Ministry of Welfare. A person who is looking forward to be a cook on ships must take examinations given by Ministry of Transportation. The qualifications and licenses are an extremely complicated matter, and with the diversification of occupations which came along with technological and social innovations, the kinds of occupations requiring national license have increased. At the same time, local authorities (mostly prefectures) give examinations for such professions as acupuncture, sanitation specialist for bakeries, laundry and dry cleaning, to mention a few. These public examinations are given along with national qualification examinations.

As a matter of fact, as of 1990, there are altogether 1259 occupations which cannot be practiced without license. From legal profession to real estate broker, from librarian to liquid gas security, from policeman to public accountants, huge number of occupational examinations are given and practiced in Japan almost every day.

The implication of increasing national/public examinations is that many new correspondence education programs came into existence. The most legitimate correspondence education of this kind is categorized as "correspondence social education" authorized by the Ministry of Education. Within this category, there are 45 schools and non-profit organizations which offer 189 different courses. These 189 courses include 72 clerical curriculum including business management, statistics, secretarial training,and others, 73 courses in specialized technical training such as mechanic, and computer sciences. The rest, 39 courses, fall into the category of humanities inclusive of music, foreign language, calligraphy and so forth. The authorization for this " correspondence social education" is given by the Ministry in accordance with the " regulation of correspondence social education" which was instituted on April 1, 1962. Because of practical nature of these correspondence courses, many organizations, especially commercial firms, took advantage by encouraging their employees to study such correspondence courses. According to the figure of 1986, 6,171 companies gave 144 courses to their employees as a part of on job training. Total number of learners now taking these correspondence courses is estimated at 205,000 in 1990.

These correspondence social education programs can be divided into two classes. In the first place, there is a form of distance education which is independent and autonomous in giving certificate outside of institutional education and national/public licenses. For example, "foreman's course" offered by Japan management school gives certificate for those who completed the course work by correspondence. The recipients can utilize such certificate as a token of qualification in their company. Naturally, the certificate thus earned can be submitted to the management, and eventually the person with the certificate may have opportunities to be promoted in the organization to which the person belongs. Another is the courses offered in preparation for national/public examinations. For instance, correspondence course for travel agents delivered by *Sundai* Travel Vocational School gives correspondence education to those who are willing to take the national examination which is conducted by Ministry of Transportation. In other words, some of the distance education within the category of "correspondence social education" is simply a preparatory course for further official examinations.

Government agencies, especially Ministry of Labor, made special efforts to encourage workers who want to take distance education by subsidizing tuition fee. For those workers whose interest is to get certain qualifications as a part of on job training, 50% of the cost is covered by government budget. Also, the Ministry subsidizes several training programs for retired people, conducted through distance education. For example, if a retired or mid-career person wants to take correspondence education in draftsmanship, he/she can apply for 50% financial aid to a government agency.

The basic difficulty on the part of schools and organizations which offer "correspondence social education" is the fact that their existence and benefits are not well known and understood by general public. In order to propagate their programs, they are almost forced to spend considerable amount of money for the recruitment of students. According to a survey report prepared by the Association of Correspondence Social Education in 1983, more than 50 % of member organizations said that they were spending at least 30% of their revenue (registration, tuition fee) for student recruitment.On the part of students, too, it was discovered that majority of them learned about their school through newspaper and magazine advertisements.

Other than two major forms of distance education, namely, distance education as a part of institutional education from secondary to university level, and "correspondence social education" authorized by Ministry of Education, there are numerous organizations which are engaged in correspondence education. They can be commercial, and they are not under any legal restrictions. Many of them are practical, especially in business management. There is a course on introductory labor law which can be very helpful for business executives, and there is a course in French language for businessmen and other interested public. There is a school which offers "do it yourself" aiming at Sunday carpenters. A school, even an individual, can advertise that they teach how to write children's picture books. The classified telephone directory lists hundreds of these "private" distance education courses. In the free market economy, any distance education can be a part of private enterprise. And interestingly enough, since "private" schools usually conduct careful market research, many of them are more up-dated and successful in comparison with the public sector. The students who take these private courses are not looking for any diploma, certificate, or qualifications. The schools or individuals may issue certificates to the learners, though such certificates do not have any legal effect. They may be sometimes not honest, implying as if the courses they offer are for official qualifications, or the completion of the courses is promising for better income. Mass media which carry these advertisement are very sensitive about these clients, but they cannot control all of the catch-phrases. This area of distance education is not well studied yet, but it is worthwhile to see the social effects of this private distance education, which is out of control of any government agency.

4. The use of media

As was mentioned elsewhere, distance education in Japan cannot be thoroughly discussed without referring to the use of broadcasting which goes back to late 1920s. Radio broadcasting in Japan was inaugurated on March 22,1924, and Shinpei Goto, the first president of NHK mentioned that one of the major missions of public broadcasting was "socialization of education" among other things. His idea was well taken by a group of progressive intellectuals and educators, but the majority of educators, especially school teachers, were against this innovative proposal saying that mechanically delivered voices were not appropriate and sufficient for education. They insisted that "real" education had to take place in classrooms where face-to-face instructions was given. Some extremists warned that radio would replace school teachers with the result of total unemployment of school teachers. At the same time, there were policy disagreements between Ministry of Education and Ministry of Post and Transportation at that time about the uses of this new mass medium.

Under these circumstances, even though the second radio channel was facilitated in 1931 to serve for educational purposes, school education was not included as the target of this new channel. Somehow, however, certain compromises were made, and in 1933, Osaka station of NHK started a new program, "radio exercise", to be broadcast primarily to elementary schools. The program is designed in such a way that school children practice simple physical exercise for ten minutes every morning before their classroom work. At the same time, the station made another ten minutes program for pre-school children, as well as "music for school" during lunch time so that children could listen to music. Following these neutral experimental programs, they programmed "teachers' hour" every day in which school teachers could listen to special lectures. Then, "elementary school children's hour" was broadcast as an "extra-curricula hour" every afternoon. NHK's Osaka station, after the practice of these five programs, categorized them under the name of "school broadcast" and from September of the same year, they distributed supplementary textbooks to 2,500 elementary schools within its service area.

With the success and further potential of educational use of radio, in March 1935, NHK, upon consultation with supervising ministries, formally decided to program "school broadcast". In his inauguration speech, Genji Matsuda, Minister of Education of the day, emphasized that "school broadcast" is not the replacement of regular classroom instruction and that the programs are "supplementary to normal teaching where curriculum related matters are delivered by different method so that children can be further motivated". In addition to, or as a special part of, "school broadcast", "Morning speech" was inaugurated. As a matter of fact, Matsuda's speech was the first of this lecture series. The time scheme was from 8:00 to 8:10 every morning, and most of the school children throughout the nation had to listen to these speeches. Considering the historical fact that 1935 was the year when Japan was reaching the peak of militarism, ironically, this morning program performed its role as ideological indoctrination.

In spite of the fact that the minister was so cautious in stating "school broadcast" as "supplementary", concerned professionals in NHK were eager to make school-targeted programs a part of regular curriculum, and in reality, programs independent from classroom instructions were designed and broadcast in the same year. In this new programming, teaching by broadcast was designed in such a way that children of each grade (from 1 to 6) could have access to its own program 30 minutes every week. The questions whether to take this new means of education in classroom, and whether the programs are taken as "supplementary" or " independent" were up to the decision of each school principal. It was natural that there were two groups of extremists and varieties of neutrals, but at any rate, this was the beginning of the use of broadcasting medium for institutional education.

After ten year's blank, which was interrupted by a series of incidents and wars, educational broadcast revived. With the encouragements from Civil Information and Education Section of Occupation Forces, NHK in cooperation with the ministry of education, resumed its school education programs, and in 1953, such programs covered not only elementary schools but also secondary and high schools. Channel 2 of NHK radio devoted 5 hours every weekday to school broadcast. With the introduction of television, NHK expanded educational programs to this new medium. Television instructions were inaugurated in 1958, and in 1964 when television receivers were diffused among general public, channel 2 of NHK television gave 7 hours instructional programs everyday. The ministry of education as well as local authorities encouraged and subsidized the purchase of television receivers by each school, and the purchase of sets was tax exempt, as they were regarded as educational equipments.

Two interesting things happened at this stage. On the one hand, many school teachers welcomed the arrival of school education programs offered by television because television demonstrated that it could bring certain visual presentations which regular classroom instruction cannot. For example, sophisticated experiments in physics and chemistry could be understood by students when they were delivered by television. In the second place, instructional television programs were found to be watched not only by the targeted students but also by certain portion of general audience. A good example is foreign language courses, especially English. And the textbooks which originally designed for secondary and high school students were in high demand.

This trend was the indication that educational programs for general public education were feasible. Channel 2, which was designated "educational station", by definition, was obliged to broadcast programs devoted to education in the broadest sense of the term. And the staff of Channel 2 has been working on the production of educational programs which range from lecture series on world history to botanical science, from computer science to oil painting, mostly weekly basis, 13 weeks as a term. NHK's affiliated publishing house printed and circulated the textbooks to accompany these programs, and popular ones such as conversational English often sold millions of copies. Though these programs are not for any credit, diploma, or official qualifications, the massive sales of textbooks was extremely encouraging for NHK. Channel 2 is still active and popular in this area, and what channel 2 has been doing is enough to demonstrate that there is a huge population of learners who are looking forward to receiving popular and liberal public distance education.

As discussed earlier, Channel 2, as soon as correspondence high school program was legalized, started its own high school by means of broadcasting. And further, channel 2 began new programs under the category of "citizens" university" in early 1970s. The term "university" was metaphorical in the sense that the "university" is neither accredited, nor meets with the standards set by the ministry of Education. And the final design for officially recognized "university" was materialized when University of the Air was established in 1984.

In its initial phase, the University of the Air was planned to be a national university in utilizing broadcasting media. However, by the restriction of Broadcasting Law, which states clearly that no government agency can have broadcasting facilities, the Ministry of Education, in cooperation with Ministry of Post and Telecommunications, the University was finally established as a part of special judicial person called University of the Air Foundation which includes broadcasting stations. However, in reality, the University's finance is some 85%

subsidized by government budget. The annual operating cost of the University of fiscal year 1990–91 is \ 8.5 billion, or 6.5 million U.S.dollars, aside from capital asset of another equivalent of U.S. $ 10 million.

In addition to this new venture in higher education, 13 national universities and colleges from Hokkaido, the northernmost island, to Okinawa, the group of islands which stretch to the south, are delivering their respective university lecture series in cooperation with National Association of Educational Broadcasters, consisted of commercial broadcasters interested in educational use of broadcasting media, since 1979. This group of universities are subsidized by Ministry of Education for this project through National Institute of Multimedia Education. The Institute has been coordinating these universities both in budget appropriation and research activities on educational effects of such broadcast. Though the lectures which reach to general public are not for credit, they were proven to be new ways of university extension and public service on the part of universities, and evaluation from communities has been extremely positive. The cost is totally covered by government, and budget appropriation for this project for fiscal year 1990–91 is \ 440 million, or U.S.$ 3 million.

With the rise of new satellite technology, practically minded educators began to pay their attention to the potentials of satellite communication. The pioneers in this area were, first, business firms which were interested in delivering necessary education along with information to the employees scattered many parts of the nation. For instance, NEC, one of the largest manufacturers of electronic products, especially computers, inaugurated their own training programs via communication satellite as early as 1987. In this network, called NESPAC, 10 branch offices of the company can receive technical lectures sent from headquarter located in Tokyo. Moreover, the lectures thus given are interactive in the sense that the learners can "talk" to the instructors. In terms of cost–effectiveness, the company proved that, in the long run, it pays.

The method was followed not only by other business firms but also by schools. A good example is *Kawai Juku*, a preparatory school for university entrance examination. It is a private school, and with established reputation, the school attracted thousands of students. With the expansion of their business, they decided to send instructions by way of communication satellite, and 18 branch schools throughout Japan are getting the beam from the headquarter, so that students can have simultaneous access to the instructions. The school started this new program in 1988, and the tele–course has been successful both in terms of educational effect and cost performance. Here again, the system was designed in such a way that students can have their chances of feed–back.

In the area of institutional education, several innovative ideas came into the scene especially in higher education. In the first place, in order to cope with increasing number of students and facilities, Tokyo Institute of Technology decided to set up a second campus in the suburb of Tokyo, some 50 kilometers away from its main campus. To connect two campuses, the Institute introduced optical fiber cable in 1986, and with the cable service, two classrooms can get simultaneous lectures with audio–visual interactions. The second example is *Shinsyū* University.

It is a national university located in mountainous central part of the nation, and from its beginning, it divided its campus in four different communities which are separated by highlands. A new telecommunication device was introduced here in 1988, and with its own system, the university faculty and students are enjoying integrated and efficient interactions.

Another neglected area of distance education is the activities of education commission of each local authorities. Japan is consisted of some 7,000 autonomous administrative bodies, and each prefecture, city, town, and village has its own education commission, and under the supervision and administrative guidance of the Ministry of education, such commissions were active in the area of social education by offering occasional lectures at their civic centers, for instance. Especially, in rural area, as early as mid-1950s, Ministry of Agriculture encouraged and subsidized "cable radio" combined with close circuit telephone system called *Yūsen Denwa Hōsō* so that villagers could have access to public radio as well as programs produced by each community. This telecommunication system was amazingly effective in the sense that villagers could be informed about the price of agricultural products and other matters concerned with respective community. And this system also served as a means of social education.

The infrastructure thus provided was refined in late 1970s so that communities could have closed circuit television system. Some 15 progressive communities were ambitious enough to produce and to transmit regular programs on such topics as child care, hygiene, social security, and others to meet the needs of villagers. Some of these wired "community broadcast" now have even "address system" where particular group of viewers/listeners can have special signal from the headquarter so that they are informed on urgent and necessary matters.

5. Research and development

Despite the importance of distance education in past, present, and especially in future, very little research has been done in this particular area. The reasons are probably three fold. In the first place, as was introduced already, distance education as legally established means of education in all levels is relatively new in Japan. As a matter of fact, they were not counted as parts of formal education until very recent years. Both researchers and administrators in education, therefore, did not pay enough attention to this area. In the second place, even after the series of legislature, the majority of Japanese scholars in pedagogy were interested in conducting their research in traditional and institutional education. Sometimes, as it happened elsewhere, educators looked at media as opposed to education. For example, there has been huge number of studies on the effects of television to children and youth in past 30 years, but most of such studies regarded television as a new obstacle, even a vice, for the performance of school education. The bibliographies on this subjects are numerous, but with few exceptions, researchers tended to draw their negative conclusions about media. At the same time, researchers seemed to have their preoccupation that "real" education takes place only in physically fixed classrooms where face-to-face contacts between instructors and students are promised. Because of the indirect nature of distance education, traditional educators were, more or less, skeptical about its effectiveness.

In the third place, distance education, hitherto called "correspondence education" were, at least implicitly, thought to be "second class citizen" by general public, including most of Japanese educators and researchers. Many anecdotes, for instance, about those who achieved themselves by correspondence education were told, and such success stories were favorably accepted. However, general public usually feel that those people who succeeded by distance education as extraordinary nd exceptional. The "ordinaries" are those who finished their formal education, without failure in competitive entrance examinations, in traditional system. A person who graduated from a prestigious university at the age of 22 or 23 is not only normal but also assumed to be excellent. On the contrary, a person who completed university education by correspondence at the age of 35 is regarded as unusual and often socially handicapped. This hierarchy, so to speak, is a part of "ordinary" cult in Japanese education system, though Prime Ministers Special Education Council, which adjourned in 1988, and other government agencies and commissions strongly urged "Educational backgrounds oriented society" should be corrected.

In this connection, it may be fair to say that research and development on distance education in Japan is much poorer than those of traditional education. New tide, however, is coming into the scene especially after the inauguration of the University of the Air. National Institute of Multimedia Education which was established in 1979, particularly, has been engaged in research and development of distance education and distance learning. The projects with which the Institute is working on in 1990 ranges from experiments of interactive audio visual higher education to the production of video materials for teacher training, from field research, in collaboration with open universities in Asia and the Pacific, of schooling centers to theoretical research of evaluation in distance education. Further research activities are expected in this area. It should be emphasized here that, in 1989, Central Education Council made its interim recommendation to the Minister of Education that "life-long learning" must be the key for educational reform for the years to come.

6. Perspective

One of the most important changes which was introduced in Japanese education in past decade was, as mentioned in the paragraph above, the heavy emphasis in "life-long learning". This concept was first came to the attention of Central Education Council, and in the resolution of the Council in 1981, it encouraged "life-long education" along with school education. Prime Minister's Special Education Council, as already mentioned, followed similar policy recommendations and replaced the word "education" by "learning", and it further defined school education as a part of "life long- learning" in its broadest sense of the term. In accordance with the resolution, Ministry of Education itself was reorganized in such away that new bureau called "Bureau of Life-long Education" was established. This new bureau is responsible not only for what former Bureau of Social Education was assigned but also for combining school education with other educational facilities and opportunities. As a result, for instance the University of the Air came under joint jurisdiction of this new bureau and Bureau of Higher Education, leaving accreditation and other matters to the latter. Various forms and institutions, both public and private, engaged in social education are encouraged by the bureau to make best efforts so that credits and/or qualifications could be transferred to traditional institutions where applicable. This particular issue is being examined by Central Education Council as of 1990, and a concrete recommendation is expected to be submitted to the minister early 1991. Social education in this context, from obvious reasons, includes distance education.

A special attention should be paid to the fact that the term "education" was replaced by "learning" after a series of discussions within government and its councils and committees in 1980s. The implications for the change of terminology is that Japanese education is expected to be more "learner oriented" system. In other words, education must be defined as the means through which learners can have access to the subjects they spontaneously want to study. In order to meet with the expectations and demands of learners, traditional schools are not so flexible as non-traditional institutions. The figures of correspondence courses and their prosperity are indications of promising future of distance education in Japan, especially in view of the fact that Japan has been so successful in technological developments and innovations in telecommunication which can serve as a new means of distance education where interactive and faster education can be conducted.

A Content Analysis of Life Counseling Columns

A "Life Counseling" (*Minoue Sōdan*) column is found in many Japanese newspapers and women's magazines. Readers send letters about their personal troubles, asking professional consultants for solutions.

From a sociological or social psychological point of view, life counseling in the mass media is an interesting and important clue to interpreting contemporary Japanese society and culture.

In recent years, many techniques have been devised to measure attitudes. We respect these efforts and hope for their progress. But sometimes questionnaire–and–answer type research has a weakness in that the answers are not spontaneous. People are forced to answer questions on which they are not well informed.

While the readers who write letters for life counseling are not a valid cross–section of the Japanese people, yet theirs are voluntary opinions on various problems in some detail.

Life counseling letters are not like letters to the editor. Letters to the editor contain more or less definite conclusions about something. Life counseling letters do not express any conclusion. They describe people's situations and ask authorities for a solution. Hence it may be possible, through the analysis of life counseling letters, to ascertain the problems with which people are confronted.[1]

1. Introduction and The Sample Used

"When you have any difficult personal problem, do you generally consult either family or friends?" To this question 84% of a Japanese adult population sample answered "Yes" and over 40% of those who answered "Yes" further replied that they do "as suggested by the consultant."[2] Counsel is clearly an important factor in determining an individual's behavior orientation. Through various kinds of counseling, people are relieved from feelings of loneliness and instability, and by having answers from consultants they try to make the basis of their behavior more objective. The "life counseling" described in our present study, is, however, merely one type of counseling. It may be distinguished from other forms by three criteria:

(1) It is done for readers of a mass medium. The problem and its solution are published as human interest material.

(2) The consultants are not such ordinary consultants as family or friends but

professional experts or authorities.

(3) Unlike legal counseling, life counseling deals with moral problems.

Surveying mass media which contain life counseling we found the following.

(1) Newspapers: 24 daily newspapers (including one nationally circulated paper the *Yomiuri*) have life counseling columns.

(2) Magazines: Almost every women's magazine. Popular magazines such as *Heibon, Myōjō,* etc., have a few pages devoted to counseling.

(3) Radio: The only case is a life guidance program on Radio Tokyo.

In this article, the *Yomiuri* newspaper and the *Heibon* magazines were used for the sample. The *Yomiuri* is the only paper among the "big three" Japanese newspapers which has a life counseling column, and, as Professor Ikeuchi has pointed out, it was the *Yomiuri* which developed life counseling in the mass media. *Heibon* is a post-war magazine with an extraordinary circulation (over 1,000,000) among the younger gentration. Its contents are mostly movie stories and fiction.

The number of letters which those two media receive and their backgrounds are as follows:

(1) *Yomiuri:* Around 50 letters are received every day. The writers are about equally divided between the sexes though male clients are concentrated around the age of 25 or younger while females are generally over 30. The women's section of the *Yomiuri* handles the column.

(2) *Heibon:* The number of letters is about 50 daily. The majority of the writers are high school girls of the ages 16–19. As we shall see, the contents of their letters center around the body.

From these letters, a few are selected and published with "responsible" answers. The selection is made "to serve the common interest of the readers" (editor of the *Yomiuri*) or "to appeal to the young generation" (*Heibon*), so that we cannot infer the general trend of the content from those which are published.

In order to avoid the distortion brought about by editorial selection we borrowed approximately 200 original letters from the editor of *Heibon.* However, since *Yomiuri* has strict regulations to protect the privacy of the writers, we had to be satisfied with those letters published in the paper.

There is no valid basis for assuming that those who send letters for counseling are a representative sample of the Japanese population nor that the letters which we used in our analysis are representative of all life counseling letters. We cannot generalize from this material to the full nature of the problems from which the Japanese people are suffering. This study is an analysis of life counseling as it appeared in a few mass communications.

2. The Classification of The Contents

It is not easy to find a sound basis for classifying the content of the letters, as each problem is unique and delicate. However, we employed the following categories describing dimensions of individual and group relationships.

(a) Problems of the individual's body which may include psychosomatic problems. (Example: "How can I make my ugly legs smart?")

(b) Problem which occur in one-to-one human relations. (Example: "My boy friend is changing his mind. How can I get his love again?")

(c) Problems which occur in group or institutional situations. Is there any way to persuade them?")

Letters to the two mass communication media were classified according to this scheme and the comparative result is indicated in Table I.

Table 1. Classification of the Contents

	Yomiuri Letters	*Heibon* Letters
(A) Physical	22	143
(B) One-to-one human relations	15	58
(C) Group human relations	91	21
	---	---
	128	222

We shall analyze these three types of problems in the following sections.

3. Physical Problems as Seen in *Heibon*'s Counseling Column

Characteristically the letters received by the editors of *Heibon* concentrate on physique; even problems of human relations are reduced by the readers to physical problems. These physical problems are, however, not medical since most of the clients complain of their physical disadvantage as an obstacle to adjusting in their human relations.

"I am working in bus transportation. But my brothers laugh at my fat legs, and for the same reason I cannot get a boy friend." "My breast is very big so I am very ashamed when I am among my friends." "The mark of a burn which I got when I was a child still remains on my face. Because of this mark I failed in love."

The clients who ask counseling on physical problems, in short, regard their physical handicap or abnormality as a disadvantage in their social activities.

Table II indicates the distribution of physical handicaps or abnormalities, at least as perceived by the letter writers.

Examples:

1–a "I don't like to see people talking about my fat body. Please suggest some diet for me."

1–b "I am a girl 19 years old. I have a boy friend whose nose is very smartly shaped. He may be ashamed of me who has this small nose. And I would like to undertake necessary medical operation. Will you please tell me about reliable doctors?"

1–d "I am 18. My constitution is average except for these extraordinary big breasts. Please tell me how I can make them smaller."
1–f "I had a chance to be acquainted with a young man for 9 months. But because of my fat legs he has left me. Mine are three times bigger than average. Please solve my trouble."
2–a "I don't like to go to school these days. The reason is the pimples spread over my face."

Table 2.

Division	Subdivision	Number	Total
1) Constitution	a) constitution in general (fat, short, etc.)	13	
	b) Nose (small, short, red, etc.)	11	
	c) Shape of face	6	
	d) Breasts	6	
	e) Eyes	7	
	f) Legs (fat, short)	4	
		--	47
2) Configuration of face	a) skin (pimples, moles, etc.)	10	
	b) color (dark)	6	
	c) hair (frizzled, etc.)	9	
	d) burns or scars	6	
		--	31
3) Psychosomatic	a) blush easily	3	
	b) communication (stammer)	4	
	c) sweat profusely	4	
		--	11
4) Sex	a) sexual organ (male)	28	
	b) sexual organ (female)	15	
		--	43
5) Sickness		6	6
	Total		138

From these examples it will be clear that most of the inquiries about physique arise from assuming that a non–average physique is a disadvantage in social life.

This kind of fixation on physical conditions contains some neurotic tendencies which we shall examine later. However, this fixation is not only a problem of abnormal psychology but also a problem of Japanese culture. As the social background of concentration on physique, we may mention the following two cultural charateristics.

1) The Expression of Social Status Through Physique:

In Japanese society, any given occupation or social status is apt to be expressed through a man's physical appearance. As Professor Mochizuki has said, "In Japan, when one praises another's physique, he is not talking about his physical condition itself saying, 'your status is well expressed by your physique.'" What writers to life counsellors desire is a physique suitable to their appropriate social statue.

2) The Desire for Unity of Standards:

The formation of physique stereotypes is related to the single valued orientation which can be found in all aspects of Japanese culture. People are accustomed to be obedient to one single value (such as the Emperor's authority), and this obedience has been the security system for the Japanese people. Japanese cannot feel at ease when lacking clear social expectations in various situations. They want unified and ideal types for everything, and physique also is one of the objects which should be standardized.

The desire for unity of standards is not only a Japanese problem. It is found in all highly mechanized modern societies. However, in Japan it is a carry-over from the feudal ages.

In other words, clients of *Heibon's* life counseling suffer from the fact that they do not have average or standard physiques which the culture approves. They are eager to approach the ideal type by improving their bodily structure.

But what are these standards from the clients' point of view? It should be noted here that there exist two different cultural values in contemporary Japanese society. Because of several years of occupation by the United States, the ideals that exist may be designated Ideal-Japanese and Ideal-American. The contents of the letters convey the conflict between the ideals of physique in the two cultures.

Ideal Physique ("A" means American influenced)

Constitution . . . . tall "A"
Nose . . . . high "A"
Face . . . . round shape
Breast . . . . small and large, a conflict of values
Legs . . . . thin and long
Color . . . . white
Hair . . . . black

Special attention should be paid to nose and breast. As to the nose, the

Japanese traditional value was said to be well-shaped with medium height. (*Hanasuji ga tōru*). So the desire of girls to make their noses high "like Elizabeth Taylor," may be regarded as an example of Americanization.

As to the breasts, the Japanese value has been smallness. But girls who complain that theirs are "too big" are also well aware of the opposite value. One of them states, "I know that some girls feel it trouble that their breasts are too small and I read that bigger ones are more attractive. But I do not know which is better".

Since most of the advertisements of cosmetics and women's clothes are illustrated by American girls, Japanese girls feel a conflict as to their ideal-type.

4. Emphasis on Physique in Human Relations Problems: An Analysis of Category (B)

In *Heibon,* most of the problems which involve troubles in human relations concern one-to-one relations, that is boy-girl problems. Some write presenting their love-getting problems in romantic sentimental ways with dramatization of themselves. Some are full of sentimentality about broken hearts.

However, about 60% of the letters are not of this kind. They tell their stories and troubles, but their troubles are reduced to physical or biological ones. They are sex problems, not moralistic, but biological ones.

Most of the letter writers have lost their loves, but they are not asking for salve for a broken heart. Their problem is virginity.

"When I was quite ignorant about this kind of thing, I happened to have a relation with a boy. I was foolish."

"He took me to a small inn in a small town and promised that he would marry me...I came back home crying."

These girls are nervous about their lost virginity. They seem to have the traditional social norm that virginity is a most important thing for good girls who are going to marry. They are anxious about their mistake, but their concern is not moralistic or ethical nor a feeling of guilt, but biological and practical. They regret that they committed a mistake, but they formulate their problems as follows:

"Is it possible for me to marry another man without telling him my mistakes?"

"I wonder whether a man can recognize me as a non-virgin."

They do not think it is ethically wrong but disadvantageous in terms of future marriage. Some of them are afraid only of the possibility of pregnancy. In a word, the pattern of love affair inquiries is that of girls viewing the problem of virginity biologically, not ethically. This tendency may be viewed as one more example of the *apres guerre* generation's philosophy of carnality.[3]

5. Problems of Group Relations as Seen in *Yomiuri*'s Counseling Column

About 70% of the letters published in *Yomiuri* concern problems which occur in groups or institutions. (See Table 1.) In what sort of groups do these troubles take place? Table III shows that most take place in the family.

Table 3. Groups in Which Problems Take Place

(1) Family and kinship group	75
(2) Friends or school	3
(3) Occupational group	3
Total	81

Table 4. Classification of Conflicts in the Family Group

Child about parent	21
Parent about child	4
Total parent–children relations	25
About parents–in–law	5
About children–in–law	1
Total parent–children–in–law relations	6
Wife about husband	20
Husband about wife	11
Total husband–wife relations	31
Older sibling about younger sibling	7
Younger sibling about older sibling	5
Total brother–sister relations	12
About relatives	1
Total	75

As pointed out by many authors, the human relations within the family are among the dominant and characteristic relations in Japanese society. It will not, therefore, be surprising that most of these problems center around family relations.

Table IV further indicates who is complaining about whom in the family as related to their status in the family.

It is evident from the Table that most of the letter writers are of inferior status in the family. This is most notable in the balance between letters from parents and children. As an expert on the Japanese family system pointed out, "the relations of parents and children were expected by the conservatives to be the last line of compromise after the family system was at least legally abolished." The following are examples of inquiries on this topic:

1) Complaints from Children about Parents:

"The other day on my way from school I felt a headache and dropped in at a friend's house to take a rest. But as soon as I came back home, my father scolded me without listening to my apology: he insisted that I was late for supper."

"These days my father drinks every day, saying that he is invited to a party...but, actually he is having a special relation with a Geisha girl. I saw the other day they went to a restaurant together. I advised him several times, but he always says, 'It's not your business.'"

"Because my family is poor, I could not go to college, but anyway I think I must get a job and be independent. However, since my father has absolute authority about every domestic matter, he wants me to take a job which I do not like. The same thing happened when my elder sister found a job which he did not like. Is it approved for fathers to interfere in the choices of a child?"

2) Complaints from Wife about Husband:

"We spent fourteen years together. But he has never told me the exact amount of his salary. He used to give me some money every month, but I am like a slave who must manage housekeeping with this small amount of money. Whenever I complain about this problem, he beats me."

"Twenty-five year old housewife, married four years ago. He has disappeared for past six months without notice. He might have gone with another girl."

Inquiries concerning family relationships are a natural reflection on the irrational family system.

6. Social Psychology of Life Counseling

The contents of some of the letters are so dramatic that many people doubt their authenticity. However, the letters which we obtained do not seem spurious, though subjective selections are made by the editors.

Among these letters we find several elements of interest from the point of view of abnormal social psychology. In this section we want to deal briefly with social pathological aspects of life counseling.

First of all, it should be noted most of the letters which fall into category (A) or letters about physique express a feeling of inferiority.

As we have noted, these people are nervous because some of their physical qualities are not ideal or standard. They, therefore, think of themselves as inferior persons. As a result they hesitate to write their names and addresses correctly. Most of the letters lack a return address.

Since these writers are nameless, isolated, and inferior (at least in their own view) they internalize their trouble and regard themselves as the most powerless creatures in society. This feeling of isolation and helplessness may be well explained in terms of Eric Fromm's concept of social masochism.

(1) sometimes the masochistic tendency in life counseling clients appears in the form of exhibitionism. Clients describe their physical abnormalities very precisely, especially in the case of sexual organs.

(2) The desire to become average or ideal can itself be seen as an expression of social masochism. The clients want to identify themselves with socially-approved ideals disregarding their actual and given attributes. They are not sure enough of themselves to develop their own way independently and individually.

(3) A masochistic tendency may also be seen in the relationship between clients and the "authorities" they consult. Since the consultants employed by newspapers are viewed as experts in their respective field, the fact of receiving advice means more to the clients than the advice *per se.* actually clients await not the consultant's *advice* but his *orders.* They cannot judge their own situations for themselves, so they want to find authorities who can judge. According to Fromm this complete reliance on experts is a symptom of social masochism. The stereotypic concluding sentence in these letters is "I don't know what I should do! Please help me."

People are looking for a magic helper from outside. In the extreme case, this tendency appears as neurosis.

"Isn't there any way I can be taller? I am worrying because I may be excluded from society." (The height of this 17 year old girl is 160 cm., which actually is average.)

"I think I had better kill myself, for I, who lost virginity, cannot get married ever."

These are the extreme cases in which the felling of insecurity became a kind of obsessive compulsive neurosis.

Again, if we may use Fromm's concept, the masochistic tendencies seen in life counseling can be generalized into the concept of "receptive orientation." (See: E. Fromm, *Man For Himself,* 1949, Chapter 3, Section II.) The concept of receptive orientation can also serve as an explanatory principle in the study of many other aspects of Japanese culture.

In Japanese society, there are many hierarchical compartmentalizations of social groups, and the basic human relations are based on a family or pseudo-familistic model. The Emperor has absolute authority over the people, landlords over tenants, parents over children, men over women, and so on. This kind of rule-and-obedience relationship was, and still is, the traditional Japanese social behavior pattern. The Japanese are forced to live "properly" in accordance with various external indices, such as age, sex, occupation, residence, etc. [See such frames of reference as "...*like*" *(rashiku),*"...tempered" *(katagi).*] In a word, individuality is suppressed by social expectations.

The give–it–up logic, which is frequently found in Japanese popular songs, is an expression of the feeling of powerlessness. And, of course, sometimes frustration is transformed into aggressiveness. Consequently, the Japanese want to find something on which they can rely. If they can find such a thing, they feel secure. In this respect, there is no difference for the Japanese people between Ideal–Japanese and Ideal–American; both are authorities approved by society. The former was dominant in the pre–war period while the latter appeared in post–war japan; but the attitude of the people to the two values was similar.

7. Conclusion[4]

We have attempted, in the preceding sections to analyze the contents of life counseling columns. Both the technique and materials of the study are only partially valid, and it may not be altogether sound to generalize to the problems of contemporary Japanese culture from this analysis. However, the analysis seems to give us some suggestions and hints concerning the function of counseling in society.

When in trouble, people turn to counsel. Counseling is an important pattern of communication in human life. The cooperative problem–solving by the client and the consultant develops their thoughts as well as the society to which they belong. Life counseling columns lack this general value of counseling in society. The consultants in life counseling formulate a problem on an improper level.

Marxists, on the one hand, formulate problems on a wrong level in the sense that they believe every contemporary problem can be solved in terms of contradictions in capitalist society, so that such minor problems as erythrophobia of a person may be explained by them as the result of capitalism. They want to widen every personal problem situation to a social problem. On the other hand, in life counseling, every problem is narrowed down to a very personal problem. When, for instance, a trouble in a family is presented by a client, the consultant suggests "be patient" and tells her that "everything will be all right if you try to be nice to every one." Even a social problem such as unemployment is interpreted as a personal problem. They tell the client that the reason why he cannot find a job is because be is not an able man or because he is lacking in eagerness to find a job, and so forth.

Every human problem has its unique character and the level of problem solution depends on the character of the problem. This is the starting point of counseling. But contemporary counseling is completely blind in the sense that it is based on the belief that there is only one level for problem solving.

Notes

1. Like other popular communications, such as popular songs, fiction, radio and TV programs, the importance of life counseling was completely neglected by scholars. This study of it was originally proposed in Japan by Professor Shunsuke Tsurumi, and several members of the Institute of Science of Thought have engaged in an inter-disciplinary survey of this subject. This paper is a translation of one of the reports which appeared in *Me* magazine, (organ of the Institute), No. 8–9,1953. For reference we list here the full table of contents of the original edition:

Akio Saki:	The Origin of Life Counselling.
Hajime Ikeuchi:	A Historical Survey of Life Counseling in Newspapers.
Motoichi Nogami:	Life Counseling in Postwar Europe (fortunetellers).
Kazuko Tsurumi:	A Content Analysis of Life Counseling as Related to communication and Discommunication Problems.
Eiko Ohama:	As a Consultant.
Nobue Sato:	The Philosophy of Life Guidance (an essay).

2. Public Opinion Series: On social Education," National Bureau of Public Research, March 1953, p. 25.
3. The "liberation" of sex was one of the most distinctive features of post-war japanese society. In the field of literature such authors as Taijiro Tamura, Seiichi Funabashi, Sakunosuke Oda, became best-sellers because of their bold treatment of the problem of sex and its liberation. In addition there was an influence from American culture, especially through movies. The reconsideration of sex is essentially a reaction against rigid feudalistic morals between man and woman. Also at the time of confusion after the war, the revaluation of sex found philosophical support in existentialism. See "A Content Analysis of Tamura's Writing." by Hyosuke Kuro.
4. after this article was published, the study of life counseling was continued by some members of IST, and their study, including the historical observation of problems, was published in the form of a book titled, *Life Counseling,* Kawade Shobō Publishing Co., 1956.

III. Popular Culture and Social History

Qualitative Sociology in Japan

Institutional Backgrounds

Sociology as a discipline,is relatively new in Japan. It was introduced after the Meiji Revolution (1868) through visiting scholars from Europe and the United States, and as a reflection of the age, the first sociological thought brought into Japan was that of Herbert Spencer. According to historical research, it was taught by Errest Fenollosa, a visiting American scholar, to Japanese students of Tokyo University as a part of sociology, though Fenollosa quoted Spencer as a "sociologist." Like most of the countries of the late 19th century, the "departmentalization" of universities in Japan was mobile but still arbitrary, and as a result, "sociology" was given its position as a subdivision of philosophy, and not until the early 1950s, before postwar education reform took place, organizationally speaking, the faculty of sociology at Tokyo University and other major institutions were a part of the philosophy division of the Department of Literature, which also included history, foreign literature and language, psychology, and other disciplines of the humanities. Thus, sociology used to be a weak sub-subdivision of the Department of Literature until the end of World War II.

Such positioning of sociology in Japanese academia had two major implications. In the first place, the discipline lacked relative "independence" for obvious reasons. Though a small group of sociologists enjoyed their autonomy, it was covered under the umbrella of philosophy and as often happened elsewhere in university politics, the faculty of sociology was to a certain degree obliged to interact with philosophers. In the second place because of such academic arrangements, sociology in Japan tended to be close to philosophy. In other words, philosophically-oriented sociology turned out to be the mainstream, if not the orthodoxy, of Japanese sociology. In this connection it was rather natural that Japanese sociology, until recent years, accepted the works of German scholars, especially Georg Simmel and other formal sociologists. Empirical or quantitative methodology was regarded as peripheral. The "dislocation" of sociology made its relationship with other branches of social sciences remote. For instance such disciplines as economics and political science were established as independent departments from the beginning of modern Japanese universities. In other words, sociology in Japan has been counted as a minor part of humanities rather than social sciences. Even today the tradition still exists, in the sense that only about a dozen of pioneering universities out of 600 finally decided to make sociology an independent department. Tokyo University, the leading academic institution in Japan still has its sociology department within its Department of Literature.

However, this tradition has positive aspects too. Since sociology has been treated as a part of humanities, Japanese sociologists could have the liberty of not being disturbed by quantitative and statistical data. They were permitted to mobilized more imaginative and sometimes intuitive insights into social relations and social organizations. As a matter of fact, it was after the 1950s that Japanese sociologists started to show their interest in quantitative methodology under the influence of the general tendency towards American sociology. Statistical social survey was introduced,and Japanese sociology, generally speaking,shifted from the German method to the American. Although there is no evidence, there could have been administrative guidance from General Headquarters of American occupation forces to the major Japanese academic institutions to absorb more from contemporary American sociology. At least, younger Japanese sociologists were encouraged to study at American institutions, and various scholarships were provided. However, it is worthwhile to note here that, along with quantitative sociology, many Japanese sociologists showed keen interest in qualitative sociology along with sociologists from the United States. For example, american sociologists whose works have been highly appreciated and widely read by Japanese counterparts were David Riesman, Erich Fromm, William Whyte, Wright Mills, and other qualitative scholars. Also, among classics George Herbert Mead and Thorstein Veblen were reevaluated highly.

To summarize, the postwar Japanese sociology, in spite of the "discovery" of quantitative sociology-inclusive of public opinion poll, content analysis by means of space measurement-many Japanese sociologists looked into qualitative sociological traditions of the United States, partly because the qualitative approach provided a sense of continuity with a century-old Japanese sociology which had been influenced by European descriptive, and sometimes contemplative, sociology until contemporary quantitative American sociology was introduced, and partly because sophisticated quantitative computation was relatively unfamiliar and difficult to cope with. Therefore, it is safe to say that "qualitative sociology" in Japan has been the major trend and still is.

Indeed, representative works of eminent Japanese sociologists in the past such as the rural sociology of Eitaro Suzuki, and the family sociology of Teizo Toda and Kizaemon Aruga, were essentially qualitative in the sense that their methodology was empirical case studies, without much generalization. Therefore it was natural that Japanese sociologists in general agreed with MacIver's statements which criticized overwhelming quantitative method as "testmania" or "quantophrenia."

Another factor which encouraged qualitative sociology in Japan was that the discipline had to confront with Marxism. From the 1920s, Marxism penetrated among Japanese social scientists, and either implicitly or explicitly, Japanese sociology was obliged to justify its nature and function vis-à-vis Marxism which claimed "sociology" as "bourgeois science." As a matter of fact the term "social science (s)"has been sometimes interpreted with heavy Marxist tone in Japan. The theoretical controversy between sociology and Marxian social interpretation had been one of the major issues among Japanese social scientists until the 1970s when Marxism started to show relative decline. And since Marxism is essentially philosophical, sociology also tended to confront it on a philosophical level. Thus Japanese sociology tended to be qualitative rather than quantitative. In that sense, Japanese sociology shared similar experiences with its counterparts in Europe, especially Germany.

These are the institutional and ideological backgrounds which may explain why Japanese sociology inclined to be qualitative both in methodology and achievements.

Ethno-methodological Background

Apart from academia, it should be emphasized here that there were a group of scholars who were interested in empirical research in contemporary Japanese society. The representative person of this group is Kunio Yanagita, whose exhaustive works are compiled in 36 volumes. Yanagita started his career as a government official at the Ministry of Agriculture, investigating old records of Japanese villages. He was shocked to find a rich oral tradition, annual rites, and folk belief systems. He conducted his own field survey in the villages of various parts of Japan, collecting and observing the facts of such communities, mostly by interviewing. He called his work "a study of common people," and asked his European friends what his kind of research was called in English. The answer was "folklore," and he translated that term as "*Minzokugaku.*" However, in the opinion of a group of social scientists including the author of this article, the European response as well as Yanagita's translation were not precise in the sense that both its background and its contents were completely different from what is known as "folklore," as typically demonstrated by James Frazer. As a matter of fact, Yanagita's works were an intensive and extensive study of what Graham Sumnner called "folkways," and in a society like Japan, with long and rich historical heritage, "*Minzokugaku*" could be regarded as sociological inquiries which became quite appropriate to define as a school of Japanese sociology. "*Minzokugaku*" school claimed its position as "*Kokugaku*" or "Japanese Studies," and it fits to a certain degree the American concept of "area studies."

Yanagita himself was invited ad an honorary guest lecturer in the major universities, and in over ten universities today he has a professors' chair in "*Minzokugaku*," and under those arrangements, "*minzokugaku*" scholars usually work with sociologists and anthropologists. To footnote at this point, anthropology in Japan also had its own unique history, in the sense that the discipline used to be a part of the Department of Natural Science because "anthropology"in Japan had been limited to physical anthropology until cultural (and social) anthropology was introduced after World War II. And in this connection, newly emerged cultural anthropologists (mostly trained in American institutions) felt familiar with the traditions of "*Minzokugaku*" as an ethno-science. As a matter of fact, there have been exchanges between the "*Minzokugaku*" school and cultural anthropologists, both in terms of personnel placements and research findings.

Among the "*Minzokugaku*" school, Tsuneichi Miyamoto most enthusiastically contributed by collecting cultural material from various parts of Japan, as well as interviewing the "common man," especially in rural and fishing communities. His works were compiled in 25 volumes. And, from a sociologist's viewpoint, the "*Minzokugaku*" tradition in Japan may be, or should be counted as a precious contribution to rural sociology.

The methodology of "*Minzokugaku*" is essentially qualitative. As a matter of fact some of Yanagita's works, in spite of their academic content, are regarded as literary writings and included in high school textbooks or collections of modern Japanese literature. At the same time, the "*Minzokugaku*" school paid extraordinary interest and attention to history. For instance, in comparing oral traditions or annual rituals, "*Minzokugaku*" scholars carefully looked into their historical backgrounds and presented their hypothesis in cultural diffusion processes within Japan from the ancient period. And by doing so, they have furnished basic sociological data for comparative studies. Though their basic philosophy was a "common man" approach, as far as historical documentation was concerned, Yanagita and others never neglected literature in a related field.

Since "*Minzokugaku*" scholars started their own unique history, the problems they dealt with were diverse, ranging from changes in food habit to an analysis of Shinto doctrine, from folk medicine to the diffusion of cotton products in 19th century. Only a very few sociologists in Japan today would disagree to call "*Minzokugaku*" achievements of the past and present "an encyclopedia of Japanese society."

It is obvious from the above statements that "*Minzokugaku*" as a peculiar and indigenous discipline of Japan, has been descriptive and qualitative in nature. They introduced cases and typologies, but they consciously avoided a quantitative method with the belief that all social observations had to be direct and that each locale and individual is unique. Their method was to introduce an episode or an observed fact, and then try to find the social and historical implications of such social occurrences. They did not explicitly refer to quantitative method, but they seemed to be "indifferent" to quantitative sociology. These trends were another factor which made Japanese sociology essentially qualitative, even a nonfiction literature. For these reasons, among the works of American anthropologists it is no wonder that the writings of Oscar Lewis attracted many sociologists in Japan.

Qualitative Sociology Updated

Sociology in Japan, as briefly described at the outset, is a new imported discipline, though there had been a good tradition of "*Minzokugaku*." As a result, in academic institutions it was rather customary for the instructors of sociology to deliver a series of lectures to introduce diversified schools of sociology from Europe and the United States. The sociology lectures, as well as the text books at college level, were an exhaustive warehouse of major works from Western sociologists, starting from August Comte to Talcott Parsons. The students of sociology, therefore, tended to memorize the names and ideas of Durkheim, Weber, von Wiese, Toennies, MacIver, etc., without looking into the actual social issues and realities of Japan. Indeed, a quick investigation of graduation theses of sociology students before the 1960s will reveal that each student was busy organizing a paper to summarize the methodology or major findings of his/her favorite (or instructed) Western sociologist. Furthermore, they often tried to adapt alien theories and models to Japanese society, mostly in vain.

In reaction, a new trend if not a movement to establish "Japanese Sociology" came onto the scene. As already mentioned, Suzuki, Aruga, and others had already worked on Japanese kinship relations and rural social organizations as early as the 1920s, and that tradition was revived and encouraged. In the postwar period, sociologists in Japan generally became aware of the fact that the discipline had to be empirical rather than contemplative, and the pragmatic methodology of American sociology helped to accelerate that new direction. Moreover, the introduction of cultural anthropology and social psychology made Japanese sociology widen its scope and methodology, and the necessity of interdisciplinary efforts was strongly felt by sociologists. In the past two decades Japanese sociologists have been very much interested in cultural and social anthropology because anthropology in essentially descriptive and concentrates on intensive case studies. These attributes make it similar to traditional sociology and to "*Minzoku–gaku*" heritage. It is impossible to determine to what degree "qualitative" sociology is appreciated among Japanese sociologists. Some sociologists, specializing in sophisticated quantitative methods, criticize qualitative methods as "impressionistic" or "subjective." In return, those who use qualitative methods usually retort that "quantitative" sociologists cherish figures and statistics which cannot incorporate the most essential nature of man and society. This familiar antagonism between qualitative and quantitative people is not specific to Japan.

However, in comparison with some other countries, such antagonism seems to be less visible on the Japanese scene. Rather, here both Parties pay mutual respect and attempt to utilize each other's resources. For instance, a qualitative sociologist who engages in a case study of a small village may rely on nation–wide survey figures of rice production for background data, and a statistically–minded sociologist may quote a paragraph from an episode written by a qualitative sociologist. Because Japanese sociologists do not see a sharp dichotomy between "qualitative" and "quantitative" research, it may be safe to say that Japanese sociology is, with very few and minor exceptions, either "quali–quantitative" or "quanti–qualitative." Indeed, the term "qualitative sociology" itself may sound somewhat strange to most Japanese sociologists seeing that they are not used to perceiving a dichotomy in sociological methods.

Since sociology as an independent discipline is relatively new in Japanese intellectual circles, it has been interpreted very broadly to include social criticism, social welfare, casual observation of social affairs, and even journalistic treatment of social trends. As a result, there was a danger, if not a trend, for sociology to become a hodge-podge of liberal arts. The disadvantages are obvious. Scholars have often said that sociology is that branch of academic inquiry into which issues with well-defined disciplines that could not be dealt with were dumped. For this reason, it is not surprising that until recently graduates who majored in sociology took jobs in the mass media industry, especially newspapers, because they were thought to be knowledgeable in current social affairs. The advantages of the hodge-podge nature of Japanese sociology should not be underestimated. In the first place, Japanese sociologists were able to mix with other experts such as historians, philosophers, and artists, to mention a few. As a result, Japanese sociologists (both qualitative and quantitative) could integrate knowledge and insights from other disciplines. For example, an urban sociologist could have easy access to his/her colleagues in the engineering school where there were many architects interested in the human aspect of architecture, and vice-versa. For rural sociologists in Japan, contacts with local historians were essential. In that sense, Japanese sociology as a whole has been interdisciplinary from the beginning and not defensive.

Sociology in Japan, of course, included serious students of Max Weber, for example, but at the same time, it could give generous space for a scholar who was interested in down-to-earth social observation. One good example was a series of studies of everyday life records by Wajiro Kon. Kon was originally trained as a graphic designer, but his interest inclined to keeping visual records of the man on the street in the literal sense of the word. He went to visit downtown slum sections and drew sketches of the lives of poor people with his extensive comments. Or he sat in a coffee shop in the busiest street of Tokyo and observed the color and style of clothes of pedestrians so that he could establish his own typology of urban dwellers. He called his method "modernology" as contrasted to "archeology." The works of Kon attracted the eyes of certain sociologists as an example of excellent survey data, and only a few sociologists would disagree with the opinion that Kon's works were a great contribution to urban sociology in Japan.

In other words, Japanese sociology, especially qualitative sociology, has a liberal tradition of interacting with other disciplines and creating new perspectives on the interpretation of Japanese society. It is interesting to see that a group of younger sociologists in Japan today are brilliant and courageous enough to challenge various aspects of Japanese society with their imaginative approach. For instance, N. Ikei's *"Sociology of Bonsai,"* S. Inoue's *"A Social History of the Funeral car,"* M. Matsudaira's *"Sociology of the Black Market,"* K. Takata's *"Sociology of Drinking Places,"* and others are good ethno-based (not ethnocentric) works. They are not recognized as the mainstream of postwar sociology, especially in light of the fact that examination of major Western sociological theories is still the orthodoxy. However, these ambitious trials are not criticized either.

These sociological works attracted both professionals and the general public. In contrast to many other countries where sociological writings are intended purely for sociologists, in Japan the works of sociologists are often read by a popular audience. The titles mentioned in the preceding paragraph, for instance, were reviewed favorably in the book review sections of major newspapers. And some of the books sold tens of thousands of copies. (Japanese publishers usually make at least 10,000 copies for the first printing.)

Because of the Japanese reading public's intellectual curiosity and the hodge-podge nature of sociology in Japan, sociology is an accepted nonfiction category in bookstores. Younger sociologists interested in contemporary Japanese society are particularly well accepted. They are much less contemplative and "bookish" than the previous generation which was busy introducing new theories and the findings of Euro-American sociology. At the same time, their personal histories are extremely interesting in the sense that many of them majored in other areas as undergraduates. It had been customary until the 1960s that those who wished to be sociologists majored in sociology both as undergraduates and as graduate students. But in recent years, those who finished undergraduate studies in biology, architecture, agricultural economics, and other fields decided to study sociology in graduate school. Thus, among the postwar generation of sociologists, an interdisciplinary approach was almost natural. These sociologists, then, are not only quantitative but also multidisciplinary. My only regret is that their works are available only in Japanese.

Comics, Rebellion, and Ecology

Prologue

When Japanese university campuses exploded with protests and violence in 1968–1969, Kyoto University, where I was working, was no exception. Everyday there were demonstrations and confrontations, and in the summer of 1969, the university building where I had my office was taken over and barricaded by a group of radical students.

On the first of September of the year, the dean of the department finally decided to call the police force. The barricades were taken away and the students who had occupied the building were arrested. As soon as everything was over, I dashed to my office on the third floor to find that my office space was an absolute mess of paint, broken furniture, torn books, and left–over food. I checked my disorganized bookcase and found out that my entire collection of back issues of "Garo," was missing. I was very sad, because I had been the only person on the campus who kept that collection of comics (university professors usually do not read comics, at least in their offices), ant it was hopelessly impossible to replace the whole set, as comic magazines were extremely fugitive even in the publisher's warehouse.

Some days later, a student who had been inside the barricade but escaped arrest came to see me and said "Oh, we enjoyed your 'Garo'", he apologized for his comrades, who had taken the magazines away to show to a group of students who occupied another building. I asked, out of curiosity, why students liked the "Garo." The students answered "Kamui–den , of course!"

I must confess that I was not as attentive a reader of comic magazines as I was a collector, and I wondered why students were so fond of "Kamui–den." That question remained in my mind even after I left the campus in spring 1970, but without the original text, I was unable to study "Kamui–den" to find the answer.

In 1972, while browsing at a bookstore in Kyoto, to my surprise I found "Kamui–den"in paperbacks. Apparently, the comic strips published in the "Garo" had been compiled in book form. Without hesitation I purchased the entire 21–volume set and started to read. This essay is a tentative answer to the question inspired by those innocently violent students who occupied my office, several years ago, and to them I dedicate this research.

H.K.

Honolulu, 1974

Introduction

Nobuhiro Takemoto was suspected to be a leader of the organization called the Japan Red Army, whose members engaged in several hijackings, including the cruel massacre at Tel Aviv airport in 1972. When he was a graduate student at Kyoto University in the 1960s. Takemoto had been a devoted reader of the *Garo*, an avantgarde monthly comic magazine. In a letter to its editors in the November 1965 issue, he said "I am a graduate student in the department of economics, studying the revolutionary thoughts of Karl Marx. My hope is to revitalize Marxism, which at present is in the hands of formalistic eggheads. In this context, I feel that the comics by Mr. Sampei Shirato sharply touch my problem area, and I am reading his works most intensively. ....I am keeping all the issues so that they can be read by other people, including my son."

Three years later, the young radical Takemoto was appointed an assistant in his department. A legendary organizer, there was a warrant issued for his arrest. The "Takemoto problem" is still one of the basic issues in the student unrest.

It is sheer nonsense to hypothesize a simple cause-and-effect relationship between Mr.Takemoto's absorption in Mr. Shirato's comics and his underground operations, but it was quite probable that the images of the comic strip's heroic figures frequently crossed his mind when he was sitting with other activists discussing their strategies and tactics.

In the late 1960s, it was fashionable for student newspapers to print commentaries on the works of Mr. Shirato and to encourage their readers to learn from the comics. For instance, a student editor for Musashi University campus newspaper commented in 1966 that "... Mr. Shirato's comics are based on historical materialism, and the agrarian revolt which Mr. Shirato depicts in his works must be projected to contemporary revolutionary movements. In conclusion, Mr. Shirato's comics are lessons for our revolutionary practice." Critics of this easy learning of revolution from comic books argued that students must read Marx and Engels to have more sophisticated ideas of revolution; but the students, who also opposed elitism and snobbism, preferred to read comics. It seemed, interestingly enough, that their counter-snobbism turned out to be another new form of snobbism, accompanied by long-hair, flowers, and the cult of innocence and childishness. And the *Garo* might have been a part of it.

When the editors of the magazine conducted a readership survey, they discovered that the average age of the readers was 21, and 70 percent of them were students, mostly males with urban backgrounds. Also, many of the readers were found to be serious intellectuals (or would-be intellectuals) who were attentive to sophisticated intellectual magazines as well as *Garo*. When the editors asked "What would you like to do now?", the most frequent answer was "traveling," followed by "revolution" and "student movements." There were also such unique responses as "to destroy the parliament building by dynamite," "fighting," "to kill people with a rifle," and " confrontation with police with the *Garo* in my pocket."

It is difficult to generalize the ideological orientations of readers from a simple survey such as this, but as will be discussed later, they appeared to be anarchistic rather than communistic, utopian rather than revolutionary, and as symbolized by the case of Takemoto, it was probable that the readers of the *Garo* were at odds not only with the police force but also with communist party members, who were much more organized and theoretically oriented. (When Takemoto talked about "formalistic eggheads" he meant members of the main sustenance, of the ultra-leftist activities on university campuses in the late 1960s, whether or not Mr. Shirato intended that effect. But there are reasons to believe that Mr. Shirato fully intended to propagate his revolutionary ideas through comics. As we shall see later, he made many explicit comments on the socio-economic contradictions of our age as he developed his stories.

Mr. Shirato was born in 1925 in Tokyo, the son of Mr. Karaki Okamoto, who had been a left-wing artist since the pre-war period. Because of war, poverty, and his father's distrust of school education, Mr. Shirato did not finish his higher education. He started his career as an illustrator for *Kamishibai*, an original entertainment medium for younger children in Japan since the middle of the nineteenth century. *Kamishibai*, literally meaning "pictorial theater," was a street show where a narrator told various stories to children with the aid of a series of still pictures, and in order to attract the audience, the narrators needed new and exciting stories and pictures all the time. Mr. Shirato, being a son of an artist and an artist himself, could create these pictures easily. When he joined left-wing cultural movements in the 1950s, he was pleased at the opportunity to experiment with *Kamishibai* as a means of education and propaganda.

Kamishibai, however, became outdated when television came onto the scene. Japanese children, for obvious reasons, ceased to go out to see *Kamishibai*, preferring to stay at home with its electronic version. Mr. Shirato thus lost his job, and tried to make a shift from *Kamishibai* illustrator to comic strip artist. But he was not satisfied. In 1963, his pictorial story of Ernest Seton's "Wild Animals I Have Known" won the Children's Comics Award and since then, he has been producing long, serious comics known as *Gekiga*.

Gekiga, or "dramatic comics,"is a new genre which emerged in Japanese popular culture during the middle 1960s. It is a kind of comics, but is not necessarily funny. It is very often a serious illustrated story, though the media which carry *Gekiga* are usually comic magazines. Mr. Shirato has been one of the leading *Gekiga* producer-writers, and many of his works are classics of the genre.

While Mr.Takemoto was writing his letter to the editors (mentioned earlier), Mr. Shirato was energetically producing new monthly segments of his everlasting serial "Kamui-den" in the *Garo*. Indeed, "*Kamui-den*,"which was started in December 1964, took some 100 pages of a periodical whose total paged were little over 200; it is safe to say that the magazine's major attraction was "*Kamui-den*,"and that the work which impressed Takemoto so much was this particular serial. The readership survey also showed that more than 50 percent of the readers nominated Mr. Shirato as their favorite contributor to the magazine. Among Mr. Shirato's major works, therefore, "*Kamui-den*" is a good subject for a case study of the dynamics of comics and university radicals and of the role of serious comics in youth culture at large.

The Story

"*Kamui-den*" ("*The Legend of Kamui*") is a voluminous epic in comics form, produced and drawn by Sampei Shirato. Serial publication in the *Garo* began in 1964 and has continued ever since. In 1971, the stories published to that date were compiled into 21 volumes of paperbacks of 300 pages each--some 50,000 frames of pictures altogether--and the author stated in his postscript to volume 21 that it was merely the end of Part I of "*Kamui-den*," which eventually would consist of three parts. One might expect, therefore, another 40 volumes of the continuing story of "*Kamui-den*" in the years to come. This, of course, is one of the longest stories in the history of comic books; as Toshio Kagawa, a playwright, commented, it is comparable with Wagner's "*Der Ring des Nibelungen*" or Tolstoy's *War and Peace*. More than 50 major characters have appeared in the story, and the social relationships among the characters are extremely complex. The story goes on continually depicting power and suppression, joy and agony, hopes and discouragement, and above all, the life and death of the characters. It's a long story, but never boring.

The setting of the story is in eighteenth century Japan, when feudal lords dominated the peasant society; "*Kamui-den*" is essentially a story of feudal exploitation and of agrarian revolt against it. It is a story about a violent revolution and many of the heroes die in the process of the glorious struggle. In this sense, "*Kamui-den*" is revolutionary literature, and this is the precise reason that activists were attracted by the story.

The term "Kamui" carries a somewhat intricate connotation. The word originated with the *Ainu*, an aboriginal ethnic group of Japan whose descendants survive as a minority group in Hokkaido; "Kamui" means "god," or something "sacred." Kamui is the name of the hero of the story, but at the same time it is used to mean *any* heroic figure or event. It may be safe to say that the word "Kamui" is what Wagner would define as the "Leitmotif" of the story. Because the *Ainu* are a neglected and suppressed minority, the title "Kamui" is symbolic of the contents of the epic. Mr. Shirato is very sophisticated in his approach to the theme and, in spite of the realism of his style, he has been quite successful in leaving a certain ambiguity so that a reader could identify contemporary counterparts out of this historical drama. As a matter of fact, Mr. Shirato commented in the first volume of the series, "If your righteous demands as a human being are ignored and suppressed, you will surely be indignant and frustrated! Today, in spite of developments of human societies permitting life to be full of joy, the real facts are quite contrary. This is the story of those people who tried hard to make progress in seventeenth century Japan."

The story begins in a poor farming village in a feudal territory fictitiously called "*Heki* territory." The feudal lord governing the territory is sadistically cruel and ignorant, and he exploits the farmers with heavier taxation every year.

Get Out!

Like many other rulers, his policy is "divide and rule," and in this case, he divides the people of his territory by status and discrimination. The top social class, of course, is the *Samurai* or warriors, headed by the lord of the territory. Then come the farmers, but they were divided into two classes, *Hyakushō* (independent farmers) and *Genin* (serf). Below *Genin* is a caste called *Hinin*, who are engaged in such dirty jobs as the processing of the dead bodies of animals, and their community is segregated from that of the farmers. Even the mountain passes and river banks that the *Hinin* can use are segregated from those of farmers. Farmers, *Hyakushō* and *Genin* together, look down on the *Hinin* as if they were not human beings. Another special assignment for *Hinin* is the execution of criminals. The leaders of agrarian revolt, for instance, are executed at the hands of *Hinin*. The tension between farmers and *Hinin* is thus reinforced, and mutual hatreds and hostilities are created and perpetuated.

Oh, you Hinin
eat dog food!

Shōsuke

Because of heavy taxation, the farmers revolt periodically against the tyranny of the lord, but the revolts are always unsuccessful, and every time the leading figures are arrested and killed. It is in this context that Shōsuke, a hero of the story, comes on the scene. Shōsuke belongs to *Genin*, but his ideas are liberal and he sees no reason why *Hinin* should be segregated and discriminated against. He devotes his efforts to combining the powers of farmers and *Hinin*. He himself falls in love with a *Hinin* girl and gets married.

The younger brother of the girl Shōsuke marries is another heroic figure, Kamui. He, naturally, belongs to the *Hinin* class, but he chooses to live as a lone-wolf, a solitary fighter rather than a member of an organized movement. Through mysterious training in the mountains, Kamui acquires super-human abilities and helps Shōsuke and others.



Kamui disciplines himself in the woods

There is a sympathizer of Shōsuke among the young *Samurai*, too. Tatsunoshin, a son of a very important family, joins with the farmers after unfortunate experiences in the factional struggle and complications within the *Samurai* class. He comes to believe that the government must be overthrown. Through a series of accidents, he lives with *Hinin* and learns the realities of the life of the lower class people.

Tatsunoshin

Fencing is basic for a Samurai

Another important figure in the story is Shichibei, an ambitious merchant who looks for free trade and big profit. He is opposed to the feudal lord, whose economic policy is very restrictive, and he acts as the financier for innovative farmers such as Shōsuke. He can be an ally of the suppressed in the sense that the lord is their common enemy. Here again is a classic formula--the temporary solidarity between bourgeois and farmers--and as the formula of Marxism predicts, this solidarity is broken as soon as Shichibei gains economic hegemony in the territory.

Shichibei, a strategist

Then . . .

Power is to manipulate, not to rely upon

Victorious farmers

We're surrounded!

The difficulties and unrest in the territory are reported by a special group of spies to the shogunate, or the central government of the day, which looks for any justification to confiscate the territory from the lord. At last, the lord is killed by a terrorist, and the territory is confiscated by the central government. Tatsunoshin, because of his popularity with the farmers, is appointed as the local governor, and he tries very hard to abolish discrimination and to make the people happy. This "Weimar" period, however, does not last; since Tatsunoshin is too liberal and too nice to the people, the central government replaces him. The agony and suffering of the farmers begins anew, and in the process all of the heroes die.



Confrontation

This is the end of part one of the story. There are many other important side stories which cannot be described here in detail, but in the following pages, three major heroes, namely Kamui, Shōsuke, and Tatsunoshin will be studied in close–ups.

The Trinity of Heroes

Shōsuke: Organizer, Educator, and Innovator

When he was a child, Shōsuke asked his father why people discriminate against *Hinin*. Father answered "It's a matter of birth. They are different." Shōsuke retorted, "Then, are we *Genin* different from *Hyakushō* by birth?

Are we different?

Are we?" His father just could not answer. After this incident, Shōsuke did not hesitate to play with the kids of *Hinin* class, in spite of the adults' warnings. He also learned why his father hated *Hinin* so much. The father confessed one day about the tragedy of Shōsuke's mother. She was born *Hinin* and did not tell her husband about her birth till Shōsuke was born. The aggrieved husband suddenly regretted his marriage, and out of anger, he kicked his wife. The desperate woman left the house and committed suicide.

Shōsuke's life became more sad and tragic when his elder sister (who once was in love with Tatsunoshin, another hero) was killed by a brutal *Samurai*. Being a boy of the *Genin* class, he could do nothing about his misery and misfortune.

1. Your mother told me the secret
2. I got mad and kicked her
3. She ran away into the snow
4. and killed herself
5. So, you hated *Hinin*
   What a fool I was

However, his ambition was never discouraged. First of all, he wanted to learn to read. There was, of course, no school, and he had to educate himself. Soon he was able to read the documents of the village chief, the local representative of power, and he learned that the village chief had been dishonest in tax allocation. Shōsuke accused him of this injustice. Shōsuke was arrested and almost executed, but being a smart boy, he had given a copy of the document to Kamui so that the injustice would be reported to higher officials if he were executed. Shōsuke had not intended blackmail. but in effect, the village chief proposed that he would give Shōsuke the status of Hyakushō (an independent farmer with a small parcel of land) in exchange for a copy of the document. Shōsuke accepted this offer.

He became a hardworking, independent farmer,and he thought that perhaps a cash crop other than rice would bring more profit for the farmers. He visited neighboring communities and learned that growing cotton could be a good business. He made an experimental pilot farm where he got good yield of cotton.

A copy is in the hands of my friend

He will bring it to the office if I don't make contact

You . . .

The farmers, especially the younger ones, admired Shōsuke as the new leader of the village and helped him. He later introduced silk production, and saw an opportunity to sell both cotton and silk to the merchants on the free market. He went to the big urban centers to check the current price of cotton and silk, lest he be cheated by the merchants. The products of the village were sold on bids, and Shichibei came onto the scene. He encouraged Shōsuke to produce more and financed his projects, including a large-scale irrigation construction.

Look! cotton flowers

Is this cotton?

Never seen before

The agriculture financed by commercial capital required more organized labor, and for that purpose, too, the discrimination and segregation of *Hinin* from farmers had to be abolished. Therefore, in the village, the two classes of the people worked together, sharing the joy of communal projects. The lord of the territory felt a threat in Shōsuke's activities because he saw them as a menace to the existing power structure, and the antagonism between the lord and farmers was intensified. Finally, a military confrontation took place. The farmers, armed with farming tools, fought against the lord's army in vain. Shōsuke, a pacifist, could not stop the violence, but he was arrested as the suspected leader. The farmers, as well as *Hinin*, however, testified in court that Shōsuke was not participating in the riot, and he was released.

Throughout his life, Shōsuke was a legalist. He discouraged the use of violence, and suggested rather a Gandhi-like non-violent resistance. He believed in law and justice, and every time he was arrested, he insisted that he would talk about anything, but only in the court where he could see responsible officers;he was never defeated by sadistic tortures.

Farmers moved into the new village

School was built

He also believed in collective action for farmers. He said that the power of an individual was weak, but a well-organized group of individuals could be the strongest power in the world, even stronger than a lord's army. He encouraged communal life. For instance, he organized villagers to collectively purchase the daily necessities so that farmers could bargain on the price. Indeed, Shōsuke was a fictional pioneer in consumer cooperative movement. He organized such community organizations as youth clubs and children's clubs so that young people could exchange ideas. Young girls who had been educated by Shōsuke grew up to be teachers in the community school. A nursery school also was built so that parents could leave their small children while working in the farm. With the permission of the lord's office, which always looked for more taxes from more land, Shōsuke undertook a new project to convert wilderness into new farmland, so that more independent farmers could migrate and settle.

Shōsuke can be defined as an innovator of early capitalism, comparable with Benjamin Franklin and, like him, an inventor. He invented many new agricultural tools to save energy and to intensify agricultural production. He was, as seen before, a liberal-minded person who dared to marry a girl who belonged to the *Hinin* class. The villagers, who had been prejudiced against *Hinin*, celebrated their marriage, and solidarity between farmers and *Hinin* grew.

The happiness did not, however, continue. The village was attacked by a dreadful flood;the lord had cut most of the trees on the mountainside to get quick cash, and the rains ran off quickly and swelled the river. The farmers decided, again, to revolt against the lord. Shōsuke persuaded them not to, and with the help of Shichibei,the merchant, he took the whole population of the village to another territory where also there was a cruel lord, and many migrant farmers lost their lives.

Shōsuke's last plea

We wanted to defend our farm!
I can't understand why you ruin our village! We defended what we had to!

The lord of Shōsuke's village, meanwhile, was accused by the central government of injustice and misconduct, and as soon as the news reached the migrant farmers, they decided to return home. They learned when they arrived that Tatsunoshin, who once had spent part of his life with the farmers, was the new governor of the village. The alliance of Shōsuke and Tatsunoshin created a kind of Utopia. But the Tatsunoshin Era was a very short one, and another exploitative governor soon took office. The new governor was as bad as the former lord, and Shōsuke could no longer be patient. The only action he could take was to report to the central government himself. He went to Kyoto, then to Edo, was put in jail and tortured.

In spite of his firm belief in law and justice, his mission was unsuccessful. He went back home, almost half-dead(his tongue was cut by torture), and the villagers who had insisted on violent revolt did not support Shōsuke any more. Mr. Shirato, the author, says simply "....after that he disappeared, nobody saw him."

Shōsuke was a model of democracy, a textbook by himself. But the textbook could not change the society, except for temporary reforms and short-lived innovations.

Kamui: An Underground Lone-Wolf

Kamui was a fearless, militant, and isolated hero. He belonged to the *Hinin* class, and he knew that he could not rise above it. But instead of being exploited and suppressed by both farmers and *Samurai,* he chose to engage himself in a special assignment. The ruling class, the *Samurai,* was clever enough to give a special mission to selected *Hinin*: Espionage. The *Samurai* needed secret information about farmers who were potential subversives of their power. *Hinin,* who were discriminated against and often treated as non-human by the farmers, could take a sado-masochistic pleasure in these espionage missions. The selected *Hinin* also could enjoy more freedom and less labor, in comparison with most of the people belonging to this class, who had to butcher dead animals. Kamui chose to be one of the spies, or to take an intellectually dirty job rather than a physically dirty one.

In order to be a spy, one had to be strong and swift. Kamui, wearing an animal hide and a sword, trained himself in the mountains. He was a "nature boy" so to speak, and he learned quick and smooth bodily actions from the wild animals he observed. He could jump from tree to tree like a monkey, and swim in the water like a trout.

And like a wild animal, he was prepared to fight against any danger he faced. He knew that nobody would help him, and he saw the world as a place where the strongest takes all. He had no friend. Even when a boy came to ask his if he could give him certain training, Kamui answered calmly, "You should take care of yourself! Nobody will help you."



After all, nobody helps people

You need guts

Don't ask anything of anybody!

Yes

Espionage, however, was not as simple as it seemed. Even though the activities of spies were directed by the *Samurai*, it was very difficult for a man like Kamui to feel he was a part of the power structure;he knew that the *real* enemy was the *Samurai* class and not farmers. Especially in view of the fact that his elder sister Nana was married to Shōsuke, Kamui tended to give support to the farmers under the disguise of a spy dispatched by *Samurai*. He, in a sense, was a double agent, like "The Spy Who Came in From the Cold." Indeed, Kamui was a tragic figure, and like most spies, especially double agents, he was perpetually in danger. Above all. his job being what it was, he could not tell who were his "enemies" and who were his "friends." Only by quick judgment and action could he keep himself alive. He killed people with a stroke of the sword as if he were chopping carrots.

Because of his extraordinary skill, he was selected as a member of a spy organization of higher ranking where training in *Ninjutsu*, or the mysterious martial arts, was given. The rules and regulations of the organization were so strict and absolute that anyone who betrayed them, or tried to escape from the organization had to be killed by his colleagues. No member could trust any other member. Kamui was ordered by the top boss of the organization to kill his teacher, who had become skeptical and was planning to drop out of the group. However, during this desperate clash, Kamui also became skeptical about the meaning of his life as an



If I didn't, I'd have been killed . . .

I killed him.

"organization man" who had always to follow the orders of his superiors;eventually, he decided to escape from the organization.

2

1

4

6

5

1. What a life I am living

2. But I can't start it again

3. then . . .

4. What's the mean ing?

5. Are you happy?

Naturally, his escape might mean his death. He became one of the deviants who was chased by killers like himself. The socio-psychological setting of Kamui was not as simple as that of Shōsuke. Kamui, first of all, was a member of the alienated class, *Hinin*, and then decided to alienate himself even from other *Hinin* by becoming a member of the spy organization, but that was not all. He then alienated himself from the organization to which he belonged, at his own serious risk. The life he was living was, in a word, a perpetual process of alienation. He had no friend, except for animals. He asked his questions to himself and he had to answer the questions. Indeed, Kamui was a militant existential philosopher, and one may even see a variation of André Malraux in the monologues of Kamui.

What made his situation worse was that he finally discovered the secret of the central government. The discovery, which Kamui made by an energetic search of the old secret documents, was something fantastic:according to the secret papers, the Tokugawa family, the dominant power of Japan at that time, actually came from the *Hinin* class, and all the sophisticated genealogies of the family had been a fake. This, of course, was a serious matter. If the secret was leaked, the whole power structure based on a rigid status system would have lost its justification. The central government, who knew that Kamui had learned the secret, started their own hunt for him, mobilizing their whole police force and secret service. Kamui became a most desperate fugitive, but he survived underground by his own skill and strength as a superhuman hero.

Unlike Shōsuke, Kamui did not have any belief in, or even a sense of, justice. He did not have any political ambition. He just wanted to live his own life as a free human being. His ideological orientation was anarchy combined with wild naturalism. He was usually cynical about most human affairs, yet he came onto the scene where two other major heroes, namely Shōsuke and Tatsunoshin, were in danger, and he helped them. He avoided, however, any emotional involvement with them. He was a cool boy, and at the end of the story, a reader would wonder if he was still alive. It seems that even Mr. Shirato does not know where Kamui has gone.

Tatsunoshin: The Limits of Understanding Elites

The early training of Tatsunoshin was quite a contrast to that of the other two heroes. Born to one of the key families of the ruling class, he was given the best education as a future elite. He was taught by his teacher that martial arts such as fencing were required if the *Samurai* class, whose number was small, was to rule the majority, the farmers.

military is to keep the power

You need power to govern the people, and . . .

Then?

His father was the highest ranking official in the lord's castle. He was a capable secretary of the territorial government, and his brilliance could compensate, partially, for the ignorance and mischief of the lord. However, the lord liked him less than another, evil-minded official, and by a series of conspiracies, had him killed. Moreover, the lord ordered that every single person among Tatsunoshin's family and relatives be eliminated. Miraculously, however, Tatsunoshin was able to escape; he hid himself in the deep mountains, and there he met an old man.. The old man was a famous retired swordsman, and Tatsunoshin was given extraordinarily hard training. In his mind, there was one absolute goal: revenge. His former lord reigned as the object of his hate and vendetta, and he could barely wait for his chance.

One day, when the lord was hunting, Tatsunoshin carelessly tried to attack him. He found that it was he who was actually being attacked, and he could have been killed by the lord's troops if it were not for Kamui's adventurous help. Tatsunoshin was too naive to fight a strategic war.

No. You shouldn't die here

Oh you!

leave me!

Mr. Tatsu-
noshin

Wait!



Go quick!

After the incident, of course, the search for Tatsunoshin was intensified and he could not escape into the mountains. Once again assisted by Kamui, he decided to hide himself in an isolated *Hinin* hamlet where the *Samurai* would not dare to inspect. He even cut his hair so that he would look like a *Hinin*. The situation was that living conditions in the *Hinin* community were extremely bad.

Especially for a person like Tatsunoshin, who had been brought up in an upper class family, the life of the *Hinin* class was intolerable, even with his wild experience in the mountains. As a member of the community, he had to work with other members, whose job was to dispose of the dead bodies of animals. He was instructed by the leader of the community to take off the skin of a dead cow. The rotten body of the animal made him retch, and he, as a man still belonging to the *Samurai* class, almost decided to kill himself rather than to take such a dirty job. He also refused to eat the food he was served, which stank.

Heavy It stinks

He was touched and ashamed, however, when he learned that the food was prepared from left–overs which young *Hinin* children had begged from the farmers' kitchens and brought back that he might eat. The most underprivileged people in the society, Tatsunoshin found out, were also human beings who were trying to help their own miserable people, *Hinin* and farmers inclusive, which was a far more important task for him than seeking revenge, which was, after all, a personal matter. He became aware that assassinating the lord would not mean any–thing;there would always be another equally bad *Samurai* who would succeed to the lord's castle. Thus, he concluded that elimination of the individual lord was not enough, and that the whole *Samurai* class had to be eliminated. Because Tatsunoshin himself was a member of *Samurai* class, his conclusion meant self–denial.

While living in the village, he became acquainted with Shōsuke and learned from him. One day he had a philosophical dialogue with Shōsuke, who said, pointing to a big old tree, "Look at that tree. If you want to cut down the tree, you should have tools, such as an ax and saw. Unless you have these tools, you can't do anything about the tree. I think the tools that we have now are the results of human struggle which has continued for centuries." Tatsunoshin asked him, "Then, how many years do you think it takes for our generation to change the society?" Shōsuke answered, "I don't know. We can cut down a tree easily, but in order to cut down a castle, we need another, stronger tool." Tatsunoshin put his next question: "What do you mean by 'a stronger tool'?" Shōsuke answered, "Power. The power of the people working and producing. The power of hundreds of farmers. Pick up a hair. It's hopelessly weak. But if you make a rope out of thousands of hairs, even a sword can't cut it." Tatsunoshin was happy to be a part of Shōsuke's organization.

However, he could not totally agree with Shōsuke's non-violent resistance. After seeing many farmers killed by the tyranny of the lord, Tatsunoshin separated himself from the pacifism of Shōsuke and organized a guerrilla troop with other *Samurai* drop-outs. It was a Robin Hood-style militia--helping farmers and harassing the lord's army. Naturally, Tatsunoshin's militia was the strongest component in a series of agrarian riots.

Farmers, be united

Don't be trapped!!

That's the only enemy

The guerrilla activities continued successfully, although with the sacrifice of hundreds of farmers' lives, until the lord was discharged by the central government. In order to quiet the excited farmers, the central government awarded the position

Let's look forward

of the governor of the territory to Tatsunoshin. He, of course, was a qualified person as he was the son of an important family, and with his past experience with the farmers, he was an ideal governor for getting along with the people. On the day he took office, he came to the village to see Shōsuke, and shook his hand.

Since he had such an experience with the underprivileged people, he understood his territory in detail. He was an enlightened ruler, and encouraged democratic action among the people. It was, as was suggested before, a kind of "Weimar Republic." He, however, found out that he had a new enemy, the central government. The central government was worried by his enlightened policy and gave him instructions that the status system had to be reinstated. Tatsunoshin refused such instruction and warnings until at last he was discharged. When his successor arrived, Tatsunoshin went to see him and insisted on justice. The new governor drew his sword and killed him.

Tatsunoshin was an understanding member of the elite;but because he was too understanding, his life ended in tragedy.

Marx, Darwin, or . . . ?

As we have seen briefly, "*Kamui-den*" is essentially a revolutionary comic, yet it is hard to define this work as propaganda literature. The author, Mr. Shirato, seems to present diversified patterns of revolutionary action rather than a single orthodox approach. The three young heroes represent three "ideal types" of rebels in an authoritarian social structure, and as was hinted elsewhere, Mr. Shirato made both implicit and explicit the implications of these heroes for contemporary society--an amazingly sophisticated style. Shōsuke, for instance, is an innovator who feels that farmers could be happier even in a feudal society, *if* law and justice were practiced. He is a success-minded person, and has no qualms about making a deal with the village chief, who promotes him by special arrangements to *Hyakushō* status from the *Genin* class. He is pleased to accept a promotion which he cannot share with his fellow *Genin*, even with his father. In spite of his democratic ideals and cooperative ventures, it seems that Shōsuke is essentially the hero of a success story, a model for other ambitious young men. He teaches the hopeful lesson that a lower class serf can be an independent farmer if he is diligent and confident. The young people of today might project the life style and philosophy of Shōsuke to the opposition parties in contemporary parliamentary democracy. The parties are very active and critical of the government's policies. They demand, for instance, a larger social welfare budget, less military expenditure, etc. They encourage consumers' cooperatives and labor unions. They appeal to the people to unite and to establish solidarity. These are very nice ideas, and the opposition parties may be able to succeed in gradually changing the government's policies. But gradualism is not a revolutionary idea. By definition, militant radicals would not put much hope in parliamentary democracy, and for that season, they would not accept *Shōsuke* as their hero.

If Shōsuke falls into the category of "innovation" in Robert Merton's schema of anomie and deviant behavior, Tatsunoshin is fundamentally a conformist, in spite of his seemingly rebellious life. Of course, he is an exceptional *Samurai* who understands the facts of life in the poor peasants' village. But his adventurous life, after all, seems to be another version of the "beggar prince" story. Tatsunoshin has a wonderful and strange experience with the farmers, but it is an accidental and temporary event. The lessons he learns from the farmers are simply his "reference materials" as a member of the ruling class. Sometimes, he feels that he should deny his class and himself, but he cannot escape the *Samurai* consciousness. His Robin Hood–style guerilla warfare may please and excite the radical students on the contemporary university campus, who are not quite satisfied by parliamentary democracy, but his groovy guerilla warfare might well be viewed as what Lenin has labeled "leftist adventurism." He is a brave swordsman, and he feels that the farmers must revolt, unknowing that the time is not mature. Above all, this Robin Hood does not stay with the farmers. He accepts the governorship of the territory when the position is offered. He is the best governor the farmers could hope for, and he has good justifications and reasons for accepting the appointment. Nobody can blame him. But the important quality of Tatsunoshin is that he is an elite throughout his life. He is destined to stay *inside* the elite class. He may feel that he is one of the common people, but such a feeling is self–deceiving. He is an exceptional *Samurai*, but he remains a *Samurai* no matter how exceptional he is. Tatsunoshin is like a young radical student who propagates populism but takes a job as a promising young executive in a big company upon his graduation. His deviance is incidental and accidental; in the long run, he is a conformist. Tatsunoshin is conscientious enough to work for the people, and he never betrays them. As a result, he had to be executed. But he dies an honorable *Samurai* death.

Kamui is a contrast to both Shōsuke and Tatsunoshin in the sense that the world he lives in is different. He is cynical, not impressed by the glorious social justice toward which other heroes strive, and he tries to live his life as an unrestricted, free individual. He also seems to be rebellious as far as his fighting with and killing of the *Samurai* are concerned, but he would fall into the category of "retreatism" of Merton's scheme. Merton said, "People who adapt in this fashion are, strictly speaking, *in* the society but not *of* it. Sociologically, these constitute the true aliens. Not sharing the common frame of values, they can be included as members of the society (in distinction from the population) only in a fictional sense." Further, he stated, "It is, moreover, a privatized rather than a collective mode of adaptation. Although people exhibiting this deviant behavior may gravitate toward centers where they come into contact with other deviants, and although they may come to share in the subculture of these deviant groups, their adaptations are largely private and isolated rather than unified under the aegis of a new cultural goal."

Indeed, Kamui is an isolated, alienated hero. He is desperately tired of all the complications of human society, and he retreats. To where?

As we have seen, Mr. Shirato's career as a comic artist began with the illustrated story of Seton's books on wild animals. He, according to his biographi–

cal notes, was keenly interested in animal life, and that was why he chose Seton for his debut. As a matter of fact, his pictures of animals are often much more vivid than those of human beings. The theme of "nature," therefore, is an indispensable component of his works, and "*Kamui-den*" is no exception.

The first page of volume one of "*Kamui-den*," for instance, begins with a scene of animals in the mountains, accompanied by this narration: "This year, in this area, was a rich year, both for animals and for human beings."In the following ten pages, the lives of animals are introduced. The basic principle which governs the lives of animals is that of the ecological cycle. A tree's leaves are eaten by the deer, who in turn are attacked by a group of wolves. It is a Darwinian world, and a story of these animals precedes the story about human beings. Mr. Shirato even gives lectures on ecology in these passages.

In a side story about a group of wolves, Mr. Shirato creates a lone wolf. The wolf, who happens to have white fur, is segregated from other wolves and is not permitted to join the group. The wolf has to go hunting alone to get food for himself. The author gives the name of "Kamui" to this lone wolf, and that wolf becomes the antecedent for the hero Kamui who appears several pages later;the parallel development of two Kamui--human and animal--is combined in a style reminiscent of a counterpoint in musical composition. The word "Kamui," therefore, is used quite ambiguously from the beginning, though in most of the cases, it is used as the name of the human hero.

The parallel description of two Kamuis gives the impression that the basic view of Mr. Shirato is that of the naturalist who regards human beings as a species whose position on the earth is equal with that of other species. Like hunting wolves, human beings are also cruel, and like deer, they are surrounded by dangers all the time. The world of animals, including the human animal, in "*Kamui-den*" is a Leviathan one. And in this comic, humans are animals, contrary to the Wait Disney approach where animals are humans.

The role of Kamui, the hero, in this context, functions to mediate and combine human society with that of other creatures. The word "Kamui" itself is ambiguous and mysterious, probably even for Mr. Shirato himself. One may suspect that "Kamui" could mean "elan vital" in the sense of Jean Jacques Rousseau's treatise. "Kamui" in itself is a *Weltanschauung*.

From the "Kamui" viewpoint, therefore, all the human efforts, including revolution, are negligible variations on the wider theme of natural history. The final picture of volume 21 is of a dark, stormy sea. Mr. Shirato comments:

"People are born in different places, coming together in a sea called life.
The sea is rough and never pacified, endlessly."

Mass Culture in Japan

1. Introductory Note

It has only been since World War II that the concept of mass culture has become an important sociological issue in Japan. Though even before 1945 pioneer works on mass culture had appeared, the sociological literature to be discussed here was mostly published after 1945, especially after 1950.

The recent development of interest in mass culture does not, of course, mean that the problems of mass culture themselves surfaced only after the war. Mass culture began to take a fairly definite form in Japan around 1910, and certain forms of public art which may be regarded as prototypes of mass culture were already present in feudal society as early as the end of the seventeenth century. Although modern research on mass culture has a history of only about ten years, mass culture itself thus goes back more than three centuries.

Why, then, was the nature of mass culture unexplored until so recently, and why did it suddenly attract attention after World War II? First, mass culture underwent a huge expansion during the postwar period and its existence could no longer be ignored. With the establishment of various leisure markets and the Americanization of their styles, mass culture, so to speak, became a social issue. Second, and perhaps more important, Japanese sociology before World War II regarded mass culture as of little value and hardly worthy as a serious object of sociological inquiry. Robert Morton made a distinction between European sociology of knowledge and American studies of mass communication as follows: "The European variant being concerned with knowledge, comes to deal with the intellectual elite; the American variant, concerned with widely held opinions, deals with masses." Japanese sociology was closer to the European model, Japanese sociology was unconcerned not only with "mass culture," but anything involving the "masses."

After the war, the importation of methodology and techniques from American sociology first called the attention of Japanese sociologists to mass culture. Just as Japanese mass culture itself was influenced to a large extent by America in the postwar period, so was their way of viewing it influenced by the special and deep relationship between America and Japan.

However, in this paper, it is not possible for us to limit ourselves only to the development of mass culture in the postwar period. Since Japan has an old cultural tradition, and since the forms of present-day mass culture have been greatly influenced by the forms of ancient folk art, it is essential to consider its origin and development in order to understand present-day mass culture. Therefore, the author will begin with a historical introduction to Japanese mass culture.

2. The Three-Fold Structure of Mass Culture

When we speak of Japanese mass culture, we notice a kind of layer-cake structure consisting of three cultures different in their historical background. One of them is the folk culture which originated in old agricultural society and still survives in rural communities. For example, in present-day Japanese villages, there are still forms of public entertainment and recreation which are largely connected with religious ceremonies such as rice-planting and harvest festivals. According to studies made by ethnologists and historians, the folk arts of this kind can be traced in existing records as far back as to seventh century. In other words, Japanese farmers have continued for thirteen centuries a traditional culture which is connected with their agricultural life-style. For example, in the *Kasuga* Shrine in Nara, *Shinto* music and dancing by sacred virgins known as *kagura* is held on a stage constructed for this purpose in 859 A.D. We cannot ignore this folk art which has continued for eleven centuries. For farmers who constitute over half of the total population, this folk culture with a history of over ten centuries is still a very basic ingredient of Japanese culture. This phenomenon is not limited to those who actually till the soil. Urban populations which are more or less rural in nature have, in various new forms, stayed with this folk culture.

Far from these rural arts described above being washed away by the emergence of the so-called mass culture, they have, on the contrary, thrived on it and been included as part of it. For example, in the fall-festivals in villages, modern techniques such as loud speakers are brought in, and the number of participants in the dancing and recreational activities is larger than before. From the *kagura* in *Kasuga* Shrine down to various local arts there has been a revival through the establishment of sightseeing tours and this has given them the form of mass culture. The situation is similar to the case of the war dances of American Indians which continue on as a spectacle for sightseeing tours. In Japan, however, tourists have a much more intimate feeling for the folk arts. The *kagura* in Kasuga Shrine is always performed in response to donations by the tourists, but it is not a simple show for sightseeing tourists. Even if only nominally, the visitors join in worshipping the god to whom *kagura* is dedicated.

Of course, the modes of folk arts as such do not exist in a pure form. Even if the form of a dance were to persist in identical form over ten centuries, the social function of the dance can become completely different. Despite this fact, folk culture is the first layer which lies at the bottom of contemporary mass culture.

If the folk culture which has existed over ten centuries is the primary layer of mass culture, then the second layer is the popular culture and public arts founded in the eighteenth century. While the first layer arose in the agricultural community, popular culture had its significant beginning among the newly risen class of merchants in the later feudal period. *Ukiyoe* in the field of painting, *kabuki* in drama, *haiku* in literature--those forms of art were all fully developed from the seventeenth to the eighteenth centuries. Economic activities based on the exchange of commodities developed within the feudal system, and merchants who dealt with production and circulation of commodities rose in socio-economic status. This development formed the background of the growth of popular culture. In fact, among the merchants, there were even money brokers who lent money to warriors or, at times, to feudal lords. Also wholesale dealers who collected and sold special products in various parts of the country accumulated an amazing amount of wealth.

Using European capitalism as an example, W. Sombart noted an intimate relationship between luxury and capitalism. The same interpretation applies to Japanese capitalism in which merchants took a similar role. The popular culture under the feudal system emphasized extravagance and epicureanism in contrast to the Confucian and stoic tendency of the warrior's culture found among the leaders. Often, the popular culture of this time functioned as a kind of resistance, an antithesis, to various feudal systems.

As an example, let us consider the theatrical form of *kabuki* which is known throughout the world. It was at the end of the seventeenth century when the prototype of modern *kabuki*, was established and a permanent theater. The word kabuki derived from the root form of a verb "*kabuki*" which stands for "do something extraordinary." In sociological terms, *kabuki* is predicated on expressing non-conformity, or deviant behavior.

The stage and costume of *kabuki* make a sharp contrast to plainness and stoicism which were the moral standards of Japanese feudal society. The costumes were of brilliant, dazzling colors, and of startling designs and the persons who conspicuously deviated from feudal norms in these costumes were *kabuki* actors.

This tendency was not limited solely to *kabuki*. To put it briefly, the standard of popular culture in the middle Tokugawa period may be called the "spirit of anti-authority." Let us consider the short novels in Japan at the end of the eighteenth century. The illustrated short stories, of about ten pages each in length, were called "*share-bon*" or yellowback novels, and most of these themes were based on the immorality of the prodigal life, and are comparable to some Western literature in the Renaissance period, such as the *Decameron*. In treating such themes, writers in this period sought to emancipate humanity from feudal norms. However, such a trend in literature was completely against culture and had been proscribed by the Tokugawa regime. The following article in the ordinance on publication in 1790 invites our attention as symbolizing the attitude of Tokugawa Government toward folk arts: "Gaily printed *ukiyoe*, sensual books, wordly gossip, and political satire should not be published. Old books will more than suffice; new books hereafter should not be published; if anyone insists on publishing books, he should follow the direction of a town magistrate."

This kind of control which attempted to continue the system of feudal culture in an unchanged state and the spirit of folk art which appealed to the spirit of emancipation were often in conflict. For example, in 1791, the year after the control ordinance was made public, Kyōden Santō, one of the most famous popular writers at that time, was subjected to an examination by a town magistrate for his publication of erotic literature, and as a result, he was condemned to be handcuffed for fifty days. Half of the property of Juzaburō Tsutaya, his publisher, was confiscated, and the further printing of already existing share-bons was prohibited. The fact that the public arts tended to deviate from official prescriptions can be most clearly seen in the popular poetry written by the ordinary citizens. In its content, this poetry, known as *senryu* or *kyoka*, included a number of poems which were severe satires of the cracks in the feudal order. For example, it made fun of the corruption of public officials: "Stern officials became softer by being soaked in sake." It even teased another privileged class, the priests: "They puff up with pride when they wear their robe, but within their hearts, they are filled with envy of the secular life." Using a more or less comic approach, they constituted a challenge to existing authority.

In short, popular art in feudal society was critical of the social order. It may be regarded as an "avant-grade" literature of the time, spontaneously created by the people for the people. The popular art which derived from such historical sources constitutes a second layer of present-day Japanese mass culture, superimposed upon folk art.

For example, let us take a look back to the production of Japanese films when the film industry was just beginning. As will be described later, it was relatively early when the technique of cinematography was imported to Japan, and the first movie made by Japanese producers was simply the filming of a *kabuki* performance. Even in contemporary Japanese films, movies which are essentially a modification of *kabuki* plays constitute a distinct, even if not, a major genre.

In Japan, there is a small editorial column, comparable to the humor column of European and American newspapers, which contains a few brief lines of political satire. These short articles are based on the contributions from readers, and the origins of this practice may be traced back to *senryu* and *kyoka* mentioned above.

3. The Emergence of Mass Culture

After the Meiji restoration in 1868, Japan very rapidly imported all kinds of Western cultural products. Railway engineering, the stock market, the technique of oil painting, the habit of eating meat, and changes in all areas of life followed from the waves of westernization. Public entertainment was not an exception, and this westernized entertainment, in turn, forms the third layer of Japanese mass culture.

Let us illustrate this development by various diverse examples found in the Origin of Meiji Cultures by Kendō Ishii. In 1872, circus troupes and acrobats from France and Italy gave performances in Japan. As it was only four years after the new age had started, the performances were not very successful. After two years, i.e., in 1874, a couple of jugglers from England disseminated a new mode of western artistry into Japan. Night performances of Japanese theatrical arts were forbidden in the feudal age because it was not in keeping with public morality. However, it was allowed after 1897, when Saburō Kōmyōji, newly returned from Europe, gave a detailed report on French plays, and his stress on the advantages of night performances became a powerful stimulus.

In 1898, Western manners for spectators were taught to the audience by actors who had adopted a modern style. These actors made the following speech to the audience prior to the raising of a curtain: "If you wish to express your approval, please clap your hands at the time the curtain comes down, and if your applause is extended, we will raise the curtain several times, and all the actors on stage will greet you to express their gratitude." To quote another example from the theatrical arts, a foreign play in Japanese version was first performed in 1889. It is recorded that the translator of the play was Dr. Suematsu who studied in England, and the play performed was the work of Belceron Kley.

Billiard games were added to the Japanese repertoire of recreational activities around 1877, and about the same year, *chess* was imported. An especially interesting game among the imported ones is baseball. In 1872, a man by the name of Hironaka, an engineer of the Railway Bureau went to America to study train construction. When he returned after two years, he carried with him a bat and three hard balls. While he gave English lessons to students in his free time, these students learned not only English, but also baseball from him. Baseball which was first played by this group became tremendously popular within ten years, and in the 1880's, every high school and university in Tokyo had a baseball team. Japanese people today are said to be second in the world as a baseball-loving nation, next to America: the source of this tradition goes back eighty years.

The list of new items of entertainment imported from or inspired by Western countries is virtually limitless: dance, opera, tennis, football, golf, and so forth. Almost all Western sports and theatrical arts were transplanted rapidly during 1868 and 1890, and without exception they took root in Japan.

Parallel to these stimuli from outside Japan which deserve attention, there were changes occurring in the social structures inside. The Meiji Restoration is regarded as the important turning point when the feudal order was abolished and Japan, at least institutionally, changed into a modern country. The major social status distinctions, in the feudal society--as to whether one is a warrior, merchant or farmer--disappeared. Observing the cultural counterpart of this change, one can say that the sub-culture which was a specific for a particular social status--for example, the popular culture among merchants--began to lose ground. In the audience attending the various new types of entertainment mentioned above were government officials, farmers, merchants and students. In other words, we may say that a culture with a new structure and function which can be called "mass arts" in contrast to "public arts" was established. The collapse of the feudal order of status led to the destruction of cultural and artistic forms which were specific to a given social status.

The author considers two institutional innovations vital for stimulating the change of public arts into mass arts. The first is the compulsory educational system institutionalized in 1872, which implied an egalitarianism by providing an equal opportunity for all to receive elementary education. At the same time, textbooks were compiled by the state, which facilitated the equalization of opportunity for all Japanese to gain basic knowledge. Later, the rapid extension of newspapers as nation-wide mass media was also a part of the institutional innovation. In short, a basic cultural orientation common to all Japanese was prepared through the compulsory educational system[1].

The second is the increased opportunity for physical mobility and the decrease in social distance between people as a result of the expansion of transportation and communication facilities. Postal services, tele-communication networks and trunk railroad lines were almost completed by 1890, permitting a diminution of geographical differences and cleavages. With the development of transportation and communication, the urban-rural dichotomy of culture gradually began to lose its sharpness.

In this way, a Japanese "mass" began to sprout in the Meiji Period. Various new cultural items imported from Western countries were assimilated with a surprising speed, and the preparation for mass culture in the modern sense had begun in Japanese society.

4. Mass Media: The Role of Print

In looking over the examples of public and folk arts mentioned above, it is noteworthy that there was only a small audience to whom these arts were transmitted. If *kabuki* performances were run for twenty days in a theater with a capacity of 500 persons, the audience would at most be 10,000. *Ukiyoe* and *share-bon*, as long as they were made with wood-block prints could not have a circulation of over several hundred in size. In other words, there was a numerical limit to the audience who enjoyed popular arts.

In the previous chapter, we considered the transition from popular arts to mass arts in connection with the change of social structure. This is not enough, however, in order to bring mass culture into existence; it is indispensable to have a technological development to cope with an overwhelming growth of the audience of mass culture, namely, the extension of mass media. Let us briefly take a look at the history of the media with special reference to mass culture.

First of all, let us take up printed materials, the oldest form of mass media. The first printing in Japan took place in 1872 with the first publication of *Yokohama Mainichi* Newspapers. After the Meiji Restoration, printing and publication of Japanese newspapers expanded rapidly. In the year 1880, at least three kinds of newspapers were published in each prefecture. However, many of the newspapers at that time were organs for publication of political comments and were sponsored by specific political parties. There was very little of a "mass culture" quality to these publications.

In the 1890's, newspapers independent of political sponsorship were first established in Japan. A new series of papers starting with *Jiji Shinpō* edited by Yukichi Fukuzawa, made an effort to inform the reader of objective news at home and abroad as quickly as possible while at the same time publishing a series of novels to attract the attention of the readers. Many of them were popular romances. It is important to note that the spread of such newspapers inculcated the habit of reading novels among the people. In an extreme case, the characteristics of such a novel became the basis of the reputation of a newspaper. For example, the reputation of the *Manchō-ho* newspaper was intimately related to the reputation of the translations of European novels by Ruiko Kuroiwa.

Such a fact is related to the problem of the position of writers or novelists in society. Newspaper novels which had a mass circulation, and the literary interests of people stimulated by them provided favorable opportunities for the emergence of able writers. Once they wrote novels for mass appeal, they were assured of a high reputation and an enormous income. In other words, the appearance of commercial novelists was made possible through the newspapers. The group called "*Ken-yū-sha*"[2] headed by Kōyō Ozaki, comprised this kind of newly-rising professional novelists. Almost intentionally avoiding literature which was a serious reflection on life, they aimed at the production of romances which would excite their readers. The members of this group used to gather in a restaurant "Kōyōkan" built with the income of Kōyō, and hold discussions about literature.

The *Ken-yū-sha* represented popular literature from the 1890's to the beginning of the twentieth century, and the viewpoint of this literature was influenced more or less by the modern literature of the West. Preceding this, there was another current. This was the popular literature which was an extension of the popular art in the Edo Period.

Around 1890, Enchō Sanyūtei, comic story-teller, monopolized the audience of mass entertainment in Tokyo through his popular talks on *ninjō-hanashi* (stories of human fooling). Being endowed with an almost perfect charm as a story-teller, and telling stories implying moral instructions for life in the form of spook series, Encho was loved not only by the commoners in downtown, but also had many fans among university students. Stenography was developed in Japan when Enchō's reputation was at its height. The combination of the traditional art of story-telling and stenography made it possible to transform oral communication to printed form, and to circulate a huge number of printed copies. In this way, the art of story-telling by Enchō opened a new genre for popular literature.

This fact has a profound significance not only in the change of the form of communication, but also in the whole history of modern Japanese literature. Around 1890, a writer, Shimei Futabatei, was somewhat dissatisfied with the style of novels, i.e., the literary style based on the old tradition in which the literary syntax was different from the daily spoken language. The common written style was by no means a satisfactory form of expression for those writers like Futabatei who were influenced by the naturalistic literature of the West. Shōyō Tsubouchi, probably the first writer to discuss this issue with Futabatei, one day suggested that he adopt the style of Enchō. The first novel which Futabatei wrote by combining written and spoken languages was *Ukigumo* (Floating Cloud). One might say that the practice of writing novels by transforming a spoken language into written language was stimulated by Encho.

It was Seiji Noma, founder of *Kōdan-sha* Publishing Co. in the 1910's, who, by making a synthesis of these two currents of popular literature, introduced a golden age of popular novels. Since his boyhood, Noma had been interested in speeches, especially political speeches, and was proud of his powers of persuasion and spell-binding a listener. While he was a clerk at Tokyo University, Noma got an idea of rapid recording and later printing the lectures of professors and politicians, and subsequently started a publication business. With the growth of the enterprise, he concentrated his effort on the publication of popular magazines and in 1919, he began to publish a magazine called the "King" with a circulation of 500,000. This magazine appealed to and trained those popular writers who could write with great speed. It is owing to the efforts of *Kōdan-sha* that the Japanese popular literature was given the new name of mass literature. Today, *Kōdan-sha* has 1,000 employees, publishes 20 kinds of periodicals ranging from infants' magazines to adults' amusement magazines, and is regarded as the largest publishing company in Japan. It controls a large section of the Japanese popular literature market.

Such a mass publication naturally presupposes a huge reading public. As described previously, the literacy of the Japanese had a leveling effect on differences in symbolic ability. In addition, the number who received secondary education grew by leaps and bounds after compulsory education was introduced in the 1910's. Furthermore, the paper indispensable for producing printed matter was mass-produced so that the cost decreased. Various conditions essential for literally bringing about "pulp consumption" were gradually realized.

However, such a development of mass culture was not viewed favorably by the intellectuals, the advocates of high-brow culture. For over fifty years the writers and critics who advocated "pure literature" criticized mass literature as being inartistic and commercial. One can scarcely find academic works, however, which seriously investigated the social effects of mass literature up to the present. The main sociological approaches toward popular literature were not developed until after 1945.

In the sociology of popular literature after 1945, one may first point out the article "The Secret of Eiji Yoshikawa" by a historian Shinichi Takahashi[3]. It consists of an analysis of the ideology of Yoshikawa, the most famous writer in contemporary popular literature, giving empirical and historical considerations to show how his series of novels in the newspapers reflected the contemporary political situation. Among those articles which analyzed the novels by Yoshikawa by taking different approaches, there is an article by Takeo Kuwabara, et al, Miyamoto Musashi Kenkyu (Studies on Musashi Miyamoto). This is an analytical story of Musashi Miyamoto, a representative work of Yoshikawa, in which Kuwabara not only criticizes the author, but also gives a criticism of Japanese culture and the readers, too.

5. Mass Media: The Role of Visual and Auditory Devices

Communication devices in the twentieth century, i.e., the techniques of stimulating and entertaining visually and aurally, were imported to Japan almost as rapidly as they were introduced in Europe and America.

In 1894 Edison invented the Kinetoscope in the United States. Three years later, in January 1897, Kazukichi Araki imported it promptly into Japan and in February he tried the first screening. In 1896, the first domestic Kinetoscope was constructed, and in the following year, a film play about 70 feet long was made. On the basis of these facts, one can see that the popularization of films in Japan developed at a surprising speed.

Radio Broadcasting was also imported extremely rapidly, and in 1925 the first broadcast was aired in Japan. Since the first broadcasting in America was in 1920, there was only a gap of five years in Japan. This delay was chiefly due to political and legal issues as to whom the license of broadcasting should be given, and technically, in 1922, the *Tokyo Asahi* Newspaper did perform experimental broadcasting.

Concerning television, because of World War II, and specific circumstances following the surrender, T.V. broadcasting started relatively recently. Experimental broadcasting was begun in 1950, and regular broadcasting started in 1953.

However, when compared with other countries at the present time, these three kinds of mass media have in Japan reached a very high level First, with regard to movies, the average annual production in the last few years is approximately 400 films, and the total number of viewers per year reaches over 660,000,0-00. The spread of radio is also remarkable. The results of various market surveys have shown that 94% of the total Japanese households have at least one radio set. Since the most popular program in Japan recorded so far caught 43% of the total audiences, we have evidence that 40% of the total population listened to the same radio program simultaneously. The experimental broadcasting of television was first performed in 1950, as stated before, and the number of television sets reached 16,000,000 in 1963; in terms of percentage, one can say that 76% of the total Japanese households have television sets.

In the preceding section, we discussed the foundation of mass culture through printed materials. One characteristic noted above, i.e., the trend of transforming traditional contents into the new forms of media is also observed in the output of audio-visual media.

Japan's rich tradition of folk and popular art is now disseminated through audio-visual media. *Kabuki*, the story-teller's art and folk songs are examples of this. Needless to say, new forms of mass media do not always develop at the expense of traditional artistic forms. To replace old contents into new forms is an extremely easy affair.

For example, let us analyze the themes of dramatic films produced in contemporary Japan. Although we briefly mentioned it in the introductory comments, 50% of this total number of productions are included in the category which may by called "historical films". These are the dramas with themes taken from feudal society; the conflict between feudal lords over who shall inherit a home, stories of romance forbidden by the system of family headship. In short, various feudal norms described in the Chrysanthemum and the Sword by Ruth Benedict are reflected in Japanese historical films.

Several young directors have attempted to present these old-fashioned norms in a satirical way. Furthermore, the audience does not always have a high degree of identification with the hero in these historical films. In other words, producers and audiences to some extent seem to consider the ideology of the historical drama as something to be criticized. Yet it is still true that historical films attract consistently larger audiences than modern films. Indicative of this trend is the fact that *Tōei* Film Co. which boasts the highest income in the Japanese film industry, has a policy of focusing on the production of historical films.

The same situation is reflected in the popular songs which have gained a constant high popularity in radio programs[5]. According to the recent report by Keiichi Matsushita, in regard to both their ideological content and social function, today's Japanese popular songs have a continuity with *naniwabushi* which has maintained a long tradition as a popular art. Matsushita insists that, although the melody and vocal production of *naniwabushi* are regarded as out of date by contemporary youths, the ideological and psychological gratifications which *naniwabushi* gave to old generations, and those which popular songs have given to younger generations are by no means different[6].

However, we cannot consider the mass culture which developed through audio-visual communication as merely the transformation of traditional cultural contents to suit the new media. For, it is also true that previously, about half of the Japanese films took the theme of human relationships in feudalistic ages. However, as for techniques used in producing these films, it is not possible to adopt directly such conventional forms as *kabuki*, since the film media demands more than conventionalism. For example, when a certain human relationship is dramatized, more realistic actions are introduced into films, and this circumstance imparts to the audience a different meaning.

In addition, it is important to note that in the new media, especially in films and television, not only were foreign techniques of communication introduced but foreign information was transmitted by them. Audio-visual symbols can be communicated between different cultures even if cultural factors introduces some change of meaning. For example, it is difficult for the Japanese to read a detective story by Mickey Spillane. For these stories one needs a special training to understand the linguistic system of English. However, when they see on the screen gun-shooting between cavalrymen and Indians in Western films by John Ford, or listen to the mambo music by Perez Prado's Orchestra, such a training is not required.

In such circumstances, the audio-visual media of mass communication have brought forth a kind of internationalism in mass culture. We already observed that the production of films in Japan was undertaken relatively early. Parallel with the production, importation of foreign films, especially American films has historically been very important. In the day of silent films, an expert film interpreter stood by the movie screen and explained the plots. Since "talking picture days" foreign films have always been understood by the Japanese through the device of dubbing. According to the statistics concerning the performance of films in Japan in 1955, approximately 200 foreign films--70% of which are American films-- were released during that year, and of the total income from films, 35% was received by foreign films.

This proportion, although accompanied by some fluctuations, is regarded as almost constant. With regard to television broadcasting, the situation is about the same. In large metropolitan cities such as Tokyo and Osaka, there are five or six television channels, and each of these stations broadcasts two American television programs a day. In short, the audio-visual media have made mass culture more and more popular through mixing old and new values from home and abroad. The mass culture described in the preceding sections was diffused by the printed media and, unlike the "popular novels," it did not, in fact, reach the same levels of popularity as the other forms of mass media.

Notes

1. For details see H. Kato, "Some Observations on Communication and Japanese Nationalism in the 1890's," in Papers on Mass Communication in Asia, Institute for Communication Research, Stanford University, 1960.
2. The literal translation of the group's name might be suggestive for foreign readers: "key-yū-sha" means "Association of friends of the ink-bottle."
3. Nippon Hyōron (Japanese Review), 1948.
4. Included in H. Kato, The Japanese Popular Culture, Charles Tuttle, 1959.
5. For a content analysis of the ideology of popular songs, see Hiroshi Minami, et al, "The Content Analysis of the Postwar Japanese Popular Songs," in Kato, ed., Japanese Popular Culture.
6. Keiichi Katsushita, "Taishū Goraku to Konnichi no Shisō-teki Jōkyō" (Mass Entertainment and the Condition of Contemporary Ideology)," Shisō, No.5, 1960.

Japanese Popular Culture Reconsidered

One of the best-known festivals of Japan is the *Gionmatsuri* of Kyoto, which has been held every year on July 14 since the seventeenth century. Hundreds of thousands of spectators from various parts of the country and abroad are excited by the splendid parade of floats, decorated with exotic materials. The hot and humid air of that season in Kyoto makes the people damp, even wet, but they still dare to watch the festival in mid-day with joy and fascination.

Though *Gionmatsuri* is typical of the traditional-popular culture of Japan, very few people are aware of the origin and significance of the event. In order to clarify a major point of this essay, a modest reminder of its historical background is necessary.

As many historians have proved, *Gionmatsuri* was inaugurated by wealthy merchants of Kyoto late in the seventeenth century to commemorate the golden days of international trade before the Tokugawa government decided to adopt an isolationist policy in 1612. The merchant-traders who had been active in foreign trade with the countries of Southeast Asia before the enforcement of the new policy were obliged to confine their commercial activities solely to the domestic market. The huge merchant ships, which used to make regular voyages to Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia, where adventurous Japanese had already established colonies with populations of thousands, became useless. Out of frustration and disappointment, they decided to cut down the masts of their boats and to install them as the center poles of parade floats, called *hoko,* which they decorated with foreign imports like Persian carpets and European tapestries obtained in the heyday of foreign trade. In other words, *Gionmatsuri* was invented partly as a humble resistance against a new foreign (or anti-foreign) policy, and partly as nostalgic sentimentalism on the part of the merchants.

This story of *Gionmatsuri* is indicative not only of the nature of Japanese society but also of modern and contemporary Japanese popular culture in the sense that Japan during her period of isolation achieved a unique cultural maturity. Indeed, as Arnold Toynbee aptly remarked, from 1612 through 1868, approximately two and a half centuries, there existed in Japan the only period in the whole of human history where absolute peace prevailed and society devoted its efforts to cultural enterprises. Of course, there were minor internal conflicts, but after the Tokugawa government firmly established its power, Japan's economic surplus, which otherwise would have been used for foreign investment and external expansion, found its outlet in the area of domestic cultural development, particularly popular culture in the strict sense of the term.

As is known by most Japanologists, this social stability and cultural development started with the famous *katanagari* or "sword hunting" of 1588, which was executed by Toyotomi Hideyoshi[1] (1536–1598), the predecessor of the Tokugawa government. Under this policy and regulation, Japanese common people were totally disarmed. Every sword owned by commoners was confiscated by the government, permitting only the *samurai* class to possess swords. Moreover, even the *samurai* class was discouraged from being rude and militant, and it was not allowed to use its swords except in case of danger and emergency. These historical facts are quite contrary to the popular image depicted in such contemporary popular fiction as *Shōgun*. As a matter of fact, *daimyō* (feudal lords) were prohibited from building military castles and forts, as well as from having forces with firearms. The policy was to minimize armed forces and to maximize socioeconomic and cultural development, and the *samurai* class was very adaptive to this new policy.

Actually, it may be safe to say that there had been a literary tradition among Japanese *samurai* even before the isolation policy was adopted. For instance, since the medieval period, it was customary among *samurai* to exchange poetry with their opponents before fighting on the battlefield. A *samurai* who was illiterate or had little learning and poor literary taste was despised by his peers. It was natural, therefore, that the *samurai* after the seventeenth century became essentially civilian bureaucrats rather than brutal fighters. In this connection, as early as the late seventeenth century, each *daimyō* started to inaugurate schools, called *hankō*, for the higher education of his retainers. *Daimyō* were eager to invite eminent scholars, and they were very competitive in recruiting good instructors in order to raise the cultural level of the elites of their territories. It is interesting to note here that many of these *hankō* have continued until today as local universities and high schools. The *samurai* of this period, especially after the mid-eighteenth century, were required to be literate on a sophisticated level. They also had to be competent in calculation and computation since they had to deal with professional merchants when selling local products or borrowing money. Both were necessary if their local economy was to enjoy stability and prosperity. It was also often necessary for them to be knowledgeable about technological innovations in textiles, ceramics and other products.

In a word, *samurai* were expected not only to be sharp bureaucrats but also forward-looking technocrats. In their spare time, they indulged themselves in such artistic activity as the tea ceremony (which, incidentally, was one of the most important arts for their social interaction), music, and sometimes *noh* drama. Even though they carried swords, these were simply symbols to indicate their privileged status, and, as mentioned before, swords were never used as weapons. Indeed, the martial arts of modern Japan were simply physical exercises and the object of artistic appreciation for *samurai*.

The same was true with merchants. By definition, their major concern was moneymaking, but in their value system leisure activities had great importance. According to Miyamoto Mataji (b. 1907), an authority on the local history of

Osaka, the center of commercial transactions of the day, the ideal of the Osaka merchant was to retire from business at the earliest possible age (after successful capital accumulation) and to delegate routine business to a trusted chief clerk. Retired merchants could then enjoy music, dance, book reading, or the tea ceremony. It may be worthwhile to not here that this tradition has been continued in contemporary Japan. As has been often noted, at social gatherings such as banquets, all Japanese, especially men, are supposed to give a performance-- usually singing. Nowadays it is often accompanied and amplified by an electronic gadget known as a *karaoke.* This amateurism in the arts can be traced back to the days of the Tokugawa period.

The merchants of the Tokugawa era were also patrons of great artists. As is known by most art connoisseurs, such artists as Koetetsu, Korin, and Sotatsu were not only appreciated and encouraged by wealthy merchants of the Kyoto-Osaka area but also financially supported by them.

The implication of the social history of the period of the isolation policy is that, in spite of literary class distinctions, both the *samurai* class and the merchant class had to have a common arena where they could (often had to) mix and socialize with each other. As mentioned in preceding paragraphs, the *samurai* had to deal and work with merchants, and for down-to-earth business negotiations a "neutral zone" was needed to erase class distinctions. In order to meet this new need, the *chaya* (teahouse) came into business, which later turned into what is usually known as the *geisha* house in the West. As a matter of fact, the *chaya* later in its evolution became an establishment with female entertainers. An absolute rule in such establishments was to have the *samurai* deposit their swords at the entrance gate. In short, as far as the *chaya* was concerned, as Kato has pointed out in his *Toshi to Goraku,* its time and space were regarded as not only neutral but also classless.

Farmers, who were between the *samurai* and the merchants in caste system but who were actually the poorest of all, also made an effort to be highly literate because they were supposed to keep the records of the village. In addition, whatever surplus they could save was often used for intellectual betterment. They were unable to be the patrons of artists, but they were willing to offer hospitality to travelling men of letters. As is well known, when Matsuo Basho (1644-1694), one of the greatest *haiku* poets, wrote his famous "*Oku-no-hosomichi*" he was hosted by both wealthy merchants and rich farmers during his extensive journeys. Wherever he stayed, he was asked to give instruction in *haiku* to those who were interested in this form of short poetry. Painters also did not have much difficulty finding host families wherever they went. They were usually solicited to do their paintings on sliding doors or on scrolls to pay for their room and board, and they often stayed in a village for several months. It is no wonder that Western missionaries who visited Japan in the eighteen century noted with amazement that "in Japan, even a peasant is a poet."

Popular education also penetrated the farming class. There were no regulations or laws regarding elementary education, but the farmers, even the poorest peasants, were willing to send their children to local private *terakoya* (literally "temple school" because the classes were usually held in Buddhist temples where monks and/or priests gave lessons in reading, writing, and arithmetic) in the hope, as R. P. Dore argues, that the children might succeed in their upward mobility. According to a historical survey, at the end of the eighteenth century, each rural community throughout the nation had at least one *terakoya* (the total number or rural communities of the period was something like 70,000). As a result, Japan became the country with the highest literacy rate early in the nineteenth century, (The literacy rate of the nation at that time is estimated at between 45 and 50 percent.)

The implication of the high literacy of the Japanese population is extremely important in understanding modern and contemporary Japanese popular culture. First, it should be noted that Japan was the first country that succeeded in forming a "mass audience" in the field of popular fiction. The publication of the popular fiction usually known as *Kibyōshi* or *Ninjōbon* began to flourish in the mid-eighteenth century, and the "reading public" came into existence at that time. Such best-selling authors as Takizawa Bakin (1767–1848) sold thousands of copies, and historians claim that Bakin was the first author in the world to succeed in establishing himself as a perfectly independent writer in the sense that he earned his living solely by his royalties and honoraria from his writing activities. *Kibyōshi* and *Ninjōbon* were numerous, and many people, including women, read these publications with enthusiasm, especially in urban areas.

Rapid secularization took place along with developments in literacy and artistic taste. Borrowing the dichotomy of Eliade, what had been regarded as "sacred" was transformed into something "profane." A good and typical example is *kabuki*. This theatrical form was invented by Izumo-no-Okuni (1572–?), a shaman of the Izumo Shrine, and in 1603 she gave her first secular performance in Kyoto. Furukawa Miki has shown how since then *kabuki* gradually became a popular theater. The term *kabuki* is the noun form of the verb *kabuku*, meaning "to deviate from the norm," and in its usage in the seventeenth century, *kabukimono* meant people who dressed and behaved with extreme eccentricity. In other words, *kabukimono* were the punks of the seventeenth century, and Izumo-no-Okuni was the leading figure of this eccentric group. At any rate, her performance attracted huge audiences, and the number of theatergoers increased almost explosively in the eighteenth century. Here again, an important aspect of the performing arts as represented by *kabuki* was that the theater was not monopolized by any particular social class. The majority of audiences were urban commoners, but quite a few *samurai* and wealthy farmers were also found among theatergoers.

Another example of secularization may be found in the development of *sumō,* the well-known form of Japanese wrestling. Etymologically speaking, *sumō* originally meant "simple (undressed)dance" dedicated to holy deities, and the sport used to be performed only in sacred shrines. Sometime in the fifteenth century, however, *sumō* transformed itself into a secular game where wrestlers competed in power and technique. A careful observer of *sumō* today will find the remain s of the original religious ritual in the ceremonial parts of the sport, for example, the process of purification of the arena by salt and the Shintoist shrine roof hung over the arena.

The art of storytelling, as Yasutaka Teruoka (1898–), and others (Kazuo Sekiyama, for example) have shown, also had a sacred origin. That is to say, storytelling in Japan originated in the preaching of Buddhist missionaries. In order to make their appeal more popular, the preachers invented more attractive methods of speech. Thus, storytelling, both serious and comic, became a new form of popular entertainment. With the development of urbanization, especially in Edo (Tokyo), Osaka, and kyoto (incidentally, these three cities were called *santo*, meaning three cities, and became one of the favorite subjects of the writers of the day), smaller theaters specializing in storytelling and vaudeville appeared as new entertainment facilities. These places were originally called *yoseba*, or "temporary gathering places," but later evolved into permanent establishments, and the original name was abbreviated as *yose*. According to historical records cited by *Geinōshi Kenkyūkai*, there were more than 800 *yose* in Edo alone toward the end of the eighteenth century. Furthermore, as media researchers have learned in their studies, television's versions of *yose* have been constantly gaining extremely high ratings. *Yose* alone is a unique audio service that can be found only in the international flights of Japan Air Lines. Jetsetters and tourists alike enjoy this traditional popular art during their long and boring flights. It is interesting and important to note that the vaudeville performances that originated in the eighteenth century can be heard aboard one of the world's largest fleets of 747s.

Reference to 747s and package tours should remind one of the development of mass tourism in Japan, which also started in the middle of the eighteenth century. During this period, the government strictly prohibited commoners from travelling, because free physical mobility might have brought the migration of farmers from relatively poor regions to more affluent areas. However, an exception was made for those who wanted to travel for religious purposes. For example, if a merchant or a farmer submitted an application for a private tour to the Ise Shrine or a pilgrimage to the famous eighty–eight temples of Shikoku Island, such a petition was almost automatically approved since religious trips were thought to be admirable, desirable, and, at least, harmless behavior. Therefore, major shrines and temples became interested in organizing groups of people who were supposed to be devoted believers of these sacred places. In order to attract more people, secularized quasi–priests organized groups called *ko* in each community, and *ko* members travelled together to shrines and temples. Even though poor farmers could not afford the cost of travel, *ko* were organized on a mutual aid system, and people were able to join such organized trips on a rotation basis. As a result, Ise Shrine or Kōyasan Temple became the equivalent of Mecca among Moslems, and people thought that they had to visit at least one of these places once in their lifetime.

Good accommodations were prepared to entertain these groups of tourists. As represented in Hiroshige's famous series of *ukiyoe* depicting the fifty–three stations of Tōkaidō, the major trunk road connecting Edo and Kyoto, small towns emerged along the roads of pilgrims. Of course, for many, shrine or temple worship was simply an excuse to justify their holiday trip. As is familiar to most students of popular culture and modern Japanese history, such great humorous fiction as *Tōkaidōchū Hizakurige* (1802–1809) by Juppensha Ikku (1765–1831) was the product of the mass tourism of the era. As a matter of fact, it is worthwhile to note that Yasumi Roan (1760–?), another popular writer and traveller, wrote *Ryokō Yōjinshū* [The art of traveling] in 1810, which turned out to be one of the best-selling books at the turn of the nineteenth century. The Japanese group tour of today is world famous, sometimes even notorious, and that popular image of Japanese tourists is quite correct in many occasions; but at the same time it should be understood that such group tours have been a part of traditional popular culture and that the 747s are part of a continuity from the day of Ikku to the contemporary technological age.

These historical reflections show, in summary, three important characteristics of Japanese popular culture: (1) Japanese popular culture came into maturity during Japan's period of isolation when the nation's surplus energy found its outlet in the field of cultural activities and developments. (2) In spite of nominal class distinctions, Japan became an egalitarian society where everybody could enjoy popular culture ranging from tea ceremony to *kabuki*. (3) Popular culture in contemporary Japan should be studied as a continuous tradition dating from the Tokugawa period.

Research: The Early Years

As was mentioned in the preceding section, with the rise of the reading public, the publication business gradually developed as a pioneer of the Japanese information industry, and many authors tried to sell their books; at the very least, there were many people who liked to write. Thus, we have excellent access to the writings of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. In the field of essays alone, for instance, there are such voluminous collections of works as *Nihon Zuihitsu Shūsei* (1979) in roughly one hundred volumes of 300 pages each. Interestingly enough, quite a few authors liked to keep records of urban popular culture, and this includes *Kiyu Shouran* (1830) by Kitamura Shinsetsu (1783–1856). This book was an encyclopedia of the everyday life of that era, and the author made his best efforts to clarify the origin and function of very trivial yet important objects, events, manners, and customs, ranging from housing to cosmetics, language to food habits. In the preface of this great encyclopedia, Kitamura said,

> From my childhood, my only hobby has been reading books, and knowing that my ancestors left a huge library, I thought that it might be worthwhile to organize trivia. I know that ants make their nest by accumulating small bits of soil. What I am trying to do in this volume is something similar to their enterprise.

With this philosophy in mind, Kitamura started his data gathering. His style of writing was genuinely secular, yet scholarly and academic, in the sense that he was quite familiar with Japanese as well as Chinese classics; he attempted to give the definition, common usage, and etymology of each word he used. For instance, under the heading of *utage* (banquet), the author traced the usage of the word in ancient Japan as well as Korea; according to his theory, this term originated in the gathering of newlyweds with their parents. This kind of study of individual items in popular culture is a treasure trove for those who are interested in the everyday life of common people, not only of his day but also of today. It is no wonder that *Kiyu Shouran* is used as the classic and basic source book by students of popular culture research, even today.

Another important characteristic of Japanese popular culture research has been the fact that folklore in its broadest sense was fully explored by researchers, and that folklorists in this country, as represented by Yanagita Kunio (1875–1962), have worked vigorously in the field of popular culture. In his celebrated book, *Meiji Taishō sesō shi* [*A social history of the Meiji–Taishō era*], Yanagita looked at the changes that took place after the Meiji Revolution (usually referred to as the "Meiji Restoration") in such everyday life areas as drinking, courtship, family life, entertainment, and so forth. Indeed, it seems that one of the features of Japanese academia was, and is a genuine scholarly interest in everyday trivia. Thus, popular culture research in this country gained "citizenship" in intellectual circles several centuries ago.

Yanagita stated in the preface of this widely read book that "this...is not a history book quoting the actions and words of heroes and bigshots. I am simply concerned with the ideas and attitudes upon which common people in the country can agree, if they think a little bit about their own personal experience" (pp.113–14). Yanagita and his students in the last few decades concentrated their efforts on studying popular practices in food habits, religion, festivals, special local occasions, changes in the consumption of alcoholic beverages, and many other miscellaneous facts by means of extensive field research. Yanagita himself, being a folklorist according to his own style, left voluminous writings about the popular belief system and finally his grand theory of cultural diffusion in East Asia. His most frequently used word was *jōmin* (common people), and he never forgot the importance of the everyday life of *jōmin*. In this sense, it may be safe to say that Yanagita and his group were the pioneering researchers of popular culture. As a matter of fact, Miyamoto Tsuneichi (1907–1982), one of Yanagita's students and colleagues, left an excellent study of *sarushibai*, or street entertainment performed by tamed monkeys.

As is obvious from the preceding paragraphs, folklore, or *minzokugaku*, in Japan has been slightly different from the common usage of the term in English. It is true that Yanagita borrowed, or at least hinted at, the works of Frazer and other European folklorists when they became interested in the daily lives of the *jōmin*. However, their concern was not the archaic, historical, or primitive aspects of society. Their basic belief was that in order to understand Japanese society, as well as other societies, the facts of life of the *jōmin* living in contemporary society were the key issue. Yanagita emphasized repeatedly the importance of this discipline by saying that the shortcoming of historians and social observers was their focus only on the elite circle. According to him, most social records in both the past and the present were more or less those of political, economic, or administrative figures; very few records of *jōmin* were kept. But Yanagita claimed that throughout history it was the *jōmin* who shaped and led the society at work. He says, in this connection, that to listen to "the voices of the voiceless" is the most urgent task for *minzokugaku*. In order to realize this task, he and his colleagues made extensive trips all over the country, collecting oral histories and observing the manners and customs of various parts of Japan. This group of folklorists finally compiled a handbook of field research titled *Minzokugaku Nyūmon* [*An introduction to folklore research*] (1947), which consists of some 2,000 questions to be asked of *jōmin*, rural and urban alike. Indeed, the writings of Yanagita in thirty-one volumes are a great resource book for the understanding of popular culture. Those interested in the historical roots of Japanese rituals, games, sports, and entertainments cannot afford to neglect Yanagita's work. In other works, *minzokugaku* was and still is the discipline from which modern popular culture research emerged.

Another name that should be introduced as a pioneer in the field of popular culture research is Kon Wajiro (1888–1973). Trained as a graphic designer in his youth, Kon became interested in recording miscellaneous yet important aspects of the lives of his Japanese contemporaries in visual form. For example, he was the first artist who kept records of the floor plans of farm houses as well as slum areas of Tokyo. He also made detailed studies of the possessions of these people. He counted the kinds and numbers of clothes, kitchenware, furniture, and other household materials by direct observation, and made wonderful drawings of these items. He was fascinated by the way people lived, and coined a new word, "modernology." According to him, just as archaeologists dig archaic remains from underground, "modernologists" follow their discipline by digging into the everyday life of their contemporaries, in both their material culture and their behavior patterns.

In order to prove the importance of modernology, Kon explored many new innovative methodologies, and his most famous work was done in the Ginza, the busiest shopping street of Tokyo in the early 1930s. In this study, for example, he spent all day in a coffeeshop watching the attire of the people passing by: the number of men wearing hats, the number of women in *kimonos*, the number of umbrellas, handbags, and their combinations. All were counted and each percentage was calculated. Being an artist, he did not use a camera. Instead he used his sketchbook, and left huge numbers of quick and yet precise sketches of what he saw. His most interesting study, however, was what is known as the "private eye" method of social observation. He picked up a person on the street at random, and chased after this person for hours to see what one did in the Ginza. A middle–aged lady, for example, started her rambling by window shopping at a jewelry store, stopping there for three minutes. Then she crossed the street to pay a visit to a department store, first in the *kimono* section, then in the housewares section where she purchased three tea cups. After the department store, she went to the ticketing office of a theater just to take a look at the posters and the price of tickets. Kon followed her until she took a bus, probably to go back home. For each stop of his "silent informant," he carefully and accurately took memos on her use of time and space as well as the amount of money she spent. Kon also conducted time and space research vis-à-vis crowd behavior in the Ginza by counting the number of people in each street intersection by the time of the day and the days of the week, in the hope that he might be able to find regularities in the street life of urban populations.

These direct observational records in themselves did not have any immediate sociological significance, but Kon had a firm belief that the behavior of people is indicative of the day and that observational records could be good historical data. His data, partially used by William Whyte in the late 1970s for comparative research (in Kato's *A Comparative Study of Street Life*), were another milestone in the history of popular culture study in Japan.

Quite apart from Yanagita's *minzokugaku* and Kon's "modernology," another classic of popular culture research appeared in the 1920s, by a scholar whose original discipline was the German language. His name was Gonda Yasunosuke (1887–1951), and his works are still quoted by most scholars in popular culture research as well as mass media studies. As a matter of fact, Gonda was the first scholar who paid proper and serious attention to the effects of movies.
In his representative work, *Minshū Goraku Mondai* [*The problems of popular entertainment*], published in 1920, he studied the number of people attending theaters in Tokyo from 1902 through 1918 and discovered that the number of the annual total audience increased from 8 to 21 million in these seventeen years. He was struck by the fact that attendance at live theaters had declined as the overwhelming part of the audience by the late 1910s were movie fans. Indeed, according to the statistics, it was clear that the absolute numbers of the audience in live theaters, including *yose*, declined drastically despite the increase in the total number of theatergoers. In other words, theaters in the late 1910s meant almost automatically "movie theaters" rather than traditional "live theaters."

Gonda further found that, in contrast to traditional theaters, movie theaters were full of young people, including elementary school children. These facts made Gonda very much concerned with the sociocultural effects of this new audiovisual medium of mass communications. With this problem in mind, he conducted the first audience survey in 1917 by the questionnaire method, soliciting the cooperation of thirty-one elementary school principals. Altogether, he obtained responses from some 12,000 children and found that, without a single exception, the children were familiar with movies and that they were exposed to the media as early as the age of six. The frequency of moviegoing, on average, was found to be approximately once a month, but Gonda discovered that, though the number was small, there were "heavy viewers" who attended movie theaters more than three times a week. In order to find a possible correlation between movies and juvenile delinquency, he further studied major juvenile detention homes in Tokyo and its vicinity and found that considerable numbers of the young people in these facilities were heavy viewers of movies. In extreme cases, there were a few who told him that they indulged themselves in movie theaters all day every day, skipping their schoolwork. At the same time, when he interviewed the children in the detention homes, Gonda learned that 27 percent of them said that they were influenced by movies before they committed minor crimes such as stealing or shoplifting. Thus, Gonda concluded that, in spite of the great potential of movies for educational purpose, this new form of entertainment might pose a new social problem, especially among the youth.

It is true that modern methodologies of social research were not introduced when Gonda conducted his survey, and a sociologist today might argue about the validity of his data, but it is surprising that such large-scale audience research was done at the turn of the century, and that it was done by a scholar whose major interest was the German language, and not popular culture research.

Gonda, however, was extremely sympathetic toward popular culture phenomena, partly because of a populist attitude derived from his interest in Marxism (while studying the German language and linguistics, he encountered Marxian economists who were reading the works of Marx and Engels in German) and partly because of his own urban background. He repeatedly remarked in his writings that, with the rise of movies and other modern entertainment, the arts were liberated from the monopoly of the rich and that a new era of popular culture, which was shared by the masses, was coming. Essentially, he believed in the great potential of this emerging new cultural trend supported by the common sense of the people. With the money, which was not a great fortune, that he earned from his renowned *Gonda's German Japanese Dictionary*, he performed extensive field work. He interviewed various popular entertainers, visited movie districts of major cities, and observed the menus of inexpensive restaurants to learn the details of the "eating out" habits of lower-class people. His energetic studies were compiled in the four volumes of the *Selected Works of Yasunosuke Gonda* by his admirers in 1974 with annotations so that popular culture students today can appreciate Gonda's pioneering and extraordinarily suggestive work.

Another important contribution to popular culture studies was made by Ohya Souchi (1900-1970), a freelance journalist and social critic who was also interested in observing the everyday life of the people. As a graduate of Tokyo University, where he majored in sociology, Ohya was interested in various aspects of the lives of the common people. Among his numerous writings a reader will easily locate many essays written from the 1930s to the 1960s related to popular culture at large. He did, for example, a study of historical changes in the lyrics of popular songs as the reflection of the sociocultural environments of each period. Ohya also was a very talented participant-observer and a great investigative reporter who utilized imaginative journalistic techniques. One of his earlier works included a collection of the records of taxicab passengers at midnight. In order to learn what middle-class men talk about in taxicabs, he disguised himself as an assistant to the driver (thanks to an earlier model of the Ford, which required extra hands) and listened to what passengers in the back seat said to each other, or sometimes what they talked about to Ohya, who pretended to be an honest young assistant to the driver. By doing so, he did marvelous work on "the topics of the town." In the postwar period, he continued to work in the same style. Through his connections with underground organizations, he succeeded in sneaking into one of the illegal gambling spots in Tokyo and published his findings. When striptease became a new genre of popular entertainment, he went to those theaters and, without hesitation, rushed backstage to interview the performers, asking about their backgrounds as well as their observations of the audience from the stage. He sometimes claimed that he was the John Gunther of Japan and said that most of his works were the pieces of his own *Inside Japan*.

In 1953, when television was introduced to Japan, Ohya took a very critical and serious attitude toward the media, and published his well-known "peanuts theory of TV." According to his observations as well as his own experience, television watching is similar to having a bowl of peanuts on the table. A person usually continues almost unconsciously to pick up peanuts and eat until the bowl becomes empty. Likewise, once the switch is on, a person usually continues to watch television, and scarcely turns it off regardless of what is on the screen. Ohya said that television was an addictive information machine, and since many of the programs were, in his judgment, sheer nonsense, he predicted that if the Japanese people became television addicts, they might be in danger of becoming a collection of fools. Thus, he coined the phrase "one-hundred-million-fool-making effect" (100 million meant the whole population of the country), which was borrowed by hundreds of journalists, critics, and scholars, either supportively or negatively, for years. Ohya sometimes defined his ideological position as "an irresponsible social observer," but his keen insights and interpretations stimulated a concern about popular culture phenomena in contemporary Japan.

These reflections lead to the following summarized statements: (1) Intellectual interest in popular culture in Japan can be traced back as far as the late nineteenth century, when scholars and writers had an enthusiastic interest in the everyday affairs of common people. Such a trend was accelerated by urbanization, especially in the three cities of *Edo* (Tokyo), Kyoto, and Osaka. (2) Popular culture studies and research were conducted by scholars with diverse backgrounds. They were, more or less, detached from orthodox academia, but their contributions have been properly appreciated and evaluated in academic circles. (3) The facts and data related to popular culture recorded by these pioneers are still valuable sources in popular culture studies, and, for those who are interested in Japanese popular culture research, their works should not be neglected. Popular culture researchers in Japan today are well aware of the importance of the intellectual tradition in this field in the last two centuries.

Research: Today

As was indicated in the preceding paragraphs, Japanese culture, especially urban culture, came into maturity during the period of isolation, a time when Japan also developed its high literacy and experienced a notable growth of the arts. Contemporary Japanese popular culture can be seen as a continuation of developments that began in the eighteenth century. Indeed, *kabuki* theaters still attract millions of people every year. *Yose*, in spite of Gonda's warning, also still survive, though the number has declined with the diffusion of radio and television. Artistic practice among amateurs, *haiku*, for instance, is more popular than ever. Millions of Japanese who enjoy *haiku* write to sections of newspapers devoted totally to this poetic contest every week. Or one may argue that photography, a world-famous pastime of the Japanese people, is a contemporary version of *haiku* in the sense that each snapshot is a visual presentation of the photographer's sentiment and feeling at a particular time and place. Though the forms of presentation are different, both *haiku* and a photographic snapshot are aesthetic expressions of a person, and, most important, such expressive behavior is shared by the whole population of the country. In the nightspots where the *geisha* entertained their guests in the past, today one will find charming hostesses in bars and nightclubs as their replacement, though their contemporary counterparts are not as talented in the arts of music or poetry. The point here is that, though seemingly new, Japanese popular culture today is a historical product and that a student in this field must look into the continuities of popular culture in their historical context.

As a matter of fact, Japan is a country of popular culture in the sense that the society has been essentially not only homogeneous but also egalitarian for at least the past two centuries. In his well-known popular fiction, *Ukiyoburo [A story of a public bath]*(1809), Shikitei Samba (1776-1822) stressed the fact that in a public bath, where people enjoy the hot air and water totally naked, a man is simply a man regardless of his social status. He says, "A public bath makes everybody equal. Nobody can discern a *samurai* from a garbage collector, a wealthy merchant from a poor peasant," and Samba's philosophy has been well accepted by the public in both past and present. Though the concept of "equality" in the sense of Western intellectual history was alien when the idea was introduced after the Meiji Revolution, Japan developed its own unique view on "equality" as represented by *Ukiyoburo*.

Egalitarianism in Japan has been dramatically accelerated in the last forty years in the process of "democratization." In the first place, through radical land reform, without a single exception, the agrarian population in Japan became independent farmers, even though the size of the average land holding is very small. In other words, the traditional landlord-tenant relationship in rural communities has totally disappeared. With the rise of small independent farmers, middle-class consciousness came to prevail even in small local villages.

In addition to the emergence of millions of independent farmers, the development of the mass media coupled with the improvement of the transportation infrastructure made existing urban-rural culture gaps disappear. In Japan today, one cannot find much difference between a central metropolitan area and a small island several hundred miles away from any major island of the Japanese archipelago. Various commodities are distributed nationwide, and the broadcast media cover every corner of the country. In the past, those who lived deep in the mountains, which cover 70 percent of the total land surface of Japan, were handicapped and underprivileged, sometimes even deprived, economically, socially, and culturally. Now, thanks to technological innovations, they can enjoy the same conveniences and advantages as city people.

Another equalizing effect came from the diffusion of higher education, as Kato demonstrates in *Education and Youth Employment in Japan*. In the past, major universities were concentrated in large urban areas. For instance, the old Imperial universities were found only in seven cities, namely, Sapporo, Sendai, Tokyo, Nagoya, Kyoto, Osaka, and Fukuoka. However, under the new educational reform, national universities were established in each prefecture, so that young high school graduates everywhere could have the opportunity of a university education. It should also be noted here that in Japan today senior high school education is almost compulsory (98 percent of junior high graduates go to senior high, and the dropout ratio is almost negligible). As was mentioned before, the Japanese population was quite literate by the eighteenth century, and the new education reform of 1946 raised its literacy raised its literacy to one of the highest levels in the world. If popular culture is the product of mass society in which the traditional dichotomy between elite and mass does not have much significance, then Japan probably can be defined as a country of popular culture.

In addition to the "equalization" brought by agrarian and educational reforms, there is another important factor that makes the society more egalitarian--an extremely progressive income tax. In Japan today, personal income is classified into twenty-two brackets, probably the most differentiated system of categorization in the world, and those whose income is in the top bracket have more than 70 percent of their income taken by the internal revenue agency. For example, a business executive whose annual salary is 15 million yen (approximately 120,000 dollars) takes home only 50 percent of his nominal income. On the other hand, a young secretary-typist who earns 2.5 million yen (20,000 dollars) pays some 10 percent of her income as tax. In other words, an executive in his fifties earns only three or, at best, four times more than a young employee in her twenties (or even late teens) if personal income is considered in substantial terms. Democratization of income distribution in Japan, in this sense, is extraordinary, and its result is obvious. In short, what happened in Japan in the last twenty years resulted in the dominance of middle class consciousness.

According to annual public opinion surveys conducted by the Prime Minister's Office, the number of those Japanese who think of themselves as belonging to the middle class has increased every year, and in 1984 more than 90 percent of the Japanese responded that they were the members of the middle-class. Needless to say, responses to this type of public opinion research are essentially subjective, but it is worthwhile to note here that a small farmer as well as a business executive, a service station attendant along with a college professor, feel equally that they belong to the middle class.

There are reasons on their part to justify their middle-class consciousness or awareness. Their income level is close to the national average, which is made public by the Economic Planning Board or other government agencies, though the amount a parson earns could be a little more or less than average. Without exception they have at least a senior high school diploma, which assures them that they are average Japanese. They have a standard set of durable goods, another token of middle class-ness, which includes a refrigerator, a vacuum cleaner, a stereo, a television, a small automobile, and more recently a videotape deck. The material possessions of a factory foreman are essentially the same as those of the prime minister. Therefore, the Japanese declare without doubt or hesitation that they are middle-class people.

Of course, there are a few who are slightly skeptical about their identification with the middle class. Some think that they cannot be middle class until they become independent homeowners rather than tenants in a housing project. Others may feel that the real middle class comprises university graduates, while others may think that their cars are too old and that such automobiles are not becoming to the middle class. On the other hand, there may be a relatively wealthy group of people who are afraid that they may not be middle class simply because they have bigger house or better cars than the average. But, generally speaking, the majority of the Japanese people today feel that they are middle class.

Of course, either implicitly or explicitly, class distinctions in terms of behavior patterns, artistic taste, kinds of magazines read, wardrobe, or use of language can be discovered if the public is carefully examined. However, everybody in Japan today is the recipient of and audience for popular culture. For instance, baseball, *sumō*, and other sports are enjoyed and appreciated by millions of people regardless of their social status of educational background. It is not strange to see, for instance, a senior vice president of a large firm enjoy his conversation on the scores of professional baseball games of the previous day with the driver of his limousine on his way to his office. Indeed, Paul Fussell's hypothetical figures called "X People," introduced in his witty book, *Class,* also seem to exist among upper-class Japanese today.

A good example of such trends, or even efforts, can be observed in group pleasure trips to hot springs, a common practice among business firms in Japan. The major purpose of this kind of trip, usually for one or two nights, under the name of "workshop" or "employees' welfare," is to make sure that everybody in the organization feels equal. In a huge banquet room, top management consciously mixes with newly recruited junior clerks, drinking together, singing together, and sometimes even sharing a room. On these occasions juniors are allowed to tease seniors, and vice versa, so that they can reconfirm their equality and solidarity as human beings. Not only on these special occasions, but also in daily office life, the egalitarian philosophy is at work. The same company cafeteria is used by both the president of the firm and by factory workers, and their topic of conversation, again, is *sumō* or favorite popular singers. In this sense, Japanese popular culture today may have the function of a social cement that closes the gaps between upper class and lower middle class, between highly educated and high school graduates, and sometimes even between male and female.

Interestingly enough, in Japanese society intellectual snobbery is almost nil. Of course, there are the minority who have high artistic taste, that is, are "high-brow." But "high-brows" in this country are also very knowledgeable about popular culture. It is a commonplace scene, at a bar at midnight, for a university professor or a high court judge to sing a popular song with a carpenter or taxicab driver. Such snobbery as "conspicuous non-ownership of television," which Reuel Denney brilliantly interpreted years ago, is totally alien in Japanese society. It is quite probable the spirit and philosophy of *Ukiyoburo* is still in action in contemporary Japan. Popular culture in this country is *the* culture that is shared by every single individual. In this sense, a new scope and perspective are needed to study not only the popular culture phenomena of Japan but also popular culture research methodology.

A new wave in popular culture research in Japan seems to be emerging, partly inheriting the tradition established by Yanagita, Kon, Gonda, Kitamura, and others and partly stimulated by mass media research that was introduced from the United States in the postwar period. At the same time, the populism that Gonda expressed in his work is another factor encouraging "progressive" scholars from such disciplines as sociology, psychology, political science, and literature to work on popular culture issues. Indeed, there was a group called the "Science of Thought"(see Shunsuke Tsurumi) that devoted much of its energy in the 1950s to popular culture study. This group consisted of intellectuals, mostly university professors, who felt that they were obliged to understand the everyday interests of the common people, or *jōmin*, in order to establish real democracy in Japan. In this sense, popular culture research in Japan in the earlier postwar period, had, more or less, a political tone. As a matter of fact, left-wing political parties in the 1950s, while criticizing money-making capitalist popular culture as possibly another form of the suppression and exploitation of the proletariat, encouraged "productive" and "democratic" popular culture so that the lives of working-class people could be improved and that the proletariat could be prepared to fight with the capitalist system.

At the same time, scholars in academia also began to show interest in popular culture, especially when mass communications and journalism became part of the social science curriculum in colleges and universities. A few sociologists and anthropologists started ambitious and unique projects such as the sociology of bars (Kouri Takada), the sociology of *bonsai* (Nozomu Ikei), and the thropology of housing (Naoki Sugimoto). In the initial phase, there was criticism from conservative and traditional social scientists, but by the 1980s these seemingly deviant research projects has been accorded recognition in academia.

Summarizing the results of the previous discussion, it may be safe to say that: (1) Japan has been an egalitarian country, though the origin and nature of the philosophy are somewhat different from those of Western countries. Japanese egalitarianism was accelerated by the reforms of the postwar period. (2) The Japanese population is extremely homogeneous, and the gaps between social classes are probably much narrower than in other societies. (3)On the part of the elite in Japan, there seems to be less class consciousness and anxiety. They usually do not have much psychological and ideological resistance to popular culture. (4) In conclusion, Japanese popular culture is unique, and its research methodology requires that special consideration be given to this singularity.

Note

1. Proper names in this essay are in the Japanese style of family name, given name.

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Culture without Class

"*Mito Kōmon*" is one of Japan's most popular TV programs today. It is set in the early Tokugawa Period, around the middle of the 17th century, and the title role is a retired vice-*Shōgun*. He travels about through the length and breadth of Japan in disguise with only two retainers to accompany him. Kōmon himself is disguised as a retired merchant. He travels in the manner of a common citizen, putting up at roadside inns, eating everyday food and making friends with the poor farmers and craftsmen he meets along the way. No one is aware that he is a man of supreme political power. Sometimes old farm women give him advice on how best to care for crops. In other words, by going about in disguise, Kōmon is able to continue to learn about the conditions of society. Also, he sometimes discovers feudal lords or their underlings involved in graft or exploitation of the people. At such times, he takes the side of the people in resistance activities against such corrupt regional government officials. These bad guys, of course, do their best to harm or even kill Kōmon and his retainers. Kōmon's retainers protect him, and at the last moment, he shows his badge of office (his family crest), revealing his true identity, and using his authority to punish the bad guys.

There are many period dramas that resemble this one, and their plots always follow the same pattern. The heroes of all of these TV dramas are persons of double identity who appear to be just ordinary citizens but who, in actual fact, hold positions of power and have a good conscience. Of course, this type of double-social-identity fiction is not exclusive to Japan. "The Prince and the Pauper" is a good example of a Western tale of this type. But in the context of Japan's popular culture, there is a particular fondness for stories like "*Mito Kōmon*" in which people of the elite classes go beyond the confines of social class to move about freely and enjoy the life of a commoner. And this is definitely not a product of the "democratization" that has taken place in Japan since 1945. Japanese popular literature has been full of stories of this sort since the beginning of the 20th century. The existence of social classes is an incontrovertible fact. But the idea that people are capable of breaking down the walls of class to communicate and that this is the way things should be is a concept that is deeply rooted in the hearts and minds of the people of Japan. Such heroes are expected to be "like a commoner" no matter how high their social position may be.

And this concept is not limited to the world of fiction. Even in the real world, Japanese people move about and act as equals no matter what their social class or position may be. Of course, in feudal society, social class was strictly delineated, but the late 18th century writer Sanba Shikite created humorous word pictures of warriors and townsmen as all the same "plain people" after all in his "*Bath of the Floating World*" (*Ukiyo Furo*) that is set in a public bath. His basic premise is that it is only clothing and possessions that create social distinctions, and that when all such ornamentation is stripped away, people are all the same. The philosopher Shunsuke Tsurumi called this "public bath democracy."

This tradition still remains is effect today. For example, group trips are often sponsored by such Japanese organizations as companies or neighborhood associations to promote friendship among their members, and the destination is almost always a spa. At these spas, there is always a huge public bath where everybody takes a leisurely soak while chatting with each other. Here there is no distinction between company presidents and common workers. All are literally stripped down to their bare humanity and become equal with each other. Also light sleeping *kimonos* known as *yukata* are provided for all guests by these spas. Since all of the *yukata* are of exactly the same pattern and fabric, the minute the guests shed their own clothing and change into these *yukata*, the social class and position normally held in their organization to which they belong completely disappear. And when they enter the public bath, the highest executives and the newest young company members communicate with each other naturally. In the Japanese language there is an expression that translates literally "to become mutually naked and have a talk" that means to have a straightforward conversation. It means to talk together with no lies, no exaggeration, and no reserve. It may well be that this expression includes the image of the popular group trip to a spa.

Differentiation based on social class is particularly repugnant to the Japanese, particularly the Japanese people of today. To give a concrete example, there is no first class on the railways of Japan. In other countries, there are special roomy compartments that are more expensive and are called "first class," but in Japan, cars like this are called "green cars" instead of "first class." The name here comes from the green stickers that are placed on the outside of these special cars. Also, on the domestic airlines of Japan, there are special seats that would normally be called "first class," but they are called "super seats." Since passengers who wish to use these seats naturally pay a higher price, any other culture would call them "first class," but in Japan's transportation industry, an "invisible" distinction is made while the actual terms "first class" and "second class" are strictly avoided. Perhaps what we see at work here is such feelings of "shame" or "hesitation" toward conspicuous social privilege.

In other words, the ideal of the Japanese of today is to be "ordinary" or "average." And they want others to recognize them as such. This is obvious from the results of public opinion polls. According to numerous polls taken by such organizations as the prime minister's office more than 90% of all Japanese people consider themselves to be of the middle class. There are extremely few who think that they belong to the upper class, and equally as few who place themselves in the lower class. All are in the middle class. And there is sufficient reason behind this phenomenon. First, the basic philosophy behind the Japanese tax system is equal distribution of wealth, and the income tax is based upon a graduated scale. On top of this, thanks to the existence of an inheritance tax, it is a quite impossible for a family to remain extremely wealthy generation after generation. In other words, it is safe to say that the tax system itself is constantly aimed toward the creation of an "equal" middle class. Also, thanks to the farm land reform of 1946, all farmers became independent, placing them in the middle class as well.

On top of this, the Japanese education system, particularly in terms of the popularization of higher education, contributes greatly to the nurturing of "average people." In Japan today, the ratio of people who go on to high school after their nine years of compulsive education is upwards of 95%, and more than 35% of all high school graduates go on to university or junior college. This also contributes to further promotion of the homogeneity of the population. Against the background of such standardization of income and education, it is not surprising that the sense of equality mentioned above has proceeded at an increasingly accelerated pace. And neither the lifestyle nor the way of thinking allow for establishment of classes in the social system of Japan.

This can be easily understood even by looking at the mass media of Japan alone. In most countries of the world, the newspapers can be easily divided into "quality papers" and "popular papers." The former newspapers are targeted toward the intellectual class and deal with the international situation and financing conditions, while the latter often strive to excite the curiosity of the masses on a day to day basis through sensationalism. In other words, in most countries of the world, you can easily guess the social class and even the profession of a person by the newspaper he or she reads. In direct contrast, all Japanese newspapers are aimed at all the people. There are three or four daily newspapers in Japan today that have a distribution of several million copies, but their contents are a combination of all the different types of articles found in both the "quality papers" and the "popular papers" of foreign countries. They are filled with everything from serious editorials to literary criticism, the world situation, political problems, entertainment world gossip, sports, and murders. While the different newspapers do indeed have their own unique personality, there is no way to determine the social class of the reader by the newspaper he or she reads. The prime minister, farmers, university professors, and factory workers all read the same newspapers.

Thus it becomes clear that Japan is truly a "popular society" ruled by the middle class where no such dichotomies as high class and low class, elite and the masses, privileged and underprivileged exist. And by extension this means that Japan is in a state of cultural equality at the present time. So it follows that it is correct to refer to Japan's present day culture as a "culture without class." Sociologists often speak of the dichotomy of "high class culture" and "common culture" when they discuss the phenomenon of culture, but it is normally difficult to apply this dichotomy to Japan. For example, there is no case in which a certain sport reminds one of a certain social class in Japan. In the past, golf was considered a high class sport, but in Japan today, salaried workers in their thirties often spend their Sundays golfing. Skiing is also a sport of the masses today. Everybody from students to waitresses, artists, taxi drivers, and people in all other walks of life are skiers in Japan and they number around one hundred million.

Baseball is a sport that was imported from America during the latter half of the 19th century, and the first people to take an interest in it were university students, giving rise to college baseball teams. Then during the 1930s, professional baseball put in its appearance. Thus both the playing and the watching of baseball became a national hobby. When one goes to a Japanese professional baseball stadium today, one cannot help but notice that the grandstands are filled with people of all professions and all social levels. There are executives of giant enterprises and there are janitors. There are students and there are senior citizens. One finds car salesmen sitting next to university professors. From this cultural phenomenon it becomes obvious that the cultural nucleus is neither high brow nor low brow. If it must be given a name, it can only be called middle brow culture.

Let us look at a few more examples. Anybody who has visited Japan has probably noticed that the game known as *pachinko* is found everywhere. It consists of a board covered with a complex pattern of protruding nails among which a number of holes are scattered. Steel balls of one millimeter in diameter are flung up along the board with a spring, and if it goes into one of the holes as it rolls down the board, the player wins a prize. In other words, it is a simple type of gambling. In Japan today, there exist at least two million *pachinko* machines. This game has the character of a national pastime in Japan. This is clearly substantiated by the fact that the *pachinko* industry enjoys an annual sales figure of 1.5 billion yen, an amount equivalent to 20% of Japan's national budget. And the people who play the game are definitely not limited to any special social class. There is a larger ratio of men than women, but there are still many women who play it. There are great *pachinko* fans among the famous authors and the Dietmen of Japan. A look at the history of the game reveals that it began as a minor hobby of the working class, but today it is loved by people of all professions and all social levels. No one would ever think of frowning at an intellectual for playing *pachinko* today. A new form of popular entertainment called "*karaoke*" began to catch on in Japan around the beginning of the 1980s. "*Kara*" means "empty" or "devoid" and "*oke*" is an abbreviation of "orchestra." In other words, *Karaoke* is orchestral accompaniment devoid of a singer. Most *karaoke* consist of taped recordings of popular songs, with laser discs beginning to appear recently. Amateurs sing with a microphone in their hands while listening to the sound tapes or listening to and watching the laser discs. As I mentioned earlier, Japanese enterprises often sponsor spa trips for their employees where everybody "gets naked" together and enjoys chatting with each other. After bathing, they all go to the dining room where they eat and enjoys singing to the *karaoke*. Executives, typists, secretaries, and factory overseers all join together, taking turns in front of the microphone. This may seem like a strange sight to many people, but to the Japanese people it has become a part of everyday life. This does not, however, mean that all Japanese people are totally absorbed in the singing of popular songs. There are not a few people who have a high level of education who play the violin themselves or frequent the classical concert halls. But even such people as these find themselves participating in *karaoke* gatherings, for such participation proves that a person is "ordinary" which, as I explained earlier,is the ardent desire of all Japanese people.

This concept of equality permeates every corner of life in industrial society. For example, the dining rooms of almost all Japanese companies are shared by both executives and workers. They all line up in the same cafeteria to receive the same food as everyone else there. Here we observe the same thorough-going "democracy" as that of the public baths at the spas. And as the company employees eat their lunch, the president often unofficially seeks the opinions of his field workers. People often wonder why production is so high and quality so superior in Japan's manufacturing industry, and I am convinced that this sort of "democracy" is one of the major secrets behind this phenomenon. In a word, it is because there is no sense of class in either Japanese society or culture. It is for this reason that I believe that the term "culture without class" is appropriate in describing Japanese culture.

Originally Japanese society possessed an extremely strict class system. While there were indeed no suppressor or suppressed in the Marxist context, there was a sharp division between poverty and wealth. No matter how widespread higher education may be today, it does not mean that all Japanese people possess a truly high level of knowledge and culture. In reality, the exact opposite is the case, for even among the salaried workers who are university graduates, there are not a few who are intellectually poverty-stricken in the extreme. While there are a number of educated persons and businessmen who are active on the international scene, there are numerous other people who have never ventured away from the village in which they were born. The graduated income tax system does indeed exist, but this does not mean that income is entirely equal. In term of property, in this age of extremely high and further rising land price, one's social life differs greatly depending upon whether or not one owns land. There are also large discrepancies between full-time salaried workers and retired senior citizens. There is an equal employment rights law for men and women, but it cannot be said that men and women receive totally equal treatment in the actual work place. Social classes or strata do exist here.

But, still, I am convinced that the cultural mainstream consists of a "middle brow" stratum that goes beyond the bounds of social class. At least, it is certain that the Japanese people live in accordance with the basic principle that they are all "ordinary" people. One must not either rise above or drop below the "ordinary" level. Everybody eats the same kind of food, sings to the same *karaoke*, goes on the same group spa trips, and watches the same television programs as everyone else... And no one ever even so much as considers doing anything that would be socially conspicuous. This is the ironclad rule. If a person happens to be a capitalist with great power, if he displays it ostensibly or brags about it, it will cause society to scorn and repulse him. It is considered the greatest of virtues to always act ordinary, always associate with others in an ordinary manner, and to never reveal one's wealth or power unless absolutely necessary. *The Mito Kōmon* whom I introduced at the beginning of this essay is a perfect example of the ideal human being in this context. And it goes without saying that it is not only the general public who watch the television program of which he is the star, but also people who would be considered of the elite class in other societies, for it is a program targeted toward "ordinary" people, so everybody who aims toward being an "ordinary" person is almost duty-bound to watch it. This includes even the type of Japanese person who dreams of visiting London. If you were to ask any Japanese from a politician to a student, a man, a woman, or anyone of any age if they are familiar with the character named *Mito Kōmon*, the answer would be invariably "of course." If you were ever to discover a Japanese who answered no to your query, you can be assured that he or she would be lying about his or her citizenship. And you are best advised to avoid any further communication with such a person.

The Machine Cult

In the summer of 1870, Japan's great enlightened thinker and educator, Yukichi Fukuzawa, suddenly came down with a fever. His students began to wonder how they could find some ice for him. One of them remembered that a former *Daimyō* named Shungan (Yoshinaga) Matsudaira had once purchased a Western ice-making machine out of curiosity, but that since he did not know how to operate it, it had been subsequently neglected. The students quickly went and borrowed the machine, took it to the university laboratory, and figured out how to make ice with it. Thus they succeeded in curing Fukuzawa's illness.

The year 1870 was during a period of confusion, when Japan had just emerged from its long period of seclusionism to set foot on the path toward becoming a modern nation. Even so there was such a machine in Japan. When speaking of the old feudal lords, most people think of conservative authoritarians, but as is obvious from this episode, there were not a few among their numbers who liked new things as well. For example, Nariaki Shimazu of the *Satsuma* Clan bought a camera and had his own portrait photo taken with it. A certain clan leader in Shikoku saw a steamship and ordered his craftsmen to make him one just like it. Keinosuke Kawai, the supreme commander of the Nagaoka Clan, invested all of his clan's financial holdings in British machineguns, putting them to use in the Bakumatsu civil war. Even so the Nagaoka Clan was defeated.

The early modern age in Japan got its start through this sort of interest in and curiosity toward machines. This was before there was a constitution, or any sort of political system (though there were countless voices expressing opinions), or even any clear ideological concept of how things should be. There was a certain consciousness of the fact that there was a world out there containing an area known as the West that possessed an advanced civilization, but there were extremely few people who had ever actually traveled beyond the islands of Japan. In the midst of all of this, the Japanese people had an amazing interest in the machines that were born of Western civilization. They had not only an acute interest, but there were many people who had the skill to learn how to use those machines.

It was during this same period that steamships were imported into Japan. And as soon as they got a hold of these steamships and received basic instruction on their operation, they quickly learned how to handle them well. When the first British Consul-General, Sir Rutherford Alcock, entered Tokyo Bay in 1859, he was deeply impressed with the way the Japanese handled the small steamship that came out to meet his ship. He is quoted as having said. "They keep their engines and brass fittings so shipshape that they are equal to the most loyal of British military men."

In other words, Japan's modernization, that was generally seen as "civilization and enlightenment" began in very concrete terms with things that were visible to the naked eye and could be touched with the hand. And most of these concrete objects were machines. Let us take a chronological look at the history of this rather singular early modern period.

During the same year that Fukuzawa succeeded in producing ice with that first ice-making machine, printing was initiated, and the first automobile was imported from America. A shoe factory was already in operation, and amazingly enough, wine brewing was also being tested. In the following year of 1871, Morse code machines were imported, and in 1872, a railway line was opened between Shinbashi and Yokohama. And that was not all. Inventors appeared among the townsmen and began producing strange inventions. For example, there was one man who invented a spring-operated fan, and another who devised a steam-operated contraption for climbing mountains. Most of these inventions ended in failure. However, it was during this same that a man named Wasuke Izumiya was inspired by the horse-drawn carriage to invent the rickshaw that proved such a success that it was subsequently exported to many Asian countries.

I know this may sound repetitious, but I want to point out here once again that all of this took place during the period of confusion prior to the establishment of a political system and economic policies in Japan. From the stand point of common sense, the proper order would be for the government to begin by setting up policies for science and technology, then for the educational system to be formulated in accordance with those policies, and finally for guidance and support to be provided for industrial production gradually. But it appears that it was the wisdom and energy of the citizens that took the initiative in the case of the "machine" that served to stimulate Japan's modernization. The *daimyō* I mentioned earlier had very little political knowledge at the beginning, but they had a burning interest in machines that were able to accomplish all sorts of strange and wonderful things, and they did not mind spending great amounts of money on those machines. In fact, it appears that the various *daimyō* had a great interest in machines even before the 19th century. One good example is the clock. The clock was first introduced into Japan from the West at the beginning of the 18th century, and the *daimyō* became deeply absorbed in them as soon as they arrived. The government established an isolationist policy, so when the clocks broke down, the *daimyō* ordered their craftsmen to repair them. For example, since they did not have the necessary metal springs, they used whale whiskers as a substitute. Clocks made in such a way came to be known as "*daimyō* clocks," and today there is even a special museum dedicated to them. In any case, the *daimyō* of those days were totally fascinated with anything mechanical.

And it was not only the *daimyō*. General citizens also found enjoyment in dreaming up all sorts of technical devices. For example, everyone knows that the traditional Japanese writing utensils are India ink and brushes, but in 1760, a craftsman named Tobei Kunitomo invented a portable writing set that was just like the fountain pen. But the greatest of all Japanese inventors appeared in the middle of the 18th century. His name was Ōmi Takeda. It appears that his genius level inventive talent got its start with clock technology, and he went on to create a series of mechanical dolls. Among them is the famed "tea serving doll" that is the prototype of today's robots. This doll carries a tea cup in both hand, takes it to a guest, and as soon as the guest takes the tea cup from the doll, it turns around and returns to where it started. No one knows why he went to all the trouble to create this doll. But it was likely from Ōmi's experiential knowledge and technology, along with his amazing intuition that he came to create this series of works, and they certainly must have surprised the people of his day. This was most likely the simple purpose behind his desire to design such things. This is a fine example of the art of Japanese craftsmen. Ōmi had no strong patron to support him, nor did he do his work in accordance with the orders of a customer. In other words, the work he did was for nothing other than his own personal pleasure.

"Mechanical devices" went on to develop in a number of different directions. Huge mechanical dolls appear even today in the Takayama festival of Gifu Prefecture. The dolls used here are the products of the skills of the traditional carpenters known as "*Hida no Takumi*" who have lived in this area for many generations. But they have no practical usefulness of any sort. But when one leafs through the pages of the book titled "*An illustrated Collection of Mechanical Devices*" (*Kikō Zushu*) that contains all these different types of mechanical toys and devices, one cannot help but be amazed at the enthusiastic creative inventiveness of the Japanese people of the 18th and 19th centuries. Invention was popular even among the scholars of common stock. For example, Gennai Hiraga used Dutch books as reference material for making the first experiment in Japan for generating electricity, and he developed a nonflammable fiber as well. Also, Giemon Tanaka made further developments of the clocks mentioned earlier, and he finally succeeded in perfecting a perpetual clock. This clock indicated not only the time, but the phases of the sun and the moon automatically as well. This was the most sophisticated clock in the world in those days.

But the most important point to be made here is that the people of Japan found great joy in observing these technological inventions. The people welcomed the exotic workings of machines, and they waited eagerly for the invention of more new machine. In ancient Japanese, the word "*takumi*" was actually used to mean both skill and craftsman. And it was particularly used for traditional carpenters. It is a well known fact that in traditional Japanese architecture, no nails or other metal materials were used, with the entire structure consisting of wooden framework. And there are any number of structures built in this style that have survived for several centuries. The Horyu Temple is one famous example. It is in such buildings that we find the art of traditional Japanese carpenters still living with vivid life today. It was practical application of this "art" that produced the "mechanical devices" mentioned above.

It was a sort of respect for this type of "art" among the people of Japan that gave birth to their thorough-going curiosity and that made them the greatest "machine loving" nation of the world. Today we are living within an extension of this same tradition. To the people of Japan, machines are priceless friends. In the West, the introduction of machines often results in a loss of work for laborers, giving rise to movements for destroying machines. But the Japanese have always welcomed machines unconditionally. When the railway was opened, the laborers who had born palanquins showed no objection, nor did those artists involved in painting portraits feel that their profession had been brought into question with the appearance of the camera. When the Morse code was introduced, the couriers were quite surprised, but they felt more joy at its appearance as another manifestation of "civilization and enlightenment." In other words, to the Japanese, "civilization" meant things from the West, and more specifically machines. People were deeply impressed by the "things" that machines made and the way in which those "things" served to make daily life more convenient.

It was such feelings of interest and surprise that served as the main support for the industrialization of Japan. There is no doubt that if there had been any sort of scepticism toward the machine, the speed of industrialization in Japan would have been greatly impeded. The Japanese welcomed the machine in everything from the steel industry to the textile industry. Both the leaders and the people were unanimous in their belief that the introduction of machines was absolutely necessary in order to place Japan among the civilized nations of the world. Thus, quite a large part of the budget of this poor nation was allocated to the purchase of machinery.

Concerning the way Japanese people use machines, a most impressive example is the fact that many of the trolley cars that were in use in Kyoto up to the end of the 1960s had been imported from England a full century ago. In proof of this, their dashboards bore the name of Manchester, the place where they had been manufactured. From the time these cars were purchased, Japan concentrated all its energies on learning mechanical technology from the West and in thus catching up with the rest of the world. This was true not only in the manufacturing industry, but in all other fields as well, machines were freely introduced and put into practical use.

Another important point to be noted in this context is that, different from the West, the technicians who invented and made machines did not suffer from any sort of social class prejudice. In Western culture, there was always a group of "scholars" or scientists on the one hand and a special group of craftsmen on the other. Normally there was a great social gap between these two groups. The social status of the former was high while the latter were considered nothing but laborers. As a result, these two groups remained apart from each other with hardly any contact of any sort between them. This was a custom and a system that had been formulated over a long period of history. But in Japan, the situation was very different. Here "science" and "technology" have always been considered parts of the same body of knowledge. In the universities of Japan, separate departments of sciences and engineering were set up, but there was very little differentiation between the two and no sense of a difference in quality or status. The mission of the science department was to pursue theory and that of the engineering department to put theory into practice. They always maintained a relationship of mutual cooperation.

Also, the Japanese government worked to foster the nurturing of learning in both science and technology in its organization of the system of higher education. The government was always fully aware of the great importance of application in the natural sciences. As a result, at the end of the 19th century, Japan produced the greatest number of persons educated in the field of science and technology, most particularly in the field of engineering, in the entire world. One of the people who was the first to take particular notice of this fact was W.E.Ayerton. He was a British scientist who discovered that Japan had exerted great efforts toward the opening of an institute of technology and that it had developed into the largest school of its kind in the entire world by the middle of the 19th century. And based upon what he found here in Japan, he wrote in Nature Magazine, "While it may seem strange under the circumstance, though Japan is constantly first class in engineering production activities, it is still lagging far behind in systematic education of its engineers." This governmental policy in education was directly reflected in Japanese industry. A huge number of factories were built one after another, and a vast volume of industrial products were produced. And before long, Japanese consumers found their daily lives surrounded with domestically produced industrial products. Of course, the points most strongly stressed in the governmental policies toward science and technology were first to nurture production of military products, and second to promote production of products that could be exported. Thus in the very earliest stages of industrialization, "machines" did not become a part of the daily lives of the Japanese people. At the same time, during the 1920s, such products as automobiles, clocks, and phonographs gradually began to permeate the lives of the people. And the people of Japan came to experience "progress" through their machines. To the Japanese, machines were unconditionally convenient and enjoyable. In this context, one fact that must not be ignored is that during the 1930s the most popular hobby among the children of Japan was the building of radios. As a result, during this period, all sorts of scientific and technological inventions were produced in Japan. For example, the first high level application experiment for television in the world was carried out by Kenjiro Takayagi in 1927. And in the field of the munitions industry the famed Zero Fighter Plane was designed.

In 1945, Japan was defeated in the war. And Japan thought carefully about the reasons for its defeat. The first reason was the overwhelming mass production establishment of the allied force. The allied forces, particularly America, were supported by vast mass production, and it was with such mass produced products as airplanes and ships that Japan was overwhelmed. The second reason was the high level of technology in the West. Particularly in the field of radar, Japan's technology was no match for that of America. America's radar was able to detect all movements of the Japanese military forces without fail, and fighters that were effective in defeating the Zero fighters were quickly developed by America and England in the early stages of the war. And the most decisive product of all was the atomic bomb. Research was being carried out on the atomic bomb in Japan as well. Thus, the instant the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, the scientists of Japan knew exactly what it was. The newspapers described it as merely a "new type of bomb," but the scientist and the military were immediately aware of the fact that Japan was lagging far behind in the military utilization of atomic power.

A consciousness of these reasons for defeat made post-war Japan decide to exert its greatest efforts toward development of science and technology. Since the Japanese people had been so extremely fascinated with machine technology since the middle of the 19th century, they had no hesitation in completely accepting this government policy. Also, on top of this, a new constitution was adopted by Japan in 1945 in which it was announced to the world that Japan would never again maintain armed forces. Thus, Japanese technology was completely concentrated on the peace industry. All sorts of machines were developed and put on the market to satisfy the demands of the people. One example is the semiconductor. And it goes without saying that it was Japanese technicians who first hit upon the idea of using transistors in radios. Other countries were busy putting this tiny semiconductor to use for military purposes, but Japan applied it to the making of radios and tape recorders. In this way, civilian goods that utilized transistors were invented in Japan and dominated the world market. It is a well-known fact that the prime minister of a certain country spoke of the prime minister of Japan as a "transistor merchant." And it is true that Japan went from the transistor to the integrated circuit, and finally developed the semiconductor and became the world's top producer. On top of this, since, as mentioned earlier, the Japanese constitution does not recognize the munitions industry, the semiconductors that have been developed one after another have been put to use in not only communications equipment but in all sorts of other fields as well. For example, all Japanese cameras are packed full of semiconductors that operate their various sensors. Also, in the case of automobiles, engines are full of computer circuits that ensure top operating conditions at all times.

Electronics is being utilized in an amazingly broad range of fields. Let us take, for example, the field of *pachinko* that is Japan's most popular form of entertainment. Historically speaking, *pachinko* was invented based upon a hint from America's pin ball machine, but recently, a single *pachinko* machine contains as many as fifty semiconductors, making it a precision electronics instrument. This game is played by simply inserting a one-centimeter in diameter steel ball into a hole on the front of the machine, and then it moves through the holes inside in accordance with a process very much like that of a slot machine. As the result of combinations of all sorts of figures and signals, the players are able to obtain prizes. In order to make those combinations absolutely random, the makers of these game machines have begun to commission electronics experts to design them. Thus the present day *pachinko* machine is no longer a simple affair. It has changed into a highly complex computer.

The daily life of the average citizen has undergone an amazing electronic transformation. Taking household electronic appliances as examples, even the electric rice cookers is controlled by computer today, and the electric vacuum cleaner that is capable of automatically detecting the difference in flooring materials by means of fuzzy logic has become the mainstream. A huge number of automatic vending machines fill the streets of the cities. They are designed in such a way that they can detect the type of coin that has been inserted and give the correct change, and there are some of them that even go so far as to give vocal instructions to the customer by means of sound tapes and thank them after the transaction has been completed. Ticket machines and even wickets at railway stations have also become mechanized today.

When a customer makes a mistake, the machine provides him with appropriate instructions. In other words, in many ways, the daily life of the Japanese people is controlled by computers today. And the Japanese people themselves feel no sense of strangeness or repulsion to this phenomenon. In fact, most of them are quite overjoyed at the convenience and pleasantness thus provided for their lives.

And this phenomenon is in evidence in areas other than daily life as well. In the field of production, conversion to machines and automation has progressed greatly. One of the best examples is the industrial robot. A full 70% of the industrial robots in use in the world today are in Japan. Interest has risen in these robots in other countries as well, but in most cases, the labor unions strongly oppose their introduction. The main reason given is that if robots take the place of conventional human labor, there is no way the mass unemployment can be avoided. But in direct contrast, the laborers of Japan have welcomed robots with open arms. Their reasons are that simple repetitive work can be left up to robots, because more than anything else, robots are able to produce absolutely uniform work devoid of errors. For example, in the tightening of a single bolt, there is an inevitable difference in tightness when it is done by human beings. But since machines are, after all, nothing more than machines, they never make mistakes. And, after all, human labor should be applied to jobs that machines are incapable of doing. Thus in the factories of Japan, robots have taken the place of human beings. And on top of this, robots have become new "co-workers" for the laborers in Japanese factories. The workers have given pet names to each of their robots, and they give them words of encouragement every day just like they do to their fellow human workers, treating them very much like human beings. Herein is seen a sense of trust and "friendship" toward machines among the Japanese. It is hard to tell just what significance this trend will have for Japan in the future. But it does appear that the Japanese people will continue to develop new machines and to co-exist joyfully with them.

Cultural Significance of Seclusion Policy

1. A Comparative Social History

During the academic year 1963–64, I was lecturing at an American University. My principal teaching assignment was a course in general sociological theory, but because I myself happen to be a Japanese, I also undertook to deliver special lectures in the area of Japanese sociology.

Helping people who have been educated in one culture to understand the problems of another independent society, and to comprehend the issues of the configuration of culture in that other society, is a difficult task, especially in the case of a culture like Japan's. Indeed, one begins to enter upon the impossible when one tries to help students understand a country like Japan, which has an extremely dense population. Describing Japan while one is actually in Japan is easy enough. But such descriptions lack the conviction that they have to enjoy currency in the outside world.

As I prepared my lectures, I was forced to consider what might be the most effective way to help foreigners–particularly to help such unsophisticated, native people as the Americans–to understand Japan. I decided that indeed there was a method available for going about this: the method of what might be called comparative sociology, or perhaps comparative cultural anthropology. This method was one that did not consist in trying to explain Japanese culture or Japanese society by isolating these issues and trying to treat them independently. Instead, I would first identify elements in non–Japanese societies that were analogous to the Japanese, and then use these as a kind of intermediary, or catalyst, to explain Japan.

Let us take, for example, the problem of *Shintō*. In order to explain *Shintō*, I would first make reference in my lectures to Druidism, one of the indigenous religious beliefs of northern europe. Of course, *Shintō* and Druidism are different but they nevertheless resemble one another in many ways–as for example, in the way both beliefs understand the life of the spirit or soul after death. To explain the course of development of Buddhist–Shinto syncretism, I would start with examples of the syncretism between Christianity and the indigenous religious beliefs of transalpine Europe, such as the development of the celebration of Christmas. The two have a great deal in common. I would compare T'ang China with ancient Rome, and in the process throw light upon how the two great religions concerned–Buddhism and Christianity–were spread.

I would have my American students read the Germania of Tacitus, and The

Golden Bough by J.G Frazer; only after that would I have them read Sir George Sansom's Japan, A Short Cultural History, and Ruth Benedict's The Chrysanthemum and the Sword. Since my students had learned something about pre-Christian Europe by reading Frazer, it would be easier for them to understand Japan by presenting it in terms that they could comprehend, rather than by presenting it as something "mysterious." The technique might be called interposing a "cushion" between them and their goal, to borrow an expression from the game of billiards. Japan soon became something that my American students could comprehend in perfectly ordinary terms.

I must emphasize that my goal was not to present Japan in the terms of the West. Instead, I tried to treat Japan and the West in analogous terms and to study them on a basis of equality, without paying much attention to which element in the comparison was Western or which was Japanese. When we try to help Occidentals understand Japan, the more we emphasize the "uniqueness" of Japan, the more we end up burdening these same Westerners with a growing sense that a gulf has been introduced between them and Japan. If we persist in stressing what is unique, we will only end up with every country in the world somehow being unique. Finally we will reach the point where students of Japan can do little more than reply, "It is really?!" Explaining Japanese things in terms of how unique they are may appear to lead others to understanding them but in my opinion, such an approach interferes with, or even rejects, understanding.

In approaching this problem through comparative sociology, I make a conscious effort never to emphasize that anything is "unique." Rather, I use examples of analogous points that relate to two or more societies, and I then attempt to generalize, even though this sometimes means treating the data a little roughly. There is always plenty of time left later for taking about what is unique. I hope that I may be forgiven for expressing myself this bluntly, but in my experience, human societies are organized essentially in the same way everywhere on earth, and people think and act pretty much alike. Because none of these things is much different from any other, our attention is distracted to an inordinate degree by minor difference. It is this way that we soon conclude that this, that, and everything is "unique."

As I started to put my lecture notes in order and began to elaborate my comparative sociological approach along the lines described above, I found that I needed to study a number of historical issues afresh. Japanese society, the subject of my comparative sociological approach, is actually a high density society. To be successful in advancing a convincing discussion of any aspect of Japanese sociology, contemporary social structure, cultural patterns, or whatever, one must incorporate historical background into the approach and construct a three-dimensional logic. In principle, academic sociology is an operation conducted on a simple, objective plane. History may in general terms be perceived as a projection onto that plane. It is in this confrontation that the method I am concerned with is to be identified.

In attempting the full-scale comparison of two or more societies, I soon discovered that it was not sufficient merely to consider history as some sort of auxiliary material aiding sociology. Approaching history as if it were a plane of projection was not a satisfactory approach. It seemed to me that only if we took up history properly, in its own terms, would we be successful in introducing it into the framework of comparative sociology.

Although I am no historian, I am surely entitled to construct my own hypotheses using the data that historians have brought to light. To be sure, an amateur is an amateur, first, last, and always. But in the case of historical studies, this also means that an amateur is sometimes able to approach the subject in a new light–to restudy history with a kind of lighthearted approach that would be impossible for a professional historian. As I began this restudy of history with the reckless temerity of the amateur, I found that some preliminary groundwork had been done by a group in anthropological evolutionary studies headed by Professor Imanishi Kinji.

Please keep in mind that my goal remained sociological comparativism. This meant that my own study of history would be largely comparative. For my own personal approach to the problem, I tentatively coined the term "comparative social history." This comparative social history of mine I originally put together for my American students to answer the practical demands of the moment, which meant that the comparisons were limited to Japan and Europe. I was concerned with identifying points of analogy between the history of Japan and the history of the West and establishing an analogy of social history from those points. But then this method, devised as a practical expedient, gradually came to interest me more for its own snake. I began to be more and more fascinated with this variety of comparative social history, quite apart from the utility it had in connection with my university lectures in America.

In my amateur approach, I was particularly impressed by the almost starting way Japanese history resembles Western history. These two histories have both been progressing along course so similar that one might very well suspect that the details had been worked out between the two by some sort of previous common consent. I had thought Japan was "unique" but now I realized that Japan and Europe are quite alike. They are so alike that there is no particular reason why they should not simply ignore each others' "unique" circumstances.

Two sources provided me with important in developing this approach: Umesao Tadao's book on *An Ecological–Historical View of Civillization* and Karl A. Wittfogel's theory of hydraulic civilization[1]. I was able to elaborate the concepts of my own particular thesis of social history largely thanks to the theoretical groundwork already laid down by these two scholars.

For an example of how I have gone about this, let me refer again to my comparison of T'ang China and ancient Rome. There are many elements in which the two differ, but we also find that they are startlingly alike when we consider imperial expansion, and the cultural contact and cultural diffusion that accompanied expansion. Another example, somewhat more recent in time, is the way the culture of *Muromachi* Japan closely corresponds to that of Renaissance Europe. The emergence of the Pure Land sects of Japanese Buddhism corresponds to the Reformation. The *Momoyama* period is to be compared with Elizabethan England;

even in such fields as decorative design, the two are surprisingly alike. In effect, I brought together a large number of individual cases and in the process of doing so, I gradually came to understand more and more about the West, while also beginning to understand more and more about Japan.

Throughout my study of this kind of piecemeal social history, the *Tokugawa* period in Japan continued to be of the greatest interest to me, particularly in the context of the period of "national seclusion" (*sakoku*). It now appears to me that the key for understanding the "unique" circumstances of Japan that have existed since the early seventeenth century is to be found in the study of this period of "national seclusion." Here I will attempt to elaborate upon this theme in terms of comparative social history, and then try and demonstrate what significance this subject may have for our understanding of contemporary Japan.

2. The World in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries, and the Navigation Revolution

In his book on national seclusion[2], Watsuji Tetsuro took as his point of departure what he called the "course of development of a global viewpoint," beginning in the thirteenth century. Following Watsuji's model, I believe it necessary to go back in time and to initiate our discussion by positioning both Japan and Europe in a time-context that is considerably earlier than the period of Japan's *sakoku*.

A good way to begin is to open any historical atlas to the fifteenth century. Then, if you can, reproduce on tracing paper the outlines of the two preceding maps in the atlas-one for the thirteenth and one for the fourteenth centuries-and place these two outlines over the map of the world for the fifteenth century. New look carefully at the result. What does it have to teach us?

Put in the simplest terms possible, this exercise will at once demonstrate how the "world" between the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries spread from tip to tip of the Eurasian landmass. The Old World expanded with tremendous force during this period. Earlier than this, there had been occasions when the world had seen expansion intermittently, like a geyser. The Persian Empire, the empires of Rome and Byzantium, the Sui dynasty in China, the Saracens, and the T'ang dynasty of China each represented the explosive manifestation of an enormous social organization.

But if we place these empires within the context of the totality of the old Eurasian continent, they become extremely localized empires. The "Roman Empire" was actually never anything more than a regional social organization centered around the Mediterranean Sea. View from the perspective of the totality of the Eurasian continent, The Roman Empire was a mustard seed. The ancient Persian Empire was also regional, extending only from the Near and Middle East across to the Indian peninsula.

One of these intermittent, geyser-like expansions of empire was to prove be truly enormous. In the very middle of the old Eurasian continent, the tremendous explosion of the Mongol Empire took place. This empire would eventually extend from Siberia in the northeast to what is now Vietnam in the southeast, to the Polish borders in the northwest, and to Turkey in the southwest. If you draw a quadrilateral connecting these four points of reference, you will produce a map of the Mongol Empire at its park. The Mongols managed to put under their control over half of the territory of Eurasia suitable for human habitation.

Only two parts of Eurasia–its easternmost and westernmost extremities–narrowly escaped Mongol control. Mongol–Yuan forces attempted to invade the Japanese island, and leaders of the Mongol Empire such as Guyug qayan and Mongke qayan demanded the capitulation of the Roman Pontiff and KIng Louis IX of France. Western Europe and Japan were both fortunate beyond description to have been spared the Mongols, yet both owed their extraordinary good fortune to their location at the most remote extremities of the continent. The central regions of Eurasia, on the other hand, were crushed and totally smashed out of recognition.

We might compare the Mongol Empire to a house painter, and Western Europe and Japan to tiny portions of the exterior of the building that the painter happens to miss. The painter overlooks a few parts and they really make no difference in his effort to "paint the house." In this way the Mongols "overlooked" Western Europe and Japan. Both were remote corners of the Old World and sustained only a few secondary tremors of the Mongol explosion.

A period of rest finally came even to this most terrible and devastating explosion. By the fourteenth century the Mongol Empire had begun to fall apart, and disintegration soon set in. It was as if a deluge had subsided. At just the same moment, Japan and Western Europe, having been in their own respective corners of Eurasia, entered a stage of "counter attack." Each redirected itself and its activities toward the Eurasian continent.

Let us first consider what happened in Europe.J.H.Parry, in his book *The Establishment of European Hegemony*[3], describes the three technological conditions that made this "roll–back" possible: modern navigation techniques, including the making of navigational charts; ship–building; and firearms, especially cannot that could be used abroad ship. All the measures decisive in facilitating this "roll–back" had to do with naval development.

The navigational charts and geographic knowledge of Europe in the Middle Ages were by and large spurious. Geography was simply the product of the medieval imagination. The year 1410 saw the publication of the *Imago Mundi*, an encyclopedic work that brought together both these imaginary elements and a certain amount of actual, descriptive information. Columbus' voyage of exploration result from taking literally, as articles of faith, the equivocal and dubious information found in the *Imago Mundi*. The same year that Columbus set out, the *Geography* of Ptolemy, which dated from the second century, once became the object of serious attention in Europe.

A new variety of seamen's chart called *portolan* had begun to be used on the Mediterranean. These charts were almost entirely based upon actual experience of the places concerned and were totally independent from the classical, metaphysical approach to geographical "science." They were partially based on Arabic knowledge of astronomy, and represented a tradition quite separate from Greek and Roman learning. They were also quite accurate. Jews living in Portugal and Italy introduced these Arabic techniques of making such charts to Europe; and we may point to the year 1478 as the precise point at which these new techniques formally became a part of European knowledge.

This was the year when Abraham Zacut, a professor of astronomy at the University of Salamanca, fled from Spain to Portugal as a result of the Spanish expulsion of the Jews. In Portugal Zacut became tutor in astronomy to the royal household. King John II of Portugal ordered two translations of an atlas that Zacut had originally written in Hebrew, the first into Latin, the second into Portuguese. In 1485, the Portuguese dispatched an expedition to Guinea in order to test the accuracy of Zacut's charts; they proved to have only a 4 per cent error in latitude. Not until the eighteenth century were fully satisfactory methods for the computation of longitude devised. Meanwhile, the Portuguese had now demonstrated that it was possible to rely on Zacut's calculations of latitude. It was possible to set out upon the seas, relying upon scientific fact rather than on religious or transcendental beliefs. By the end of the fifteenth century, the modern navigational revolution had begun to unfold.

A new type of ship was soon developed in order to put these new navigational techniques into practical employment. This new kind of vessel had three or more masts and represented a technological compromise between the European type of sailing vessel that had been in common use down to the fourteenth century, and the Arabic type with its characteristically large, triangular sail. This new type of ship was distinguished by a hull large enough for long voyages, and it was capable of being freely maneuvered. Not only were the navigational charts ready, so were the ships that would put them to use.

The military capability of these new ships was even more important than their commercial potential. Equipping seagoing vessels with firearms appears to have been a Venetian innovation, though the details are not clear. At first the cannot were simply mounted on the hull of the ship and fired from the deck. But this tended to make the ships top–heavy. In the fifteenth century the problem was solved by building portholes in the side of the ships and mounting the cannon there. But firing cannon mounted from this position tended to upset the lateral stability of the ship. A stocky thickset type of ship design was worked out in which the width of the upper decks was cut back, while that of the lower decks was increased.

Portuguese ships at one period had upper decks that were only half as wide as the lower decks; the result, we are told, was the even when two such vessels hove alongside one another, it was not possible for the crews to board one from the other. This is the way the basic design for the kind of vessel that we typify as a "Western pirate ship" was evolved. By the end of the fifteenth century, Europeans had found it possible to build large–scale seagoing vessels with full combat capability.

At the same time, Japan was undergoing an identical navigational revolution. Japan's navigational skills were an accumulation of what had been learned since the first voyages transporting official missions to Sui China. In many of these voyages to China the Japanese found themselves at the mercy of the winds and seas. In each voyage undertaken to transport official Japanese missions to T'ang China during the seventh and eight centuries, one ship or more almost always came to grief. The fate of Abe no Nakamaro, whose ship washed ashore in Annam while returning from China to Japan, is only too well known. Abe was eventually to die Annam, without ever seeing his own country again.

By the *Muromachi* period, modern navigational charts also began to be used in Japan. A remarkable navigational chart still exists from that period, the so-called "Parchment Chart used by Shichirobei Sumiya," which includes latitude and longitude markings throughout. It covers the entire Western Pacific, including the southern shore of the Chinese mainland, Annam, Luzon, ThAiland, Cochin China, Borneo, and Makassar. Pinpricks may still be detected in the parchment of the chart, reaching directly from Kyushu to Annam, providing evidence for the way this chart was used in plotting voyages.

Several other similar early navigational charts are also preserved in Japan, including one attributed to Magozaemon Sueyoshi and a chart in the collection of the Ikeda family, former lords of the Okayama *han*. These charts were not drawn up by means of traditional Japanese map-making methods, but by a technique brought to Japan from Portugal about the same time fire-arms were introduced. In a sense, Japan's shipbuilding technology was more advanced than Europe's. Just as both European shipbuilding and European navigation were indebted to Arabic knowledge, so did the Japanese study these Arabic advances. The Japanese knowledge of shipbuilding was through contacts with Arabs, not indirectly through Europe. In the same way that John II of Portugal had made use of Zacut as an advisor, so also Yoshimitsu Ashikaga-who might be thought of as the John II of Japan!-employed an Arab as his adviser on shipbuilding and the science of navigation. (The Arab in question is known in the historical sources under his assumed Japanese name of "Kusuha Seinin.") This is the way the Ashikagas built the enormous vessels that they used in their foreign trade with Ming China-mighty ships that are said to have carried as much as 2,500 *koku*.

Japanese shipbuilding had made further notable progress by the latter half of the sixteenth century. Shipyards constructed the *shuinsen*, or "vermilion seal ships" (so called because they carried papers-of-charter signed with a vermilion seal, rather than with the usual signature; the first such charter was issued by Hideyoshi in 1592) , as well as the seven hundred boats that participated in the two military invasions that Hideyoshi launched against the Korean peninsula in 1592 and 1597. All these ship were somewhat smaller in size and scale than the Portuguese and English vessels, but the shipbuilding skills that they demonstrated were on a level with the best of European standards. Japanese sailors in this period made effective use of seamens' charts, astronomical instruments, and the magnetic compass.

Each of the seven warships that Yoshitaka Kuki built on orders from Nobunaga in 1581, in order to engage the Murakami naval forces, was mounted with three cannon. When these seven warships put into the port of Sakai, a Portuguese missionary who saw them there reported home in surprise that they were identical with Portuguese vessels. These seven warships built for Nobunaga were actually superior to Portuguese vessels of the same period, since, unlike the Portuguese warships, they carried metal armor plate on their hulls as protection against enemy bombardment. Armor plate of this variety was installed on a number of new vessels constructed in Japanese yards between 1592 and 1615. Armor plate was not employed on European warships until 1855, in the midst of the Crimean War. This means that as far as the history of shipbuilding technology is concerned, Nobunaga and Yoshitaka might very well have been entitled to file a claim for patent rights on the entire idea.

Japanese shipbuilding in the fifteenth century developed another epoch-making idea in the form of the screw propeller. This was an important new advance in naval propulsion, different from both the use of oars and the use of sails for motive power. Unfortunately the original Japanese model of the screw propeller was hand operated and never got beyond the drawing board; nevertheless, it represented a world-first in the technology of shipbuilding.

My major point here is that Eurasia expanded in the thirteenth century and after the contraction of the fourteenth century, the two out-of-the-way corners of Eurasia suddenly entered into a period of "roll-back" because of advances in shipbuilding. Both Europe and Japan became intensely interested a variety of maritime activities. J.H.Parry was correct enough when he called the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries "the period of the establishment of European hegemony," as long as we restrict ourselves to the history of Europe. In the context of world history, it might be better to refer to "the period of the establishment of European and Japanese hegemony." It is this idea that I mean to stress when I use the expression "navigational revolution."

3. Expansion of the "Periphery"

Europe and Japan are indeed the two topological "extremities" of Eurasia when we approach the question from the standpoint of geography alone. But when we consider it from the political point of view, then we must instead think of them as being the cultural "periphery." When the Roman Pontiff replied to the Mongol letters by ordering the Mongols to convert to Christianity, we know that what he was doing was as pointless as trying to sweep up the ocean with a broom. Even Japan might well have suffered considerably from the Mongols had it not been for the divine assistance extended to it in the form of the *kamikaze*.

This powerless "periphery" suddenly emerged from the wings to take its place front stage and tried to take the initiative in history. The "periphery" emerged by bringing force to bear upon Eurasia from the outside using armed naval vessels and a naval strategy of surrounding Eurasia rather than approaching overland or attempting to control the center of the landmass. Naval operations are far more efficient than land-based operations, and far more functional. On land, one must move "lines" on maps back and forth, but in a naval operation, one free to establish "points" on a chart, first in this location, then in that. The eastern and western extremities of Eurasia set out to capture such "points," using the advances in shipbuilding and navigation discussed above.

In Europe, the westernmost extremity of Eurasia, first Portugal, then Spain, Holland, and England each embarked upon a policy of maritime activity. In 1588, the English fleet secured naval supremacy in the Atlantic Ocean by smashing the "Invincible Armada" of Spain. England's supremacy proceeded from the Atlantic into the Indian Ocean by way of the Cape of Good Hope and directly west across the Atlantic to the New World. Each of the small maritime nations of Europe also embarked upon naval operations of tremendous scale. Sometimes these operations were undertaken by properly armed naval vessels, sometimes by fleets of merchantmen, and sometimes by squadrons of pirates. No matter hoe it was carried out, each operation combined functional elements represented by each of these three types of vessels–the warship, the merchantman, and the pirate. The European "counter attack" that followed thereafter–the acquisition, the exploitation, and the domination over their colonies–may be read about in any account of Western history; we hardly need recount these events here.

We are more interested in what happened in Japan, the easternmost extremity of Eurasia. At precisely the same point in history at which the Anglo-Saxon pirates were prospering in the Atlantic, Japanese pirates were active in the China Sea. These were the so-called *wakō* ("Japanese raiders"), also known as the *babansen* (from the Ming-period Chinese pronunciation of the characters for Hachiman, the name of the Japanese god of battles, that they displayed on their mainsail). Between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, the *wakō* laid waste the entire East China coast. The Korean state of Koryo was totally wiped out by these Japanese raiders, and during the time that they were active, not a single vessel could venture out into the China Sea without being in constant terror of an attack by the dreaded *babansen.* Sometimes these Japanese railers sailed in mighty flotillas of five hundred vessels, thus virtually constituting a privately-sponsored navy. Groups of warriors who had found themselves squeezed out in the continual domestic struggles over acquiring and holding a territorial "beat," often took to the sea and became pirates. The design of the screw propeller, noted above, was an invention of these Japanese pirates.

Let us turn to more regularized Japanese overseas advances. In his study *Shuinsen bōekka no seikaku* (The Character of the "Vermilion Seal Ship" Foreign Traders), Professor Seiichi Iwao has shown that between 1607 and 1635, a total of 341 of these vessels plied the China Sea, going back and forth between Japanese ports and Thailand and Luzon. The year 1605 saw the most activity, with a total of twenty-seven round-trip voyages being undertaken. The Japanese vessels used in this foreign trade were constructed on an extremely large scale. An *ex voto* plaque dedicated to the *Kiyomizu Temple* in Kyoto is still in existence, from which we learn that one of the *Sueyoshi* ships was 37 meters in length, and one of the *Suminokura* ships 40 meters; both were three masted, with double keels, and carried crews of 80, in addition to 320 passengers–enormous vessels, built on a lavish scale!

Will Adams (1564-1620), who served as an adviser to Ieyasu, had been a captain in the English navy when it smashed the "Invincible Spanish Armada." The scale and scope of Japanese seagoing operations soon were able to rival those of England, particularly since they were now in the hands of such powerful bourgeois figures as Ryoi Suminokura (1554–1614) and Shirojiro Chaya and enjoying the technological advice of such men as Will Adams. Judging from what I know of the matter, I believe that it would be a mistake to minimize the military might of Japan in terms of world history at the beginning of the seventeenth century. For example, in a letter sent from Japan to the King of Spain in 1610, Don Rodrigo wrote as follows:

> In this fashion, then, one hardly need use many words to demonstrate the profit that would accrue to Your Majesty in the course of advanc ing into this most extensive, and prosperously great kingdom [i.e., Japan]. But pondering deeply what the methods might be for making this possible, I ... have decided that any approach through military force is ruled out. This is because, even were not Spain as far distant as it is, nevertheless there is still to be found here a large population, with stout fortresses and defenses, so that it is quite impossible to invade this country[4].

Perhaps to write of the military might of Japan at this is an oversimplification of expression. It would probably be more accurate to speak instead of the "social energy" that filled Japan to overflowing. Foreign trade and colonization were both actively pursued. An autonomous area populated by several hundred household of Japanese was established in Cochin China. For over a decade, beginning in 1615, Nagamasa Yamada (?–1630) dominated political matters in Thailand, where the king is said have counted eight hundred Japanese soldiers among his personal bodyguard. In 1620 the population of a "Japantown" on the outskirts of Manila reached 3,000. And in that same year, one-tenth of the employees of the East India Company in Batavia were Japanese.

England and Holland set out from the west, and reached toward Africa and India. Japan reached out toward Southeast Asia. The extremities of Eurasia established one stronghold after another along the southern coast of the continent. A magnificient and astonishing spectacle was taking place in world history. What had been the "periphery" suddenly began to enlarge the mental map of the world, thanks to the new techniques of naval warfare. Formerly it had only been possible for the central sectors of Eurasia to use the painfully slow, and painfully difficult, method of expansion by advancing "lines." Now, in striking contrast, the civilizations of the two extremities of Eurasia had begun to challenge the entire world, by the facile method of holding down "points." This expansion was undertaken with an efficiency and swiftness that found its expression in Elizabethan England and in the culture of *Momoyama* Japan.

I find myself in disagreement with several of the points made by Watsuji in his study of the period of Japan's national seclusion. I am unable to agree with his interpretation of the expansionist movement as it involved mutual East-West interaction. Watsuji writes as follows:

> Both parties [i.e., what I have been referring to as the easternmost and westernmost

> extremities of Eurasia] resembled each other in that their actions were undertaken out of commercial considerations. At the core of the Portuguese movement was the spirit of Prince Henry the Navigator. Within him were united the sprit of unlimited quest, and the spirit of public enterprice. In Japan however, the movement was shot through with the spirit of outlaws and ruffians; it quite lacked any concern for unlimited exploration, or any consideration of public interest.... The force that came pressing in from the west, to reach as far as Malacca, were characterized by being the vanguard of movements that extended the sphere of vision of modern Europe. But the forces that came bearing in from the east, and also reached as far as Malacca, have not only disappeared without leaving even a trace on the communal memory of the Japanese people, they also have gone their way without making any contribution to the exploratory urge of the Japanese.

I believe that both Japanese and European movements of expansion were essentially the same. It was all rather a kind of East–West war game, with the victory going to the first on the scene.

At any rate, once the armed flotillas of East and West had set out on their voyages of expansion and exploration, they were bound to confront one another somewhere. It was not as if both parties had previously managed to set down some clear line of demarcation to separate their own territorial "beats." Naval encounters between Japan and England or Japan and Holland could theoretically have broken out in the South China Sea or the India Ocean. If such battles had taken place, they would have radically altered world history. Although they did not take place, a preliminary skirmish seemed almost to be in the offing when Hideyoshi adopted a provocatively challenging attitude in his approach to the Spanish authorities on Luzon. For a moment, it seemed as if Japan was about to become involved in a Philippine War. Then, as quickly as it flared up, the trouble subsided. Why? Because Japan had itself suddenly entered upon its policy of "national seclusion." From the very moment that this policy was embarked upon the paths of Europe and Japan, which had until then evolved in precisely parallel courses, parted company.

4. The Two Directions of Japan's Social Energy

Why did Japan embark on its policy of national seclusion? This question has already been treated in a large number of independent studies by such eminent historical specialists as Koya Nakamura, Izuru Shimmura, Zennosuke Tsuji, Mototsugu Kurita, Arimichi Ebisawa, Seiichi Iwao, and Motoi Hayashi. I am familiar with these studies, and would like to leave the question of why the policy was undertaken to these historians. My interest focuses on the fact of *sakoku* itself and its significance, particularly *sakoku* as seen from the vantage point of comparative social history, with consideration of European activities of the same period. I am most concerned with what the Japanese *sakoku* experience means in terms of world history.

The enormous outpouring of Japanese social energy that took place from the end of the sixteenth century well into the seventeenth was of a level that might have made a military confrontation with England or Holland possible. Sylvia

L.Thrupp's study of the merchant class of medieval London[5] is rich in interesting accounts of London merchants from the fourteenth through the sixteenth centuries. If we simply substitute the name of the town of Sakai for "London" in passages of her book, it reads just as well. Clearly, it will not do to underestimate Japan of the period, nor will it do to overevaluate Europe. It is difficult to speculate about who would have emerged victorious if one of the theoretically possible naval battles between England and Japan had actually taken place. But one might well imagine that if such an engagement had been joined, Japan would most likely have won.

These two powerful forces of East and West, of Europe and Japan, who had for so long been evolving in a parallel fashion, suddenly parted company at the beginning of the seventeenth century. From the year 1639 on, they were to in diametrically opposed directions. The Europeans not only continued their expansionist movement, but with increasingly impressive power and strength. But the Japanese summarily retreated from East Asia, where until 1639 they had undertaken a great amount of development. Had these two expansionist movements continued, one from the East, the other from the West, it would have been impossible for them not to have collided in East ASia. However, moments before the collision that might have been expected, one of the two retreated from the scene. The European force quickly inundated the regions left vacant by this retreat.

The contrast between East and West fell out along the following lines: the social energy of the westernmost extremity of Eurasia directed itself toward unending expansion, while the easternmost extremity suddenly turned itself toward contraction, but maintaining an unlimited possibility for expansion. In my opinion, the essential point of departure between modern Europe and Japan is to be identified in the way each elected to go down opposite paths–one toward expansion, the other toward contraction.

One hardly needs to elaborate here upon what variety of social morphology was adopted by the expansionist principle; nor does it matter whether we call it colonialism or imperialism. The enormous social energy of Europe maintained its base in the western extremity of Eurasia and expanded in every possible direction, establishing "points" everywhere and penetrating every inch of the globe to secure the regions that backed up these "points." The Boer War and the Opium War were direct results of this European expansion.

The theoretical basis of European expansion is extremely simple and no more difficult to understand than blowing up a balloon. The principles of contraction, as exemplified by the Japanese policy of national seclusion, are rather more difficult to elucidate. The Japanese "contraction" was not a simple process, such as might happen when one punctures an inflated balloon, it wan more like reducing the volume of the balloon, while maintaining its possibility for future inflation. Rather than contraction, we should probably refer to its as intensification or concentration. The energies that until then had been allowed to dissipate toward the outside were redirected internally where they now had to be coped with. Looking back at this period in Japanese history from the present, we can understand just how great a social experiment all this was–an experiment without parallel on world history.

There are numerous concrete examples that show what the necessity of coping with Japan's social energy implied internally, but let us limit ourselves to one. The heads of the well-known Suminokura family of Kyoto were enormously wealthy merchants in two successive generations. Ryoi Suminokura and his son Yoichi, who had played a central role in the lucrative foreign trade undertaken by the "vermillion seal ships." After the policy of national seclusion was instituted, the energy and capital accumulation of the Suminokura family was redirected toward undertaking large-scale civil engineering projects in many different parts of Japan, with particular emphasis on the development of inland waterways for the transport of agricultural products and other goods. With the coming of *sakoku*, no other avenues existed whereby the Suminokura family might possibly have "coped with" their social energy.

The resources that had been dissipated in overseas expansion were now suddenly redirected toward Japan's domestic development. In the political realm, this phenomenon completed the establishment of control by the Tokugawa *bakufu*, which included its meticulous bureaucracy and its system of *han* organization. In the economic sphere, there was growing development in local production. Had all of this social energy continued to be directed overseas, it would surely have dissipated itself to no particular purpose. But now that it was concentrated, it made possible the firm establishment of an elaborately detailed society and culture.

I would especially like to direct the reader's attention toward the way the surplus social energy of Japan was focused on the tertiary sector of production during this period of national seclusion. Further localizing this phenomenon, I would also like to call attention to the improvement in the standards and level of education that transpired during the two hundred fifty years of the Tokugawa regime.

Generally speaking, Tokugawa society was distinguished by a high level of intelligentsia. Ieyasu, fond of literatus-officials, determined the appointments of the Buddhist clergy according to their scholarly accomplishments and even went so far as to bestow specific temple lands according to the intellectual achievements of the clergy involved. Ieyasu did not permit himself to be swayed by cliques and factions but was deeply concerned about the academic merit achieved by each individual he dealt with. I believe that Zennosuke Tsuji was quite correct in his categorization of the Tokugawa period as one distinguished by a literatus "administration." This is particularly true when we recall that from the Ken'ei period (1624–1644) on, Tokugawa society was completely at peace, with no occasion to resort to the mobilization of its military forces.

Ukichi Taguchi has described the situation in the following lapidary passage (his dates are those of the "Imperial Calendar" of the 1940s, which began its chronology with the accession of the Emperor Jinmu in 660 B.C.)

> *O tempora, o mores!* If one were to compare the phenomenon of a society of the great peace such as obtained in the 2,400s and 2,500s [i.e., the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries] with that of the warravaged society of the 2,300s, how great the differences between these two extremes! For while both were, it is true, feudal

> systems of government, and while in both liege lords were enfeoffed throughout the land, the one saw the people engaged in slaughtering each other, while the other instead saw them living together in pleasant harmony.

It would clearly be supererogatory for me to detail the cultural advances achieved from the Genroku period (1688–1704) on. Every reader is already quite well aware of the remarkable lowering of the illiteracy rate, advances in the arts, the development of the transportation network, and the way this development led to a "culture of travel" that allowed participation by the great masses of the population.

It is important to note here something everyone is not already well aware of, that it is precisely this course of cultural development that constitutes the "unique" character of Japan. European culture of the same period, caught up in expansion–ism, was not culture on the "literatus administration" model. Instead, it took what must be described as a resolutely thorough and highly developed militaristic course. The structure of European production was determined by the stimuli between production and this militaristic course.

Consequently, in Europe factors such as the level of general education were sacrificed to other concerns. According to Thrupp's book, cite above, sixteenth–century London had an illiteracy rate of between 60 and 70 per cent. At the same time, military affairs in Japan had become quite formalized, or even merely matters of etiquette. The martial "arts" had been transformed into a military "code," and the warrior class began to function, not actually as military men, but as civil administrative officials on the literatus model.

In each of the two societies, we find different cultural patterns evolving–in the anthropological sense of that term–as each society decided upon one of the two contrasting courses available to it, the expansion of social energy, or its concentra–tion. In my view, these two societies also evolved differences in their systems of values at this time. In our consideration of Japan as an example of the course of "concentration," it is important to keep in mind a point that has been emphasized by many scholars since it was first made by Ginzo Uchida–namely, that the "elaboration" of Japanese culture went ahead during a period when the culture itself was in a state of stability. Professor Uchida first stressed this point in the following terms:

> Surveying the grand, overall circumstances of the development of the spiritual culture of Japan, we realize that the more than two hundred years of the Edo period was a time when the national culture of Japan truly entered upon its season of full fruition. During that period, we brought together the finest flowering of the other civilizations of the Orient, blended them skillfully when one another, seasoned the whole, and finally topped off the resulting blend by the application of a Japanese–style "uniqueness."

The greater portion of what we Japanese possess today as "Japanese tradition" was generated during the period of national seclusion. In every single instance, we are able to trace the wellsprings of those "traditional values" that determine the form of our practical actions and control and restrain those actions directly back to the period of Japan's *sakoku*.

This, in my opinion, provides some indication of how thorough and far-reaching Japanese culture of that period was. The question is not whether it was "good" or "bad"; that is quite another issue. What I wish to establish here is that we Japanese today are really the heirs of the culture of the period of national seclusion. If we try taking a cross-section of the political ideologies-or what pass for political ideologies-that ruffled the surface of society in passing, one can identify this or that rather insipid debate that distinguished the "hundred years of Meiji," or "the twenty postwar years," or other similarly demarcated periods of time. But when we consider the questions as a problem in culture in the sense that the term "culture" is employed in anthropology, I believe the three hundred years of the Tokugawa can be seen as an identifiable segment of time that stands as a unit by itself.

5. National Seclusion and the Present Day

Earlier in this paper, I compared the Mongol Empire to the work of a house painter. From the thirteenth and we into the fourteenth century, this particular house painter daubed about all over the Eurasian continent with a rather rough brush. To continue the same metaphor, one would have to say that from the fifteenth until the seventeenth century, the world would have a new coat of paint applied by two new house painters. And this time around, the two new house painters, East and West, would differ greatly in their techniques. The western, European-style of house painter would go about his work in a completely slapdash manner, smearing a brushful of paint on this or that point of land in Asia or Africa; he would never work over a large expanse of geography, to be sure, but his "painting" would remain at the slapdash level.

The paint job in Japan was done very differently. Throughout the sixteenth century, Japan also went about "painting house" in a slapdash fashion. But with the institution of the policy of national seclusion, suddenly there was nowhere left on the outside for the painter to paint. At this point, the housepainter began to paint and repaint, over and over again, Japan itself, the house painter's own house, using plenty of paint and doing a really thorough job. Japan became enveloped in a thick layer of paint, a protective membrane that did not easily chip or peel. This is the way the fine, delicate texture of Japanese culture was brought into being.

I hope that I may be forgiven for introducing metaphor after metaphor; but the kind of "house painting" I have been writing about-in other words, the development of a high-density society-might also effectively be compared to the process involved in the liquification of gas. Everyone knows how a gas can be liquified if placed under pressure in a stout metal cylinder. Japan's society in the period of national seclusion might well be compared to the metal cylinders that are used to contain propane gas in its liquified state. If the valve sealing such a cylinder is opened even the slightest degree, the liquified propane will once mode turn into a gas and rush out of the container with explosive force.

To me, it seems that the three-quarters of a century extending from the time of the "opening of Japan" at the end of the Tokugawa period down to the Pacific War might well be thought of as a period when Japan resembled a propane-gas cylinder with its valve wide open. The concentrated, pent-up social energy that had remained in confinement for two hundred and fifty years suddenly burst out into the open; like liquid propane it reverted to the gaseous state. Or, depending upon one's approach to the matter, one might say instead that Japan, from the end of the nineteenth century and continuing into the first half of the twentieth, was now belatedly carrying out the same slapdash "house-painting" operation that Europe had executed three centuries earlier. The naval war between Japan and England, which ought to have been fought in the seventeenth century but was not, ended up being fought just three centuries too late, and when this war finally did take place, it was fought in a fairly muddleheaded, inane fashion.

I must make it clear at this point that I am not by any means attempting to justify Japanese imperialism. If one were to engage in any value judgment on this matter, one might feel that a chronological miscalculation was involved in the timing of when to open the valve that let loose Japan's pent-up energy; one might also venture the judgment that when that valve was opened, the heat generated by the sudden gasification that resulted was all too terrible. But these are other concerns, different from the point I wish to make here, namely that Japan's Tokugawa period represented a startling storing-up of dormant energy.

Proceeding along these lines, I find that I am once more compelled to issue with Watsuji's thesis concerning the nature of Japan's period of national seclusion. I have learned a great many things from my study of Watsuji's work; nevertheless, I must confess that it appears to me that somehow the conceptual world map I have in my mind and that of Watsuji do not coincide with one another. Watsuji's thesis of the *sakoku* phenomenon revolves about the West, particularly about the Catholic civilization of the West. His mental map was oriented on the Mediterranean world; arrows were drawn on this map leading away from the center to the east or to the west, indicating the directions taken by the "limitless pursuit" by the West. For him, Japan was simply one of the targets toward which these arrows were directed, and Japan's period of national seclusion meant only that one of these arrows on his mental map of the world had been cut off en route. For Watsuji, the tragedy of *sakoku*, as well as the tragedy of Japan, was that Japan did not come under the influence of the Catholic civilization of the West.

My own mental map of world history is rather different. It is centered on the region around the city of Qara-qorum, where the general staff and operational headquarters of the Mongol Empire were located. Furthermore, there are two sets of arrows on my map. One set point away from the Western European peninsula toward the southeast, but the other set points away from Japan, in the direction of the southwest.

For reasons that I make clear elsewhere, I do not really consider that *sakoku* was at all "the tragedy of Japan." But even if we admit, for the sake of argument, that the period of national seclusion sis have its tragic elements, then I believe that its true tragedy consisted only in the sudden elimination of these arrows that had pointed out from Japan toward the rest of the world. I believe the important issue in any consideration of the period of Japan's national seclusion is not the problem of the termination of Japan's "receptivity," in the sense of Japan having been isolated from Western civilization. To me the issue is rather the interruption of Japan's "advance," in the sense that all possibility for the social energy of Japan to continue to make it inroads into the world outside was suddenly cut off. Consequently, if one were asked to decide which of the two major proscriptions of the policy of national seclusion was effectively intrinsic to the nature of *sakoku*–that of 1635, which prohibited the Japanese from leaving Japan, or that of 1639, which prohibited foreigners from entering Japan–I would certainly be of the view that the proscription of 1635 was the more important of the two, at least when the entire question is viewed from the approach of comparative social history.

So much for my views on this problem; I only fear that they may strike the reader as being somewhat self-indulgent and idiosyncratic. I have already warned the reader that I am writing only as an amateur of comparative social history, and I am particularly concerned that I may well have incorporated egregious errors of historical data into some of my statements. still, having been allowed to indulge myself this far, perhaps I may be forgiven if I add a little more along the same general lines.

I ventured to compare *sakoku* Japan with a cylinder containing liquified gas under high pressure, particularly with respect to the way in which Japan during the period of national seclusion represented a kind of concentrated social energy. I invite the reader to look at a map of the world today, keeping this metaphor of social theory in mind. It seems to me that when do this, we cannot but notice how today, in our own time, an identical process of "concentration" has begun again in certain regions of the world.

"Certain regions of the world" is what I have written; what I actually mean by this is that small region of the Eurasian continent known as Western Europe. The European expansionist movement that began in the fifteenth century continued unabated down into our own day. Eventually most of the southern hemisphere was to feel its impact and to be turned into European colonies, or at least into quasi-colonial areas.

But this movement of colonial expansionism has now finally come to an end. We have seen one European power after another being forced to let go its colonial possessions–England in India, France in Algeria and Vietnam, Holland in Indonesia. European forces, at least as a matter of form, have also been forced to retreat from the southern hemisphere. But in the southern hemisphere, what have been the causes and consequences of that retreat? For one answer, we can only point to the rise of nationalism (*minzoku shugi*) and to the proclamations of national independence everywhere throughout the southern hemisphere. To answer the question of the significance and the role these movements, we have only to glance at any newspaper published in the past ten years.

For another answer concerning the consequence of these developments, we may point to the way in which Europe has actually begun to contract back into its own "native land." Europe itself now finds it necessary to concentrate within its own relatively small territory, out there on the western extremity of the Eurasian continent, all that enormous social energy with which it once reached out to take so much into its hands. This same energy must now somehow be accommodated internally. I do not here wish to propose that what is happening to Europe is necessarily identical with what happened in *sakoku* Japan; but at the same time I do wonder if we do not have here yet another instance of "gaseous liquification" that resembles quite closely Japan during the period of national seclusion, particularly when we view the entire question from the approach of social morphology. One hears and reads much about the "collapse of the British Empire." But what this most often means is rather that it is the principle of the diffusion of "Empire" itself that has collapsed, and that this principle has now in turn been driven into the direction of "internal concentration." "High-density society," a term I used earlier, corresponds to an "internally concentrated society" in the sense of the present discussion[6].

And what of Japan? Japan too has entered upon a process of "internal concentration." "For three-quarters of a century, Japan's high-pressure cylinder valve was left wide open, but now the social energy that once was allowed to diffuse throughout northern and eastern Asia once has more had to be redirected, to be "concentrated" within the confines of the Japanese archipelago. We Japanese are once more living in a high-density, a society that might be compared with the condition of liquified gas. I have written briefly elsewhere [in this volume] about the question of cultural continuity between the Tokugawa period and modern Japan; in a word, Japan during the period of national seclusion and Japan at the present moment are quite similar, particularly as far as their sociological morphology is concerned.

As we continue to think along these lines, one even begins to conclude that this country of Japan has actually been endowed with rather more advantageous conditions than one might otherwise have suspected. How difficult it appears to be for European society to make a smooth transition from its diffusionist principles of the past five centuries to this new "principle of internal concentration." The "glory that was Europe" is hardly something that can easily be forgotten. Indeed, it seems to me that a profound sense of loss, which at times approaches frustration, has become the dominant factor in a Europe bereft of its colonies. Europe is still suffused with a lingering attachment for its colonies, and with a reluctance to give them up. For Japan, all this is quite different. We Japanese, when our colonies were lost, were able to face up to it with a calculated unconcern; if we had to lose them, well, then, we had to lose them, and that was all there was to it.

Nor do I believe that Japan's different approach to this issue was entirely the result of our defeat in the war, or that it came about solely as a result of our second thoughts entertained at the time of the surrender with regard to the morality of our earlier colonialism. Japan already had earlier experience with the process of "liquification" to return to our earlier metaphor. This meant that it would not be all that difficult for Japan to repeat the same pattern of experience one more time.

And so it seems to me quite likely that the period of national seclusion, which in the conventional wisdom is generally considered to have been the formative element in Japan's "backward" tendencies, was instead the factor that actually provided for the formation of Japan's "forward" characteristics as far as the world of today is concerned. Some three centuries ago, Japan had already experienced the situation that Europe is today experiencing for the first time. We might say that Europe is three centuries kate in coming to this, or that Japan is three centuries in advance of Europe in this respect. Whichever construction we wish to place upon the issue, I believe that so long as we do not actively study both sides of the question, it will be impossible to arrive at historical interpretation that is fair to both.

It is perhaps needless to add that the entire question is far from being a simple one. For example, we all know about the way in which history from the fifteenth century down to the present is one of the growing evolution of agricultural societies into industrial societies. We are also daily confronted with examples of the slippage that has arisen in the degree of this evolution in different parts of the world, as exemplified for example in the problems of the so-called "Third World" countries. And we are also faced with the tiresome demands levelled by ideologies. I do not think that it is possible to comprehend the world today, and especially Japan, without taking full cognizance of all these variables. But it would be necessary to write yet another paper, if one were to undertake to discuss all the ways in which these different elements have become mutually entwined with one another. All that I have aimed at doing in the present contribution is to offer an extremely rough sketch, from the approach of comparative social history, with its focus directed toward Japan of the late sixteenth century and thereafter.

Notes

1. Umesao Tadao, *Bunmei no seitai shikan* (Chūō Kōronsha,1967). Karl A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957).
2. Watsuji Tetsurō, *Sakoku* (Chikuma Shobō,1964).
3. J. H. Parry, *The Establishment of the European Hegemony* (New York: Harper & Row,1961)
4. *Ikoku sōsho*
5. Sylvia L. Thrupp, *The Merchant Class of Medieval London* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948).
6. Katō Hidetoshi, "*Kōmitsudo shakai no tankyū,*" Chūō Kōron, April 1965.

Development Nineteenth-Century Style

Frontiers

The greatest tourist attraction of the city of Sapporo, the prefectural capital Hokkaido, the northernmost island of Japan, is the campus of Hokkaido University with its statue of Dr. William Smith Clark. The famous words he addressed to his students--"Boys, be ambitious"--are inscribed on many souvenir items. Indeed, the name of Dr. Clark has become so famous that more than 80 percent of Japanese high school and university students today can identify who he was and what he did in Hokkaido. It is doubtful if 10 percent of American intellectuals, or the students of Amherst College, where Clark was president in the 1870s, know his name. Clark is one of the few Americans whose reputation is uncontestably more widespread among Japanese people than among his countrymen.

Clark came to Japan in 1876 at the invitation of the Japanese government to help inaugurate a new agricultural college in Sapporo, and he was appointed schoolmaster. He persuaded Kiyotaka Kuroda, the commissioner of the island, to establish a completely new school system based on his own philosophy. He lived in the dormitory with the students and took them on field expeditions into the wild woodland--Clark was a botanist--opening their intellectual curiosity while instilling spiritual aspirations. Hokkaido at that time was inhabited by a small population of aboriginal *Ainu* and was not agriculturally developed.

The enrollment of the new college was extremely small, only twenty-four students altogether, but their backgrounds and qualities were extraordinary. They were boys who had already been enrolled as the students of the Tokyo English school (which later became the preparatory school for Tokyo University) but had decided to quit it in order to join Clark's new school. It was as if in the middle of the nineteenth century a group of students from a prestigious East Coast school had suddenly left it and moved to an unknown new school in Minnesota or Nebraska. The twenty-four boys dared to take the chance, partly because the government had promised a generous stipend, but mostly because the whole setting--a vast wasteland, a new school, a new education philosophy--was attractive and challenging.

Clark stayed in Hokkaido for only eight months and then went back to Amherst, so his encounter with the students was extremely brief. At the farewell party held for him, Clark left those three famous words, that was all. But he made an incredible impact. The boys stayed to be "ambitious." Moreover, the words were inscribed in the minds not only of those twenty-four students but of millions of young men who heard about episode. The challenge "Boys, be ambitious" has been inherited from generation to generation, and even today the sentence is one of the most popular English sayings in Japan.

Among the students who studied with Clark were such eminent figures as Shosuke Sato, Kanzo Uchimura, and Inazo Nitobe, who later became leaders of Japanese education. The agricultural college grew into Hokkaido University, one of the seven major national universities in Japan. It is hard to think of any other American who left so extraordinary an impact on a foreign country.

Why was there such an impact? Why did twenty-four boys decide to come to Hokkaido without hesitation? Why did Clark come? The answer to these questions is found in the sociopolitical significance of Hokkaido in the middle of the nineteenth century. Hokkaido had been the land of the native *Ainu*, covered by heavy woods with millions of deer, bear, and wolves. The sea and inland rivers were rich with salmon, herring, and seaweed, and as early as the fourteenth century small settlements by Japanese were established in the southern part of the island, mainly for trading with the *Ainu.* Migration from Japan continued, and in the seventeenth century the *Matsumae* clan occupied the southern peninsula and established it as a part of Japan. From 1799 through 1807, the Tokugawa government sent explorers to the island and declared sovereignty to check the Russians, who were trying to migrate to it from Siberia. A certain ambiguity combined with power politics prevailed in regard to the sovereignty of Hokkaido, but somehow the Tokugawa succeeded in including the island as a part of the Japanese nation.

The political and military importance of Hokkaido was recognized by the officials of the Meiji government. They were deeply concerned with international relations, and believed that Hokkaido was the most urgent problem that the new Japan had to deal with. For Hokkaido to become part of Japan under international law, it had to be legally annexed to the nation and Japan's sovereignty had to be approved by the international powers. In order to strengthen their *de facto* sovereignty over the island, it was necessary to have Hokkaido inhabited by a large Japanese population. The government encouraged migration to the wilderness. There were, fortunately for the government's policy people who were willing to migrate. They were former *samurai*, loyal to old regime, who had belonged to the army defeated in the civil war (1864–68) and had thus lost their status and position under the new government, which was dominated exclusively by anti-Tokugawa elements. They needed new jobs and assignments, just as the officers of the Confederate Army did after the American Civil War, and their former status, pride, and discipline seemed to be ideally suited to the new venture in Hokkaido. Kuroda, the newly appointed special commissioner of Hokkaido, encouraged them to go to the island as "special military police," to protect the island from attack, presumably from Russia. They were given individual houses with huge lots of land for cultivation. The heads of households were armed with guns so that in case of emergency they could from an organized militia. In peacetime, they were independent farmers. The first group was recruited from Tōhoku (the northern part of Honshū) in 1875, and 208 households migrated to Hokkaido in 1876, the year

Clark came to establish the new school. One of these pioneering ex-*samurai*, Tomohiko Abiko, wrote in his diary, "I came here with the pride of serving for the nation and the aspiration to cultivate the virgin land." Recruitment continued until 1899. By that time the number of households that had migrated to Hokkaido was 7,337, with a total population of more than 40,000 scattered in thirty-seven new village communities; 40 percent of the heads of households were ex-*samurai*. Other than those selected by the government, there were many civilians who looked to Hokkaido as the land of promise. In 1897 the total population of Hokkaido reached 700,000, mostly farmers. The native *Ainu* were suppressed, and many of them died. Deer, whose meat was one of their major foods, almost disappeared because of hunting by the immigrants and merchants.

This picture suggests a parallel with American social history of the same period: the ambiguity of territorial sovereignty, the unexplored wilderness, rich natural resources, the encouragement given by the government, the fate of ex-officers of a defeated army (even the timing of the two civil wars coincided, though the scale was quite different), the suppression of native tribal people, the crude exploitation of resources by profit-seeking merchants, the disappearance of the deer paralleling the disappearance of the buffalo, and above all the existence of "frontiers," even though the Japanese frontier was much more modest in size than that of the United States. Genius and wisdom, combined with intuitive judgment, led Commissioner Kuroda to follow the American frontier model. First, he invited Horace Caplon, the U.S. commissioner of agriculture, to be a consultant for the reclamation and development of Hokkaido. Caplon came with a team of experts and proposed a major development plan that called for the investment of some 12,500,000 Yen, or $12,700,000, for a period of ten years, from 1872 through 1881. Kuroda not only invited experts from the United States, but also sent young people to study in America. In 1873 alone, the office of the commissioner sent twenty-three students to the United State with a budget of $22,400.

Kuroda and his officials were adventurous enough to follow much of the advice given by the Americans. For example, in planning the city of Sapporo, they followed American city-planning practice exactly, using a geometrical grid with numerical street numbers, so that the American natural historian Edward Morse, visiting Sapporo in 1878, wrote in his diary, "The streets of Sapporo are wide and cross one another at right angles. The whole town suggests a new but thriving village in our Western States."[1] Even today, Sapporo is an exceptional and exotic city in Japan because of its completely american style of city layout. For obvious traditional reasons, the commissioner's office had hoped to develop the island by growing rice, but the technical advisors insisted on converting the land into pasture to feed cattle. The commissioner's office followed the suggestion. Hokkaido thus became cattle country, and it still is famous for its dairy products. In short, the island of Hokkaido was turned into a small-scale frontier society on American lines.

Other American items were brought to the virgin island. For example, Caplon found that the Japanese were not equipped for the extremely cold weather in Hokkaido, except for their small hibachis, and introduced the Franklin stove. The device was so efficient that manufacturers in Tokyo started producing it, not only for the people of Hokkaido, but for the Japanese market at large. Caplon wrote that the stove was a small souvenir to the people of Japan from America.

It was in this historical context that Clark came to Sapporo. It was quite probable that he saw, perhaps to his surprise, the same social and spiritual atmosphere he might have found in the western territories of North America. Like their counterparts on the American frontier, the new immigrants to Hokkaido looked on the island as a dreamland where infinite possibilities might be realized. On the main islands, new, tight administrative organizations were being established, but Hokkaido seemed to have more freedom and elbowroom. That was why twenty-four ambitious young men did not hesitate to go to study with Clark in the wilderness.

Tocqueville refers in a famous passage to the difference in the patterns of colonization of North and South America, saying that the colonizers of the former conformed to a pretentious morality and legality, while those of the latter occupied the territory with violence. Japanese policy toward the *Ainu* was somewhere between the two, and the government headed by Kuroda must be condemned for handling the *Ainu* tribes as their counterparts in the "wild West" handled the Indians. (As a matter of fact, inspired by the recent activism of Native Americans, a social movement on behalf of the *Ainu* population has arisen in Japan in the 1970s.)

Because the island was so underpopulated, and because there were so many people who wanted to make the move, immigrants from widely different social classes, localities, and backgrounds crossed *Tsugaru* Strait, the fifty kilometers that separated the island from the mainland of Japan. The immigration pattern was extraordinary in that, for the first time in Japanese history, people from various parts of the nation mixed on the frontier. A man from a small southern island might meet and work with a man who came from a mountain village of central Japan. In that respect, Hokkaido became a melting pot on a tiny scale, an exceptionally "cosmopolitan" territory compared with the local, even chauvinistic, territories of mainland Japan. Here again, it can be argued that there was a certain resemblance between the frontier cultures of the American West and Hokkaido. Even today there is no distinctive dialect in Hokkaido, for people picked up their vocabulary from the various dialects of Japan. Traditions of many areas of mainland Japan were mixed and more or less integrated. A traditional New Year's card game was transformed into something unique with which mainlanders are quite unfamiliar. Though the context is very different, the process of assimilation of many immigrant cultures in America found a miniature counterpart in Hokkaido, ten thousand miles west across the Pacific. In other words, the historical and cultural situation and conditions of Hokkaido in the early Meiji era prepared it, by a historical coincidence, to respond to the "frontier spirit" represented by Caplon, Clark, and other American advisors.

Equality and Mobility

Hokkaido provided a geographical frontier, but more important for Japan generally was the social and psychological mobility that characterized Japan after the Meiji revolution. As a matter of fact, the leaders of the new government themselves demonstrated the possibilities of upward mobility. As E.H. Norman has pointed out, the new leaders who overthrew the lid establishment, that is, the traditional Tokugawa elites, came from the lower-ranking *samurai* classes, and some were unknown common men. Though there were strong factions inside the new government, the new leaders shared one thing in common: they had been at the bottom of the Tokugawa social structure and had never dreamed of coming to the top. Saigo, the first modern Japanese army general, was from a lower-ranking *samurai* family of *Satsuma*. Iwakura was the son of a noble family in Kyoto, but his family's position in the court was peripheral, and it never had any significant power. In spite of his noble title, he lived poorly until the revolution took place. Ito, one of Japan's most famous politicians and the prime minister who was responsible for the construction of the Imperial Constitution, came from a poor *samurai* family of *Chōshū*. Indeed, the new elites came to power by chance. The life of Kawaji, the first superintendent general of the metropolitan police, was an extreme example of success by chance. He had been another young, unknown, poor *samurai* of *Satsuma*. On the day that Saigo left the port of *Satsuma* to lead a troop of his army against the Tokugawa, Kawaji happened to be at the pier. Noticing him, Saigo shouted from the deck, "Hey, why don't you come with me," and Kawaji suddenly decided to join. Two years later, Kawaji was sent to France to study the police system, and upon his return, he was appointed head of the police. Appointments to key positions were often arbitrary. When the new leaders found intelligent young men, they thrust them into high-ranking positions in the government. The leaders could say to a young man, "I think you should come to the Department of Justice," and the next day he would appear in the office as the chief of a section. The leaders themselves were young, too. In the 1860s many of them were in their mid-thirties, and some were in their late twenties.

The government needed bright people, regardless of their birth or family status, though the *Satsuma-Chōshū* factions were dominant, and boys from these territories had far better chances than others of getting good government appointments. Thus the Meiji revolution stirred up the stagnant Tokugawa system, and the society became extraordinarily mobile. What Daniel Lerner labeled "psychic mobility" was released with incredible velocity and on a huge scale. Everybody, especially young men, looked for success, and *Risshin Shusse*, meaning "raise yourself and make your way in the world," became their motto. Dore has remarked that " the prevalence of this belief that courage, energy, and initiative could carry a man anywhere, however humble his origin, is clear enough in the biographies of those who were young at the time."[2]

The theme of "success" was dominant in the literature of the Meiji period, especially in the 1870s. The translation of Smile's *Self-Help* was very widely read, and many people looked forward to making a bright personal future. As in the America of the 1870s, optimism prevailed in the minds of the younger generation. It is true that there was misery in the Japan of the 1870s, but one should not ignore the fact that the society as a whole was mobile, or at least many people thought it was. David McClelland was right when he inferred that between 1800 and 1920, "obviously a number of countries experienced the 'take-off' into rapid economic growth--e.g., Germany France, the United States, Japan," and that in these countries "a wave of achievement motivation should have preceded the economic 'take-off.'"[3] He exemplified this hypothesis by a case study of America, where the peak of achievement motivation was observed sometime around the 1870s. Probably the same trend could be observed in Japan almost simultaneously, although no systematic survey has yet been made.

Indeed, "success stories" were one of the most popular kinds of literature in Japan as well as in the United States, and these two countries were, and still are, rather exceptional in the degree to which success stories have become established as a genre of popular literature. It is difficult, for instance, to find success stories in the British or French literary tradition, except for certain works of Dickens and Stendhal. But "success" was the great objective for the younger generation in the early Meiji period. One good example is an autobiographical novel of Kenjiro Tokutomi (1868–1927), *Notes of Reminiscence (Omoide no ki).* Born at the time of the Meiji revolution, the hero was an ambitious boy, like many of his contemporaries. With a small amount of money he received from his mother, he went to a prestigious university, studying hard while working as a newspaper delivery boy. Finally he became a successful and famous author, with a happy family and a comfortable life. The competition with his classmates and friends was extremely severe, and the hero's attitude toward competitive situation is crude and arrogant. For him the world is a place where only the hard-working can win the battle for success and fame.

It is interesting to note in this connection that the tradition of severe competition has continued and even been strengthened in contemporary Japan. It may be seen in the severe entrance examinations for prestigious schools from kindergarten to the graduate level: in the entrance examination to a school like Tokyo University, fewer than one in ten can succeed. Although there is much less chance of success today than there was in the early Meiji era, many people still believe in "success," like their counterparts in the United States. A cynic might say that "success" is a myth in an organized, or even overorganized, society like contemporary Japan. But surprisingly large numbers of people in the Japanese upper-middle class--business executives, lawyers, doctors, and other professionals--today come from rather poor families. Many of these people are "self-made" men and women, and there are indications that Japan is still a very mobil country where one can grasp one's chance and become a success. For instance, according to Dore's comparative study of social mobility, the percentage of "farmers' and agricultural workers' sons entering non-manual occupations" in Japan is 22 percent (in the United States, 24 percent; in France, 16 percent), and the percentage of "farmers' and agricultural workers' sons entering professional and managerial occupations" is 7 percent (in the United States, 8 percent; in France, 3 percent; and in Great Britain 2 percent).[4] The prototype of success made in the 1870s is still functioning in Japan a hundred years later. Indeed, as Bellah suggested in his scheme of social organization, Japan is a country where "achievement" orientation was dominant rather than "ascription."[5]

A survey reveals that the contemporary author most widely read among business people is Ryotaro Shiba. A study of the contents of his works shows that his themes are more or less "success" oriented. Shiba likes to write about heroes who live in a mobile world, where a peasant's son, by a strange quirk of fate and by effort, becomes a famous general or an influential political figure. His touch is always realistic and semidocumentary. Readers of Shiba's novels may well identify themselves with his heroes, based on men who helped to make Meiji Japan, who usually demonstrate extraordinarily high aspiration and effectiveness in decision making. The fact that his biographical novels are popular with millions of readers suggests that, for modern Japanese, the late nineteenth century was the time when people enjoyed change and mobility, both social and psychological. Many biographies and autobiographies of successful businessmen, politicians, and professional people of the Meiji era (as well as many who were born after the Meiji revolution) boast of the poverty of their families and the misery of their early lives. Indeed, the heroes of success stories in modern Japan must come from poor family backgrounds. Here again, one is impressed by the parallelism between the United States and Japan–the nineteenth century was the time when the log cabin mythology of the Midwest became dominant, and self–made men replaced the East Coast quasi–aristocracy. And like presidents of the United States from Jackson to Hoover, Japanese prime ministers found it an advantage to come from poor agrarian backgrounds.

The basic question, then, is why japan, which had been so stagnant and hierarchically organized, transformed itself rapidly into such a mobile society? Several factors that encouraged mobility and the philosophy of mobility must be carefully examined here. In the first place, it should be noted that at the time of the establishment of the new government, the principle of "equality of four peoples" (*Shimin Byōdō*)was propagated–meaning that the four social classes (*samurai,* farmers, craftsmen, and merchants), rigidly defined during the feudal era, had to be abolished. In the new era created by the rebellions against the Tokugawa regime, an individual could choose, at least theoretically, his or her own occupation and career. A farmer's son was no longer constrained to stay in the village. He could go to a big city and look for a job or study at any school to which he was admitted. The "equality" principle officially declared by the government meant the total disorganization of the feudal hierarchy. It is in this context that Fukuzawa asserted, at the beginning of his enormously influential book, *An Encouragement of learning,* "It is said that heaven does not create one man above or below another man. This means that when men are born from heaven they are all equal. There is no innate distinction between high and low"[6]

Scholars agree this passage may have been a modified translation of the American Declaration of Independence, but the important thing is that Fukuzawa not only advocated equality, but also tried to practice the principle in his everyday life. For example, in his autobiography he describes a visit by a friend in the government who wanted him to accept a position of honor for his contribution to the nation. Fukuzawa refuses the offer, saying, "What is remarkable about a man's carrying out his own work? The cartman pulls his cart; the bean-curd makers produces bean-curd; the student reads his books. Each one follows what is his obligation. If the government wants to recognize the ordinary work of its subjects, let it begin with my neighbor, the bean-curd maker. Give up any such ideas about my special work."[7] Many of his contemporaries approved this radical equalitarian attitude.

Another source of equalitarian thinking was the teaching of American missionaries. Dr. Clark himself was a devout Protestant, and taught the Gospel of Christ along with the new agricultural technology. At the end of his stay in Hokkaido, his twenty-four students assembled and signed a pledge as believers of Jesus Christ. For those young people, every individual, regardless of origin, was equal in the light of Christian universalism. As a result, Sapporo Agricultural College produced such devout Christians as Kanzo Uchimura, who went to Amherst and became an extremely puritanical Christian. However, in his case there seemed to be elements inherited from Japanese culture that were attuned to the missionary spirit of nineteenth-century America. In *A Diary of a Japanese Convert*, published in 1895, he describes his grandfather, who lived in the late Tokugawa period, as a crystalization of honesty and his grandmother as a diligent woman for whom "vivere est laborare." The asceticism of the *samurai* spirit that Uchimura inherited found a real kinship with the individualistic Protestant ethic of nineteenth-century New England. He idealistically admired American Puritanism and criticized simple-minded American missionaries in Asia. Upon his return to Japan, he argued the essentials of true Christianity against eleven American missionaries in Niigata, basing his defense of Buddhism on his belief in a law of the universe, rather than in the narrow interpretation of biblical documents. He quit his appointment at a Christian college after serving only three months.

Not only the *samurai* tradition, based on Confucian philosophy, but also certain sects of Buddhism, could be connected with nineteenth-century American Puritanism. For example, a group of young Buddhists belonging to the Shinshu sect, in which Bellah found certain parallels with Protestantism, began publishing in 1887 a magazine called *Temperance (Hanseikai Zasshi)*, whose main purpose was to propagate abstinence from alcohol. They gathered news from abroad, especially from america, and saw in temperance a social issue that they could share with Protestant asceticism. In short, the government's declaration of "equality of four peoples" remobilized latent individualistic, achievement and mobility-oriented traditions, which were stimulated and encouraged by the intellectual and spiritual atmosphere of mid-nineteenth-century America.

Education

In this world in which everyone believed that success was possible, education was emphasized as the means to take advantage of opportunity and rise in the world, in Japan even more than in the United Stated, One indication of the extraordinary appeal of education was Fukuzawa's *An Encouragement of Learning.* According to Fukuzawa's own records, this book, first published in 1872, with continuous editions through 1876, sold 220,000 copies. The population of Japan at that time was approximately thirty-five million, and a simple calculation tells us that one out of every 160 Japanese purchased the book. Presumably younger people between the ages of fifteen and twenty-five were the most attracted, and one may estimate, taking account of the book reading and borrowing habits of the day, that Fukuzawa reached more than 50 percent of the youth of the 18702. Fukuzawa presents his argument simply. After emphasizing the theme of the equality of man, in a passage we have already quoted, he stresses the vital importance of education as the way to get ahead; "There are no innate status distinctions separating the noble and base, the rich and the poor. It is only the person who has studied diligently, so that he has a mastery over things and events, who becomes noble and rich, while his opposite becomes base and poor." Differences in status and wealth "are entirely the result of whether one has or does not have the powers which learning brings."

He was well aware of the revolutionary possibilities for social change in the principle of "equality of four peoples," and wrote, "Looking back upon the developments of recent times, we see that the peasants, artisans, and merchants have risen in dignity a hundred times over their former statuses, and have gradually reached the point of standing on equal terms with the former *Samurai* families. so today, employment in government service is open to men of character and talent among the formerly non-*Samurai* groups." Under these new circumstances, he wrote, "...the state is now grounded on the principle that all men are socially equal. Therefore, from the present day forward, there will be no such thing as hereditary class rank among the Japanese people. A man will have rank only on the ground of his talents, virtues, and accomplishments."

Undoubtedly these words encouraged and motivated ambitious young people, and many of them, like the hero of *Notes of Reminiscence,* tried to enter competitive academic institutions and test themselves against their age-mates. Thus, Yorozu Oda, a well-known professor of law and a practitioner in international law, recalls in his autobiography the competitive entrance examination for the government law school; "There were more than 15,000 applicants who took the examination. Many of them came from various local prefectures, and the first screening test continued for several days. Those 150 who passed the test had to take a second test, and finally 50 students were selected." The chances of success were one in 300, but once accepted, a student was provided with free tuition and a stipend by the government, so that he could concentrate on learning. The examination was open to all applicants without bias. The sole purpose of selection was to recruit bright young people who could take key positions in the government.

Those who failed were able to try again the next year, or to try other schools, though in private schools the tuition fees came to be burdensome. But students were proud of their statues for they knew that good job opportunities awaited them. A student's song of the day ran, "Don't laugh at poor students, all the ministers were once poor students, too."

Emperor Meiji himself was very much concerned with higher education, and in 1872, the year when Fukuzawa published his book, the emperor visited *Tokyo Kaisei Gakko* (later Tokyo University), where he inspected each department and gave his greetings; "His Majesty celebrates the progress of knowledge. The schools of professional knowledge are the places where talents grow. His Majesty expects the expansion of higher education of various branches. You should be reminded of His Majesty's deep concern." The "encouragement of learning" was thus everywhere, not only in the title of Fukuzawa's book. A Chinese poem written by a Japanese Confucian scholar of the eighteenth century was revived. It may be translated; "With ambition, I, a man, leave my home country. If I cannot fulfill my aim to study, I will not come back, not even to die. The place of my tombstone is not destined to be my home country. For me, green mountains are everywhere." All possible sources, old and new, from east and west, that could ignite the desire for achievement of a new generation, were mobilized and propagated.

As a result, in the 1870s Tokyo became a vibrant city to which thousands of young people came from every corner of the country, mostly on foot. High aspirations for learning prevailed; as Daikichi Irokawa aptly said, Clark's slogan, "Boys, be ambitious," was "strong gunpowder thrown into a fire."[8] According to one study, several hundred compositions written by school children and appearing in a children's magazine of the 1870s and 1880s were dominated by the themes of "study," "diligence," "fighting handicaps," "hard work," and other achievement-oriented motives. The "encouragement of learning" was a fever that attacked the new generation of the early Meiji period.

The recognition of the importance of education was, however, not the result of the Meiji revolution only. Rather, it was a continuation from the late Tokugawa period, as Passin has suggested in his intensive study of modern Japanese education.[9] Elementary schools called "*terakoya*" had been established in many communities since the beginning of the eighteenth century, and by the time of the Meiji revolution, it is estimated, almost 100 percent of *samurai*, 70 to 80 percent of merchants, and 50 to 65 percent of artisans in the big cities were literate. In rural villages, the heads of communities were 100 percent literate, and even among small tenants 20 percent were able to read and write. Respect for intellectual achievement was part of the Japanese tradition. Indeed, as early as the 1780s, Chikuzan Nakai advocated a compulsory education system on a national scale, and many people were aware that education was the basis for national development. It was no wonder, therefore, that the elites of the Meiji government felt mass education was their most urgent task.

The zeal for education was thus the product of the acceleration of the aspirations that had been latent in the pre-Meiji period. In 1871 the Ministry of

Education was founded, and in 1872 four years of compulsory education were instituted. The legislation asserts in its preface that "learning is the basis for a person to be independent, and every individual person is obliged to learn." The purpose of compulsory education was clearly stated as "to let no household in a community remain unlearned and to let no individual in a household remain unlearned." The tone of the legislation was quite similar to that of Fukuzawa's book, though the latter was more radical and had greater impact. There was little disagreement among government policy, liberal thinkers like Fukuzawa, and, above all, the general public. Everyone welcomed the new era as far as the diffusion of education was concerned.

It is worthwhile to observe an almost parallel development in the United States at approximately the same historical point. Preceded by pioneering movements such as the Pennsylvania Society for the Promotion of Public Schools (established in 1827), Horace Mann succeeded in 1852 in getting legislation passed establishing compulsory education in Massachusetts, though the actual enforcement of the law had to wait until the late 1860s. In 1871, New Hampshire, Michigan, and Washington decided to enforce compulsory education; in 1872, Connecticut and New Mexico; in 1873, Nevada; and in 1874, New York, Kansas, and California adopted similar legislation. This movement fulfilled the hopes of Jefferson's "Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge" (1779), in which he stated that "those persons whom nature has endowed with genius and virtue should be rendered by liberal education worthy to receive, and able to guard the sacred deposit of rights and liberties of their fellow citizens, and that they should be called to that charge without regard to wealth, birth or other accidental condition or circumstances." Indeed, what Fukuzawa emphasized in 1872 almost coincides with Jefferson's statement, though the sociohistorical context was rather different.

As suggested before, the 1870s were the age of the frontier in America, when mobility, both geographical and social, was accelerated, and ambition and success came to be basic American values. A close observation of the American scene of the 1870s amazes a historian of Japan, because developments in education and popular aspiration are so similar. One suspects that if Fukuzawa had ever had a chance to meet Jefferson, they would have been surprised at how much they had in common. Furthermore, the United States and Japan seem to have shared a common orientation toward "practical" education. Fukuzawa was extremely insistent on this point. He was critical of the nonpractical, philological approach to knowledge, which had been dominant in Japanese higher education in the pre-Meiji period, and emphasized the need for "practical" knowledge. He wrote, for instance, "Letters are the instruments of learning. They are like hammers and saws to build a house. Although hammers and saws are indispensable tools for building a house, a person who only knows their names but not how to build a house cannot be called a carpenter. For this reason, a person who only knows how to read letters but does not know how to discern the principles of things cannot be called a true scholar." In another passage he wrote; "The object of one's primary efforts should be practical learning that is closer to ordinary human needs. For example, a person should learn the forty-seven letter *Kana* syllabary, methods of letter writing and accounting, the practice of the abacus, the way to handle weights and measures, and the like." Fukuzawa was undoubtedly a "pragmatist," one who preceded John Dewey.

Another parallel in education was the positive acceptance of Social Darwinism, especially the work of Herbert Spencer. It is well known that Darwinism was not immediately accepted in Europe, but found much less resistance in the United States and Japan, and Spencer's Social Darwinism became a dominant theme in the social sciences in both countries in the late nineteenth century. The japanese people were rather happy to learn that the ancestors of mankind were primates, because it fitted so well into the scheme of the Buddhist cycle of reincarnation. Japan was a paradise for Darwin, and his theory as well as Spencer's, simplified and misinterpreted, was used to justify the competitive new world, where the "survival of the fittest" was the rule. Shoichi Toyama, who is regarded as the founder of sociology in Japan, was a student of Spencer's, and the first book of sociology translated into Japanese was Lester Ward's *Dynamic Sociology. The Principles of Sociology*, by Franklin Henry Giddings, was translated into Japanese in 1899, only three years after its original publication.

Patterns of Development

Both the United States and Japan were "developing countries" in the mid-nineteenth century. By historical coincidence, the 1860s were a period of civil war in both countries, and the effect of the civil wars was to strengthen both countries as independent nation-states. A dominant theme in both was the exploration and exploitation of the frontier, and its incorporation into the central society. Though the United States was far ahead of Japan industrially, the hegemony of industry was in the hands of European nations, especially Great Britain, and thus both countries may be seen as "trying harder" because of their number 2 position. Both countries were optimistic about their future, and their peoples responded to opportunities and hoped for individual success. The Protestant ethic, whether Christian or Buddhist, worked as a driving force. Social mobility was encouraged, and radical equalitarian philosophies were advocated and practiced. "Progress," with all its infinite possibilities, was believed in by many, and catching up with the "developed" world--Great Britain and other European nations--became a major national goal in both countries. Indeed, Commodore Perry's aggressive descent on Japan in 1853 was for dual purpose of investigating the possibility of direct American trade with China, which until then had been monopolized by the British, and exploring the sea route across the Pacific so that American trade with the Far East might compete with the European trade via the Indian Ocean. It was an adventure appropriate to a number 2 nation competing with a number 1 nation.

Japan at that time was unaware of the international pecking order among nations. Her concern was rather to avoid becoming another China, which was being exploited by the West. But as soon as the new course was established by the Meiji government, Japan aspired to compete with the industrial nations of the world, and as suggested at the outset of this paper, some government officials, including Kuroda, intuitively looked to America for a "model" of development. As the experience of the American frontier seemed to be applicable to the Japanese frontier, Japan thought that America, as a "developing" nation, could give her more insights than a "developed" country like Great Britain could, though missions were sent to Europe, too.

In order to achieve the national goal of industrialization, Japan emphasized the role of education. Though there was no such term as "social investment in education," what Japan did in the nineteenth century was what twentieth-century development experts would call adopting a "manpower strategy." In a lesser degree, American also was aware of the importance of education for social development.

Though there were, and are, many obvious historical and cultural differences between the two countries, the United States and Japan had, and have, one significant similarity as "developing" countries of the nineteenth century. Their patterns of development were fundamentally different from those of the eighteenth century, which may be represented by Great Britain, in which colonial exploitation was the basic mode. The two developing nations of the nineteenth century concentrated their efforts on education and technology, based on pragmatism.

One hundred years later, the United States and Japan appeared on the international economic scene as giants. The "developing" countries of the nineteenth century found themselves ahead of the former "developed" nations, having become a second generation of "developed" countries. It is interesting and important to note, however, that a number 2 consciousness still persists in the two countries. It is my impression that there is a strong belief that the present is "imperfect" and that "perfection" can never be achieved, or that it may be achieved someday, but not now. Therefore, something "new" is always being tried. The sense of "imperfection" is one of the basic themes in both American and Japanese culture. From the number 2 point of view, number 1 is a model: in city planning, for instance, Victorian London or Napoleonic Paris. Unlike London and Paris, the big cities of number 2 are imperfect. They need modification, rezoning, redevelopment, and new planning constantly: Tokyo and New York are always "under construction." There must be something better, something newer. In this sense, the two cultures are metabolic, or at least quasi-metabolic, and the cult of sociocultural metabolism is the basis of the "American dream," and, in a lesser degree, of the "Japanese dream."

Are these dreams and beliefs disappearing or declining? With the arrival of a radical left, an ecology movement, consumerism, and the women's liberation movement, in both societies, one must ask this question, but no definite answer seems to be presented yet. It should be noted that we may see another style of development, which may be called "development twentieth-century style," in the "developing countries" or the "Third World," different from both the eighteenth-century and the nineteenth-century styles. A fundamental historical question--one which we will have to leave of the future--is whether the twentieth-century style, perhaps represented by China, is going to succeed the nineteenth-century-style counties, as they have succeeded the eighteenth–century–style countries.

Notes

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2. Ronald Dore, ed., *Aspects of Social Change in Modern Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967).
3. David McClelland, *The Achieving Society* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1961), pp. 149–50.
4. Dore, *Aspects of Social Change.*
5. Robert Bellah, *Tokugawa Religion* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957).
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7. Yukichi Fukuzawa, *Autobiography* (Tokyo: *Hokuseido,* 1953).
8. Daikichi Irokawa, *Kindai Kokka no shuppatsu: Nihon no rekishi* [The beginning of a Modern Nation: History of Japan], vol. 21 (Tokyo, 1966).
9. Herbert Passin, *Society and Education in Japan* (New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1965), p. 57.

IV. Urban Studies

From Pantheon to Presley: Changes in Urban Symbolism

1. The City as Communication

The people of the Shang dynasty China (1400 B.C.), especially its priests, wrote questions pertaining to all affairs of life on a piece of animal bone, burned it in a fire, and read the resulting oracle through the patterns of cracks, which appeared on the surface of the bone. Among many other questions, archeologists found that the people of Shang often asked Heaven about the building of a new city. The question was written as "The making of a city. Does Heaven approve?" Only when the divination from Heaven was positive would people start to build a city-state; a city-state with the support of Heaven could enjoy prosperity and security.

At the center of a city-state of Shang, there was the shrine of a King's ancestor, and many offerings and sacrifices were dedicated there. The King of a Shang city-state was supposed to be a descendant of Heaven, and, therefore, was called "son of Heaven. " The worship of Heaven was synonymous with ancestor worship, and the ancestor-god was the guardian god of a Shang city.

Quite similar developments of cities are found in other parts of the world. For instance, a "Tel" (city) of ancient Sumer was essentially the place where the guardian god of the Tel resided. Ur was the city of Nannu, the moon god; Uruk was the city dominated by goddess Ishtar; and the god of air, Enlil, who was the central figure in Sumerian mythology, had his temple in the city of Nippur. The entire Sumerian civilization can be seen as one great pantheon. Vast numbers of offerings were presented at each temple to console its god, and every city was supposed to be the property of its god. The secular ruler of the city, called Enki, was nothing more than the obedient agent of the guardian god, acting at his instruction, as interpreted by the priest class.

In the case of ancient Egypt, there was no temple-city similar to Sumer or Shang, but it may be safe to say that pyramids, which each Pharaoh commenced constructing at the time of his enthronement, were special types of "cities, " because each Pharaoh established his office near the pyramid into which he would enter after his death, thus temporarily establishing the Egyptian capital at each pyramid site.

The emergence and function of the cities in Greco-Roman civilization also were extremely religious and mythological. Greek cities, needless to say, were the headquarters of gods who were worshipped as the symbolic guardian spirits of each city. Delphi was th city of Apollo, Ephesus belonged to Artemis, and Cyprus was the seat of Aphrodite. Of course, Zeus, the highest among the Greek gods resided on Mount Olympus, the great home of all the deities. Each individual household worshipped Vesta, a goddess of fire, Penates, the family gods, and so forth. The head of a family conducted religious rituals every morning as a token of respect to such gods. These same deities presided over Roman cities.

The historical situation was quite similar in Japan. Japanese urban civilization emerged in the early 6th century as the result of the conscious efforts of Princess Shotoku, who built *Shitennōji* and *Hōryuji*. Beginning with the establishment of these Buddhist temples, urban culture flourished in the Nara basin. Before Emperor Genmei announced the official inauguration of the city of Nara, priests had made divinations regarding the direction and location of the city, and the Emperor followed the old rituals of the Shang and Chou dynasties of China in selecting the site. A number of temples were near the new city site--such as *Kōfukuji*, *Yakushiji*, and *Hōryuji*--and, to commemorate the new capital, a now-famous, gigantic sculpture of Buddha was constructed. The city of Nara prospered as a cathedral city, a perfect example of the fact that ancient Japanese cities emerged with Buddhist temples. Indeed, as Arnold Toynbee said, "Every city--or it might be more accurate to say, every city before the present age of mechanization--has been, among other things, a holy city in some degree."

In these ancient holy cities, the lives of inhabitants were full of religious rituals and ceremonies. Dionysia, for example, was a festival initiated in Athens in the 6th century B. C. As the name indicates, its purpose was to entertain Dionysius, and as a part of the entertainment, competitive performances of tragedy and comedy were staged. The citizens of the cities of Greece and Rome were able to maintain spiritual solidarity with the gods through their participation in the festivals such as this, which formed the origin of the theatrical arts in the West.

In his interesting book, Magic, Myth, and Money, William Desmonde points out that the sacrificial bull offered to deities in Greek cities had to be shared by all citizens of the community, and only citizens were allowed a "ration" out of the sacrificial bull. Sports in Greece, also, were dedicated to holy gods, and the winners of the events were toasted with a cup of blood extracted from the sacrificial bull. The trophy cup which is the prize in many athletic competitions today obviously is a continuation of this tradition.

In Rome, too, similar religious rituals were observed. In the policy decisions of Rome, priests and augurs who made divinations through bird-watching played an important role, and all the sports events on the holy days had as their primary purpose the entertainment of deities,. In the early stage of the Roman Republic, there were 66 holy days; toward the end of the Empire, there were 135.

The people of Shang also dedicated their whole lives to their ancestor spirits. A joint feast of gods and men was held on all ceremonial occasions, and the people shared the sacrificed bull, cereals, and wine offered at the shrine after the ceremony. Recent archeological research revealed that both music and dancing were offered along with food and drink in Shang cities, and such festive ceremonies became more sophisticated during the Chou dynasty.

Ancient Japan was no exception. According to Kunio Yamagata, a folklorist, the verb "*matsyru*" (to worship) is akin to another verb "*matsurau*," meaning "to be at the service of . . . . " The implication is that man's worship consists of service to the gods. On every special occasion men shared their meals with gods. Yamagata said,". . . in Japanese festivals, the way to entertain gods has been quite similar to the way to host the very important human guest--at the meal time, the best food and drink are prepared with extra care, and men tried their best to prolong the pleasant hours for the guest." People gathered around the fire and exchanged wine cups with the gods. In Greece and Rome, music and sports were presented in front of a shrine to entertain the gods. In Japan, *Sumo*, or Japanese wrestling, originated as a ceremonial sport at the shrines.

Whether these similarities in the city life of East and West were the result of cultural diffusion or independent parallel development may be an interesting historical and anthropological question. But the important thing here is that in many areas of the world cities have been perceived by human beings as inseparable from superhuman deities. A city belonged to its god, and the citizens of that city were the servants of his temple. The integration as well as reorganization of ancient cities resulted from holy efforts. For instance, Enlil, the master deity of Sumer, was amalgamated with Marduk, the almighty god of Babylonia, and became Bel-Marduk when Babylonia was unified by Hammurabi. The unification of the Babylonian people took place because gods of the city states had decided to be unified. The secular world was only an expression of the heavenly worlds inhabited by the gods.

As we have seen, the people of cities were in constant touch with the gods by means of priests' mediations or joint feasts. This process was more than "communication" between human beings and deities: it was a holy communion. And to be a citizen in an ancient city was to be continuously in holy communion with the guardian deity of the city.

It is clear, then, that one of the basic historical characteristics of cities, both in the East and West, was the fact that they were established by gods as sacred places and operated as sacred places. Of course, there were many other functions in a city; commercial, industrial, and educational functions were also important. But among these functions, religious ones were fundamental, and the architecture of every ancient city demonstrates its religious nature through pantheons, temples, and shrines.

A good example is the city of Cologne. In the middle of the 13th century, this city, with a population of 25,000, decided to build the greatest church in the world. It was a fantastic idea. But the people of Cologne started the construction in the 15th century, and for a period of four hundred years, they worked continuously. Petrarch visited the city at the very early phase of construction and was skeptical that the ambitious project would be completed, but when Goethe visited the same spot 400 years later, he saw that the church was almost completed.

At last, in 1842, the Cathedral was accomplished. Even today, a traveller along the Rhine can see the gigantic building from a distance of 10 miles and in the city, the Cathedral overwhelmingly dominates the whole area. As the developmental map of Cologne prepared by Schneider shows, the history of the city has been integrally tied to the successive construction of churches. The city grew with the increase in the number and size of church towers. It has been a well–known historical fact that Greeks did not pay much attention to the style of their own residences, yet they worked hard on their pantheons. The enthusiasm of the citizens of Cologne in the past reminds us of classic Greek devotion to deities.

Not only in Cologne, but also in many cities of medieval Europe, the citizens displayed a great zeal for jumbo–size cathedrals. The people of Ulm, in the mountains of southern Germany, worked five hundred years for their church, and finally succeeded in building the highest church tower in the world(161 meters––5 meters higher than the one in Cologne). Similar religious towers and cathedrals are found among Islamic and Buddhist cultures, too. In Japan, the time and energy devoted to such fantastic temples of Kyoto as *Tōji* or *Chionin* are beyond any realistic measure.

Of course, the world's great religious architectural structures––from pyramids to the *Tōji* temple––were designed and financed by the ruling class of the day, and it is true that people of the cities were exploited through taxes and their labor for the construction projects. But at the same time, it should be noted that a cathedral had an absolute symbolic and spiritual value to the minds of these city dwellers, and they were really happy to participate in such great ventures. Just until yesterday in the history of mankind, a city was the place for communion, rather than communication. At least every historical city evolved out of such holy communion with the gods.

2. From Holy Days to Holidays

As we have seen already, in Rome, there were up to 135 "holy days" a year, and each "holy day" was filled with particular ceremonial events; indeed, according to D. Jame's historical account , the earlier calendar of Rome was nothing but a list of these festivals.

For example, in Rome, since before the days of Caesar, March was the beginning of the year, and the month was dedicated to Mars. To entertain this great god of war , chariot races were held at Campus Martius, north of the city of Rome. A parade of armored warriors was another major event of the month.

The 21st of April in Rome was a holy day called Parilia, a day for purification of the pasture and animals at the beginning of the spring season. Farmers washed their livestock as well as themselves with water, and swept the floors of their barns with laurel trees. Sulphur was burned with olive leaves, and the smoke was poured over the animals for purification. Cakes, cereals, and milk were offered to Pales, the pastoral goddess, and after such offerings were made, animals were released over the pastures. When all these complicated rituals were completed, farmers were assured of good fortune and a good harvest that year. Romulus later assimilated this festival into the city life of Rome as the founding day of the city.

On the 9th, 11th, and 13th of May––the Lemuria––the evil spirits of the dead came back to the earth, and in order to avoid them, Romans had to follow subtle rituals. First of all, the head of each family had to rise very early in the morning, wash his hands, and walk around the house in his bare feet, throwing beans over his shoulder, without looking behind him. Then he washed his hand again, and all of a sudden made a loud noise. The evil ghost would disappear as the result of such rituals.

Every holy day of Rome was accompanied by very intricate procedures through which people displayed their respect and goodwill toward the deities. A holy day, in other words, was a day which man devoted to his gods.

The situation was identical in Japan. One good example is the *Gion* Festival of Kyoto. Historical documents show that this festival, a ceremony performed for the god of the *Yasaka* Shrine, originated in 869 A. D. by order of the Emperor to drive away an epidemic which had attacked the city. The priest of the shrine performed a special prayer to drive the evil spirit of disease into a pond in the center of the city. In the 10th century the Imperial court added horse races and music to the festival ritual, thus making it one of the major annual events of Kyoto. The holy day tradition still exists in the city. Every year, millions of people gather to celebrate the festival, and most of the local businesses, including banks, are closed. The shrine also is famous for its New Year's festival, known as *Okera*. In former times, every household of the city was supposed to visit the shrine at midnight on December 31st to obtain the holy fire produced at the shrine and to cook the ceremonial meal of the New Year's day by the fire. Even in recent years, more than one million people would came to the shrine with match–cords in their hands so that they could bring holy fire back to their kitchens. The solidarity of the citizens of the city was achieved through everybody sharing the same holy fire of the city god. Festivals of the city were socially defined in the West, as Max Weber points out, the basic life style of the protestant ethic was "pray and work." Sundays were the days for prayer, and the hours were sacred.

The "holy day" tradition, however, has become transformed gradually since the medieval period. According to Kunio Yanagita, the decisive change in the meaning of Japanese festivals took place with the emergence of "spectators." For example, in the festivals of Japanese shrine, every inhabitant of the city used to participate in the ceremonial occasions. The Mikoshi, a mobile shrine, had to be carried by the hands of the citizens, and everybody had to visit the shrine to pay his respects to the deities. These were the imperatives imposed upon members of any city. However, over the years, a new group of people emerged; the "spectators." The spectators were outsiders to the festival, and therefore, to the community. They came to festive occasions not to be involved in communion, but to have fun at the festivities of the urban life.

As Weber further notes, the shift from "participation" to "spectator–ship" may be defined as the "secularization" of " holy days." Religious festivals began to lose their significance and become secular entertainment. A "holy day" became a "holiday" in the contemporary sense. The more the cities developed, the less the religious functions of the cities were felt by the people, and finally the basic integrating process in the city life––communion––became forgotten, Significantly, in ancient cities, the temple was located in the center of a city, with commercial and industrial areas often in the peripheral sections; but the priority has reversed both in the East and West. Handlin has said that this reversal took place in western Europe after the 16th century. Now the center of a city is dominated by commercial firms and banks, and traditional churches and temples are sandwiched by the bigger new office buildings. In Frankfurt, many traditional "holy days" of the city were observed until the 18th century, but with the rapid industrialization most of the festivals just disappeared. "Holy days" were transformed into "holidays" or "leisure," and "holy events" became "entertainments."

If we reflect on the history of our contemporary public "leisure" activities and "entertainments," we are struck by the fact that they have, without exception, religious origins. According to Reuel Denney, football in England developed from religious competitions between communities; as we have seen, Japanese *Sumō* also came from sacred sports. *Kabuki*, Japanese traditional art, was founded in the 17th century by a woman named Okuni, who originally was a shaman attached to *Izumo* shrine. She secularized her talent and attracted spectators to the city of Kyoto. Horse racing, a universal spectator game, needless to say, has another religious origin and music in general has been religious, too.

Indeed, Western music until the Baroque period was essentially church music, and even the composers of the Romantic and Impressionist era did not forget to write church music.

Commerce is another area connected with sacred events. Both in the East and West, the market place originated at religious festivals. Even today, *Ennichi*--temporary, small retail shops--are open in the yards of Japanese temples and shrines; the term "*Ennichi*" simply means "holy day market."

Probably the most striking example of the shift from sacred events to leisure activities is the changes that have taken place in traveling. For instance, take some of the temples of Kyoto. As was discussed earlier, some shrines of the city were the residences of local city deities, but some others, such as *Honganji* or *Myōshinji*, have been the headquarters of various Buddhist sects with nation-wide organizations of memberships which reached millions. The fact that the headquarters is there means that the members of the sect should visit the temple at least once in their lifetime. Since the 15th century, the Buddhist worshippers belonging to such sects have tried their best to come to their headquarters temples in Kyoto.

For a while, a trip to Kyoto was a sacred pilgrimage. But historically speaking, the period during which people traveled purely because of religious motivation was extremely short; the visit to the city quickly came to mean "fun" for most of the people. Of course, upon their arrival in Kyoto, they visited the temple. But after they finished their rituals, they came to spend more time on sightseeing, and a reversal of the goals-and-means relationship took place.
In the earlier stage, the sightseeing part of the travel was permissible pleasure which came with religious pilgrimages. But soon, the pleasure became the major purpose of travel. People traveled to Kyoto for fun, and, in that context, the visit to the temple was a good means of justifying it. The temple visit, indeed, was a psychological compensation for the feeling of guilt at having pleasure and fun. In the case of the *Yasaka* shrine, for instance, though its *Gion* festival was a religious occasion, as soon as the shrine became famous, it became surrounded by

entertainment facilities. Today, *Gion*, the name of the neighborhood of the shrine, is associated with a prosperous amusement zone with hundreds of teahouses. Very few people would associate *Gion* with the shrine and practically nobody knows the name of the god and all the historical and religious background of the shrine.

3. The Metamorphosis of the Gods

The secularization of holy experiences has been going on with amazing speed. The places of worship have been transformed into objects of sightseeing and holy days have become holidays. The quality of the time-space relationship in cities has completely changed. A visit to any cathedral in the world--Notre Dame of Paris Canterbury Cathedral, the Temple of Dawn in Bangkok, or Chionin of Kyoto--would be sufficient to see the changes in sacred time and space in the past two hundred years. Of course there are still monks, priests, and other people of holy professions in these holy places. There has been no change in their service in the cathedral in the past several hundred years. Changes have taken place, however, in the nature of people who visit the famous cathedrals. A few hundred years ago, the people who went to a church or temple were those who participated in sacred services. But today, most of the people inside the church are tourists poured out of guided city tour buses. They take pictures of each other in the church yard, with the gigantic architecture as their background, and they are approached by many vendors who try to sell small souvenir items of the holy place. The cathedral is not a place of communion, but a place of petty commerce in postcards and tiny replicas of religious icons.

While most of the tourists are happy merely to see the cathedrals and to take pictures of their pleasant tour, there remains an ambiguity in their minds. On the one hand, the sacred places are perceived as "something to see," but on the other, they are still regarded as somehow sacred, regardless of their affiliation or non-affiliation with particular religious sects. This ambiguity gives people an uneasy psychological experience, which perhaps forms the basis for certain continuities in the sacred timespace complex which can be seen in contemporary cities. One example of this is the architectural style of the central part of many cities.

Take a five minute walk in the center of a city, practically any city in the world, and you will find that the major governmental buildings such as government departments, courts, the capitol, as well as financial buildings such as banks, are built exactly following Greco-Roman style. Wide and dignified steps in front of the buildings, Ionian or Dorian pillars surrounding the buildings, decorative sculpture of deities, Latin inscriptions--these form the standard and universal architectural style adopted for the central buildings of the cities, at least until the 1950s. And interestingly enough, such a style has been adopted even in countries like Japan, which has no Greco-Roman tradition.

Money reveals another continuity. According to Desmonde, the origin of coins can be traced back to Greek city-states where people inscribed the image of a sacrificial bull on a piece of metal, and he notes that with the secularizing trend of the Roman period, the sacred bull image was replaced by the image of great power symbols such as Julius Caesar. This ancient symbolism has persisted in money, even though economic systems have become more complex. Indeed, Desmonde said, in reference to an aspect of the monetary symbolism of today; ". . .we can notice upon one side of the five-dollar bill a picture of Abraham Lincoln, partially framed in two sprays of wheat, and on the other side a depiction of Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D. C. This. . .is in the architectural style of the Greek temple. Surrounding the building are thirty-six columns, surmounted by state seals. . . . On the pedestals alongside the steps in front of the memorial are tripods holding a bowl, and dimly under the great pillars we can make out Lincoln himself, seated in majestic pose."

The sprays of wheat, needless to say, have been the symbol of "prosperity of the land" since the time of Greece, and the bowl in front of the monument is an exact replica of the "paterae" used to hold sacrifices. As we have seen, Greek citizens shared their sacrificial bull through this utensil. The United States, while it has historically shown other discontinuities from Greco-Roman tradition, certainly has inherited a successor of Greek style. As a matter of fact, the Capitol building is more similar to the Greek Pantheon than to any architecture in American style.

It is quite probable that the heroes after the time of Caesar were the new gods of each city, society, and period. It may not be too rude to say that, in spite of all obvious differences, there is little psychological distance between the people who worshipped the Big Buddha of Nara ten centuries ago and the contemporary Americans who have looked up to the statue of Lincoln in his memorial as a symbol of national unity.

The cities of the world seem to have been very conscientiously replacing old gods with the new. For example, we notice many new sacred memorials in such big cities as Paris or London. The Arch of Triumph in the center of Paris is a memorial, again following Roman tradition, to commemorate Napoleon Bonaparte. There are the Revolution Memorial, Republic Memorial, National Plaza, statues of Henri 4 and Joan of Arc, and numerous other memorial objects in the city. In London, Admiral Nelson looks down on Trafalgar Square, and the Marble Arch is at a corner of Hyde Park. Not only these two cities, but also most of the cities in the world in the modern period have been building new memorials and towers, and this process may be seen as the metamorphosis of "sacredness," if not religion.

Modern cities of Japan have not been exceptions. Tokyo, which emerged as the new capital of Japan in the middle of the 19th century, especially has been trying to establish new sacred place, following the models of western Europe. The *Yasukuni* shrine was built to commemorate the souls of those who died in the successive wars from the 1860s to the second World War, and Emperor Meiji has been worshipped at the Meiji shrine. Heroes of the Meiji Restoration, such as M. Ōhmura and T. Saigo, have inspired memorial parks. The nation's capital was in need of new gods for the nation as well as for the city. And exactly as the gods of ancient cities were worshipped, these new gods have been perceived as the sacred core of the city. Especially in the case of Tokyo, because of the sudden shift of the capital from Kyoto, new gods--including the Emperor himself-- had to be invented instantaneously.

The relationship of a city to its deities, old and new, can be demonstrated rather easily if one takes a sightseeing bus of that city, because in such tours one visits the various shrines of the city. The cities where sightseeing tours are prosperous are those with many shrines and sacred places; Paris, Rome, Kyoto, and London, to mention a few. In cities which do not have any pantheon--such as Los Angeles-- there are practically no sightseeing tours. The stereotypic images of cities as represented by postcards are another indication of urban symbolism in connection with sacred places. Most of the historical cities have many sacred places and can make many kinds of postcards, but newer cities with practically no sacred background have little material for postcards.

As we have seen, the prototype of the holiday was the festival day, accompanied by many kinds of ceremonies and rituals in the sacred place. Such sacred places also provided the prototypes for leisure space. As the festivals were secularized, the places which had been the most holy spaces in the cities were transformed into secular spaces for recreation. Historical cities, such as Kyoto or Paris, contain many plazas and parks in their central parts, and the origin of such space can be traced back sometimes to the 15th or 16th centuries. It is interesting to note that the old Japanese "*Jōkamachi*," or castle cities, where the feudal lords constructed their huge castles, converted the castle or the castle site into a recreation park, and very often the festivals of the modern city, such as the cherry-blossom festival, take place at the castle site. Of course, there are more spectators than participants, but in the case of the "*Awaodori*" of Tokushima or the *Gion* Festival of Kyoto, one can still see the total mobilization of a city devoted to the festivities. Despite the metamorphic cycles of gods, there has been continuity in the time-space complex of sacred festivals as far as most of the historical cities are concerned.

4. New Symbolic Experiences

From what has been discussed, it seems that cities traditionally have been places for symbolic interactions, starting as communion with the gods and continuing as interpersonal human communication mediated by the sacred. It may be safe to say that at any stage of city development, to live in a city was to be exposed to an extremely complicated symbolic environment, and city people have been characterized by their readiness and willingness to participate in symbolic interaction rather than to deal with substantive environments. Indeed, they have wanted more symbolic sophistication all the time. Voltaire observed that the citizens of Paris were happy with the presence of aristocracy because through the literate noble people, common man could learn better language and better manners; still today, cities are admired, in spite of all their difficulties, for their "cultural" values--i.e., better schools, museums, concert halls, and so on.

A city, for man, is something to be experienced. It is an agent for special types of socialization. People learn and develop their ability in symbolic interaction by living in cities. Urban people often seem to be a special human species with their own peculiar traits and social characters developed through constant exposure to symbolic environments. "City people," in other words, specialize in the production and consumption of symbols rather than substantive objects. Of course, the nature of the symbols they have worked with has changed from sacred to quasi-sacred to secular, but the city life has remained filled with huge amounts of symbols throughout the past 10,000 years. Further, with the rise of modern communication industries, the city experience became even more symbolic. It is so symbolic that it is almost impossible for a man living in contemporary cities to cope with anything substantively. His experience is essentially symbolic and his symbolic experiences must substitute for his would-be direct experiences.

For example, in the past few decades, the nature of children's play in cities has undergone tremendous change. When cities were still developing, there remained small lots in the city where children could play baseball, ride bicycles, and simply run around: they could be physically mobile. But when cities developed and overdeveloped, children could no longer enjoy such physical movement. Some parks might have remained, but they could not accommodate the ever-increasing population of children. In the big urban areas in the U.S., Europe, and Japan, children's leisure activities are restricted. As the physical density of indoor space has been getting tighter, even the size of the toys children play with has become smaller. More and more, the toys have been miniaturized. The prosperity of "matchbox" automobile models (whose size is actually smaller than a real matchbox) may be attributed to the very limited space children can use in their homes. Children in the past could enjoy bicycle riding, but in cities like Tokyo, the only way children can spend their leisure time is to play with "matchboxes" and other similar miniature toys. In contrast to the children who achieved motor sensory development through direct physical movement, today's urban children have, through their imagination, a pseudo motor sensory development. In this sense, children's play in contemporary cities is extremely symbolic. Indeed, a simple inventory of toys sold at toy departments over the past 30 years--especially the past 10 years--reveals the trend toward miniaturization of toys. And thanks to the technological innovations in electrical engineering, adult entertainment equipment, such as radio, has also become miniaturized. One must now spend his leisure within a "mini-space" with "mini-instruments."

Not only space but also the concept of time has changed in modern industrial cities. With the adoption of the modern working-hour system, workers in contemporary cities have fragments of "off" hours. A worker, white collar or blue collar, can enjoy an hour to two in the morning and evening on every work day as well as institutionalized weekly holidays. And the uses of these fractions of "time" form another aspect of contemporary city life. In other words, a symbolic experience, within a small limited space on a fragmented time scale, is one of the basic characteristics of city experience today.

In this context, the invention of TV achieved a new era in urban communication. As a matter of fact, there seems to be a mutual cause-and-effect relationship between high-density, overpopulated urban life and the success of TV. The TV screen is very small, but yet there are constant movements going on all the time, with many kinds of sounds. In that tiny screen, one can experience the vast plains of the American West, where hundreds of Indians gallop on horseback, or can feel as if he where in a spaceship from which he can see the infinite extension of outer space. With the manipulation of a simple switching device, one can go to a baseball stadium, a race track, a concert hall--all these and more are at one's disposal. Living in a confined space made of steel and concrete, people can experience all kinds of scenes and places through this small bright box. Furthermore, the time module is very flexible. A person can watch TV for 10 minutes or 60 minutes, even 24 hours if he wants to. TV seems to be a magical box which has introduced us to an expandable time-space continuum. In the 18th century, when urban problems became explicit, city inhabitants put paintings of ponds, birds, and mountains in their surroundings to compensate for their loss of contact with a substantive natural environment. TV has now become decisive in this continuum of symbolic compensation. In reality, there is no physical space left in the cities, but symbolic space is plentiful. Physical density in the cities has already passed the saturation point, but there is practically no saturation point to symbolic experience.

These thoughts, in the light of historical experience, lead us to suspect that the heroes whom we see everyday through the TV screen may be the gods of our age. The classic deities were replaced by newer gods called Kings, Emperors, and Generals. But in an age when even the statutes of these new gods are decaying and melting through increasing exposure to sulphurous acid gas, the metamorphosis of the gods has come into another cycle, and the new gods have brilliantly made their debut on the 20-inch screen of every household.

Indeed, it is quite symbolic and significant to see that the ultramodern "cathedral towers" of the industrial age--such as the Eiffel Tower, the Empire State Building, and Tokyo Tower--are being used to transmit television waves, In the past, people communicated with each other through their shared experiences, through identification with their church tower; but today, our shared experience is watching Elvis Presley, whose image is transmitted to our living room TV screen from our new "cathedral spire"--the TV transmission tower. Isn't Elvis our god? Isn't our holy day an occasion to celebrate Elvis?

A Study of "Waiting Behavior"

Hachiko The Making of an Urban Folk Hero

Seen from for above, the waves of pedestrian traffic around Shibuya station in Tokyo surge radially out in every direction. Out of exits, from across streets, and into entrances, movement is constant and rapid. Only in one place does this flow abate: people gather in the popular and crowded meeting point, Hachiko Square. However, seen from close up, this park-like open-space pulses with activity and people-people who come to wait, to rest, to conduct business, to meet a date, to sightsee, to demonstrate, or just to kill time. On an average day a theatrical collection of people assembles to perform the ongoing drama of contemporary urban life representing the variety and scope of Tokyo's street life. For example, a group of school girls in their uniforms stands chattering;two handbill-passers stuff handbills into the hands of the hurrying passersby;middle-aged businessmen bow deeply and exchange calling cards;dodging people, running the last few steps, a young girl greets her waiting friend;sprawled across a bench, a teenage couple on a date make themselves comfortable;and through the crowds weaves a staggering drunk.

But in this shifting drama there is only one permanent actor-a statue, honoring the legendary dog, Hachiko. This statue is in fact main character of the drama, for the meeting point grew up around the statue. Therefore, the history of the meeting point is first and foremost the story of Hachiko himself.

According to the now legendary tale, Hachiko was brought as a puppy from Akita Prefecture to the household of Professor Eisaburo Ueno in Tokyo in 1924. At first Hachiko was lonely in his new surroundings. But Professor Ueno treated him as if he were his own child: when Hachiko cried in the middle of the night, Professor Ueno got up and brought him into his own bed to comfort him.
Accordingly Hachiko soon grew to be a good dog, settling fights and protecting weaker dogs from bullying. And every morning, Hachiko accompanied Professor Ueno on his way to work as far as Shibuya Station;every evening Hachiko returned to the station to meet him. But one day at work, Professor Ueno suddenly passed away. Not able to comprehend his master's failure to return to the station, day after day year after year, through rain and snow, for his master who never returned, Hachiko waited. According to *The Story of Hachiko,* a booklet written by the station master of Shibuya Station at the time, Chuichi Yoshikawa, "Around May of 1925, a large, white, robust dog appeared out of nowhere about 4:00 or 5:00

every day around the entrance of Shibuya Station(usually the Aoyama entrance) and gazed at the people comming down the steps from the platform like he was waiting for someone.

'Oh, there's a big dog. Its fearful.'

'Its nothing to be afraid of. Its the one that's here every day.'

'What's it doing every day?'

'I don't know. Its probably playing,' said the children who began to notice him.

Because it was a daily occurance adults also thought it a bit strange. Its a fine dog, but what on earth is it doing, they wondered. But people were busy They marveled at Hachiko at first, but gradually became used to seeing the dog and stopped noticing him. Many days passed. Three years, five years passed. I didn't notice him either, but gradually we all realized that the dog was the pet dog of the deceased Professor Ueno and was waiting everyday for his master who left one morning and never returned" Thus, his fame spread throughout the country and to distant lands. Through the efforts and contribution of the people of Japan and foreign countries alike a statue honoring his loyalty was erected so that later generations would remember his greatness...or so the legend says.

This abbreviated tale of "faithful Hachiko" taken from a children's book[1] has become what can be called "modern urban folklore. "The term folklore is commonly associated with rural, orally preserved traditions or beliefs. Modern urban folklore is of course a modern city phenomenon, and one which enjoys the benefits of modern mass media coverage to reach a far greater number of people in less time than possible before the Meiji Period. However, the essence of folklore lies in its anonymous beginnings and its incorporation of society's values or beliefs. The romanticized story of Hachiko above fulfills both conditions. It is a story with no identifiable author in which Hachiko symbolizes the value of loyalty which was important in the official values of prewar Japan.

Four factors created the legend of Hachiko–the legend's precedents in earlier folklore, Hachiko's factual existence, his historically opportune presence. and a process of the "fictionalization" of fact to conform to social values that could be called "mythmaking."The presence of dogs in earlier moralizing folktales predisposed people to accept the legend of Hachiko. The existence of a real dog at the right time was necessary. Hachiko began to appear at Shibuya in the 1920s. He was unnoticed and even abused at first, but through the years he endeared himself to a small number of shopkeepers and station employees who fed him, cared for him in sickness, and provided him with places to sleep. The well–timed existence of a group of supporters within the local community and society's willingness to accept moral models of faithfulness nurtured the legend of Hachiko's faithfulness. From these facts the process of mythmaking took over. In the anonyminty of unrecorded local history people's projections or wishful transformed Hachiko's appearance at the station to fit society's beliefs or values. In the context of the importance of loyalty in official prewar values, Hachiko's presence at the station was labled a faithful vigil by the press. The warm public reception which greeted the story after its initial publication in the Tokyo edition of the Asahi

Newspaper in the early 1930s, attests to the story's adaptation to and concurrance with public sentiment. By 1933, Hachiko, the dog who did not forget his obligation to his master, was nationally famous. Before his death in 1935, the statue was built to his already legendary figure. Although the statue was removed and melted down during Would War II doe to the scarcity of copper, the legend survived to see the statue rebuilt in 1948. The overwhelming official importance of loyalty in the value system waned with the end of the war, but Hachiko's importance as a symbol of waiting persists. From the symbol of the faithful, waiting figure of the dog and necessity, Hachiko Meeting Point was born.

Dogs in Early Folktales

The moral theme of the folkloric story of Hachiko began in traditional Japanese folk tales. The precedent of dogs associated with virtue in folklore prepared the way for the acceptance of Hachiko as a moral example of faithfulness. The same infusion of morality into the behavior of dogs occurs in *Nanso Satomi Hakkenden,* a tale of the Edo Period, and *Momotaro* and *Hanasakaji–isan,* two folk tales.

The *Hakkenden* begins in the mythical kingdom of a lord, Satomi Yoshizane, whose daughter, Fusuhime is given eight virtues: benevolence,justice, courtesy, wisdom, sincerity, loyalty, filial piety, and obedience by a hermit of Destiny. But her father's fief becomes ensnared in a war with a neighboring fief. Consequently, the lord promises his daugher in marriage to one of his favorite retainers, a dog named Yatsufusa, if Yatsufusa can win the war by slaying the general of the rival army. In the ensuing battle Yatsufusa manages to cut off the rival general's head;the king grants him his daughter. Yatsufusa takes the unwilling Fusuhime to a place in the mountains, where eventually as proof of her purity, she commits suicide. But as she does so, out of her stomach comes a vaporous aether which becomes the seed of eight men, each of which embodies one of the eight virtues she was endowed with and the strength or vitality of Yatsufusa. Yatsufusa, himself disappears from the story, and the eight men scatter to all corners of the country. But when the fief of the lord again becomes involved in war, a retainer of the lord goes on a search for the eight men whose strength and virtue can ensure victory. Through a long process, he finds all of them and brings them back to do battle for the fief. They enter battle and win a glorious victory.

Throughout this lengthy tale the essence of Yatsufusa, the dog, is associated with virtue and its triumph. He himself appears only in the first part of the story as the lord's favorite, and by implication loyal and brave retainer. But spiritually he continues to live on in the eight men whose virtue and strength bring victory to the kingdom. This continuation of Yatsufusa in the eight virtuous men is concretely symbolized by beginning each of their names with the Japanese character for dog.

Dogs appear in two other major Japanese folk tales, *Hanasakajiisan* and *Momotaro.* In both they are supporting characters associated with virtue which triumphs over vice. The story of *Momotaro* is the story of the boy, Momotaro, who is born from an enormous peach found by an elderly couple. Momotaro grows up to be strong and brave. One day he announces that he is going to Devil's Island to subjugate the devils who dwell there.On his way he encounters a dog who asks for a piece of the dumplings for his long journey. If the dog will accompany him, he will certainly give him some of the dumplings he says. So the dog becomes his first retainer and in the same way, a monkey and a pheasant also become retainers. When they reach the island the animals all fight loyally until the devils surrender in exchange for a promise to spare their lives. Momotaro and his faithful retainers return in triumph with the treasure to the old couple.

In the story of *Hanasakajiisan,* Pochi, the dog of an honest elderly couple is the source of the couple's wealth and recognition by a lord. Pochi indicates to the couple where gold pieces are buried in the back yard, so when the greedy neighbors hear of the story they borrow Pochi. However, Pochi finds only stones and roof tiles infuriating the neighbor who kills him. But even Pochi's remains transformed into a tree, converted into a handmill, and burned to ashes, generate wealth for the honest couple and nothing for the greedy couple. At last the ashes of the tree Pochi became, cause a flowerless cherry tree to blossom just as the lord's carriage is going past, pleasing him. But when the greedy couple tries the same thing the ashes merely land in the eves of the lord, angering him.

In both the stories *Momotaro* and *Hanasakajiisan,* the image of the dog is associated with virtue in classic conflicts between "good" and "evil." In *Momotaro,* the dog is a secondary character who joins Momotaro, the symbol of "good," in the battle against the devils. In *Hanasakajiisan,* Pochi is the bestower of rewards--wealth and honor--to the honest, and punishment--poverty and dishonor--to the greedy. He is the judge and determiner of man's rewards for virtue or punishment for lack of virtue.

To a modern reader, it is inconceivable that Momotaro's retainer be a fox or that Pochi be a badger, for the stereotyped image of the animal coincides with its role in the story. In folklore and children's stories with a moral, the conflict between "good" and "evil" is usually polarized in two sets of characters, one side representing "good," the other "evil." The use of animals creates or follows a stereotyped association of a particular animal with either good or evil. In Japan, as in many countries, the dog most decisively falls on the side of good in such stories. In Japanese folktales the fox is associated with trickery and has a negative image. The badger, cat, and monkey are all ambiguous creatures whose images are not clearly identified in the reader's mind with either good or evil, but which appear as both in folklore. But the dog is a strong symbol of "good" which through image association, underscores the division between good and evil in the story.

Hachiko, the symbol of the faithfully waiting dog, continues the tradition of the stereotyped image of these stories. Doubtless, many cats have spent years near Shibuya Station yet no legends of faithful cats exist because the cat is not particularly associated with such positive qualities. The image of the dog, however, has a long history of popular association with virtuous qualities in the folktales of *Momotaro, Hanasakajiisan* and *Satomi Hakkenden.* These tales can be said to have made the creation of the story of Hachiko possible because the stereotypes they created established an image that the story of Hachiko only continues.

Image and Reality

Despite the story's background in folklore and subsequent fictionalization, the presence of a real dog at the station was essential for its spectacular growth and acceptance as modern folklore. There is no distant past to cloud whether there really was not a real dog, because the story of Hachiko is current history: it is within the memory of most Japanese over 45. Unlike traditional folklore, modern folklore is a creation of the mass media which has the capacity to create folk heroes almost overnight and keep written records of their existence. When folklore can be created in such a short time, the tangible existence of a suitable object, no matter how fictionalized, lends the credence to the story it needs.

Hachiko was born in January, 1924 in Akita Prefecture. Soon afterwards, he came to the home of Dr. Eisaburo Ueno, an agronomist well-known in his field, and a lover of dogs. Hachiko was his seventh or eighth dog (depending on the source) and second "Akita breed" Japanese dog. But only a little over a year later, Dr. Ueno died in May 1925. According to Kikusaburo Kobayashi, the Ueno's gardener and Hachiko's final owner, Ueno's widow first gave Hachiko to relatives in Asakusa, but each time he was taken there he always returned to Shibuya. The doctor's widow attempted to find another home for him with other relatives in Setagaya-ward, farmland at the time. But being a city dog, Hachiko had never learned the etiquette of country dogs: leaving the paths wandering into rice paddies, he trampled crops arousing the wrath of neighboring farmers. As a last resort, Kobayashi agreed to take him in.

For the rest of his life Hachiko officially lived with the Kobayashis and frequently commuted to the area around Shibuya Station. When in explaining why Hachiko went to the station fact succumbs to the force of the human imagination. Whether Hachiko really went to the station to wait for his master or to scavenge for food is a matter of speculation, but perhaps it may be said that it was a combination of both. Accordingly, the presence of Hachiko at Shibuya Station after his master's death spawned the story of his faithful vigil. Likewise, the availability of food produced the story of Hachiko, the stray dog scavenging for food.

The most popular story is the tale of Hachiko's faithfulness related earlier. Second, is the interpretation that Hachiko was a stray dog who came to scavenge for food and who was subsequently used by the stationmaster and merchants to publicize Shibuya. That Hachiko was a stray and that people conspired to consciously create a fictional story is improbable and ignores reliable witnesses. However, one of the reasons that Hachiko frequented the station was certainly the availability of food. For if Hachiko originally did go to the station in hopes of meeting his master, the environment compelled him to stay.

A Compelling Environment

Both the station environment and society as a whole were responsible for the creation of the story of Hachiko. In Shibuya, a small nucleus of dog-lovers food and companionship and also played the role of publicity agents to the community. Without them and in a faster-paced era Hachiko probably would have been doomed to oblivion. Likewise, the ideal of loyalty in Japanese society in the early

1930s neatly coincided with the timely presence of the symbol–to–be, Hachiko.

First, the environment around the station was favorable to Hachiko and to the development of his story. Shibuya in the 1920s or 1930s was a growing, but still small suburban community of numerous small family–owned shops and close neighborhoods. At the station itself, the lack of crowds of today's size permitted Hachiko the freedom to sit in front of the entrance as he often did. Shibuya today is a large, busy entertainment, shopping and transportation center that probably would not stop to pay homage to a dog. But most importantly, large department stores which close their doors to dogs have replaced the small shopkeepers who befriended Hachiko. It was these dog–lovers who were at least part of the reason Hachiko came to Shibuya and who were the promoters of his story. As one long–time resident of Shibuya suggested, Hachiko probably came to the station because he wanted to be with people–in the middle of the flow of pedestrian traffic or with anyone of a number of dog–lovers who ran shops close to the station. According to a panel of Shibuya residents of the time, the shopkeepers around the station were a cradle of affection in a world otherwise hostile to Hachiko. According to these residents of Shibuya, the number of people who sympathized with him and doted on him was small. Hachiko often slept on a corner of the sidewalk forcing most people to step over him, and often unkind people kicked him to make him move out of the way. Only people who knew him patted him. But the people who knew him provided him with homes away from home, complete with meals and affection.

Two shop owners in particular doted on him. Hachiko had free entry into their homes. When their front doors were shut, Hachiko would come in from the back and go up to the second floor where the owners were sleeping, and crawl into their beds. When his skin broke out, they would buy and apply medication to the sore spots. He was fed and loved by these people who treated him as if he were their dog. Through these "patrons" of Hachiko, his story spread through the small community of Shibuya. Here, Hachiko's faithfulness found a sympathetic audience among dog–lovers. Although no evidence exists it is perhaps safe to say that here, in the small group of people close to Hachiko, the story was created or discovered. In a conversation one day someone put together Hachiko's appearance at the station and the fact of his master's death. The story of Hachiko, the dog who never forgot his obligation to his master, was born.

Second, society as a whole at this time was receptive to the popular romanticized story of Hachiko's faithful vigil. The image of a faithful waiting dog formed a perfect symbol of loyalty in a society that prized loyalty. Throughout the Edo Period(1603–1868)loyalty to one's feudal master and parents was a quality encouraged by the feudal government to reinforce its own position and stabilize society. As Japan psychologically prepared for war in the early 1930s, the government resurrected the ideal of loyalty to the state symbolized by the Emperor in the official system of values. Beginning at this time elementary school moral education text books began to feature moral anecdotes extolling the virtue of loyalty. (The Ministry of Education, in fact, published the story of Hachiko's loyalty as one of such moral anecdotes the year that he died.)

The presence of the value of loyalty in a governmentally controlled educational system is not synonymous with its acceptance into the popular value system. Yet, that the building of a statue to "faithful Hachiko" was in every sense a popular movement suggests the acceptance of the value of loyalty, not as an extention of government policy but as a heartfelt expression of admiration for the legendary faithfulness of Hachiko. The importance of loyalty in the state's educational system amplified people's natural admiration for Hachiko's supposed faithfulness. Based on universal feeling, in the ideal community around the station and in a society receptive to moralizing stories, a faithful dog became a symbol of loyalty to a nation.

The Making of a Myth

The development of Hachiko as modern urban folklore and as a statue occured through a process which can be termed "myth-making"(the fictionalization of fact). Whether Hachiko was really waiting for his master or not is immaterial to the development of folklore. From the presence of the dog, men's imaginations created a symbol appropriate to the times aided by the propensity of cities to create symbols and by the mass media.

The roots of legends and myth-making lie in man's need or desire to create symbols of his values or beliefs. Applying the label of "faithful" to Hachiko's behavior was to attribute human characteristics or motivations to an animal, a fallible practice in biological research, but acceptable in the world of myth and folklore. Just when and where this occured is not certain for the beginning of the legend is anonymous. But it is likely that someone in the circle of dog-lovers near the station ascribed Hachiko's appearance at the station to faithfulness to his master upon hearing the story of Ueno's death. The anonymous, probably unintended fictionalization of an event to coincide with a society's values is the basis of myth-making.

As elaborated in a previous paper, the tendency of cities, especially modern cities, to specialize in the production and consumption of symbols contributed to the process of "myth-making."An international comparative study of ancient and modern cities substantiates the importance of symbolic interaction in traditional cities. Cities started as communion with the gods and continued as interpersonal human communication mediated by the sacred. It may be safe to say that at any stage of city development, to live in a city was and is to be exposed to an extremely complicated symbolic environment, and that city people have been characterized by their readiness and willingness to participate in symbolic interaction rather than to deal with substantive environments. The nature of the symbols they have worked with has changed from society to society and with time from sacred to quasi-sacred to secular. But city life remains filled with symbols.[2]

The development of modern mass communication industries has made cities even more symbolic. In the growth of the legend of Hachiko, first newspapers and later textbooks for moral education published by the Ministry of Education, played an essential role: they publicized the current version of the legend of Hachiko's devotion to his master. This publicity furthered the development of the legend by spreading it throughout the entire country in an extremely short period of time as well as further romanticizing it.

The newspapers transformed Hachiko from a dog known only to a few dog–lovers living near Shibuya Station into a nationally famous legend. This was possible due to the existence of an extensive centralized communications network. In the process of the social change of the Meiji Restoration, the Japanese government was aware of the vital role of the nationwide dissemination of information. Accordingly, the government encouraged newspapers so that before 1900, newspapers penetrated every corner of the Japanese islands. The development of radio broadcasting followed a similar pattern of government support. Soon after its inception the government itself consolidated the companies into one, which also broadcast nationally.

Thus when an article by a member of the Japan Dog Protection Society was published in the Tokyo edition of the *Asahi* newspaper in the early 1930s, the legend of Hachiko was transformed from local to national folklore almost overnight. This article focused on Hachiko as a faithful, aging dog who waited through rain and snow for his master's return for seven years. By choosing the sentimental explanation for Hachiko's presence at the station, it established the image of Hachiko as a faithful, waiting dog. Soon after the publication of this article, a poem inspired by the article by Teijiro Yamamoto, former Minister of Agriculture, was printed. These two articles established Hachiko on his way to national prominence. Tokyo newspapers gave the most complete coverage to Hachiko, but his story appeared nationally and even internationally. Moved by stories in the newspapers, adults as well as children wrote letters, sent donations of money, and dedicated poetry or songs to Hachiko. "Dear Mr. Stationmaster," wrote one elementary school boy, "I am a second grader in elementary school in Yokohama, Kanagawa Prefecture. Recently, my mother told me the story of Hachiko and I was very impressed. This money is pocket money I sometimes receive from my parents. Please use it to buy something Hachiko would like and feed him."[3] Publicity also stimulated the donations which built the statue. "We are employees in a company," wrote a group of men, "but this is the first time we have ever heard of a dog which cherished its master. We are human, but if even dogs are as faithful as Hachiko, we as humans, should not forget our obligations. Thus we donate this money to the fund for the construction of a statue of Hachiko."[4] Poetry further romanticized and established the story of Hachiko's faithfulness. "Even now, what you(Hachiko) have taught me, I only protect,"[5] wrote a budding poet in haiku form.

In addition to newspaper coverage the legend of faithful Hachiko was included in moral education textbooks published by the Ministry of Education and distributed nationwide. Again the story as it appeared in textbooks focused on Hachiko's faithfulness exhorting children to follow his example. It is probably safe to say that almost every Japanese elementary school student between 1935 and 1945 road the tale of Hachiko, the dog who did not forget his obligation to his master, in school.

From Statue to Meeting Point

The publicity the mass media and textbooks gave Hachiko stimulated popular admiration for his loyalty. Consequently people contributed the money necessary to build the statue. the statue also preserves the original myth with some modifications. The purpose for building the statue and for rebuilding it after the war was the same: to pass on to future generations the ideal of faithfulness embodied by Hachiko. In fact, new extensions of the theme of loyalty are even created. According to an article about the reconstruction of the statue in the Yomiuri in August 1948, a new legend had sprung from Hachiko's faithfulness and the presence of the statue. Superstitious boys and girls meeting for dates chose the statue dubbed "Love-Knot Hachiko"in order to secure the "divinegrace" of Hachiko to insure that their love would not change through their lives. This directly continues the idea of imperishable faithfulness.

Although this charming superstition has seemingly died out, the statue has continued to be a symbol of waiting. As much as it is an appropriate symbol of waiting, the statue meets a very practical need for easy-to-locate, well-known pleasant places to meet in major downtown areas of Tokyo. Each of Tokyo's major districts can claim at least one major well-known meeting point;in front of Kinokuniya Bookstore in Shinjuku, the Sony Building in the Ginza, and under the silver bell in Tokyo Station. However, none of them have any symbolic relationship to waiting. They are merely well-known and easily found places. With the creation of a small park-like square surrounding the statue of Hachiko in 1957, the number of people using it has swollen to make it the most populated meeting point in the city. Here the thousands of people who come to wait in front of Hachiko every day continue the act of waiting he began.

Hachiko Square:A Study of Actual Uses

The image of the faithful waiting dog, Hachiko, made an extraordinary symbolic transformation, and Hachiko Square in front of Shibuya Station is still one of the most popular waiting spots in Tokyo. Indeed, tens of thousands of people come to this square to wait for each other, and it may be safe to say that the square itself was designed in order to meet the public demand as well as to honor the legendary dog. As described in the preceding chapter, Hachiko Square is an incredible piece of modern urban folklore in itself. In this part of the study the actual uses of Hachiko Square(hereafter abbreviated as H. S.) will be analyzed based on time-lapse 8mm movie film.

A movie camera was set at the second-floor corridor of Shibuya Station overlooking H. S., on July 14, 1977 from 6:09 a.m. to 7:20 p.m., using a time-lapse device to take one frame every two seconds. Due to the physical location of the camera, a small corner portion of H.S. could not be recorded, but at least, 80% of the activities which took place in the area were covered by the device.

In order to determine where and at what times people gather, the editing screen was divided into 32 sections to form a grid. An identical grid was drawn, xeroxed, and the people in the meeting point were counted by marking their position in the corresponding square every one minute from 6:09 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.

During the process of counting and recording the number of people on the grids, care was taken to adjust the position of the area visible on the screen to the same point each time so that a certain area would always be recorded in the same numbered square (because of complicated spotting, we are unable to introduce visual illustration here). Since the camera looked down obliquely on H. S., the size of each square in the grid does not correspond with the actual geometrical size of the area thus divided, but it is estimated that each square is approximately between $15m^2$ to $25m^2$, and the total area covered by the camera is roughly $600m^2$. This is the space where people interact literally twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year and where they have done so without interval in the past several decades. For technical reasons, this research had to limit its time study from dawn to sunset, but in reality, several people(i.e. bums, early-bird joggers, etc.) were seen at 5:00 a.m., and hundreds of people, mostly those who were on their way home from theaters, restaurants, and bars, were still around at 2:00 a.m. In a word, H. S. is a fascinating time space complex full of activities in the center of Tokyo.

Waiting at H. S. means many things for many people. A group of young people may wait for each other at H. S. in order to catch a train which brings them together for a picnic in suburban parks and forests. A man waits for his girl friend here(or vice versa) so that they can go to a theater or coffee shop together. A business man may wait for his partner or customer at H. S. and then take him for a drink. Middle-aged housewives wait for their friends to go to department stores nearby together for shopping. A small storekeeper may wait for a messenger to receive a small shipment of merchandise. There are certainly a number of men and women waiting with the boy-meets-girl fantasy. Different motivations and different results. This is the place where young lovers say "hello" to each other at 5:00 p.m. and say good night at 9:00 p.m. This is the place where the drama begins and the drama ends. Happy stories and sad stories. Indeed, at H. S., a careful observer can see all facts of contemporary urban life. It is not an exaggeration to say that H. S. is a theater where an urban documentary drama, produced and acted by people, is performed.

Daily Rhythm of Crowding

In spite of the fact that some actors and actresses are on the stage even at 3:00 a.m., the curtain opened at 6:00 a.m. The first trains from suburban communities as well as the JNR(Japan National Railway) loop train (Yamanote Line), arrived at Shibuya around 5:30 a.m. The number of passengers were very few, but some of them had started waiting at H.S. The first person in this particular day's drama was a man who had been sleeping on a bench of H.S., apparently since midnight. The man continued to sleep, despite the increasing noise around him, until 9:30 a.m., then sat on the same bench for thirty minutes and left the spot exactly at 10:00 a.m. He seemed to be one of the "regulars" on H.S. He was a bum in his fifties, with poor clothes, and apparently using a H.S. bench as his bed, thanks to the warm air of July.

People who came out of trains began their waiting as early as 6:00 a.m., but their number was very small. With the morning rush hour, i.e. 7:00 to 9:00 a.m., the number of people jumped rapidly and continued to climb until 10:00 a.m. Young people, old people, men, and women, with apparently diverse socio-economic backgrounds came into the scene, and after successfully waiting they left the stage with the parties they had waited for. Like any summer day in Tokyo, it was very hot and humid, and naturally people tended to wait for each other in the shade, but to secure good visibility to identify each other, quite a few people did not hesitate to wait under the direct sun.

Between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the number of people decreased slightly but swelled again between 11:00 and 12:00 and grew until sometime between 1:00 and 2:00 p.m. Probably, this small peak consisted of a number of luncheon meetings. Between 2:00 and 3:00 p.m., there was a drop. But from 3:00 p.m. on, there was a steady increase, peaking around 6:00 or 6:30 p.m., which then began to drop off again.

Number of People per Hour in Entire Meeting Point

Time	Number of People
6:09–6:59	349
7:00–7:59	1,139
8:00–8:59	1,539
9:00–9:59	1,654
10:00–10:59	1,548
11:00–11:59	2,272
12:00–12:59	2,628
1:00–1:59	2,839
2:00–2:59	2,362
3:00–3:59	2,626
4:00–4:59	4,197
5:00–5:59	6,345
(5:00–5:29)	(3,111)
(5:30–5:59)	(3,234)
6:00–7:00	9,090
(6:00–6:29)	(5,137)
(6:30–7:00)	(3,953)

The peak in the evening was obviously the product of after–work meetings. Young men who had graduated from the same high school and were working in different firms might have made an appointment at H.S. at 7:00 p.m. in order to renew their friendships at a bar, or a series of barhoppings. A man might be waiting for his girl friend who worked for a department store. A group of students would meet here so that they could discuss their summer vacation plans. A happy housewife might wait for her husband who would take her for dinner at a restau–

DIAGRAM I 6:00 a.m. — 11:14 a.m.



DIAGRAM II 11:15 a.m.—3:59 p.m.



DIAGRAM III 4:00 p.m. — 7:00 p.m.



rant. The atmosphere of H.S. was full of amenity–the good smell of food from nearby restaurants, the neon–sign advertisements on top of buildings, the noise from trains, automobiles, and loudspeakers. And hundreds of people were coming to and from H.S. for pleasure and relaxation. Most people were successful in meeting, but still there were some who could not find their partners. This was the drama of the day around H.S., and a similar pattern repeated itself everyday and every night.

There seemed to be an uneven spacial spread of people, and as the following three diagrams show, there were shifts in concentration of the crowd by the time of the day. In the morning(6:00–11:00) the most crowded part was a circle bench between the statue and station entrance(Diagram 1), and from late morning to the afternoon(11:15–3:59) people spread into the center of the square and covered the area around the statue(Diagram 2). During this time, the edge of the fountain was also partially occupied by those who used this square. The spread continued toward the evening(4:00–7:00), and by this time, the heaviest crowd was found around the fountain(Diagram 3). The most popular and the most densely populated area during the daytime(the circle bench) was less crowded in the evening. Possible reasons for the series of changes will be discussed later, but the diagrams themselves are eloquent in demonstrating the behavior of the crowd of the day.

Chart 1. Mid–day (11:15 a.m.–3:59 p.m.)

Rank	Square Number	Number of People
1	16	1,293
2	13	1,156
3	14	1,115
4	15	1,071
5	12	960
6	10	918
7	9	833
8	19	687
9	17	607
10	20	565
11	22	549
12	11	402
13	27	387
14	18	376
15	23	342
16	28	268
17	26	266
18	21	253
19	24	122
20	25	122

As mentioned at the outset, time–lapse movie film was taken and analyzed. In the analysis, the whole area was studied by dividing it in to 32 smaller areas. A careful analysis was made of the movements of the people from 11:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m., and the following charts indicate the number of people found in each sub–area.

Chart 2. Evening (4:00–7:00 p.m.)

Rank	Square Number	Number of People
1	13	2,175
2	16	1,767
3	14	1,644
4	10	1,536
5	15	1,448
6	11	1,436
7	12	872
8	17	863
9	22	860
10	21	783
11	25	765
12	9	732
13	19	639
14	27	627
15	28	608
16	29	482
17	20	474
18	18	436
19	24	417
20	31	315

The most crowded squares from 11:15 a.m. to 3:59 p.m. were 16, 13, and 14 followed by 15, 12, and 10, respectively. Square 16 is half of the area around the bench nearest to the JNR Station entrance. Square 13 is the area in the middle of the benches in area 2(Map I, facing page). Square 14 is the area in front of and around the statue itself. Square 15 is the equivalent of the other side of the bench nearest the JNR Station entrance. Square 12 is the part of the railing around the fountain in front of Hachiko and between the fountain and area 2. Square 10 is an area behind the fountain extending to the lights near the street.

The least populated places from 11:15 a.m. to 3:59 p.m. were squares 25, 24, and 21, respectively. Squares 25 and 24 are outside the meeting point, but square 21 is an area right between bench 8 and area 4 around Hachiko, right in the middle of the area near no landmarks. The next least crowded squares are, respectively, 26, 28, and 23. Square 26 is outside the meeting point. Square 28 is the space between bench 8 and 9 including bench 8. Square 23 is the far back corner away from the


MAP I HACHIKO SQUARE
5
3
6
11
7
POLICE BOX
NEW
TAMAGAWA
STATION
2
JNR STATION
8
ENTRANCE
9
10
4
1
JNR
ENTRANCE
COFFEE SHOP
JNR
STATION
ENTRANCE
(NORTH EXIT)
SHRUBBERY
FOUNTAIN
GARBAGE CAN
CIGARETTE DISPOSAL CAN
OUTLINE OF AREA COVERED BY AWNINGS
AREAS:
1-11
DIVIDED ARBITRARILY FOR OBSERVATION PURPOSES
TREE
STREET LIGHTS

JNR station entrance or area 4.

The most crowded areas from 4:00 to 7:00 p.m. were squares 13, 16, 14, followed by 10, 15, and 11, respectively. This shows considerable change from the afternoon data. Square 13, the area in front of the benches in area 2 and in front of the statue near the railing around the fountain, is the most crowded rather than the bench closest to the JNR Station entrance, Square 16. This indicates a move of more people to the center in front of Hachiko. Moreover, the relative numerical difference between the first and second most crowded places in the evening data is higher than the relative difference between the first and second most populated places in the afternoon data. Likewise, square 10 near the lights and the street has become more popular than square 15, a corner close to the station. Square 11 ranked 6th at this time while it only ranked 12th during mid-day, showing a movement toward this far outside area near the end of the benches in area 2. However, square 9, an area by the pollution register, showed a drop from place 7 to place 12. From the distribution of people in the morning and afternoon, the evening data show a shift from the bench near the entrance (area 1) and from the benches on the JNR station side of the New Tamagawa Line entrance to the center in front of the statue and the middle of area 2, but a shift from Areas 8–10 to the back of the subway entrance side of the area.

The reason for the shift of concentration may be explained from various angles. In the first place, there could be a problem of visibility. Since H.S. is located in front of one of the busiest railway stations in Tokyo, where JNR's loop train as well as two major suburban trains are connected, most of the people who used H.S. as their meeting place came by train. It is natural, therefore, that a "waiter" tended to look for his or her "partner" at the exit of the train station. The closest areas to the exit (i.e., areas 1 and 2) were crowded by those who were watching the people coming out of the station carefully. The clear visibility of the station exit probably made these areas hightly populated. Especially, at the time when more people were waiting for punctual appointments, it was natural for them to stand in front of the exit so that they could catch their partners at first sight.

A second reason for uneven spread of "waiters" might be due to the spacial ambiguity of H.S. As a matter of fact, H.S. is an area where hundreds of people gather and an individual would find it extremely difficult to identify a particular person in the crowd. Therefore, to say someone "I'll wait for you at H.S.," was too confusing and might lead to an appointment which was unsuccessful. One had to make his or her waiting spot more precise and identifiable. For example, one might say "Let's meet under the willow tree in front of the subway exit," so that time-space complex of waiting behavior would be less ambiguous. In this connection, the areas where there were distinct "landmarks," such as plants, benches, or phone boothes, were used more often than the areas which lacked peculiar characteristics. The most distinct landmark, of course, was the statue of Hachiko itself, and historically speaking, in the old days, people used to wait for each other literally in front of the statue. However, as the place became more popular and the expansion of the square was complete, the statu could not be the only spot for waiting. It is true that many people still use the statue as their landmark for waiting, but connoiseurs, or "regulars" would rather avoid the crowd and designate their waiting spot as other than the statue itself. The large concentration in squares 16, 13, 14, and 10 can be interpreted as the product of the existence of distinct landmarks in these areas.

Thirdly, there was the obvious climatic reason. In the morning, when the air was still cool, people did not hesitate to stand anywhere in H.S., but during midday, it was natural for them to prefer shade rather than standing under the sun. The pattern of concentration may change in cooler seasons of the year.

Waiting Time

Among other landmarks, there were several benches at H.S., and quite a few people used these benches. Especially those who just taking a rest, or waiting for their partners for a longer period of time would sit on benches rather than standing. Chart III shows samples of the used of benches for part of the day. During the most crowded time (for example 5:00 p.m.,) there were 10 people sitting on bench 8 and 11 on bench 10. On the average, people sat on a bench for 15 minutes but there were some who continued to sit for more than two hours while there was another extreme group who used benches only for one minute. Interestingly enough, like anywhere else, there were people who used fences, low walls, or whatever was available as ad hoc street furniture, to sit on.

Most of the people used H.S. as a meeting place, and to wait for somebody is often a painstaking act. When both parties were punctual, the meeting was almost instantaneous, but often people had to wait for a longer time, 15 minutes or even 30 minutes. Some were patient enough to wait for 20 minutes while others were irritated if their partners came 10 minutes after the appointed time. Generally speaking, however, people were found to be quite punctual and tolerant of each other. Out of the 8mm film data, the average waiting time was calculated.

The following are the results of the data gathered on waiting time.

Morning average(6:09–11:00) . . . . . . 13.3 minutes
Afternoon average(11:00–5:00) . . . . . 10.2 minutes
Evening average(5:00–7:00) . . . . 8.6 minutes

These results show a steady decrease in the average waiting time as the day progresses. A man asleep on one of the benches for a total of 231 minutes was counted in the morning data raising the average significantly. However, even if he is deleted from the data, the morning average remains the highest at 11.6 minutes. This is 1.4 minutes higher than the afternoon average. This 1.4 difference in the averages is roughly the same as the 1.6 minute difference between the afternoon and evening averages.

These averages may be slightly higher than the averages of the area as a whole if they could be calculated. From observations it was noted that the people on these benches wait longer than those in areas 1 or 2. They are not usually waiting attentively: they are often reading or engaged in absorbing conversations. Moreover, when interviewed several said that they were not waiting but killing

THE USE OF BENCHES



time. This is perhaps because from these positions it is difficult to see the station entrance, although the rest of the meeting point is visible. It was noted that the people who were waiting for someone who came soon waited standing in a place where they could see and watch the station entrance. People who were not waiting or waited a long time usually waited sitting and often in a place where they could not see the entrance, like areas 8, 9, and 10.

A Day at H.S.--Observations

In order to see the rhythm of people at H.S. more closely, a series of observations was conducted by researchers for several days. They spent a whole day sitting on a bench, and recorded everything which happened, observed from that position. The following is an example of such detailed observation records. The record, needless to say, covered only a part of the drama which took place at H.S., but yet, it shows that many people with different behavior patterns appeared and disappeared one after another. (In this example, the observation data of the most common behavior, waiting, is omitted to avoid endless repetition.)

From Area 7, (MAP I.)

8:40 there are two old ladies under the awning in area 5. They seem to be having a deep conversation, although one of them in particular, looks around frequently.

8:50 There is a middle-aged man, and now a younger one, dressed in a company's khaki work shirts. The young man is now wandering around. The older man continues to lean on the railing beside the fountain.

8:55 Two men, dressed casually (one in a blue shirt and blue-striped pants, the other in a short-sleeve knit print shirt and knit pants) under the lights, sitting smoking, looking around, now go off in different directions.

9:00 A guy runs up to a girl, grabs her and playfully pulls her along as he continues to walk toward the street, causing her to lose her balance and grab him for support. They stumble forward, their arms around each other as they head to ward the street, laughing.

9:05 There are two tough-looking characters, one sitting on the ledge, the other standing in the area in back of Hachiko. After an observer tried to interview them (they said they did nothing without being paid), they moved toward the station entrance in front of tree No.1.

9:15 One of the men who was waiting under the lights at 8:55 has wandered back, and the shorter man he was with (Mr."Short") is sitting under the awning near the street. "Mr.Short" now waiting under the awning, was one of the tough guys at 9:05. The one standing (Mr."blue Shirt" recorded at 8:55) has wandered in front of the ledge again. He's wearing a blue short-sleeve shirt with a folded handkerchief draped around his neck. Now he's squatting under the station overhang. "Mr. Short" is still sitting in the same place under the awning. "Mr. Blue Shirt" alternately squats and stands, playing with something in his hands. He's now talking to "Mr. Short" and another old man sitting on the neglected looking entrance under the overhang. A man noticed before in a black see-through sweater (Mr."Black Sweater") went up to "Mr. Blue Shirt", then wandered to area No.2, said something and reached out to ward a man dressed in a business suit reading a newspaper. The man in the suit quickly got up and moved a way. "Mr. Black-Sweater" sat down in his place smirking. But not for long;he soon wandered back toward the group under the overhang.

9:25 There is a jeaned, teenage boy sitting dejectedly by the foot of Hachiko smoking a cigarette. Two girls join him but he remains sitting. Now a third girl joins them, but one of the first two is the only one who really talks to him a lot.

9:30 An old lady is patting Hachiko's feet.

All the tough-looking men have moved to have a seat in area no. 9. A man in a Hawaiian print shirt has taken it off. "Mr. Blue Shirt" talks to him for a minute and the boy reading shakes his head and looks uncomfortably around him.

Two girls, one scantily clad in a blue jean skirt and halter top, the other in a long skirt and peasant blouse, are sitting in area No. 6.

9:43 Two girls at 9:30 move to stand under the lights.

9:45 "Mr. Blue Shirt" approached a man sitting beside the observers asking if he had anything to do today, for he said he had some work that needed to be done. The guy sitting said he was busy, and "Mr. Blue Shirt" left.

10:30 The group of "toughies" is still here. They alternately disappear and reappear, walk and sit, smoke and talk to each other.

A little girl with her brother is hanging on Hachiko's legs and patting him.

11:00 The area seems to have cleared a lot. There are not so many people.

11:25 There is a couple sitting on bench no. 5. He has his legs crossed and she is resting her arm on his one leg. They sit close together. She is wearing a skirt and he is wearing slacks.

There is a group of three mothers and five children in front of the fountain.

12:20 A large group of at least three boys sits on the ledge in back of Hachiko. One pretends to pitch a ball. Now another squats like a catcher. They stand and sit while talking. They seem to be about junior-high school age students. One is wearing shorts.

1:15 There is a foreign young woman intently reading a novel next to Hachiko.

There is a man, college student age, with a towel on his head, leaning on the statue of Hachiko. He is patting Hachiko.

Two policemen just walked through glancing at the people in the area.

1:20 Two girls are strolling through drinking from McDonald's cups. They seem to be about junior-high school age.

1:25 The guy with the towelled head left with a friend after 15 minutes.

The two junior-high school-aged girls drinking sat down next to a foreigner and began to talk to him. They looked around and began giggling. Their movements are free and unconstrained. One has her legs crossed, the other her ankles, as they drink. They shake hands with the foreigner when they notice that two more of their friends have arrived. They get up and head toward the station and their friends. The foreigner gets up also and moves toward the station. They all wave goodbye.

1:45 Three children and two mothers are in front of Hachiko near the railing by the fountain. They are strolling toward the street.

Two high school aged boys are talking intently in area No.6.

Two old ladies are patting Hachiko. Now they are standing next to it, one leaning her arm on the base.

An old man is patting Hachiko.

2:00 There is a foreigner in a purple turban by the subway entrance.

2:05 A man in a pink shirt is weaving in and out of the crowds aimlessly.

A group of about eight children and two or three mothers is leaning on the railing around the back side of the fountain. The children are shouting at the noise pollution register. The mothers herd them away as quickly as they came.

One lady carrying a lunch has joined another under the awning in area 2. One is in about her late 50s and one in her early 60s or so. The younger woman who came last with a lunch begins to eat ravenously. The second older lady gazes off into space, talking while the younger one wipes her face and hands.

2:20 There is a girl from a radio station who is interviewing and taking notes. She stops to interview someone near the observers in area 5 for a few minutes. She approaches a middle-aged man with his two children, who waves her on refusing to speak. She catches another man in area 1 and when whe is finished, an observer catches up with her to interview her. It turns out that she is doing a survey on men's underwear, which explains why she only interviewed men.

The lady who was eating got up, threw away the wrapper from her lunch and went toward the station leaving the older lady sitting under the awning.

2:25 The man in the pink shirt is in area no. 1. holding a bottle of beer from which he gulps a swallow down every once in a while. He smirks at passers–by and does tricks to attract attention: he puts his foot forward, hits it,causing it to kick backwards. He approaches people, lifts his bottle high in a cheer and leeringly begins to talk with them. He has started a conversation with someone sitting on a bench who ignores him for a minute then gets up and leaves. Now he goes up to two young girls who leave the minute he stands in front of them.

2:30 Another group of kids and mothers pass but not before the kids have a chance to yell at the noise pollution counter.

2:40 A man in his 20s or 30s in a beach shirt, matching shorts, and ladies' highheeled net shoes plops himself on the round bench in area No.6 and immediately becomes engrossed in a magazine.

A young high school aged couple sits under the lights. He puts his arms around her as they animately talk. She smoothes his hair back from his forehead. Now she puts her arm around him. They are both in jeans. She sits with her legs apart. Now she puts one leg up on the bench, turns her back to his side, her arm resting in back of his leg for support, and tilts her head to rest on his shoulder. Her short hair is done up in a high pony tail revealing long gold earrings.

2:58 There is another couple under the awning in area 2. They were sitting but he now takes off his geta and lies down using her lap as a pillow. She rests her arm across his chest and plays with his hair. He is now crossing one leg up in the air on top of the other so that it sticks out toward the center of the square.

3:15 The couple under the awning in area 2 is still there. He is wearing overalls and she is wearing regular jeans.
she is playing with his mustache but as she does he grabbs her finger with his mouth sucking it or biting it so she can not wrench it free. She whimpers, he lets go, and she wipes it on the bib of his overalls.

3:20 The young couple is still there. He caresses her shoulders. Now he is beginning to put on his geta that he shed in order to curl up his feet underneath him on the bench. They both rise and stroll toward the street.

3:25 A group of six men stopped briefly in front of Hachiko, all but one wearing dark suits. The one man in a summer beige suit wore a black armband. They continued toward the street.
3:45 An older man just lifted a newspaper out of a trash can and walked away.

4:55 "Mr. Blue Shirt" is here again. He and this group have been here since about 8:30 this morning although they disappear and reappear alternately. He sits next to someone sitting next to observers. They talk and light each other's cigarettes. They try to read the observer's notes. They get up and walk away purposefully.

(The area is getting more an more crowded.)

Behavior Catagorization through Interviews

As the data shows, there were people who used H.S. for purposes other than waiting. There were people who were just taking a rest on benches, or who came to visit Hachiko statue for sentimental reasons, and after a series of interviews with those who were at H.S., certain categorization of behaviors seemed to be feasible.

1) Waiting--the most common behavior.

"I am waiting for a friend today, but I often use this place for dates, too. Hachiko is a good landmark which anyone can easily find. I am going to the Koen-dori area just to walk around after I meet with my friend. If I promise to meet someone, I will certainly wait up to 30 minutes." (a student, male)

"I am waiting for a friend here. I use this place as a meeting point, but only rarely, but as far as I meet with someone in Shibuya, usually I make the appointment either at H.S. or at the station entrance. I associate the image of Hachiko with Shibuya. Hachiko is a symbol of the area. I am patient enough to wait for someone even for an hour." (young female)

"I do not use H.S. as my meeting place often, but when I am going to meet with someone from the countryside, I usually make an appointment here because anyone can identify Hachiko. It depends on the friend how long I'd wait. For a close friend, I'd wait two hours. Today,I am expecting my good friend, and we have something to do in this neighborhood." (middle-aged female)

2) Resting

Those who just wanted to escape from crowds or to kill time, might use H.S. as a free resting place (though not restful.) Especially elderly people liked to sit on one of the benches and take a rest. The following is an example.

Q: Excuse me, we are now doing a study of Hachiko Square. May I speak with you for several minutes please?

A: But, I'm just a country person, I don't know anything.

Q: Are you waiting?

A: No, I'm not. Because I had some time I'm just resting here to kill time. I don't know anything, I'm just a country person.

Q: When you say Shibuya, does the image of Hachiko come to your mind?

A: Yes, it does.

Q: Oh, does it?

A: Well, I don't know. I've waited at Hachiko so I came here today. I just had a little bit of extra time so that's why I'm waiting here. Is that what you're doing?

Q: We're doing a study of how Hachiko Square is used now.

A: Are you students?

Q: Yes, we are.

A: Oh, really! I'm just a country person.

Q: Excuse me, but where do you live?

A: I come from Chigasaki (Kanagawa Prefecture).

Q: Oh, are you here on business?

A: No, I just came to meet someone, at 11:00. But I just mistook the time, so I can't help but wait.

Q: Are you waiting here in front of Hachiko?

A: Oh, no, I'm not waiting at all, we are going to a certain head office, and well, since we are supposed to meet at 11:00. I came too early...

3) Sentimental Visit

Surprisingly, there were some elderly people who visited H.S. to renew their memories of the area, especially of Hachiko himself. For those people, H.S. see med to be a place for a sentimental journey in a neighborly atmosphere. The following is an example:

Q: Excuse me, we're observing this area in our research of Hachiko.

A: Yes.

Q: Just a minute ago, you were patting the statue of Hachiko, I believe. Is there some reason...?

A: Well, yes, I guess I'm really getting old, I was just reminiscing about the old days, for I've known this statue ever since it was built. It's been a long time since I've seen it so that's why I was patting it, I guess.

Q: Oh, really? When was the statue built?

A: Hum, now just when was it built, let me see.....

Q: Well, according to what I've investigated, I heard it was first completed in

1934 and placed inside the station.

A: Well, I'm not sure about that, but I know about when it was built here.

Q: Oh, really?

A: Well, now, because of course it was before the war, wasn't it? And it was before that so if we say ten, twenty or so years before the war...Well, I don't really know. At any rate, it's been been a long time since I've been here.

Q: Was it used as a meeting place at the time it was just built?

A: Well, yes. Yes, it was. Because it certainly wasn't as confusing as it is now.

Q: Then at that time before the War, was the statue here?

A: Yes, yes it was here. Well now, the station, Tokyu Department Store is here. Ah ha, now that I think of it, the statue was right in front of the station entrance, I believe.

Q: Oh, really?

A: Yes, now I remember. This is Dogenzaka, isn't it? (pointing in the direction of Dogenzaka)

Q: Yes this is Dogenzaka.

A: I live in Nagoya now, so its been a long time since I've met Hachiko, so just for a short while...

Q: Oh, so you've come to greet the statue?

A: Well, I pet it.

Q: Well, I guess you have an attachment to it then?

A: No, not really an attachment, I just was recalling the past.

Q: Oh, is that so. Thank you very much.

4) Mixed Motivations

There was another middle-aged woman had mixed motivations for coming to H.S.

"My children use H.S. as their meeting place. It is an easy place to find, but I think its a noisy boisterous place from what I can see. Though children come here often, as a waiting place, its so crowded and bustling that I don't like it very much. As for myself, I came to Tokyo in 1955, but in those days it was rare for me to come here, so I do not remember Hachiko well. But I think the statue was in the same place, but it was not so terribly dirty as it is these days. Shibuya in 1955 wasn't as lively as it is now, though. The buildings around here have changed. Above all, the number of people here has increased. After all, Shibuya is the second or third (I'm not sure) largest place in Tokyo, where people gather. Young and well-dressed 'beautiful' people have increased in number. I think it is necessary for a person like myself to come to a place like this and look around to understand young people. Just being inside the house there will be differences in opinion (among family members) sometimes but I think I can understand young people a bit by coming to a place like this. One reflects on oneself, too."

5) Recruitment

In the observation record (p. 66) there was a man tentatively called "Mr. Black–Sweater." He seemed to be one of the regulars of H.S., and the observer–interviewer found his activities very interesting and unique. Apparently, he was a recruiter who looked for temporary daily laborers. He might earn commissions by sending bums, hippies, and other unemployed people to construction sites to do odd jobs. He might, from observation–also be connected with underground gangsters. The interviewee was somewhat funny, but he demonstrated an unexpected use of H.S. He made himself available for an interview, by sitting down and striking up a conversation with the interviewers one day.

A: You have a nice camera, don't you? Are you making a living by taking pictures?

Q: No, I'm not.

A: Some kind of art related work?

Q: It looks like it, doesn't it?

A: Can I ask, if you are popular with girls? Don't girls like you?

Q: No, that's not really so.

A: Yes, it is so. You look like you are popular. It shows in your face. You must be popular.

Q: You flatter people.

A: No, no, its shows in your face, you're popular among girls.

Q: Do you always wait for your friends?

A: Yes, I'm always waiting, always waiting here.

Q: How long do you wait?

A: I wait 30 minutes.

Q: Then do you go home?

A: Yes.

Q: Today are you here on business?

A: Yes, well work, work. Today's also work.

Q: Just work? You meet a friend, then go to work?

A: Yes, yes. I go to work. You're still very young, aren't you? In your teens, 17 or 18 aren't you?

Q: Around that age, yes.

A: Seventeen or eighteen, right? High school? College? Yes, a college student, right? You're 17 or...

Q: Excuse me, but what type of work are you doing?

A: It ain't very clean work. Because it ain't clean work I can't say what it is. Not clean work at all. (He laughs.) To be like you, I can't imagine it. Ah, if I only had something like that camera...I'm embarrassed. If I said what I did, I'd be ashamed...Because I'm ashamed. I'm not a clean-cut guy like you are. Art...Say, why are you recording this?

Q: We record what people say about the use of this area.

A: And this? (indicating observation notebook)

Q: In this we are recording what people do. For example I wrote there's an elderly lady sitting on the bench there.

A: I bet a lot of guys try to pick her up like this. (looking at female observer)

Q: Where?

A: No, no what I said was, isn't she approached by a lot of guys? Isn't that right? She's a good-looking chick. Too bad for me, isn't it. But gee whiz, to be beaten out by this guy! You see, but well...to have a girl like this...(sighs)I'm a bachelor.

Q: Oh really?

A: Yeah, I am a bachelor, and bachelors are popular with the ladies. But well, no woman will marry me. I'm not any good.

Q: What time did you come here today?

A: Today? I came 30 minutes ago.

Q: What time are you meeting your friend?

A: What was that? Maybe he should be coming soon, I suppose. Its five to, so they'll be here soon since they're comming at 10:00.

Q: Do you always wait here at 10:00?

A: Yes.

Q: Why do you use Hachiko?

A: Well, you say why? (Another person, acquainted with the interviewee strolls up) Why is it? Well, I guess Hachiko can be used in various ways, can't it? (laughs) Well, I've got to be going.

Notes

1. Kume, Genichi. Hachiko, 1971.
2. Kato, Hidetoshi. "From Pantheon to Presley: Change in Urban Symbolism." Journal of Communication.,Vol. 24, no. 2, 1974.
3. Yoshikawa, Chuichi. The Story of Hachiko. 1934, pp.32–33.
4. Yoshikawa, Chuichi. The Story of Hachiko. 1934, pp.36–37.
5. from the files in the stationmaster's office of Shibuya station.

Crowd as the Social Environment

1. Space and Organism

Every human being is part of the environment of others. For instance, when a person speaks to another person, it may be said that the latter is a part of environment surrounding the former, and visa versa. Indeed, other human beings are one of the most important components of the environment as perceived by the individual, though we are apt to eliminate creatures belonging to the same species from our ordinary concept of "environments". The vital importance of "others" as part of our environment has been stressed and illustrated by the research findings scholars who have observed the behavior of animals.

To begin with, let us examine the works of "proxemics", or the study of distance between organisms developed by Robert Hall. He points out, for instance, that the birds keep a certain physical distance when they rest on an electric cable and that this distance is surprisingly regular. The implication is that each bird has an invisible territorial boundary around itself. It is a kind of spacial overcoat which an individual bird wears. This kind of overcoat is appears to the part of the inherent make–up of each individual organism. Robert Sommer, an American sociologist calls such spacial overcoat as "portable space" meaning that each organism carries his own space wherever he goes.

Human beings are no exception. Each individual person has an invisible "personal space" around himself, and either consciously or unconsciously, he tries to maintain that space. The desired physical distance between individual persons differ very much depending on culture. For instance, in Japan approximately 90 centimeters would be the appropriate and comfortable physical distance, though in many Latin countries the distance usually is shorter than that. But the point is that, in spite of such cultural differences, people implicitly recognize and respect individual personal space.

One sociological observer found that, in parks and other public places, people use benches from the end. That is, when a person sits on an unoccupied bench, he does not sit in the center. Indeed, he takes his seat from the end, and very often, as soon as he sits, he puts something belonging to himself, such as overcoat, hat, briefcase, and etc., beside him. The presence of such personal belongings makes it difficult for another person to sit beside the first person. In other words, for an individual, to put something next to himself, is an action declaring that he occupied that space, or that the space belongs to him. The second user of same bench, consequently sits on the other end, again putting something toward the center of the bench. There is of course another potential sitting space for a third user, in the center, but very few people dare to sit in the center, because they see invisible spacial pressure from both sides. Most people would prefer to be standing than to sit in the center.

Dr. Hediger, a famous zoologist of Switzerland, after years of investigation, found that even among beasts in zoos and circuses each has its own personal space, and that to find the boundaries of such space is the fundamental technique in taming and training the animals. Thus, for example, if a parson steps inside the space of a lion, all of a sudden, the lion turns out to be extremely aggressive to the human.

In a word, every animal has an instinctive tendency to maintain its individual "portable space". Any invader of that space will be attacked or avoided. Invasion of personal space makes the situation critical and tense. As a matter of fact, when individual organisms fail to keep their "portable space", because of the psychological stress, the group of the species are reported to show considerably high mortality rate. Needless to say, the basic factor determining the population of a group living organisms is the amount of food supply. But even in a situation where food is abundant, compression of space can be fatal for the lives of animals. Some years ago, large number of deer died in an island in the midst of Atlantic Ocean. Food was plenty, and seemingly, the deer were in good physical condition. There was no symptom of disease. However, doctors found that the deer had trouble with the suprarental, and that was the cause of the death. Apparently, they died as the result of stress due to high density of population and the consequent compression of space.

Experiments with mice reported by Calhoun in his brilliant essay "population density and social pathology" provide another example to demonstrate the effects of space upon living organisms. According to Calhoun's observations, where a group of mice lived together in a limited space with abundant food, for obvious reasons, their population density increased. But, as thus density increased, the observer found several pathological symptoms among the animals. First, their, fertility rate decreased while the mortality rate of new-born babies dramatically increased. Second, where babies were born healthy, the mothers would be quite apathetic and indifferent in baby care. Finally, interaction between the animals became low and infrequent. In fact, the mice tended not to move. Calhoun called such apathetic behavior "cocooning". In short, with the increase of population density, the "society" of mice became "pathological".

In closed limited space, human beings also show "cocooning" symptoms. Altman and Haythorn studied what happens when a small group of live together in an experimental closed space. American salors volunteered for this experiment and were divided into pairs. Each pair was asked to live in a room of approximately 9 square meters. The basic accommodations of the room consisted of two bunks, a table, two chairs, and washing and toilet facilities. For recreational purposes, they were provided with a deck of cards and a game chess. Each pair was also assigned two hours of light work in the room in the morning, three hours in the afternoon, and an hour in the evening. Their food was delivered to them.

The sailors inside the room were permitted to do whatever they liked, but they were not given any opportunity to go out of the room. No communication with the outside, such as mail or telephone, was allowed.

After ten days, many interesting developments were observed in this experimental isolated group. In the first place, it was found that individual space was clearly established. For example, each individual implicitly declared the ownership of certain furniture, i.e., a particular bed, chair and sitting place were "owned" by each individual. Once such ownership of space was established, the roommate never invaded that ownership. In short, two people in the room divided the space and set up individual behavioral territory. This kind of territorial division of room space was not so apparent in the control groups.

In the second place, the activities of persons in the closed room were found to decline. For the first few days in the experimental room, the pairs had tried to live a "communal life" and had spent much time playing cards, chess, and in conversation. But after a week or so, they paid little attention to such sociability and partnership. Instead, the pairs spent more time in solitary, that is, during their free time, they just laid on the bed, either to sleep or to read a book. In control groups, the activity rate continued to be high.

The sailors' behavior in the closed space showed the symptoms of "cocooning" or mutual apathy. Indeed it seems that there are only slight differences between the experimental mice and experimental human beings.

Generally speaking, the more that personal space is compressed, the more individual organisms tend to be protective of their space, and further, after securing the minimum personal space, the individual becomes apathetic with others. Especially, when "public space" is scarce, an individual tends to shut off most of his contacts with others. Concern over housing is a universal trend among people in big cities all over the world today, but among other factors, it seems that the desire to secure a minimum personal space and to be safe from spacial invasion is the basic reason for this "my home–ism". In the densely populated city life, people need their own individual space. Indeed, when the cities were less dense, people did not have so much interest in their own homes, in spite of the fact that their housing facilities were much poorer. They had more elbow room in the city. Looking at it this way, it may be said that the housing in contemporary society has an ethological[1] aspect, other than social welfare and quality of life. Or, the quality of life may be determined by ethological design for living.

2. Man in the Crowd

Indeed, it is safe to say that human "cocooning" on mass scale is taking place in our urban life. In contrast to the people in rural communities where people greet each other on the street, we do not pay any attention to the person in busy and dense urban setting. Of course it is true that in villages people still have traditional communal tied, but it seems that where population density is low, people are interested in other people. In densely populated cities, on the other hand, we do not, and cannot be interested in other people. Since each individual cannot secure even the minimum space for himself, and since mutual invasion of personal space is a common practice among city dwellers, the only result on the part of the individual will be a severe and dreadful stress, if he is interested in other people as "persons". The best and the only way to get out of such stress is to perceive a person not as a parson but as a "thing". It is a intolerable experience for a man to recognize a parson at the distance of 30 centimeters for a long time. But he can tolerate the existence of an object, such as stone, at the same distance. Things are all right, but not human beings. So we try to "materialize" living human beings around us.

A journalist reported, after studying the behavior of passengers in a crowded commuter train, that without exception, the passengers engage in their "private" behavior, e.g., reading a pocket book, dozing, or gazing outside to the train window. When a passenger cannot even look outside, his eye line drops down, or he at least try not to cross his eye line of vision line with others. To the individual, others should be "things". It is not necessary for one to have human interest towards tones. Rural people, when they come to big cities, are said to be "intoxicated" by people because they apt to become involved with other people psychologically. Urban dwellers are skillful in perceiving the innumerable numbers of human beings surrounding themselves as just a huge accumulation of meaning-less "things", such as junk yard.

To add an interesting psychological sidenote, it is said that people appreciates the portrait picture of a person who closed his eyes at a closer distance than the open-eyed portrait. Eye line is a kind of search-light in human interaction, and very few people dare to come near to the source of the light. When a person closes his eyes, the light is extinguished and consequently it gives relative relief in interaction. To close the eyes and hall asleep, or to pretend to be asleep, and to drop one's eye line down, is the wisdom of human beings in an extremely crowded situation, but this wisdom is a very intricate expression of cocooning.

It is obvious that the overcrowded commuter train provides a pathological environment to its passengers. There is no space which an individual passenger can "occupy", and he is tortured physically. The research of labor scientists has demonstrated that an hour's ride on Japanese commuter train is a real physical strain. A commuter is exhausted, and according to reports, it has been found that it takes about an hour and half to recover from the fatigue and strain which was experienced in the train. (in other words, a worker can begin to work well only an hour and half or so after his arrival to his factory). And also the "crowding" which we experience in the commuter train is, ethologically speaking, a matter of life and death.

Biderman and others wrote an interesting study under the title of "Historical incidents of extreme overcrowding" and some of the incidents introduced in this report are simply striking. For example, there are descriptions of overcrowding in passenger ships which carried immigrants from Europe to the United States in 18th to 19th century. these boats took approximately 6 to 8 weeks to cross the Atlantic. The American government gave instructions to the ship companies that each immigrant passenger should have desk space of 14 square feet, and that the number of passengers should be determined on the basis of tonnage of the boat (a passenger per each five tons). But in most of cases, the carriers disregarded the regulation. As one may imagine, 14 square feet is not ample space for an individual person, and in actuality, the personal space on immigrants' boat was much more compressed than that. To spend several weeks in such crowded space should have been a incredible experience.

The size of cabins of those boats was 30 square meters, and the height of the ceiling was 2 meters. It is surprising to know that more than 30 passengers were asked to share a simple room. Many immigrants wrote their lives on board sa a terrifying experience and said that they almost suffocated.

Sanitation was also extremely poor, and the average, it is recorded that 10% of the total passengers died during the voyage, because of stress and illness. It was after the middle of 19th century that the death rate of passengers declined to less than 1%, as the result of higher speed achieved by steam engine and through better ventilation.

Horrible accidents due to high population density took place very on the ship. A good example was the "Londonderry" incident of 1848. The immigrant ship "Londonderry" left Ireland to the U.S. by way of Liverpool, and in the midst of the Atlantic, she was hit by heavy storm. The passengers were taken to a small cabin, and instructed to stay inside. Believe it or not, 150 passengers were put inside a cabin of 12 square meters, and the height of the ceiling was 1.8 meters. The door to the deck was left open, but as the storm grew heavier, the crew closed the door and nailed it from outside as the sea had become extremely rough. The 150 people crowded together in this high density space found themselves in complete darkness. They screamed out of physical pain and suffocation, but their voices were not heard by the crew. One passenger finally succeeded in escaping from the cabin, and reported to the crew members. The door was taken out, but as soon as a crew member stepped inside, his candle lamp was extinguished by the carbon dioxide filled in the room. After complete ventilation the crew entered and found that 72 persons were already dead, and their body formed 4 layers on the floor. In short, little less than 50% of the passengers died in the room to suffocation.

The slave ships of 18th century were much worse in population density. According to the regulations, each ship was allowed to carry 5 slaves for each 3 tons of its weight. The physical density of the slave ship was, by simple calculation, eight times higher than that of immigrant boat. To illustrate, it was recorded that in a typical slave ship, approximately 600 slaves were confined in a room, the size of which was a mere 150 square meters. In this high-density space, a person could not even stir around. As a result, the mortality rate of slave ships was 25% in early 19th century. One out of four slaves died in route to America.

3. Planning the Personal Space

According to studies of human ethology, it has been estimated that an average adult human male has the bulk of some 2.5 cubic feet, and the comfort of human body is very closely related to the space which the body can occupy around itself. The first class sleeper in major railroads provides 120 cubic feet, and an individual cell in a jail has 300 cubic feet. It cannot be said that either the sleeper or cell occupant is comfortable in its space, but these are the standards of "minimum" space which the human organism requires for survival. We need, in other words, 50 to 100 times of the size of our body as our minimum personal space.

It has been estimated that in the slum of London in the 19th century, one person had only 72 cubic feet. On a pilgrim ship to Mecca in the 19th century, one passenger was given 42 cubic feet. These figures awe quite below the required minimum personal space, but the slum inhabitants might be thankful if they knew that slaves on their way to America were given only 6 cubic feet per person and that the death room of "Londonderry" had only 9 cubic feet per person.

These historical incidents of human misery in relation with space and density are extremely impressive, but we cannot say that we, in the middle of 20 century, are in better position. The space per person in the New York subway, for instance, at the maximum capacity specified by law, is 20 cubic feet. Quite better than "Londonderry", but as we know from our experience, subways in the rush hours do not necessarily reflect the law. In Tokyo, very often, a passenger will ride in 5 cubic feet or less on the commuter trains. Very recently, a slight suffocation accident due to the short supply of oxygen took place in a Tokyo subway.

Needless to say, ventilation and sanitary care in commuter trains are much better than those of slave ships in 19th century. Moreover, in contrast to several weeks continuous voyage of the slave ships, a white collar commuter of contemporary urban offices shows that the total of hours spend in commuter train is much more than an average slave spent a hundred years ago. Let us assume that a commuter spends an hour on a jam-packed subway everyworking day for a period of 30 years. It means that he spends over 7000 hours on the train. On the other hand, a slave ship took about 1000 hours to cross the Atlantic. A commuter in Tokyo or New York will spend seven times more hours in extreme crowding over his life time than a slave of 19th century! Commuters are not aware of this fact because total hours they must spend are diffused into everyday. But in reality, we may be in a worse situation. As a matter of fact, if a black-out takes place in Tokyo, for instance, it is quite perceivable that an accident similar to the "Londonderry" incident would happen on mass scale through the whole subway system.

Furthermore, we see clearly, as mentioned before, that social cocooning is almost common practice among city dwellers all over the world. We do not care much about others. A sociologist would say that the transition from Gemeinschaft to Gesselschaft made the interpersonal relationship in big cities impersonal. But the Gesselschaft we are living in now is that of densely populated one. Each of us dose not have enough space. Indeed, according to recent statistics, in Tokyo, the largest city in the world, some 30% of the total households are living in apartments whose size is less than 10 square meters. How can a person enjoy his personal relaxation in this small space? And, without minimum personal space, how can a person be interested in others.

Here we encounter a grave irony and paradox in contemporary urban life. We see many people on the streets. They are just people in cities. They are, of course, human beings belonging to the same species. But we have already "materialized" others in order to avoid the stress of density, and to the materialized others, we cannot pay attention. They are "things". In the midst of huge accumulation of "things", we are frustrated because we want to live with other "people". Well, "people" are there, a plenty of them, but they are nit "people". We very often complaints that the individuals in a big cities is lonely and dose not have friends who can talk to in spite of the fact that there are so many people in the cities. On the one hand, there are plenty of people, on the other there are none. There is a huge aggregate of alienated persons, without any communal interaction.

The world population grows dense, and we are having more difficulties in getting our personal space. Needless to say, we must deal with the complicated social system for better social planning, but at the same time, it is my opinion that the planning of space in its strict sense is one of the most needed areas of careful investigation. When a person is accustomed to pathological social conditions, he can no longer see what is pathological for him. In an age of mass cocooning, to imagine a non-cocooning society is an extremely difficult task.

Note

1. Ethology is a discipline for the study of animal behavior in social setting.

Service–Industry Business Complexes

--The Growth and Development of "Terminal Culture"[1]--

> Unfortunate Osaka citizens living in this smoke–darkened metropolis, its once sparkling waters gone as if in a dream of yore.... let each of you breathe at ease in your own home, your own castle. What we have always spoken of as "clothing, food and shelter" must be rearranged in its natural sequence to "shelter, bread and clothing".... coming into the city to work the day through, day upon day, batters the brain; you who would ease your tired body at home should awaken the following morn to Chanticleer's call, rejoice in the evening to the music of insects in the heath, savor fresh, hand–cultivated vegetables. You should demand the spacious garden of your desires that you might live amidst these pastoral pleasures.... If one were to propose to present this idyllic home to you, without hesitating you would decide in favor of living in the country. Just as you expected! This perfect new homesite, this idyllic new house, is right at hand. Read carefully the following: "Exemplary Suburban Life--Ikeda New Town".

Summing up this quotation, and translating a bit, the message is, "Get out of the polluted central city and live in the suburbs. Move to Ikeda Village". The advertisement, a type familiar in today's newspapers, appeared in 1910; it was composed by Kobayashi Ichizo, then thirty–seven and a pioneer in concepts of suburban living.

Kobayashi's Idea

At that time Kobayashi was operating the Minō–Arima Electric Railway which ran through rough fields touching virtually no areas of high population or traffic. The three–year old railway was unprofitable, and Kobayashi attempted to increase the number of passengers by developing housing along the route. Thus he turned his energies to promoting and selling the "exemplary homesites" and "idyllic houses" mentioned in the advertisement. Rather than profiting from the homes themselves (he sold them for exactly what it had cost to clear the land and erect the buildings), Kobayashi capitalized on the increase in rail traffic that followed.

Despite low, bargain–prices, it took some degree of courage for people to move into a newly–developed area. They were not certain if the railway company was completely trustworthy. Kobayashi responded to this problem by instructing his own employees to buy houses along the line. He thus hoped to gain the confidence of prospective buyers and encourage still more sales along the route.

This sound salesmanship paid off as one community after another was developed and sold out within six months. After Ikeda, he opened Toyonaka in 1914, Okamoto in 1921, Senriyama in 1922, Takatsuki in 1929, and an area north of Nishinomiya Station in 1930.

Kobayashi evolved an ingenious and innovative method of selling all of these homes. In 1930 the price for a house of 1,200 square feet on a lot three times that area was about 5,400. Since the average salaried worker did not have such a fat savings account, the homes were sold on a monthly installment plan. The payments were made at the railroad's main office at Umeda Station in central Osaka, a convenient location for commuters who traveled into Umeda Station everyday. That system greatly benefitted the railway also, since no cost was incurred in the collection of payments on the houses.

Residential development along the line became the railroad's standard technique for increasing passenger income. Later it expanded and was renamed the *Kei-han-shin Kyūkō* (Kyoto-Osaka-Kobe Express) or *Hankyū*, as it is more popularly known. Its new line to Kobe, opened in 1920, made particularly strong inroads into housing development. The evidence is there today as the track stretches straight out ahead, marking the shortest distance between Osaka and Kobe. Ordinarily, railroads are constructed through populous regions, curving in and out to cover as many towns as possible in their paths. But *Hankyū* simply laid straight stretches of track and afterwards built settlements at points along the route. While the rival *Hanshin* railway train required 40 minutes to cover the distance between Osaka and Kobe, *Hankyū* took just 25.

At the outset, *Hankyū* tried to increase its number of passengers and runs with the slogan, "The *Hankyū* Railway - Where You Can Always Get a Seat". To counter this, *Hanshin* proclaimed it was the railway though; competition was fierce, but always done in a spirit of playfulness. This is one of the finer points of the Osaka style.

The beginning of a similar trend in Tokyo was marked by the establishment of the *Den'en Toshi* (Garden City) Company in September 1918. The founder was Shibusawa Eiichi, an outstanding industrialist of the time. Shibusawa's idea was to build suburban "garden cities", such as he had seen on a visit to the United States. He selected a site in Tokyo's western outskirts, and created the design for an ideal garden city. The functional plan, drawn by Yabe Kintaro, gave the new city radial and circumferential streets that intersected. The result was Den'en Chōfu, still one of the finest residential districts in the metropolis. To link the garden city to central Tokyo, the *Mekama* Line (Meguro-Kamata) was built, and opened in 1922. Then, in 1927, a line was constructed from Shibuya to Futago-tamagawa. These two became the foundation for the *Tōkyū* electric railway.

The giants of Japan's private railways are *Hankyū* in Osaka and in Tokyo, *Tōkyū*. One in the west, one in the east. But *Hankyū* was the leader, both in originating the concept and in implementing it. Kobayashi served as a consultant to the *Den'en Toshi* Co. making a monthly visit to the capital. When Kobayashi died, Goto Keita, president of the *Tōkyū* company, paid him tribute at his funeral. In saying that Tokyu's success was the result of

Kobayashi's efforts, Goto was not simply making a polite ceremonial gesture.

Commuters and Customers

The construction of housing along the railway's route had the desired effect of increasing the income of the railway company. Shibusawa Hideo, the son of Shibusawa Eiichi and at that time a manager of the *Den'en Toshi* Company, recalls:

> The *Den'en Toshi* office was in front of Senzoku Station, and from there we would ride in to Meguro. The cars were pretty empty, which was a pity. Once in a while, when it was crowded, I would stand up and offer my seat to a passenger, with great pleasure. After a while, the line came to be crowded every day, and then it was a pleasure to be able to sit. How's that for class?

The *Mekama* Line began to fill its cars at about the same time as the *Hankyū* Railway, in 1929–1930. But the *Hankyū* had the Takarazuka, Kobe and Kyoto lines which all terminated at Umeda. A new type of citizen was born: the man who commuted between his office in the north section of Osaka and his home in the "suburbs". By 1924, the number of these commuters had reached 100,000.

Watching these 100,000 commuters come and go daily, Kobayashi had an idea. Each one of them carried a wallet in his pocket. They would probably like to do a little shopping for their families on the way home. To make it convenient for them, why not open a small market at Umeda? Thus, the first floor of *Hankyū*'s Umeda station was leased to Shirokiya, which sold confections, and on the second floor a *Hankyū*-managed restaurant opened. The experiment succeeded. Earnings were high, and in 1925 the Shirokiya lease terminated and the railway-managed *Hankyū* Market opened. The store, only 1,000 square meters, sold foodstuffs, books and sundries. Business increased, and as much as 130,000 a day (in current prices) was taken in.

Then, one day, Kobayashi got in touch with Ito Chubei, a textile tycoon. "Say, Chubei, you've been calling my store a peanut stand. What do you mean by that?"

"About the only thing anyone can buy easily is peanuts. Why don't you make your shop into a real department store?"

Kobayashi smiled and replied, "To tell the truth, that's just what I wanted to discuss with you."

Until that time, just about every Japanese department store had evolved from a clothing-store, such as *Mitsukoshi* and *Takashimaya*; none had their beginnings in selling pancakes laced with sweet bean paste. Despite the apparent handicap, Ito encouraged Kobayashi to make his shop into a department store. After prudent preparations, the shop-turned-department-store succeeded splendidly. The conversion began in 1929, proceeded in three stages, and required three years for completion. Facing Midōsuji avenue, the stately store was eight stories tall, and burrowed two stories into the ground.

Riding the train directly into the city to shop at the new store was a convenience suburban housewives had never known before. *Hankyū* trains now carried shoppers in addition to commuters. But these shoppers rode during the slow daytime hours and unlike the commuters they were not eligible to purchase discount passes. In that respect, they were first-class customers. From every angle *Hankyū*'s management was on its toes.

A railway-operated department store was a completely new idea. In all the world, there was no precedent. And it was a success! Subsequently, people began to call the store the "terminal department store" (*Tāminaru depāto*). Linking the two was mutually beneficial: the store increased passenger traffic, and the railway brought customers right up to the door of the department store. There was nothing for the owners to do but to count the daily receipts.

In Tokyo, Goto Keita was watching this with great interest. In *Nanajū nen no jinsei* [*Seventy years of my life*] he wrote:

> From start to finish I owe everything to the wisdom of Kobayashi Ichizo. The idea of building a department store was his, and I made one just like *Hankyū*'s.

Goto's store is the *Tōkyū* Department Store (long known as *Tōyoko* Department Store) at Shibuya Station, in Tokyo. It began as a restaurant in 1927, and seven years later was opened as a department store. That Goto followed Kobayashi's lead by only two years was an achievement in itself.

Both these station department stores, especially the *Hankyū*, were unorthodox in many ways. Kobayashi believed that the greatest appeal of his department store should be the restaurant. He had gained confidence in restaurant management in the days of the *Hankyū* Market; and he had a particular liking for curry and rice. While sailing to Europe, he had acquired a taste for this hybrid Indo-Japanese dish, and he sought out the ship's cook for his store's restaurant. His curry and rice, for only 20 *sen* a plate, was Kobayashi's pride.

Before long, *Hankyū*'s curry and rice became so popular that the amount of beef required daily to fill orders soared upwards. This gave Kobayashi an idea. In order to obtain a stable supply of beef he made arrangements for certain farmers to raise beef cattle for the exclusive use of *Hankyū*. At the peak of the demand, these farmers were raising 7,000 head for Kobayashi to feed his customers, who averaged 25,000 a day during the week and 65,000 on Sundays. A one-day record of 115 bushels of rice, 10 head of cattle, and 78 gallons of sauce attests to the popularity of the restaurant.

Takarazuka Fans to the Fore

Among the first of *Hankyū*'s many ventures was the Takarazuka Girls Theater. The place was nothing more than a farming village at the end of the Mino-Arima line until the Hot Springs and later the Takarazuka Troupe came into being. This was the origin of the all-girl theatrical and dance troupe which is now well known throughout Japan and has become a popular tourist attraction for visitors from overseas. Its history is as old as the history of the railway's housing development. *Hankyū* was able to profit by taking people to Takarazuka, and also from their recreational activities there.

Takarazuka Girls Theater became the outstanding symbol of the culture of young girls. By 1924 an auditorium seating 4,000 had been completed. In 1927 *Mon Paris* was presented, and became the talk of the nation. About 1931, *Rose Paris* and *Sultan Bank*, directed by Shirai Tetsuzo, established the Takarazuka style. A finishing touch was provided by *A Collection of Flowery Poems*, in 1933. Young girls went crazy over the play; photoprints of the "*Zuka* girls" sold in fantastic numbers. Most Japanese women aged forty or fifty today still sentimentally recall the stage names of their one-time favorites.

Takarazuka "culture" enjoyed such popularity in Tokyo that a Takarazuka Theater was constructed there, opposite the Imperial Hotel; to this day it attracts women and girls by the busload. From that time the chorus girls (divided into the Flower Group, Snow Group, Moon Group and the Star Group) rotated performances in Takarazuka and Tokyo.

Tokyo Takarazuka: the company took the Sino-Japanese character *tō* from Tokyo and *takara* (alternate pronunciation, "*hō*") from takarazuka, to coin "*tōhō*", and thus the *Tōhō* Motion Picture Company was created. In this way, all sorts of ostensibly unrelated business ventures followed one upon another-a railroad housing development, a department store, curry and rice, an all-girl song-and-dance troupe, and a motion picture company. These seemingly disparate ventures have one point in common: They are all in the service industries. *Hankyū*, and *Tōkyū*, were thus pioneer conglomerates in the service industry as a whole. In Tokyo, the *Seibu* and *Keiō* railway companies followed the same pattern; in Nagoya the same was true for *Meitetsu*, and in the Osaka area, it was *Kintetsu*, *Hanshin* and *Nankai*.

Kobayashi Ichizo, who conceived the idea of the recreational conglomerate, was symbolic of his times. This man, once called a "modern Hideyoshi", was unquestionably a visionary with great intellectual prowess. But it should be stressed that his idea could be realized because the time was exactly right.

One outstanding feature of that society was the growth of a new urban middle class. Both Hankyū and Tokyu responded to the rapid increase of white collar workers; the services the railroad offered met some of the needs of this new social group. The "pastoral flavor" sales pitch of suburban homes appealed to the white collar worker caught up in the daily grind of office work. His modest savings made the monthly installment plan highly desirable. With the small amount of money left over, he had the moderate pleasure of taking the family for an outing to Takarazuka on Sundays, the opportunity to savor curry and rice when shopping at the terminal department store, the appeal of rummage sales and small purchases on the way home. In essence, this is the life-style of the white collar worker and the service conglomerates tapped and channeled, one after another, the desires of this group of people.

Thus, the "terminal culture" which grew out of the private railway terminal, differed in both function and character from the "banish-one's-worries" subcenters of Asakusa in Tokyo and Sennichimae in Osaka. Asakusa and Sennichimae were old middle class, the townsman's Times Square. Umeda and Shibuya were new middle class, centers for the petit bourgeois.

Perhaps this contrast is too impressionistic, but it persists in reality today. In Osaka, it is the difference between North and South, and in Tokyo it is the difference between Shibuya and Shinjuku on the one hand and Asakusa and Ueno on the other.

"Terminal culture" was a product of "commuter culture", born of the great growth of the new middle class and the increase in density of Japanese cities. Petit bourgeois, the single-family "culture homes", the recreation grounds.... these are the symbols of those people who sustained "terminal culture". That which they sustained proliferated, and developed into what has become a vital part of daily life in Japan's metropolises today.

The beef in the curried rice was nutritious indeed; the pleasure rides and amusement machines on the roof of *Tōkyū* Department Store, the Tamagawa River Recreation Center, and Minō as well soon bustled with crowds of petite bourgeoisie. They were signs of peace and plenty, and symbols of new developments in Japanese urban life. Caught up in the amusement-bent throngs they felt that this mild condition of plenty would last forever.

Our Papa goes to the company
Our Mama goes to the dance
It's Mama who always uses taxis and
It's Papa who always walks

This is from the famous song "Mon Papa", sung in the Takarazuka production of Rose Paris in August 1933. Theirs was a pleasant age.

But even this culture modestly formed by the recreational centers in a time of peace was pressed by the waves of change. In May of 1934, the girls at Takarazuka donned mannish costumes to sing "The Pacific March", and "Glory to the Battleship's Flag". Kobayashi Ichizo became an advisor to the Cabinet Rese arch Bureau, and finally had to commit himself to working on behalf of the government.

Note

1. "*Sābisujigyō no konbināto-tāminaru bunka*" in *Asahi Jānaru*, ed., *Shōwa shi no shunkan*, Vol.1 (Tokyo, 1966), pp.168-176; translation by A.M. Cohen.

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